United States v. Greer ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
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Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 16-789 (RMC)
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DOUGLAS F. GREER, M.D., et al., )
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Defendants. )
__________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
They say that diamonds are forever. Are contracts? The government asks the
Court to enforce a False Claims Act settlement that it appears to have ignored for years. Douglas
F. Greer, M.D., the counterparty, argues that the six-year statute of limitations has long since
passed. Both parties move for summary judgment. Although the government is not entitled to
recover on all of its claims, the Court finds that this lawsuit is timely, filed as it was within six
years of Dr. Greer’s completion of his related criminal sentence, and will grant in part and deny
in part both motions for summary judgment.
I. FACTS
On May 3, 2007, Dr. Douglas F. Greer, an ophthalmologist, pled guilty for
himself and his medical practice, Douglas F. Greer, M.D., P.C., to one count of Health Care
Fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347, and one count of Filing a False Tax Return, in violation
of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1), for submitting fraudulent claims for payment as a medical doctor to
Medicare and Federal Health Benefit programs for services not rendered or not medically
necessary and for falsifying his business tax records. Minute Entry, United States v. Greer, No.
CR-07-095-01 (RJL) (D.D.C. May 3, 2007). As part of his sentence, Dr. Greer was ordered to
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pay a $25,000 fine on each count ($50,000 in total), unpaid taxes, and restitution totaling
approximately $1.2 million. Judgment at 5, United States v. Greer, No. CR-07-095-01 (RJL)
(D.D.C. July 26, 2007). He was also sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and 24 months of
supervised release. Id. at 2-3. As special conditions of his supervised release, Dr. Greer was
required to serve 180 days (6 months) in home detention with electronic monitoring and to
perform 500 hours of community service within the 24-month period. Id. at 4. Thus, he was
ordered to serve a sentence of three-and-one-half years in various degrees of confinement.
On July 24, 2007, before his criminal sentencing, Dr. Greer and his medical
practice settled a parallel, $1 million civil suit brought by the government under the False Claims
Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, in return for the liquidation of identified assets. See generally Ex.
A, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Settlement Agreement (Agreement) [Dkt. 23-1]. Specifically,
because he did not have the funds to pay both the criminal penalties and the civil judgment, as
part of the Agreement, Dr. Greer agreed, inter alia, to liquidate his retirement accounts, assessed
at $1,011,747; liquidate other assets, assessed at approximately $500,000, $189,000 of which
represented the limit of his Practice Guard Insurance policy; and sell his second house at 1811
47th Place, NW, Washington, D.C., assessed at $536,500. Id. at 2. Funds collected from these
liquidations, net taxes, were allocated first to pay the criminal penalties and then to pay the civil
debt, except that the monies from the insurance policy ($189,000) could only be contributed
towards the civil debt. Id. ¶ 2.
On September 11, 2007, Dr. Greer paid the government $189,000 under the
Agreement. 1 Ex. 5, United States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Confirmation Notice of Receipt of
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Although this number matches the amount available under the insurance policy, Dr. Greer
cannot recall the exact source of the funds. See Greer Dep. 51:2-4, Dec. 28, 2017 [Dkt. 24-7] (Q:
“So you don’t remember where that money come from?” A: “No, I don’t.”).
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FEDWIRE Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) by the NCIF [Dkt. 24-8]. Then, as ordered by the
sentencing judge, Dr. Greer reported to prison on November 15, 2007. See Order, United States
v. Greer, No. CR-07-095-01 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2007). At that time, he had not sold the house at
47th Place. The government did not insist. On March 5, 2009, Dr. Greer was released from
prison to serve the duration of his sentence on supervised release, i.e., until 2011. Federal
Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2019)
(search for BOP Register Number “29030-016”). 2 He still did not sell the house. The
government still did not insist. This situation continued until December 21, 2015, when the
government sent Dr. Greer a letter informing him that he had breached the Agreement. Ex. 6,
United States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Letter from Oliver McDaniel, Assistant U.S. Attorney, to Alan
Reider, Arnold & Porter (Dec. 21, 2015) [Dkt. 24-9] (“Your client is in breach of this agreement,
having made no recent demonstrated effort to make a payment or to discuss a payment
arrangement.”). Dr. Greer refused to pay and the government filed the immediate Complaint on
April 27, 2016, seeking to enforce the Agreement by compelling liquidation of Dr. Greer’s
existing retirement account and sale of the house at 47th Place. Compl. at 5 [Dkt. 1]. Both
parties now move for summary judgement. 3
2
“[J]udicial notice may be taken of public records and government documents available from
reliable sources.” Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 67 (D.D.C. 2014).
