McClurkin Bey v. Social Security Administration ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
RICKY MCCLURKIN BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Case No. 18-cv-03142 (APM)
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ANDREW SAUL, )
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Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Ricky McClurkin Bey, proceeding pro se, seeks reversal of a final decision by the
Commissioner of Social Security denying claims for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income. See Pl.’s Mot. for Judgment of Reversal, ECF No. 13 [hereinafter
Pl.’s Mot.]. Defendant Andrew Saul, the Commissioner of Social Security, seeks affirmance of
the agency’s decision. See Def.’s Mot. for Judgment of Affirmance and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot.,
ECF No. 14 [Def.’s Mot.]. After a thorough review of the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”)
ruling and the administrative record, the court grants Defendant’s motion for affirmance and denies
Plaintiff’s motion for reversal.
There is “substantial evidence” in the record to support the ALJ’s determination that
Plaintiff can work and thus is not disabled. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019).
The ALJ comprehensively considered the record before him and concluded that (1) Plaintiff does
not have impairments that meet or equal the heightened criteria in the Commissioner’s regulations,
Admin. Rec. (“AR”), ECF No. 7, at 25–26 1; (2) Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity allows him
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The court cites to the pages as numbered in the administrative record.
to do a reduced range of sedentary work, id. at 26–29; and (3) Plaintiff is capable of doing past
relevant work that he performed in a call center, id. at 30. Each of these findings is supported by
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
Plaintiff raises multiple challenges to the ALJ’s findings, but none is persuasive. First, he
argues that “the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standard . . .” Pl.’s Mot. at 3. It is not clear,
however, what erroneous legal standard the ALJ purportedly applied. Plaintiff’s motion references
an “eight step” standard “for assessing a claimant’s disability in the context of a continuing
disability review,” id., but that standard is not applicable here, as the agency’s review concerned
an initial application for benefits, not a continuing disability review, see Def.’s Mot. at 5 n.3. The
court finds no error in the legal standard applied by the ALJ.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to give controlling weight to my primary care
doctor’s medical report concerning my disability that can be found in the SSA administrative
record on pages 501-517.” Pl.’s Mot. at 4; see also id. at 3 (asserting that “the ALJ failed to give
controlling weight to plaintiff’s primary care doctor’s lab and medical reports contained in his
medical [file], that was forwarded to the SSA concerning his overall medical condition”). The
portions of the administrative record cited by Plaintiff are treatment notes reflecting laboratory test
results for Hepatitis C. AR 501–17. As Defendant points out, such medical records do not qualify
as a “medical opinion” that is accorded weight under agency regulations. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527(a)(1), 416.927(a)(1) (“Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical
sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your
symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical
or mental restrictions.”); §§ 404.1513(b), 416.913(b) (“A medical opinion is a statement from a
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medical source about what you can still do despite your impairment(s) and whether you have one
or more impairment-related limitations or restrictions in the [following] abilities . . .”); see also
Def.’s Mot. at 9 (collecting cases). The ALJ therefore did not err by declining to give controlling
weight to Plaintiff’s doctor’s “medical report.”
Finally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ should not have relied on the opinion of Dr. Elizabeth
Nolte, the consultative examiner, because she “filed a false medical report.” Pl.’s Mot. at 3–4.
As evidence of falsity, Plaintiff cites Dr. Nolte’s titling her report “Internal Medicine
Examination,” AR 518, when in fact Dr. Nolte performed “an External Medicine
Examination . . . which did[ ] not include any lab work or X-Rays of my cervical spine on page-4
of her medical report,” Def.’s Mot. at 3. Plaintiff reads too much into the title of Dr. Nolte’s report.
The “Internal” in the report’s title refers to the doctor’s medical specialty (“internal medicine”),
not whether the examination involved an “internal” (versus “external”) diagnostic examination.
Plaintiff demonstrates no falsity or inaccuracy in Dr. Nolte’s report.
In summary, the ALJ’s ruling is supported by substantial evidence and manifests no legal
error, and Plaintiff has not shown otherwise. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment of
Reversal, ECF No. 13, is denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment of Affirmance, ECF No.
14, is granted. A separate, final order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Dated: December 3, 2019 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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