United States v. Williams ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. ) Criminal No. 09-0026 (PLF)
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RICO RODRIGUS WILLIAMS, )
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Defendant. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The defendant, Rico Williams, a former member of the United States Air Force,
killed Army Sergeant Juwan Johnson during a gang initiation that took place on July 3, 2005,
near the Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany. See United States v. Williams, 946 F. Supp. 2d
112, 114 (D.D.C. 2013). On November 15, 2010, after a twelve-day jury trial, Mr. Williams was
convicted of one count of second degree murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a), and one
count of witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3). See id. The Court sentenced
Mr. Williams in April 2012 to twenty-two years in prison on his second degree murder
conviction and ten years in prison on his witness tampering conviction, the two sentences to run
concurrently. See id. at 113. The Court also imposed five years of supervised release, with
conditions, following the period of incarceration. See id.At sentencing, the Court informed the parties that restitution would be ordered but
deferred determination of the amount of restitution until the parties had an opportunity to file
supplemental briefs. See United States v. Williams, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 113. Following the
submission of supplemental briefs in May 2013, the Court ordered Mr. Williams to pay
restitution in the amount of $756,000 to Sergeant Johnson’s estate. See id. at 114-15.
In February 2016, the D.C. Circuit reversed Mr. Williams’ conviction for second
degree murder, affirmed the conviction for witness tampering, and remanded for a new trial. See
United States v. Williams, 836 F.3d 1, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2016). This Court subsequently vacated the
second degree murder conviction and the restitution order based on that conviction. See May 3,
2017 Order Vacating Conviction, Sentence, and Restitution Order [Dkt. No. 231]. On June 15,
2017, Mr. Williams pled guilty to a superseding information charging him with one count of
involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). See Plea Agreement [Dkt. No. 237]. That
same day, the Court sentenced Mr. Williams to eight years in prison for involuntary
manslaughter and eight years in prison for witness tampering, those sentences to run
concurrently, followed by three years of supervised release. See Amended Judgment of June 16,
2017 [Dkt. No. 241] at 3.1 The Court deferred determination of the amount of restitution
pending further briefing from the parties. See id. at 8.
In October 2017, the United States filed a motion for restitution [Dkt. No. 246]. It
asked the Court to order restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18
U.S.C. § 3663A, in the amount of $756,000 – the full amount of Sergeant Johnson’s future lost
income – based on the same evidence and expert analysis considered by the Court in its prior
restitution opinion. See Motion for Restitution at 14; see also Amended Judgment of June 16,
2017 [Dkt. No. 246] at 15; United States v. Williams, 946 F. Supp. 2d at 117-19. In the
alternative, the United States argued that the Court has discretion to award the same amount of
restitution under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663. See
1
The Court entered a further Amended Judgment on December 27, 2018 [Dkt. No.
261] at the joint request of the parties.
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Motion for Restitution at 12-13. Mr. Williams responded that the MVRA does not apply in this
case because it does not cover involuntary manslaughter. See Supplemental Memorandum in
Opposition to Government’s Motion for Restitution [Dkt. No. 258]. As to the VWPA, Mr.
Williams argued that the VWPA does not authorize restitution based on future lost income and
that, even if it did, the Court should decline to award restitution in an amount greater than
$15,000 in light of his indigent status. See id.On January 8, 2019, the Court issued an opinion in which it concluded that
involuntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a) is not categorically a crime of violence
under 18 U.S.C. §16(a) because involuntary manslaughter can be committed either with or
without the use of physical force. See United States v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d 14, 20-21
(D.D.C. 2019). For that reason, the Court found that the MVRA does not apply to this case, and
because the MVRA does not apply, the Court has discretion under the VWPA to decide whether
to award restitution. See id. at 21. Most importantly, the Court concluded that because the
VWPA – unlike the MVRA – gives the Court discretion to decide whether to impose restitution,
it also necessarily gives the Court discretion to determine in what amount to order restitution.
See id. at 26-27. The Court rejected the “all-or-nothing” approach of the Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, stating: “Courts must be able to set or reduce the amount of restitution based
on the defendant’s present and future economic circumstances when determining both whether to
order restitution and in setting the amount of restitution. Otherwise, there is little discretion left
for courts to exercise and no relevant distinction between the MVRA . . . and the VWPA.” See
id. at 26.
The Court also concluded that the VWPA authorizes restitution for the future lost
income of deceased victims to their survivors. See United States v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at
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21-23. And it found – based on the same evidence and expert analysis considered by the Court
in its earlier restitution opinion in this matter, see United States v. Williams, 946 F. Supp. 2d at
117-19 – that the United States had adequately demonstrated that the amount of Sergeant
Johnson’s future lost income over the course of his lifetime was approximately $756,000. See
United States v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 24.