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See Def.’s Mot. [Dkt. 23]; United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 24]; Mem. of Points and
Authorities in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s Opp’n) [Dkt. 25]; Reply in Supp. of
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Def.’s Reply) [Dkt. 29]; Mem. of Points and Authorities in Supp. of
United States’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s Mot.) [Dkt. 24-1]; Def.’s Opp’n to Gov’t’s Mot. for
Summ. J. (Def.’s Opp’n) [Dkt. 27]; United States’ Reply Mem. in Resp. to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.’s Reply) [Dkt. 28].
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the
court must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Williams v. Callaghan, 938 F. Supp. 46,
49 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). However,
the non-moving party must still make a factual showing to create a genuine issue of material fact,
and assertions of fact must be properly supported. See id. (citing Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150,
154 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
Federal district courts have the authority to enforce settlement agreements entered
into by the litigants before them. 4 See Samra v. Shaheen Bus & Inv. Group, Inc., 355 F. Supp.
2d. 483, 493 (D.D.C. 2005). “An agreement to settle a legal dispute is a contract[,] . . . [and]
[t]he enforceability of settlement agreements is governed by familiar principles of contract law.”
Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1982). “An action to enforce a
settlement agreement is, at bottom, an action seeking the equitable remedy of specific
performance of a contract.” Samra, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 493. Therefore, a district court may
summarily enforce a completed settlement agreement—i.e., one as to which there is no dispute
as to “the material facts concerning the existence or terms of an agreement to settle.” Wilson v.
Wilson, 46 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Autera v. Robinson, 419 F.2d 1197, 1202-03
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
4
The Court has jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1345. Venue properly lies in this Court because all parties reside in this district, and the
Agreement and enforcement thereof occurred in this district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
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III. ANALYSIS
“[O]bligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are governed
exclusively by federal law.” Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). “Courts
must therefore apply the federal common law of contracts to the interpretation of contracts with
the federal government.” Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. Dep’t of Interior, 624 F. Supp.
2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F. Supp. 2d 163, 180
(D.D.C. 2007)); see also United States v. Kearns, 595 F.2d 729, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting
that “it is by now accepted that federal common law provides remedies in many situations,”
including “[g]overnment contracts”). To state such a claim, a party must show: “(1) a valid
contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of
that duty; and (4) damages caused by the breach.” Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 624 F.
Supp. 2d at 12 (citation omitted). “A breach of contract is simply the non-performance of a
contractual duty.” Kasarsky v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 296 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 235(2) (1981)). When a contract does not specify a period
for performance, “the law imposes an obligation to act within a reasonable period of time.”
Essex Electro Eng’rs, Inc. v. Danzig, 224 F.3d 1283, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Specialty
Assembling & Packing Co. v. United States, 355 F.2d 554, 565 (Ct. Cl. 1966)). “That period is
determined ‘by the reasonable expectations of the parties in the special circumstances in which
they contracted.’” Id. (quoting Commerce Int’l Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 81, 87 (Ct. Cl.
1964)). The statute of limitations for the United States to sue for a breach of contract normally
runs after six years. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a).
A. Amount Owed Under the Agreement and Performance To-Date
Some preliminary matters need discussion. First, the Complaint alleges that Dr.
Greer agreed to pay $1 million to settle the FCA lawsuit, see Compl. ¶ 9, and that, having
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already paid $189,000 towards that amount, he has an outstanding balance of $811,000, plus
interest, to be paid by liquidation of his current retirement account and sale of the house at 47th
Place. See id. at 5. This claim overstates the obligation. In the Agreement, the government
“asserted a demand against Dr. Greer” for payment of $1,000,000,” based upon his admitted
crimes and false claims, see Agreement at 1; Dr. Greer represented that he could not pay such a
judgment, see id. at 2; the parties, “to avoid the delay, inconvenience and expense of protracted
litigation,” agreed that Dr. Greer would liquidate certain assets in satisfaction of the FCA
liabilities, see id. ¶ 2; and the parties recognized that any amount raised by liquidating the
specific assets—except the $189,000 from the insurance policy—would first go towards the
criminal penalties, see id. The Agreement does not contain terms for future payment, such as by
wage garnishment or the like. Further, while the Agreement made clear that, no matter the total
value of his assets, Dr. Greer was obligated “to make full restitution under the terms of the
[criminal] Plea Agreement,” id., no such statement was included regarding the $1 million
demand asserted. Thus, performance of the civil Agreement was to be satisfied by liquidation of
specified assets (and documentation of the same) but not the payment of a specified amount, and
in this context the government’s FCA demand of $1 million serves as a cap to the funds the
government can receive from Dr. Greer.
