Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Burwell , 107 F. Supp. 3d 23 ( 2015 )


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  • UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    SPECTRUM PHARMACEUTICALS, INC., )
    Plaintiff, )
    )
    v. ) Civil Action No. 15-631 (RCL)
    )
    SYLVIA MATHEWS BURWELL, et al., )
    Defendants, )
    )
    and )
    )
    SANDOZ, INC., )
    Intervenor—Defendant. )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Spectrum Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Spectrum”) has brought this action against
    Sylvia Mathews Burwell, in her official capacity as Secretary of the US. Department of Health
    and Human Services (“HHS”), and Stephen Ostroff, M.D., in his official capacity as acting
    Commissioner of food and drugs for the US. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”). Sandoz,
    Inc. (“Sandoz”) has intervened as a defendant. Spectrum manufactures a pharmaceutical product
    under the brand name FUSILEV®. On March 9, 2015, the FDA approved Sandoz’s request to
    market a generic version of this product. Spectrum seeks to enjoin the FDA to withdraw or stay
    its approval of Sandoz’s abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) on the grounds that both the
    approval and the process by which it issued violate the requirements of the Food, Drug, and
    Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) and its implementing regulations. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. Spectrum
    also argues that the F DA’s approval of Sandoz’s ANDA constitutes arbitrary and capricious
    agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706.
    Before the Court is Plaintiffs Motion for summary judgment [31], Defendants’
    Supplemental Brief in Support of Judgment for Defendants [33], and Intervenor—Defendant’s
    Cross—Motion for summary judgment [29]. Upon consideration of Plaintiffs Motion and
    Memorandum in Support thereof [32], Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Judgment
    for Defendants, Intervenor-Defendant’s Cross-Motion and Opposition [30], the arguments made
    in open court on April 29 and May 18, 2015, the entire record in this case, and the applicable law,
    the Court will DENY Plaintiff’s Motion [31] for summary judgment and GRANT summary
    judgment for Defendants and Intervenor—Defendant [29]. The Court will explain its reasoning in
    the following analysis.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework
    1. Orphan Drug Exclusivity, New Drug Applications, and Abbreviated New Drug
    Applications
    Congress passed the Orphan Drug Act (“ODA”) to encourage the development of “orphan
    drugs,” drugs that treat diseases or disorders affecting only a small number of people. Pub. L. No.
    97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983). When a company develops a drug that the FDA has designated an
    “orphan drug,” the Act gives that developer seven years of market exclusivity, during which time
    the FDA may not approve any other entity’s application “for such drug for such disease or
    condition,” barring certain exceptional circumstances not applicable here. 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a).
    Under the FDCA, pharmaceutical companies seeking to market “pioneer” or “innovator”
    drugs must first obtain FDA approval to do so by filing a new drug application (“NDA”). 21
    U.S.C. § 355(a)—(b). The NDA must contain extensive scientific data and other information,
    including investigative reports demonstrating the drug’s safety and effectiveness, a statement of
    n.3 (8th Cir. 1996)). Much like the Sigma-Tau plaintiffs, Spectrum unabashedly discounts the fact
    that the FDA “must balance the ODA's incentive structure for the development of orphan drugs
    against . . . the Hatch—Waxman Amendments” and instead “puts all weight on the orphan drug
    development end of the scale, as if no tension exists between the two statutes that the FDA must
    negotiate.” Sigma-Tau Pharm, Inc., 288 F.3d at 148.
    2. FDA Regulations Governing Drug Shortages
    Spectrum also argues that the FDA violated the FDCA and its own regulations governing
    drug shortages when, in February 2012, it expedited Sandoz’s ANDA for generic
    levoleucovorin—a decision that Spectrum argues was intended to undermine Spectrum’s orphan
    exclusivity over the Colorectal indication—without having given Spectrum notice and an
    opportunity to be heard concerning the shortage of that orphan-protected indication. The FDA
    responded at a hearing that it expedited Sandoz’s ANDA not due to a shortage of any particular
    indication of the drug, but out of fear that the drug itself, for whatever indication, could become
    scarce. Hearing Tr. 27:1—9, May 18, 2015. Sandoz likewise argued at that hearing that the
    shortage was not for any particular indication levoleucovorin, but for levoleucovorin in general,
    or perhaps for the Methotrexate indications as well, and also argued that the law and regulations
    Spectrum had cited dealt with decisions to abrogate an entity’s exclusivity rights, which Sandoz
    maintained was not relevant because Spectrum’s exclusivity rights had not been breached by any
    ofthe FDA’s conduct. Hearing Tr. 29:10—30:18, May 18, 2015.
