Simon v. United States Department of Justice Executive Office for United States Attorneys ( 2017 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    _________________________________________
    )
    James A. Simon,                              )
    )
    Plaintiff,                            )
    )
    v.                            )                Case No. 1:16-cv-00671 (APM)
    )
    U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office )
    for United States Attorneys,                 )
    )
    Defendant.                            )
    _________________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Process FOIA Requests Individually, ECF No. 18,
    and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 23. For the reasons stated below, the court
    denies both Motions.
    Plaintiff’s Motion to Process FOIA Requests Individually. By way of background,
    Plaintiff, over a six-month period, sent 61 separate FOIA requests to Defendant Executive Office
    for United States Attorneys, seeking records relating to Plaintiff and his wife’s prosecution for tax
    evasion. See Pl.’s Mot to Process FOIA Requests Individually, ECF No. 18 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.
    to Process], Exs. 1–35, ECF No. 18-1; Pl.’s Mot. to Process, Exs. 36–61, ECF No. 18-2, at 1–403.
    After efforts to negotiate a narrowing of the requests failed, Defendant decided to conduct a single
    search for “all records related to James or Denise Simon for the period of January 1, 1995 to June
    15, 2015.” Def.’s Opp’n to Pl’s Mot. to Process, ECF No. 22, at 3. Defendant considered this
    approach to be the “least burdensome manner to search for responsive documents.” 
    Id. at 6.
    Plaintiff disagrees with that decision and asks the court to order that Defendant process each FOIA
    request individually. Pl.’s Mot. to Process at 17.
    The court declines to do so. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that a court
    can dictate the manner of an agency’s search when, as here, a requester makes dozens of related
    FOIA requests. FOIA merely requires an agency to conduct a search for responsive records that
    is “reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. S.E.C.,
    
    926 F.2d 1197
    , 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Moreover, “[w]here the search terms are reasonably
    calculated to lead to responsive documents, a court should neither ‘micromanage’ nor second guess
    the agency’s search.” Bigwood v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 
    132 F. Supp. 3d 124
    , 140–41 (D.D.C. 2015).
    Applying that standard here, the court will not “micromanage” Defendant’s ongoing search for
    responsive records—the agency is responsible in the first instance for crafting the methods needed
    to identify and produce responsive records, subject only to future judicial review upon a motion
    for summary judgment. Furthermore, Defendant’s regulations permit it to aggregate FOIA
    requests in circumstances like those present here. 28 C.F.R. § 16.10(h). Plaintiff has offered no
    valid basis for the court to “second guess” Defendant’s decision to invoke that authority here.
    Accordingly, the court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Process Requests Individually.
    Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on similar
    grounds, asserting that Defendant’s decision to aggregate Plaintiff’s requests violates the
    requirements of FOIA. Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J, ECF No. 23 [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot.], at 18–21.
    That issue, however, is not yet ripe for consideration. Plaintiff’s argument seems to be that
    Defendant’s search for responsive records, which is still ongoing, will ultimately prove inadequate.
    Maybe so. But, at this juncture, the court cannot anticipate, based solely on Defendant’s adopted
    search strategy, that Plaintiff will not receive the materials that he seeks, or that Defendant’s
    strategy for finding those materials is deficient. As the D.C. Circuit has clearly stated: “[t]he mere
    potential for future injury . . . is insufficient to render an issue ripe for review.” Gulf Oil Corp. v.
    2
    Brock, 
    778 F.2d 834
    , 841 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, any challenge
    to the adequacy of Defendant’s search in this case will not become ripe until Defendant has
    completed its search and produced the allegedly responsive records that its search uncovered.
    Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
    _____
    Dated: April 26, 2017                               Amit P. Mehta
    United States District Judge
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2016-0671

Judges: Judge Amit P. Mehta

Filed Date: 4/26/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/26/2017