Second, it appears that Dr. Greer has already partially performed under the
Agreement by liquidating some of the specified assets: $189,000 was paid to the government,
which it clearly believes came from the insurance policy. See Greer Dep. 50:19-20, 65:22-66:6.
Dr. Greer also liquidated his retirement accounts in 2007 and paid the proceeds to the
government, see id. at 24:5-18, 51:14-19, and the government does not allege that he failed to
liquidate the “other assets” worth $500,000. Compl. ¶ 9. The government argues that,
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notwithstanding the liquidation of assets, no other payments were made under the Agreement,
and seeks to force Dr. Greer to liquidate current retirement accounts that were not otherwise
discussed in the Agreement; the Court notes that the Agreement required Dr. Greer to use the
settlement funds to pay the criminal penalties first, about which the government makes no
complaint. Because the Agreement does not require Dr. Greer to use assets outside of those
described in the Agreement to satisfy the civil settlement, and because Dr. Greer already
liquidated his retirement accounts, such as they were, in 2007, the Court will not require Dr.
Greer to again liquidate his retirement accounts now. 5
B. Enforceability of the Agreement
Dr. Greer argues that given the confusion over the amount owed, the terms of the
Agreement are too vague to enforce. Not so. The Agreement is neither unintelligible nor
unenforceable simply because the government has sued for more than it is entitled to. At the
very least, Dr. Greer is estopped from making this argument because he relied on the Agreement
to obtain a lesser sentence during his criminal sentencing. See Sentencing Mem. at 19-20, 36-37,
United States v. Greer, No. CR-07-095-01 (RJL) (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2007) (using the Agreement to
show that the government was the predominant victim of his fraud and arguing that the
Agreement was already financially ruinous). Additionally, the Court finds no ambiguity as to the
actual performance required. As discussed above, it is clear to the Court that, under the
Agreement, Dr. Greer is not obligated to pay $1 million; he is obligated to pay up to $1 million,
liquidated assets permitting. That the house at 47th Place may be worth more in 2019 than it was
in 2007 is unavailing. Just as the government would have had no recourse had Dr. Greer sold his
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To the extent that Dr. Greer failed to document the liquidation of his assets and sale of the
house, the government’s remedy under the Agreement is “to file a false claims act lawsuit,” for
which Dr. Greer has waived the statute of limitations. Agreement ¶ 3.
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house during the depths of the 2007-2008 recession, so too Dr. Greer has no recourse now.
Indeed, the purpose of the Agreement was to avoid litigation over specific amounts; discrete
actions satisfy its terms. 6
C. Sale of the House
This leaves for decision only the house at 47th Place, which should have been
sold but was not. There is no question that Dr. Greer breached the Agreement; the question is
when. Because Dr. Greer’s breach was occasioned by his non-performance, and because no
period for performance was specified in the Agreement, the Court must determine what
reasonable period for performance was contemplated by the parties, based on facts provided and
the context within which it was negotiated. The government filed its complaint on April 27,
2016, which means that to prevail here it must show that the performance period extended
through at least April 28, 2010, so as to avoid the bar of the 6-year statute of limitations. For
reference, April 28, 2010, is approximately 2 years and 9 months after the Agreement was
executed; 2 years and 7 months after Dr. Greer paid $189,000 under the Agreement; 1 year and 2
months after Dr. Greer was released from prison; 348 days after Dr. Greer was scheduled to
complete his prison sentence, if he got no good-time credit; and 10 months before the end of his
supervised release.
Dr. Greer argues that his performance period ended in August 2007, after he
entered his plea and failed to make payments or provide financial documentation to the
government. This argument is totally unpersuasive. Dr. Greer did make payments in 2007—he
liquidated both his retirement accounts in 2007, see Greer Dep. 24:5-18, and other assets, see
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The Court also notes that notwithstanding his arguments as to the equity of enforcing the
Agreement, Dr. Greer has received benefits from continued ownership of the house and its rental
income during the entire period since his plea. Greer Dep. 17:9-15.
