Laureys v. District of Columbia ( 2019 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BRANDON LAUREYS,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 18-223 (RDM)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Brandon Laureys, who is represented by counsel, brings this action against the
District of Columbia, five D.C. officers or employees, and two John Does. He has now filed his
Third Amended Complaint, which alleges a variety of claims under federal and D.C. law relating
to his treatment while incarcerated at the D.C. jail. Dkt. 19. The District of Columbia, the only
defendant served to date, moves to dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and VI. Dkt. 20.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant in part and will deny in part the
District’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action in January 2018, Dkt. 1, but did not serve the District of
Columbia until March 2018, Dkt. 4; Dkt. 5; Dkt. 6. He has yet to serve any of the remaining
defendants. Because far more than 90 days have now expired, the Court has separately ordered
that, unless Plaintiff effects service on the remaining defendants on or before October 24, 2019,
the Court will dismiss the action without prejudice against those defendants. Dkt. 24.
After Plaintiff served the District of Columbia, the District moved to dismiss. Dkt. 7.
Plaintiff then filed his first amended complaint as of right. Dkt. 8. The District again moved to
dismiss, Dkt. 10, and Plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, Dkt. 12. The
District opposed that motion, Dkt. 14, and, after the Court highlighted “substantial
deficienc[ies]” in Plaintiff’s proposed, second amended complaint at a status conference, July 10,
2018 Status Conference Tr. at 23:6, the Court afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to move for leave
to file a third amended complaint addressing some of the factual gaps in the proposed second
amended complaint, id. at 24:16–21. At that time, the Court cautioned counsel that he would
need to plead more than just legal conclusions and would need to plead facts sufficient to satisfy
the elements of each claim he seeks to bring. Id. at 3:7–15, 22–25; 6:1–12; 7:20–24. Ultimately,
the District took no position regarding Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a third amended
complaint, Dkt. 18, and the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion, Minute Order (Aug. 27, 2018).
The Third Amended Complaint (hereinafter “complaint”) includes seven counts. Dkt. 19.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was “continuously incarcerated from on or about
November 14, 2008 until his release on or about January 3, 2018,” and he was held “for part of
that time” at the D.C. jail. Dkt. 19 at 4 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 16–17). Plaintiff alleges that, while
held at the D.C. jail, he was “improperly protected and classified by the defendants” and was
improperly “placed with hardened criminals.” Id. (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 19). He alleges that
employees at the D.C. jail were not properly trained or supervised, id. at 4, 6 (3d Amd. Compl.
¶¶ 20, 35), that these employees failed to properly supervise the inmates, id. at 5–6 (3d Amd.
Compl. ¶¶ 23, 33–34), that they failed to keep them in their proper locations, id. at 5–6 (3d Amd.
Compl. ¶¶ 25, 33 ), and that they failed to enforce the 8:00 p.m. curfew, id. at 5 (3d Amd.
Compl. ¶ 25). He claims that these failures of the jail employees facilitated his injuries at the
hands of other inmates. Id. at 6 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 35). He also alleges that he was
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discriminated against because he is “Caucasian.” Id. at 3, 7–8, 11 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 43,
47–49, 67–68).
Plaintiff recounts three alleged instances when he was physically injured, twice by other
inmates and once by a jail employee. First, Plaintiff alleges that in the evening of November 29,
2009, when inmates were supposed to be within their cells, an inmate punched him in the eye,
causing a serious injury. Id. at 5 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 25–27). Second, he alleges that on
February 5, 2010, Defendant “Sergeant Ekwanna sprayed [him] with mace for about eight . . .
seconds for no valid reason,” injuring him. Id. (3d Amd. Comp. ¶¶ 28, 30). Third, he alleges
that, on or about March 28, 2010, he was “assaulted by three . . . inmates when he was in his
protective cellblock,” beaten with a broomstick, and cut on his face with razors. Id. at 6 (3d
Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 32, 34). Following this last incident, Plaintiff alleges that the warden of the
D.C. jail used “threat[s]” to try to convince him “to sign papers to prosecute the perpetrators of
the March 28, 2010 incident and [to] waive liability against the defendants [named in the present
action]” and that, in fact, he “was placed in solitary confinement . . . for more than five . . .
months as punishment for failing to sign” the papers. Id. at 7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 40–42).
