Coleman v. District of Columbia Water and Sewer Authority ( 2018 )


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  •                        UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    _________________________________________
    )
    JEFFERY COLEMAN,                           )
    )
    Plaintiff,                           )
    )
    v.                            ) Case No. 18-cv-01215 (APM)
    )
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WATER                 )
    AND SEWER AUTHORITY,                       )
    )
    Defendant.                           )
    _________________________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Defendant D.C. Water and Sewer Authority’s Motion to Dismiss rests on a single premise:
    Plaintiff Jeffrey Coleman’s Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Intake
    Questionnaire, filed on January 18, 2017, does not constitute a “charge” for purposes of the
    limitations period under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).
    See Def.’s Mem. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 [hereinafter Def.’s Mem.], at 5–10.
    The parties agree that, if the Intake Questionnaire constitutes a “charge” under the ADEA, then
    Plaintiff’s suit is timely; if not, the action is untimely.
    I.
    As applicable here, the ADEA requires that an employee file a “charge” with the EEOC
    “within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred . . .” 
    29 U.S.C. § 626
    (d)(1)(B). The
    ADEA does not define the term “charge,” but the Supreme Court filled that gap in Federal Express
    Corp. v. Holowecki.       
    552 U.S. 389
     (2008).           There, the court held that an EEOC Intake
    Questionnaire can constitute a “charge” if it contains three elements: (1) an allegation of age
    discrimination; (2) the name of the charged party; and, critically, (3) “a request for the agency to
    take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the
    employer and the employee.” 
    Id. at 402
    . As to that last element, it must appear to the “objective
    observer” that “the filer requests the agency to activate its machinery and remedial processes . . . .”
    
    Id.
    Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire easily satisfies the standard set forth in Holowecki. Like
    the filer in Holowecki, Plaintiff’s Questionnaire—including his two-page statement appended
    thereto—contains the following basic factual information: Plaintiff’s name, address, and phone
    number, as well as those of his employer; an allegation that he and others were the victims of age
    discrimination; the number of persons employed by his employer; and a statement that he had not
    sought the assistance of any other government agency regarding the matter. Compare 
    id.
     at 404
    with Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 11, Ex. A., ECF No. 11-2 [hereinafter Intake
    Questionnaire], at 2, 4, 6–7.
    Additionally, and most importantly, Plaintiff unequivocally requested that the agency
    “activate its machinery and remedial processes.” Holowecki, 
    552 U.S. at 402
    . Plaintiff checked
    “Box 2” on the Intake Questionnaire, which provides: “I want to file a charge of discrimination,
    and I authorize the EEOC to look into the discrimination I described above. I understand that the
    EEOC must give the employer . . . that I accuse of discrimination information about the charge,
    including my name.” Intake Questionnaire at 4. That fact is arguably dispositive. Following
    Holowecki, the EEOC revised its intake questionnaire to include “Box 2,” so as “to require
    claimants to check a box to request that the EEOC take remedial action.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny
    County, 
    757 F.3d 99
    , 113 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit in Hildebrand held that “an employee
    who completes the Intake Questionnaire and checks Box 2 unquestionably files a charge of
    discrimination.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added); accord Leftwich v. Gallaudet Univ., 
    878 F. Supp. 2d 81
    ,
    2
    91–92 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that intake questionnaire qualified as a charge where the employee
    had checked a box similar to “Box 2”). Thus, Plaintiff’s unqualified checking of “Box 2” is itself
    a request for action.
    But there is more. Plaintiff concluded his two-page statement with an express call for the
    agency to act:      “I am requesting that the EEOC investigate the claims contained in this
    supplement.” Intake Questionnaire at 7. That sentence unambiguously calls on the EEOC to act
    on his complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire qualifies as a “charge” for the
    ADEA’s 300-day limitations period.
    II.
    The cases Defendant relies upon are all readily distinguishable. See Def.’s Mem. at 6–9;
    see also Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 13, at 2–6. Defendant’s heavy reliance on Dyson
    v. District of Columbia is misplaced, as Dyson, though decided after Holowecki, does not even
    mention that binding authority. See generally 
    808 F. Supp. 2d 84
     (D.D.C. 2011). 1 Dyson therefore
    carries no persuasive force. Additionally, Marshall v. Honeywell Tech. Solutions, Inc., is wholly
    inapt. 
    598 F. Supp. 2d 57
     (D.D.C. 2009). There, the intake form suffered from “significant
    deficiencies,” such as failing to name the employer; identifying the petitioner as under the age of
    40, thereby taking himself outside of the ADEA’s coverage; and missing “any detailed description
    of the discriminatory conduct.” 
    Id. at 61
    . The Intake Questionnaire here does not suffer from
    these shortcomings. Finally, Minter v. District of Columbia is readily distinguishable, as the
    employee in that case “did not attach a letter or separate document to the questionnaire expressing
    her intention to file a claim,” but instead expressly asked only to “consult with a[n] EEO Specialist
    1
    The Circuit’s decision in Dyson v. District of Columbia does not help Defendant either, as that decision did not
    address whether the employee’s intake questionnaire qualified as a “charge” under Holowecki. See generally 
    710 F.3d 415
     (D.C. Cir. 2013).
    3
    regarding the possible filing of charges.” 
    62 F. Supp. 3d 149
    , 163 (D.D.C. 2014) (internal
    quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff, by contrast, expressly asked the EEOC
    to “investigate the claims contained in this supplement.”
    III.
    In summary, Plaintiff’s Intake Questionnaire meets the definition of “charge” as interpreted
    by the Supreme Court in Holowecki. Accordingly, his claim is timely. Defendant’s Motion to
    Dismiss is therefore denied.
    Dated: December 17, 2018                                     Amit P. Mehta
    United States District Judge
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2018-1215

Judges: Judge Amit P. Mehta

Filed Date: 12/17/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/18/2018