Having decided that it would order restitution, the Court turned to the remaining
question: how much restitution to award Sergeant Johnson’s survivors. As stated, Mr. Williams
suggested that $15,000 was an appropriate amount given his indigency, but there was little
factual support for that proposal. See United States v. Williams, 353 F. Supp. 3d at 27-28. The
Court noted in its opinion that the burden of demonstrating the financial resources and earning
ability of a defendant and the financial resources, earning ability, and needs of the defendant’s
dependents is, by statute, on the defendant, and the defendant must make that showing by a
preponderance of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); see also United States v. Williams, 353
F. Supp. 3d at 27. Because the declaration submitted by Mr. Williams was insufficient to meet
that burden, the Court offered Mr. Williams “one final opportunity” to submit supplemental
briefing and expert evidence regarding his financial resources, his future earnings ability, and the
financial needs and earnings ability of his dependents. See United States v. Williams, 353 F.
Supp. 3d at 28.
On May 8, 2019, the defendant submitted a supplemental motion regarding
restitution [Dkt. No. 269], accompanied by the expert report of Dr. Shireen Meer, an economist
and Associate Director in the Washington office of the Berkeley Research Group, an
international economic consulting firm. See Expert Report of Dr. Shireen Meer (“Dr. Meer
Report”) [Dkt. No. 269-1]. On June 26, 2019, the United States filed a notice [Dkt. No. 270],
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informing the Court that it had no response to the defendant’s expert report other than to rely on
its earlier arguments and assertions, along with the testimony and expert report previously
submitted.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed the expert report of Dr. Meer, who clearly is
eminently qualified on the basis of education, training, and experience to opine in this matter.
The Court also finds Dr. Meer’s methodology reliable. As for the bases for Dr. Meer’s opinions,
the Court generally finds them reasonable. It does, however, question whether all relevant
information was taken into account in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the expert report. There,
Dr. Meer reports that because of certain nerve damage to Mr. Williams’ hands – without
specifying the extent of the damage – he can no longer use his technical skills and years of
experience as a mechanic and thus has enrolled in barber school. See Dr. Meer Report at ¶14.
Dr. Meer goes on to assume that Mr. Williams, now 41 years old, will be employed as a full-time
barber for approximately twenty-three years. See id. ¶13. That assumption notwithstanding, Dr.
Meer then finds that Mr. Williams may not be able to find full-time employment as a barber
because of his felony conviction and because race “plays a non-trivial effect in further decreasing
employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated persons of the African American race.” See
id. ¶15. Dr. Meer also discounts the estimate of future earnings from barbering to account for
Mr. Williams’ disability, see Dr. Meer Report at ¶16, and notes that Mr. Williams pays child
support for his fifteen-year-old daughter of $2880 annually, which will continue until 2022,
when Mr. Williams’ daughter will turn eighteen. Id. ¶18. At the same time, Dr. Meer
reasonably added the amount Mr. Williams receives in disability income and – looking forward
twenty-plus years – Social Security income. See id. ¶17. Dr. Meer then presents two alternative
scenarios: In the first, she applies a 20 percent discount rate to the value of Mr. Williams’ future
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potential earnings, less personal consumption; in the second, she applies an 11.5 percent discount
rate. See id. ¶21. In the first scenario, she finds that the net present value of Mr. Williams’
future earnings (less personal consumption) to range from ($17,760) to $22,379. See id. ¶22. In
the second scenario, she calculates a range to be between ($8,686) and $56,304. See id. ¶23.
The Court itself previously recognized that Mr. Williams will “undoubtedly face
difficulty finding employment due to his criminal conviction.” United States v. Williams, 353 F.
Supp. 3d at 27. It also noted, however, that his education, vocational skills, and work history
“indicate that he could earn sufficient income in the future such that he can pay restitution in an
amount greater than $15,000. . . . He graduated from high school and enlisted in the United
States Air Force, where he served for almost nine years.” See id. at 27-28. The Court also noted
his expertise as a jet engine mechanic and the fact that he was then qualified to repair helicopters
and possesses skills in electrical and hydraulic systems, as well as in turbine and diesel motors.
See id. at 28. Thus, the Court concluded that Mr. Williams “[had] some, perhaps significant,
earning potential.” See id. While the Court was unaware of the nerve damage to his hands – and
is still unaware of the severity of that damage – the Court is not convinced that all of those years
of Mr. Williams’ experience as a mechanic and his knowledge of electrical and hydraulic
systems and turbine and diesel motors necessarily must go for naught and that his only option is
to become a barber, as Dr. Meer contends. See Dr. Meer Report ¶14.
In light of all of the facts and evidence before it, and in view of the discretion this
Court has already concluded it has under the Victim and Witness Protection Act, the Court
concludes that Mr. Williams clearly does not have the ability to pay anything close to the
$756,000 the government requests. Nor is it convinced that Mr. Williams’ only employment
option is to work as a barber. Nevertheless, in view of Dr. Meer’s expert report and the other
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information before it, the Court finds that a fair and reasonable amount of restitution should be
calculated by beginning with the high end of Dr. Meer’s second scenario – $56,304 – and then
ratcheting it up slightly to take account of the expertise Mr. Williams gained while serving in the
United States Air Force and the strong possibility that he will at some point find employment
other than barbering. Accordingly, the Court will order restitution to Sergeant Johnson’s estate
in the total amount of $100,000 to be paid at a rate of $250 per month.
A separate order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued this
same day.
SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
United States District Judge
DATE: November 4, 2019
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