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Compl. ¶ 9, showing compliance with the Agreement. In addition, the accrual period would
have reset in September 2007, when he paid $189,000. See 28 U.S.C. 2415(a) (“That in the
event of later partial payment . . . the right of action shall be deemed to accrue again at the time
of each such payment.”). More to the point, retirement accounts and insurance policies are far
more liquid than real property, and Dr. Greer was obligated to report to prison in November
2007. The Agreement is not unenforceable because the government forbore from enforcement
before Dr. Greer reported to prison or served his sentence. Although Dr. Greer now argues it is
theoretically possible that he could have sold the house at that time, there is nothing in the
Agreement that supports his argument that such was his deadline. Similarly, Dr. Greer’s second
proposed date for the end of a reasonable period for compliance, January 2008 (six months after
his sentencing and 2-3 months into his prison term) is no more reasonable because it would have
required him to sell the house, document the transaction, and remit the funds while he was still
serving his prison sentence.
Beyond these arguments, Dr. Greer remembers very little about the formation of
the Agreement and so cannot hazard a guess as to the unspoken “intentions of the parties” at the
time of its execution. Dr. Greer testified that, after his prison sentence, he thought that
“everything had just gone away,” and believes that he did not breach the Agreement by virtue of
the fact that he “didn’t remember the [A]greement.” Greer Dep. 61:11-15, 63:21; see also id. at
64:1-2 (“[The Agreement] didn’t cross my mind.”). Having paid $189,000 under the Agreement,
Dr. Greer also testified that he “‘made no payments under the settlement agreement,” and doesn’t
“understand all these figures now or . . . how they connect.” Id. at 64:18-22, 65:17-21. Finally,
when asked what the purpose of the Agreement was, Dr. Greer testified “I just don’t remember.
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This is ten years ago, and I do not remember.” Id. at 71:16-22. Without more, there is
insufficient evidence to rule in Dr. Greer’s favor. 7
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Dr. Greer does remember being terrified at the time. Greer Dep. 74:13-20. With good cause.
As a snapshot of his criminal proceedings, the government proffered during his plea hearing that
if the matter had gone to trial, it would have shown, “by clear and competent evidence and
beyond a reasonable doubt”:
[T]hat between 1999 and 2002, Douglas Greer was an
ophthalmologist practicing in Washington D.C. [and] in Annandale,
Virginia. He serviced approximately 429 Medicare patients and 778
patients, many of which [sic] were members of the Federal Health
Benefit Plan Program and other private insurance companies.
With respect to his billing practices, the government would have
shown that Dr. Greer performed or billed for performing numerous
diagnostic tests that are mostly used to diagnose people with
glaucoma. According to his own records, he billed for these
diagnostic tests [when] only 23 percent of those patients required
them. They were only medically necessary for 23 percent of those
patients.
He also performed what’s known as an extended Ophthalmoscopy
. . . , which is a very extensive look at the back of someone’s eye.
Only 17 percent of the bills he submitted, only 17 percent of those
claims by his own diagnostic[s] were medically necessary.
He also billed for what’s known as fundus photography, which again
is taking pictures at the back of someone’s eyes to be able to make
a diagnostic decision. He had a technician who took very clear,
medically sound photographs of people’s eyes. But in addition, Dr.
Greer took his own photographs and billed for those, many of which
were clearly unusable.
Ex. 1, United States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Tr. of Plea Hr’g (Greer Plea) [Dkt. 24-4] at 25:2-26:1;
see also id. at 26:2-29:9; Ex.2, United States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Statement of Offense [Dkt. 24-
5]. According to the Statement of Offense, which he signed and acknowledged, Dr. Greer
received $281,018 for fraudulent glaucoma claims; $141,889 for fraudulent internal eye
disorders; $88,686 for fraudulent and unrendered services for photographs; $37,022 for
fraudulent ocular surgeries; $10,348 for fraudulent claims for unnecessary or unsupported tests;
$39,726 for fraudulent unrendered or unnecessary claims to Medicare; $111,652 for fraudulent
procedures beyond the maximum allowed; $103,767 for fraudulent claims for laser treatments;
and $186,511 for fraudulent claims for another laser procedure. See generally Ex.2, United
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The government argues by turn that the intent of the parties is discernable from
the structure of the Agreement, which states:
Greer shall provide to the United States specific documentation
exactly detailing the monies obtained from the liquidation of the
Retirement Accounts, the availability and amount of liquid assets,
the actual payment of taxes related to the liquidation of assets, and
the proceeds from the sale of the [House on 47th Place] including
the actual payment of any related capital gains taxes. Failure to
provide adequate documentation shall be grounds for the United
States to file a false claims act lawsuit regarding the allegations
settled herein. The statute of limitations for those claims is agreed
waived by the signing of this Settlement Agreement.