    21 U.S.C. § 3600c(b)(1) provides that the HHS Secretary may approve an application for
    a drug/indication pair protected by orphan exclusivity if she
    finds, after providing the holder notice and opportunity for the
    submission of views, that in [the exclusivity] period the holder of
    the approved application or of the license cannot assure the
    availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the needs of
    11
    persons with the disease or condition for which the drug was
    designated.
    As stated previously, none of the F DA’s conduct in this case rises to the level of violating
    Spectrum’s orphan exclusivity over the Colorectal Indication. Given that § 360cc(b)(1) governs
    only what the FDA must do in order to properly breach orphan exclusivity, that portion of the
    statute does not apply here.
    21 CPR. § 316.36, titled “Insufficient quantities of orphan drugs,” provides that
    “whenever the Director has reason to believe that the holder of exclusive approval cannot assure
    the availability of sufficient quantities of an orphan drug to meet the needs of patients with the
    disease or condition for which the drug was designated, the Director will so notify” that holder of
    the possible insufficiency, and will give the holder a chance to either (1) present evidence that the
    holder can provide enough of the orphan drug to meet the needs of patients requiring the orphan
    indication, or (2) give the Director consent to approve other applications for the protected drug
    and indication.
    The plain text of the regulation states that the FDA’s possession of “reason to believe” that
    Spectrum could not “assure the availability of sufficient quantities of an orphan drug” was
    sufficient to oblige the FDA to give Spectrum notice and an opportunity to be heard. The
    regulation’s language is unambiguous, and an agency’s interpretation of unambiguous regulatory
    language merits no Auer deference. Drake v. FAA, 
    291 F.3d 59
    , 68 (DC. Cir. 2002) (citing
    Christensen v. Harris County, 529 US. 576, 588 (2000). Despite Sandoz and the FDA’s
    arguments to the contrary, it does not matter whether the FDA’s decision to expedite Sandoz’s
    ANDA related to the Methotrexate Indications, the Colorectal Indication, or the drug generally,
    because each of these explanations (the only explanations the parties have offered) would have
    triggered the FDA’s duties under § 316.36(a). The Court reaches this conclusion for two reasons.
    12
    First, §316.36(a) does not discuss decisions to expedite ANDAs, but rather requires the
    FDA to give the holder of an orphan-drug approval notice and the opportunity to be heard once
    the FDA has reason to expect a shortage of that orphan-protected drug. The relevant inquiry is
    thus not why the FDA expedited Sandoz’s ANDA, but whether the FDA had “reason to believe”
    Spectrum could not supply sufficient quantities of the orphan drugs it manufactured. Second,
    when the FDA decided to expedite Sandoz’s ANDA in February 2012, both the Methotrexate and
    Colorectal indications were still orphan-protected, and the defendants have identified no non-
    orphan-protected uses for the drug. AR. 1513, 1650, 1652, 1706. Consequently, even if the FDA
    expedited Sandoz’s ANDA not to bolster supplies of the drug for the Colorectal Indication but
    rather (as it claims) to ensure sufficient quantities of “the drug itself,” the FDA had “reason to
    believe” Spectrum would be unable to “assure the availability of sufficient quantities of an orphan
    drug,” as every FDA-approved use of “the drug itself’ was orphan-protected. 21 CPR. §
    316.36(a). Neither the FDA nor Sandoz have offered arguments to the contrary. The Court
    therefore concludes that the FDA violated 21 CPR. § 316.36 by failing to provide Spectrum with
    the required notice and opportunity for a hearing
    Spectrum has failed, however, to identify any prejudice it suffered from the FDA’s
    violation. The Court’s review of the record in the case has revealed none: Spectrum voiced its
    objections to the F DA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic in its September 30, 2014 Citizen Petition,
    A.R. 16—17, and has offered no reason to believe that the arguments raised in its Petition would
    have been any different, or more persuasive, if made more than two years earlier in the FDA’s
    approval process. Thus, notwithstanding (1) the FDA’s February 2012 decision to expedite
    Sandoz’s ANDA and (2) the FDA’s failure to give Spectrum notice and an opportunity to be heard
    with respect to the FDA’s then-anticipated levoleucovorin shortage, Spectrum ultimately did have
    13
    an unimpaired opportunity to comment on Sandoz’s ANDA. Spectrum’s request that the Court
    vacate the FDA’s February, 2012 failure to comply with 21 C.F.R. § 316.36 would in practice
    mean ordering the FDA to reconsider arguments it has already rightly rejected—a pointless
    exercise. Without reason to believe that the FDA’s failure to give Spectrum notice and an
    opportunity to be heard affected the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic drug, the Court has no
    basis to undo that decision.