According to Plaintiff, this action was taken in “retaliation by persons in charge of policy,
including the Warden, [the] directors of the Department of Corrections[,] Lieutenant Taylor[,]
and all defendants.” Id. (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 41). He also alleges that he was “denied legal
counsel and medical treatment” following this incident, id. (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 44), and that
“[o]n numerous occasions, including March 28, 2010, unsupervised inmates hit [him] with
feces.” Id. at 6 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 38).
The District of Columbia moves for partial dismissal of Counts I, II, IV, and VI of
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt 20.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Well-
pleaded complaints include “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Raising the “sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not enough. Id. In evaluating a 12(b)(6)
motion, the Court “accept[s] facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw[s] all reasonable
inferences from those facts in the plaintiff[’s] favor.” Humane Soc’y of the United States v.
Vilsack, 797 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2015). This focus on the factual content of the complaint
means that “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff’s complaint is not a picture of clarity. With respect to each of the four counts
that the District moves to dismiss, however, the Court will attempt to identify the nature of the
claim asserted and the facts alleged in support of that claim. The Court will then determine
whether those facts are sufficient to state the claim for relief. Because only the District of
Columbia has been served, the Court will limit its analysis to the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims
against the District.
A. Count I: “Violation of Civil Rights pursuant to Title 42 Section 1983 of the United
States Code”
In Count I, Plaintiff seeks to recover from the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for a series of alleged violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Dkt. 19 at 7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 45). To state a claim for municipal liability
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under § 1983, a plaintiff must clear two hurdles. First, he must allege “a predicate constitutional
violation.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Second, as
required under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and its progeny, he must
allege facts sufficient to support a plausible inference “that a custom or policy of the
municipality caused the violation.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. Each requirement “is separate and
serves [a] different purpose[ ],” id., and a plaintiff’s failure to plead facts sufficient to satisfy
either hurdle requires dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
With respect to the first hurdle, the District correctly observes that the District of
Columbia is a federal entity subject to the Fifth Amendment, and not the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the Constitution, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Propert v.
District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1330 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and thus Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim must be dismissed. The District also argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege
a predicate First Amendment violation, but it offers little or no analysis of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim. As the District recognized, Plaintiff alleges that he was “threatened and
punished”—and, in particular, was placed in solitary confinement for five months—because he
refused to identify his assailants and because he refused to waive his right to bring suit against
the District. Dkt. 20 at 6; Dkt. at 7 (3d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 40–41). It is not obvious to the Court that
this allegation fails to state a claim under the First Amendment, which, among other things,
protects the right to petition the government by bringing suit. See BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516, 524–25 (2002) (right to file suit is one aspect of the right to petition protected by
the First Amendment). If the First Amendment does not bar government actors from punishing
prisoners for refusing to waive their constitutional right to file suit, the District has failed to
explain why that is so.
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The District devotes the bulk of its argument to the second hurdle—the requirement that
section 1983 plaintiffs plausibly allege that “a policy or custom of the District of Columbia
caused the constitutional violation alleged.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306; see also Triplett v. District
of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (explaining that § 1983 does not provide for
municipal respondeat superior liability). “There are a number of ways in which a ‘policy’ can be
set by a municipality to cause it to be liable under § 1983,” including (1) “the explicit setting of a
policy by the government that violates the Constitution;” (2) “the action of a policy maker within
the government;” (3) “the adoption through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of
[unconstitutional] actions by his subordinates that are so consistent that they have become
‘custom’’” and (4) “the failure of the government to respond to a need (for example, training of
employees) in such a manner as to show ‘deliberate indifference’ to the risk that not addressing
the need will result in constitutional violations.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (citations omitted); see
also Ennis v. Lott, 589 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Plaintiff’s [c]omplaint must ‘include
some factual basis for the allegation of a municipal policy or custom.’” (quoting Hinson ex rel.
N.H. v. Merritt Educ. Ctr., 521 F. Supp. 2d 22, 29 (D.D.C. 2007))).
