LLC Energoalliance v. Republic of Moldova ( 2019 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    LLC KOMSTROY, as successor in interest
    to LLC ENERGOALLIANCE,
    Petitioner,
    Case No. 14-cv-1921 (CRC)
    v.
    REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA,
    Respondent.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    On August 23, 2019, the Court issued a memorandum opinion confirming a foreign
    arbitral award in Petitioner’s favor but deferred issuing a final judgment. Because the award had
    to be converted from Moldovan lei to U.S. dollars and updated to reflect the prejudgment interest
    that had accrued since the award was issued on October 25, 2013, the Court postponed
    determining the total amount of the judgment and solicited supplemental briefing from the
    parties on that question. However, the Order accompanying that memorandum opinion
    inadvertently and erroneously stated that the Order was final and appealable.
    Petitioner LLC Komstroy filed a brief detailing its calculation of a proposed total
    judgment amount. Mot. for J. at 2; 
    id. Ex. A
    & B. Instead of responding to Petitioner’s
    calculations, Respondent Republic of Moldova (“Moldova”) appealed the Court’s August 23,
    2019 Order and submitted a response in which it argued that the Court no longer had jurisdiction
    due to its prior issuance of a “final appealable order.” Response at 1–2. In reply, Petitioner
    moved to strike Moldova’s response for failing to comply with the Court’s order instructing the
    parties to submit briefing on the total judgment amount. Reply at 1–2. In the alternative,
    Petitioner sought leave to respond to Moldova’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction. 
    Id. As a
    threshold matter, this Court retains jurisdiction to determine the amount of the
    judgment. Although the Order accompanying the August 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion stated
    that it was a final appealable order, that statement was a clerical error. As such, contrary to
    Moldova’s argument, the Court’s designation of that Order as “final and appealable” did not
    instantly divest this Court of jurisdiction. See Ciralsky v. C.I.A., 
    355 F.3d 661
    , 667 (D.C. Cir.
    2004) (noting that a district court’s characterization of an order as “a final appealable order” did
    not bind the Circuit). The August 23, 2019 Order plainly was not final because it did not “end[]
    the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,”
    Franklin v. D.C., 
    163 F.3d 625
    , 628 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 
    324 U.S. 229
    , 233 (1945)), given that the Order expressly indicated that the Court still needed to calculate
    the final judgment amount. In actions seeking damages, “a final judgment in a Petitioner’s favor
    declares not only liability but also the consequences of liability—what, if anything, the
    Moldovas must do as a result.” 
    Id. (citing Liberty
    Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 
    424 U.S. 737
    , 742
    (1976)). The August 23, 2019 Order “established [Moldova’s] liability, but it granted no relief,
    it imposed no obligations on [Moldova], [and] it did not say, as final decisions in such
    cases must, ‘who is entitled to what from whom.’” 
    Id. (quoting Horn
    v. Transcon Lines,
    Inc., 
    898 F.2d 589
    , 591 (7th Cir. 1990)). “It therefore was not a final judgment subject to
    appeal.” Id.; see also 
    id. (An order
    “adjudging liability but leaving the quantum of relief still to
    be determined has been a classic example of non-finality and non-appealability from the time of
    Chief Justice Marshall to our own.” (quoting Taylor v. Board of Educ., 
    288 F.2d 600
    , 602 (2d
    Cir. 1961) (Friendly, J.)). Accordingly, this Court retained jurisdiction to consider the total
    amount of the judgment notwithstanding Moldova’s appeal.
    2
    Turning to the amount of the final judgment, the Court finds that the properly converted
    amount of the arbitral award, pre-interest, is $46,426,089.38 in U.S. Dollars (“USD”), based on a
    conversion rate of 12.9207 (the rate that existed on the date the arbitral award was issued,
    October 25, 2013) and the attorney fees and arbitration costs awarded by the arbitration tribunal,
    which were assessed in USD. Further, the Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to prejudgment
    interest in the amount $12,164,969.12 USD, which was calculated using the average prime
    interest rate between October 25, 2013 (the date that the arbitral award was issued) and
    October 2, 2019 (the date of judgment). In total, Petitioner is presently entitled to a judgment in
    the amount of $58,591,058.50 USD. 1 Additionally, Petitioner is entitled to post-judgment
    interest starting on October 2, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
    For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s Motion to Affirm the arbitral
    award in the amount of $58,591,058.50 USD. The Court denies Petitioner’s Motion to Strike as
    moot. A separate Order shall accompany this memorandum opinion.
    CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER
    United States District Judge
    Date: October 2, 2019
    1
    The Court calculated the total amount of the award using the formula M = P*(1 + i)^n,
    where “P” is a principal amount of the award, “i” is the annual rate of interest, and “n” is the
    number of years that interest ran to determine compound prejudgment interest. See Cont’l
    Transfert Technique Ltd. v. Fed. Gov’t of Nigeria, 
    932 F. Supp. 2d 153
    , 166 n.7 (D.D.C. 2013),
    aff’d 603 Fed. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As is “standard practice,” this formula compounds
    prejudgment interest annually. 
    Id. 3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2014-1921

Judges: Judge Christopher R. Cooper

Filed Date: 10/2/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/2/2019