    3. The FDA ’s Approval ofSandoz’s Use of the Large Vials for the Methotrexate
    Indications
    Spectrum asserts that the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s ANDA for use in large vials with
    the Methotrexate indication reversed, without adequate explanation, an earlier FDA position that
    the large vials were appropriate for only the Colorectal Indication. The Court agrees with the FDA
    that the FDA never took such a position.
    Spectrum makes much of the fact that several documents in the administrative record
    establish that the FDA has repeatedly discussed the large vials and the Colorectal indication in the
    same breath. See AR. 1 199 (describing the large vials as “support[ing] the new colorectal cancer
    indication” and the small vial as “support[ing] the high dose methotrexate indication), 1270
    (stating that the large vials “support . . . treatment of colorectal cancer”); Verified Compl. Ex. 3
    (stating that “[t]he approved [Methotrexate Indications do] not require single use vials larger than
    50 mg”). These examples amply prove that the FDA believed the large vials were appropriate for
    the Colorectal Indication, but say nothing about whether the FDA believed the large vials were not
    safely usable for anything else. And as the FDA points out, on April 20, 2011, it approved
    Spectrum’s supplement to the FUSILEV® NDA requesting approval of the RTU dosage form in
    the large vials—the approved labeling included in that letter listed the Methotrexate Indications—
    14
    and did not approve the Colorectal Indication as a supplemental indication for FUSILEV® until
    nine days later. AR. 1181, 1186, 1732—34.
    Though Spectrum protests that it actually applied for the Colorectal Indication first and the
    large vials second, the FDA nonetheless clearly expressed the View that the large vials could safely
    and effectively be used in conjunction with the Methotrexate Indication. That Spectrum may have
    ordered its submissions to avoid this result does not change the fact that it happened, and Spectrum
    has pointed to no authority stating that it was entitled to have its supplemental NDA applications
    disposed of in the order in which it submitted them. Furthermore, even if the FDA had responded
    in Spectrum’s desired order, it still reasonably could (and apparently would) have approved the
    large vials as appropriate for the Methotrexate Indications.
    4. The FDA ’5 Regulations Governing Labeling Carve—Outs
    Finally, Spectrum argues that the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s ANDA violates FDA
    regulations prohibiting labeling carve-outs for an ANDA that make the proposed generic drug less
    safe or effective than its RLD. 21 C.F.R. § 314.127(a)(7). Spectrum argues that Sandoz’s generic
    has two heightened risks: 1) vial contamination and (2) potential overdosing. The large vials,
    being 175 mg/17.5 m1 and 250 mg/ZS ml, will contain significant amounts of leftover drug product
    after a single Methotrexate dose (typically 7.5m g) is withdrawn. Though Spectrum does not
    dispute that the FDA’s approved labeling for Sandoz’s generic drug includes instructions to
    medical providers that the large vials are single—use only, it nevertheless insists that the temptation
    to economize will spur providers to double-dip. Spectrum also argues that providers could mistake
    Sandoz’s genetic drug (stored in liquid RTU form) for levoleucovorin’s predecessor leucovorin
    (also stored in liquid RTU form) because providers treating patients who require the Methotrexate
    Indication will, being familiar with FUSILEV®, not expect levoleucovorin to come in anything
    other than the freeze-dried powder form.
