United States v. Anderson ( 2019 )


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  •                       UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    _______________________________________
    )
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               )
    )
    v.                         )    No. 1:94-cr-00055 (RCL)
    )
    WILL ANDERSON,                          )
    Defendant.            )
    )
    _______________________________________)
    ORDER
    Defendant Will Anderson seeks a court order modifying his sentence under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2255. He looks for relief in the holding of Johnson v. United States, 
    135 S. Ct. 2551
    (2015).
    The Johnson Court held that the residual clause defining “violent felony” under the Armed
    Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was unconstitutionally vague. Anderson was sentenced pursuant to
    then-mandatory guidelines that contained an identical residual clause defining “crime of
    violence.” If the ACCA residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, the logic goes, so too is the
    residual clause under the mandatory sentencing guidelines. The government objects to all this
    and more. It says that Anderson’s claim is untimely and procedurally defaulted, that Johnson did
    not apply to the mandatory sentencing guidelines, and that in any event Johnson cannot apply to
    the guidelines retroactively.
    In August of 1994, a jury convicted Anderson of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d). Def.’s Suppl. Mot. Vacate 4, ECF No. 239. Because Anderson had
    already been convicted of three separate robbery offenses, Judge Bryant sentenced him as a
    “career offender” under the mandatory guidelines. 
    Id. at 4–5.
    The career offender designation
    raised the sentencing guideline range, and Anderson was sentenced to 24 years for his armed
    bank robbery conviction. 
    Id. at 6.
    He appealed, but the D.C. Circuit affirmed. United States v.
    1
    Anderson, 
    80 F.3d 558
    (D.C. Cir. 1996). He filed three previous § 2255 motions, all of which
    were denied. Def.’s Suppl. Mot. Vacate 6–7, ECF No. 239. In June of 2016, he filed this fourth
    § 2255 motion. Emerg. Mot., ECF No. 235.
    Anderson’s theory—that Johnson established a new rule that retroactively applied to his
    sentencing under the mandatory guidelines—has been already been addressed by this Court. USA
    v. Arrington, No. 1:00-cv-159, ECF No. 192. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Beckles
    v. United States, 
    137 S. Ct. 886
    (2017), Johnson’s holding is too narrow to control the
    constitutionality of the mandatory sentencing guidelines’ residual clause. For the reasons set
    forth in the Arrington memorandum, Anderson’s motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is
    untimely and thus DENIED.
    It is SO ORDERED.
    SIGNED this 24th day of September, 2019.
    _______________/s/_______________
    Royce C. Lamberth
    United States District Judge
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Criminal No. 1994-0055

Judges: Judge Royce C. Lamberth

Filed Date: 9/24/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2019