Agreement ¶ 3 (emphasis added). This provision is key because the FCA normally has a statute
of limitations of six years, see 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b), which would have run in December 2012. It
therefore follows, the government argues, that the parties “anticipated payment well beyond
2012.” Pl.’s Mot. at 22.
Rooted as it is in the text of the Agreement, the Court finds the government’s
position compelling. If Dr. Greer was expected to sell the house within the FCA’s six-year
statute of limitations, no waiver of that statute of limitations would have been required to enforce
the documentation requirements. And while the government needed the stick of the FCA to
enforce the documentation requirements because those requirements otherwise had no monetary
value, it had another option for the enforcement of the sale of the house: suit in this Court.
While Dr. Greer responds that it would be unreasonable to imply from waiver of the FCA statute
of limitations an extended period for performance, the inference of his argument would require
the Court to find that the parties intended the house to be sold immediately but only documented
States’ Mot. for Summ. J., Statement of Offense. All of which totals $1,011,467 in monies
received through fraud. Id. at 9.
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years later. Otherwise, there would be no purpose behind the waiver for the FCA claims. Such
an inference is unsound on its face. Notably, Dr. Greer supplies no facts or contract
interpretation to support his claim.
Context also matters. Dr. Greer surrendered his medical licenses in the District of
Columbia, Maryland, and Virginia before pleading guilty. Greer Plea 21:1-8. During his prison
term, he lost his medical practice and the two rented locations in downtown D.C. and suburban
Maryland at which he had previously practiced. Greer Dep. 59:12-60:18. Dr. Greer’s wife had
been employed by his medical practice. Id. at 42:20-21. Thus, his family income depended
heavily upon his medical work. Dr. Greer’s grown son is also “unemployable” and so depends
entirely on Dr. Greer and his wife for financial support. Id. at 31:2-6. When Dr. Greer was
released from prison, he was “facing trying to get the practice going back again” since “all the
money [he] had, basically, was transferred to the federal government and then to those insurance
entities.” Id. at 60:19-21, 51:14-17. Against this chaotic backdrop, and without evidence to the
contrary, the Court concludes that the parties could not and did not expect Dr. Greer to sell the
house at 47th Place immediately; he had to rebuild his life. The Court also notes that while the
Agreement settled the civil FCA lawsuit, it also pertained to the criminal monetary penalties
imposed as part of Dr. Greer’s criminal sentence. As such, the Court finds that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to show that Dr. Greer had at least until the end his prison sentence—
including supervised release—to perform under the Agreement.
Having thus determined that Dr. Greer had until at least 2011 to perform, the
Court need not determine exactly when the Agreement was breached. In any event, the
government’s arguments about the repudiation doctrine provide an outer bound for that breach.
Specifically, the government argues that, absent a time certain for payment, breach could only
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occur after “(1) the performing party demands performance within a reasonable amount of time,
and the other party still fails to perform within the time specified; or (2) the non-performing
party repudiates the contract, and the performing party chooses to treat the repudiation as a
breach.” Kasarsky, 296 F.3d at 1336. Put another way, Dr. Greer was in breach either after he
failed to perform upon a timely government demand or after he repudiated the agreement. See
id. (stating that the repudiation doctrine “gives the promisee the right of electing either to wait
until the time for the promisor’s performance has arrived or to act upon the renunciation” (citing
Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1, 13 (1900))). Both Dr. Greer and the government agree that Dr.
Greer did not repudiate the Agreement, at least not until 2015 when the government made its
demand for payment and Dr. Greer refused to pay, as evidenced by this lawsuit. Whether Dr.
Greer’s period for performance expired sometime between 2011 and 2015, or whether it would
have extended indefinitely absent repudiation, is irrelevant—either way, he was not in breach in
2011, and he was in breach when he forced the government to bring this suit to enforce the
Agreement.
The government brought its complaint for breach of contract within six years of
2011. Therefore, its complaint was timely. 8 Dr. Greer having asserted no other defenses to the
breach of contract claim, the Court will require specific performance of his obligation under the
Agreement.
8
Dr. Greer also argues that waivers of statutes of limitations must be clear and unequivocal and
the Agreement contains no such statement as to the statute of limitations for breach of contract.
See Def.’s Opp’n at 6. The argument misinterprets the government’s position. The point is not
that the statute of limitations for breach of contract is greater than six years; it is that
performance was not required until at least 2012 (after Dr. Greer’s criminal sentence was
completed in whole), and so it had until at least 2018 to file its complaint.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The government’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 24, will be granted in part
and denied in part. Dr. Greer’s cross motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 23, will be granted in
part and denied in part. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: January 22, 2019
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
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