    15
    To support its premise that the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic was not only wrong
    but also an inadequately-explained reversal of an earlier position, Spectrum points to a draft FDA
    guidance document that warns generally against approving drugs where the appropriate dosage for
    the drug is far below the size of the injectable vial in which the drug is stored, for the reasons stated
    above. See, e.g., Verified Compl. Ex. 13 at 4 (“Single—dose vials should not contain a significant
    volume beyond what would be considered a usual or maximum dose for the expected use of the
    drug product”). And the draft guidance admittedly recognizes that these risks exist “even when
    appropriately labeled.” Id. at 3. But as the FDA points out, this draft guidance concerned drug
    products generally, and does not analyze the specific risks affiliated with FUSILEV®. The draft
    guidance was also likewise, if not to the same degree, at odds with the FDA’s approval of
    Spectrum’s use of the small vials (containing 50 mg) to administer doses of 7.5 mg. To the extent
    that the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic drug was inconsistent with its draft guidance on
    excess capacity of injectable vials, it was on the basis of the F DA’s careful analysis of the specific
    risks affiliated with the drug under consideration and the extreme rarity of levoleucovorin
    overdose. See A.R. 9—13.
    The Court also notes that the FDA’s draft guidance, in discussing the risk of single—dose
    vials containing significantly more drug than required for a single dose, no less strongly warns that
    “[s]imilarly, the need to combine several single-dose vials for a single patient dose may lead to
    medication errors and microbial contamination.” Verified Compl. Ex. 13 at 3. The fact that
    Spectrum markets FUSILEV® exclusively in small vials—which, as Spectrum stated in their
    Citizen Petition, compels oncologists to routinely “use multiple 50 mg vial to achieve the
    appropriate dose” for patients requiring the Colorectal Indication, AR. 23, in direct contravention
    of the draft guidance they now belatedly embrace—supports the Court’s conclusion that FDA had
    16
    sufficient reasonable basis to disregard that draft guidance with respect to Spectrum’s and
    Sandoz’s levoleucovorin products alike.
    Spectrum appears to believe that the FDA was obliged to explain not only why it approved
    Sandoz’s ANDA for the Methotrexate Indications in the large vials, but also why it chose not to
    approve that ANDA for the small vials instead. This view fundamentally misunderstands an
    agency’s obligation to engage in reasoned decisionmaking: Though an agency must have reasons
    for the options it chooses, it need not pause to justify every option it does not choose. Any other
    approach would doom agencies to an endless and fruitless cycle of introspection. The FDA’s
    obligation in reviewing Sandoz’s ANDA was not to prove why the drug was better suited to one
    vial or another, but to determine whether Sandoz’s generic drug was safe and effective as proposed.
    See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff 5 Motion for summary judgment will be DENIED, and
    Intervenor—Defendant’s Cross-Motion for summary judgment and Defendants’ Memorandum in
    Support of Judgment for Defendants will be GRANTED, in a separate order issued this date.
    Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, Judge, on May 27, 2015.
    17
    the drug’s components, and specimens of proposed labeling for the packaging of the drug. 21
    U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
    The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman
    Amendments”), codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, and 282, lets generic
    versions of already-NDA—approved drug products bypass the lengthy NDA process and proceed
    instead via abbreviated new drug applications (“ANDAs”). 21 U.S.C. § 3550'). The Hatch-
    Waxman Amendments were intended to balance encouraging innovation in drug development with
    accelerating the availability of lower-cost generic alternatives to innovator drugs. See H.R. Rep.
    No. 98-857 (Part 1), 98th Cong, 2d Sess. at 14—15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547—
    48; see also Tri-Bio Labs, Inc. v. United States, 
    836 F.2d 135
    , 139 (3d Cir. 1987). Though an
    entity submitting an ANDA must still obtain FDA approval, the ANDA need not include clinical
    evidence establishing the safety and effectiveness of its proposed generic drug. Instead, the ANDA
    may point to the already-approved innovator drug that their generic drug mimics, known as the
    reference listed drug (“RLD”), and rely instead on the FDA’s previous finding that the RLD is safe
    and effective. See 21 U.S.C. 355 § (j)(2).
    To use this shortcut, the ANDA applicant must show that its proposed drug is the “same
    as” the RLD in all key respects (including active ingredient, dosage form, strength, route of
    administration, and, with certain exceptions, labeling), and is bioequivalent to the RLD. 21 U.S.C.
    § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)—(v). The statute also requires that an ANDA contain “information to show that
    the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling proposed for the new
    drug have been previously approved for a [listed drug].” 21 U.S.C. § 3550')(2)(A)(i). The FDA
    must approve an ANDA unless it finds, among other things, that the ANDA has not provided
    sufficient evidence of the foregoing. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4).
    FDA regulations allow for a labeling “carve-out,” whereby a generic drug’s labeling may
    differ from the RLD’s to omit those parts of the RLD’s labeling that “are protected by patent, or
    by exclusivity.” 21 CPR. § 314.127(a)(7). Such carve-outs are allowed, however, only where
    the omissions “do not render the proposed drug product less safe or effective than the listed drug
    for all remaining, non—protected conditions of use.” 1d. When a proposed labeling carve-out
    renders the generic product less safe than the RLD, the FDA may not approve the ANDA. 1d. The
    FDA has acknowledged that this language reflects Congress’s intent that the generic drug be safe
    and effective for each “condition of use” prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the generic
    drug labeling. See FDA Letter to Dexmedetomidine Hydrochloride Injection NDA Holder/ANDA
    Applicant, Docket No. FDA—2014-N-0087 (Aug. 18, 2014) at 7, available at
    http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0087—0025.
    B. Factual Background
    1. F USILE V®
    The name of Spectrum’s innovator drug product at issue in this case is FUSILEV®.
    FUSILEV® contains levoleucovorin, a variant of leucovorin, a drug that has been used to treat the
    toxic effects of the cancer medicine methotrexate. A.R. 183—84.
    3. The Methotrexate Indications
    On March 7, 2008 the FDA approved FUSILEV® for injection, in the form of a freeze-
    dried powder single-use Vial containing the equivalent of 50 mg levoleucovorin (the “small vial”),
    for the following medical uses (“indications”): (1) Rescue after high-dose methotrexate therapy
    in osteosarcoma, and (2) Diminishing the toxicity and counteracting the effects of impaired
    methotrexate elimination and of inadvertent overdosage of folic acid antagonists. A.R. 135—38.
    These indications are referred to collectively herein as the “Methotrexate Indications.” Before the
    drug contained in the small vial can be injected intravenously it must first be reconstituted through
    mixture with another chemical, and once reconstituted becomes unsafe for use after twelve hours.
    AR. 65. The typical individual dose for the Methotrexate Indications is roughly 7.5 mg. AR. 26.
    The Methotrexate Indications were protected by orphan exclusivity until March 7, 2015. AR. 2,
    1706.
    b. The Colorectal Indication
    On December 8, 2008, Spectrum submitted a supplemental NDA seeking approval of a
    new indication for FUSILEV®z The palliative treatment of patients with advanced metastatic
    colorectal cancer (the “Colorectal Indication”). AR. 513. The use of leucovorin for the Colorectal
    Indication had been eligible for orphan exclusivity since 1990. AR. 1732—34. On December 22,
    2010, Spectrum submitted another supplemental NDA seeking approval of two new, larger vials
    of FUSILEV® in a liquid ready-to—use (“RTU”) form (the “large vials”) to be used with the
    Colorectal Indication, which requires larger doses than the previously-approved Methotrexate
    Indications. Verified Compl. Ex. 3. On April 20, 201 1, the FDA approved the large vials proposed
    in the second of the two supplemental NDAs. AR. 1181, 1186. Nine days later, on April 29,
    2011, FDA approved the Colorectal Indication as a supplemental indication for FUSILEV®. AR
    513—16. For the Colorectal Indication, FUSILEV®’s individual dose is either 15 mg or 150 mg.
    Spectrum ultimately chose not to market the large vials. AR. 23. Because Spectrum does
    not market FUSILEV® in the large vials, oncologists routinely use multiple small vials to achieve
    the appropriate dose for colorectal cancer patients. Id. The Colorectal Indication is protected by
    orphan exclusivity until April 29, 2018. AR. 1706.
    2. Sandoz’s ANDA
    On October 26, 2011, Sandoz submitted an ANDA seeking permission to market a
    generic version of FUSILEV®. A.R. 1370. At that time, Sandoz sought permission to market its
    drug solely for the Colorectal Indication, and in the larger vials associated with that indication.
    A.R. 1714. After the FDA formally granted Spectrum orphan drug exclusivity for the Colorectal
    Indication on November 7, 2011, Sandoz amended its ANDA on December 14, 2011, to carve out
    the Colorectal Indication and instead seek approval for the Methotrexate Indications, A.R. 1703,
    1706. Sandoz did not, however, change the proposed vial size, and continued to seek approval for
    the large vials even after amending its ANDA to carve out the Colorectal Indication and include
    the Methotrexate Indications. A.R. 1370—72. On February 9, 2012, FDA granted Sandoz’s ANDA
    expedited review in order to address a “drug shortage.” A.R. 1513, 1650, 1652. One FDA
    document discussing the expedited review described Sandoz’s generic as “indicated for . . .
    colorectal cancer.” A.R. 1513.
    3. Spectrum’s Citizen Petition and Sandoz’s ANDA Approval
    On September 30, 2014, Spectrum submitted a Citizen Petition asking the FDA to (1) not
    approve any ANDAs carving out the CRC Indication and requesting approval for the large vial
    sizes, and (2) not approve any proposed generic levoleucovorin products in the large vial sizes
    before the expiration Spectrum’s orphan protection for the Colorectal Indication on April 29, 2018.
    A.R. 16—17. On February 24, 2015, the FDA denied Spectrum’s Citizen Petition and tentatively
    approved Sandoz’s ANDA. A.R. 1—15. On March 9, 2015, the FDA gave Sandoz final approval
    to distribute its generic drug in the single—use large vials for the Methotrexate Indications. A.R.
    1370—72.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    The Court reviews the FDA’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).
    5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. Under the APA, a court may set aside final agency action that is “arbitrary,
    capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” or “unsupported by
    substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (2)(E). When a litigant moves for summary judgment
    under Rule 56(c) in a challenge to final agency action brought under the APA, “the standard set
    forth in Rule 56(c) does not apply because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the
    administrative record.” ViroPharma, Inc. v. Hamburg, 
    916 F. Supp. 2d 76
    , 79 (D.D.C. 2013)
    (citing Sierra Club v. Mainella, 
    459 F. Supp. 2d 76
    , 89 (D.D.C. 2006)). Instead, the district court
    must “review the administrative record to determine whether the agency's decision was arbitrary
    and capricious, and whether its findings were based on substantial evidence.” See Forsyth Mem’l
    Hosp, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
    639 F.3d 534
    , 537 (DC. Cir. 2011) (citing Troy Corp. v. Browner, 
    120 F.3d 277
    , 281 (DC. Cir. 1997)).
    A court reviews “an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers” under the
    two-step process of Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1984). Under Chevron, the court must determine first “whether Congress has directly
    spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. If Congress’s intent is clear, “that is the end of the
    matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
    of Congress.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842—43. “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous” on that
    question, the court must defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it is “based on a permissible
    construction of the statute.” Alabama Educ. Ass ’n v. Chao, 
    455 F.3d 386
    , 392 (DC. Cir. 2006)
    (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
    An agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, on the other hand, has “controlling
    weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.” Thomas Jefi’erson Univ.
    v. Shalala, 
    512 U.S. 504
    , 512 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the court “must defer
    to [that] . . . interpretation unless an ‘alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain
    language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at the time of the regulation's
    promulgation.” Id. (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 US. 415, 430 (1988)).
    III. ANALYSIS
    A. Spectrum’s Arguments
    Spectrum argues that it is entitled to summary judgment vacating the FDA’s approval of
    Sandoz’s generic drug for four reasons: (1) the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic drug violated
    the ODA; (2) the FDA’s expedited review of Sandoz’s generic drug on the grounds of drug
    shortage violated the FDCA provisions governing drug shortages and the FDA’s own regulations
    regarding the same; (3) the FDA’s approval of Sandoz’s generic drug in the large vials for the
    Methotrexate Indications was an arbitrary and capricious reversal of an earlier FDA position on
    the permissible uses of the large vials; and (4) the FDA’s approval of a labeling carve—out of the
    Colorectal Indication for Sandoz’s generic drug violated FDA regulations governing labeling
    carve-outs by making the generic drug less safe for its remaining on-label uses.
    Three of Spectrum’s four arguments rely on the conclusion that Sandoz’s generic drug was,
    as approved by the FDA, appropriate only for the orphan-protected Colorectal Indication. The
    Court finds that conclusion, and all four of Spectrum’s arguments, unpersuasive.
    I. Orphan Exclusivity
    The ODA states that during an approved applicant’s exclusivity period for an orphan—
    designated drug and indication, the FDA may not approve any other entity’s application “for such
    drug for such disease or condition.” 21 U.S.C. § 36OCc(a). Spectrum argues that the FDA violated
    the ODA’s exclusivity provisions by approving Sandoz’s generic drug for the Methotrexate
    Indications even though (1) the FDA knew and intended that the generic drug would be bought
    and used by healthcare providers for the carved-out and orphan-protected Colorectal Indication,
    and (2) the generic drug was approved in a form that was only “appropriate” for the orphan-
    protected indication. The FDA responds that its approval of Sandoz’s generic drug did not violate
    Spectrum’s orphan exclusivity for the Colorectal Indication because (1) Sandoz’s approved label
    carved out the Colorectal indication, and (2) Sandoz’s generic drug was, as approved and labeled,
    safe and effective for the Methotrexate indication.
    The Court agrees with the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that the plain language of the ODA’s
    exclusivity provisions is unambiguous: Section 360cc(a), which provides simply that the FDA
    “may not approve” generics for a protected indication, “is clearly directed at FDA approved-use,
    not generic competitor intended-use.” Sigma-Tau Pharms., Inc. v. Schwetz, 
    288 F.3d 141
    , 145
    (4th Cir. 2002). Congress’s use of the words “such drug for such disease or condition” makes
    plain that § 36OCc(a) was to meant to be disease-specific, not drug-specific, and “in view of this
    textual emphasis on approved-use, the evidentiary basis for the agency's approvals must be the use
    for which the approvals are sought—that is, the use for which the generics are labeled.” Id.
    (emphasis added).
    Here, as in Sigma-Tau, the FDA properly granted labeling approval for the non-orphan-
    protected indication of a drug that also has a carved-out and orphan-protected off—label use. See
    Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 
    91 F.3d 1493
    , 1500 (DC. Cir. 1996) (“[T]he statute expresses
    the legislature’s concern that the new generic be safe and effective for each indication that will
    appear on its label; whether the label for the new generic lists every indication approved for use of
    the pioneer [drug] is a matter of indifference”); Mem. Op. at 13, 0tsuka Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
    Burwell, No. 15-cv-0852 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 2015) (stating, in denying a request for Preliminary
    Injunction to reverse ANDA approval, that the FDA “has broad authority to approve ANDAs
    carving out exclusivities under the FDCA, including orphan drug exclusivity”). That the FDA
    may have known or even intended that Sandoz’s generic would be commonly used by healthcare
    providers for the carved-out, orphan-protected, and off-label Colorectal Indication does not rise to
    the level of violating Spectrum’s exclusivity right: Spectrum’s right extends as far as preventing
    the FDA from approving any other entity’s application to market levoleucovorin for the Colorectal
    Indication, but no further.
    Spectrum attempts to distinguish Sigma—Tau by arguing that one of the Fourth Circuit’s
    concerns in that case—that requiring the FDA to examine a generic manufacturer’s “intended use”
    of a drug with a carved-out orphan-protected indication would ultimately lead to a difficult and
    overly anticompetitive “foreseeable-use” test that would hamper the development of generic
    drugs—is not relevant here where, Spectrum claims, it is not merely possible but in fact certain
    that Sandoz’s generic will be used for the Colorectal Indication and that the FDA intended for it
    to be so.
    An intended- or foreseeable-use test is not the appropriate test. Even setting that aside, the
    fact that such a test might be easily satisfied here is cold comfort. Such tests must be used
    consistently, not just when expedient, and there are endless possible fact patterns from which a
    court would have to glean knowledge, intent, or even the relative strength of multiple
    simultaneously—held intents. But more importantly, inconvenience was not the Si gma-T au court’s
    only objection to an intended— or foreseeable-use test, as such a regulatory regime would also “be
    one in which relatively few generics are approved,” resulting “in extensions of exclusivity periods
    that Congress never intended” and “frustrat[ing] the longstanding practice of Congress, the FDA,
    and the courts not to interfere with physicians’ judgments and their prescription of drugs for off-
    label uses.” Sigma-Tau Pharm., Inc, 288 F.3d at 147 (citing Bristol—Myers Squibb Co., 91 F.3d
    at 1496, and Rhone~P0ulenc Rorer Pharm, Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc., 
    93 F.3d 511
    , 514
    10