Plaintiff’s complaint is rife with legal conclusions and in many places amounts to no
more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court disregards such statements in its
consideration of the District’s motion to dismiss and breaks down Plaintiff’s various factual
allegations to assess whether he has pleaded facts that could plausibly support municipal
liability:
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1. Solitary Confinement
According to the complaint, “[t]he Warden stated to [P]laintiff after March 28, 2010 that
if he did not sign a paper releasing the District of Columbia from liability that he would remain
in solitary confinement” and Plaintiff was subjected to five months in solitary confinement due
to his refusal to surrender his claim. Dkt. 19 at 7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 41–42). Liberally
construed, the complaint also alleges that Directors Booth and Brown of the Department of
Corrections acted alongside the Warden and that the Warden and Directors Booth and Brown are
actors who “may by their actions subject the government to § 1983 liability” because they have
“final policymaking authority.” City of St. Louis v. Prapotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988) (second
quote quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)); see also Moonblatt v.
District of Columbia, 572 F. Supp. 2d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that the Director of the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections has final policymaking authority); Dkt. 19 at 3
(3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 5) (“Booth and . . . Brown . . . were directors of the Department of
Corrections and were and are in charge of policy by the defendant District of Columbia.”); id. at
7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 41) (alleging that the Warden was “in charge of policy”).
“Accept[ing] [these allegations] as true,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, Plaintiff has alleged that
the Warden and Directors Booth and Brown threatened him with and eventually subjected him to
five months of solitary confinement because he refused to release a claim against Defendants,
Dkt. 19 at 7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 41). These allegations, although lacking substantial detail, are
sufficient to state a First Amendment claim against the District of Columbia under the Monell
framework. See 436 U.S. at 694. The Court will, accordingly, deny the District’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.
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2. Jail Employees’ Failure to Protect and Supervise
The complaint fails, however, to allege facts permitting a plausible inference that the
District had a policy or custom of providing inadequate supervision and protection of inmates.
Even assuming that Plaintiff has pleaded facts that could plausibly support the inference that jail
employees had a “consistent” or “widespread” practice of failing adequately to supervise and
protect inmates, Richardson v. District of Columbia, 322 F. Supp. 3d 175, 182 (D.D.C. 2018);
Dickerson v. District of Columbia, 806 F. Supp. 2d 116, 120 (D.D.C. 2011)—and the Court
doubts that he has done so—he has not alleged any facts that might support an inference that the
District “adopt[ed] [any such custom] through a knowing failure to act” or otherwise had a
policy or custom that caused his alleged injuries. Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306. He has not alleged
that he put “prison officials . . . on notice” of jail employees’ allegedly dangerous behavior by,
for example, “complain[ing] of the excessive risk to his safety” that it posed. Thomas v. District
of Columbia, 887 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1995); see also Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227
F.3d 433, 441–42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (concluding that “the District and its policymakers were on
notice that D.C. guards lacked basic respect for the rights of female inmates, and
that . . . substantial intervention” was needed because of a recent court decision finding the
District liable for such abuses as well as the plaintiff’s “repeated[ ] complain[ts] of sexual
abuse,” including “grievance forms and letters [sent] to everyone from correctional officers to
the Deputy Warden, Warden, and Director of the Department”). Nor has he alleged “that had the
District of Columbia . . . done its job competently [it] would had to have known that” jail
employees were insufficiently supervising and protecting inmates, but the District “nonetheless
‘deliberately’ allowed this to continue.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1307. “This is not, moreover, the
unusual situation in which misconduct is ‘sufficiently . . . obvious’ that the misconduct, ‘on its
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face, raises doubts about a municipality’s training policies.’” Grissom v. District of Columbia,
853 F. Supp. 2d 118, 124 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d
418, 422–23 (D.C. Cir. 1996)) (finding such an unusual situation where a police officer shot a
man on a city street almost immediately after yelling “freeze”).
The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth and Eighth Amendment failure-to-
protect and failure-to-supervise claims.
3. Other Claims: Racial Discrimination, Failure to Provide Legal and Medical
Assistance, Use of Mace
Finally, the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to support a municipal-liability claim
against the District for racial discrimination, failure to provide access to legal counsel, failure to
provide medical assistance, or for Sergeant Ekwanna’s alleged use of mace. First, Plaintiff does
not allege that the District had an official policy that mandated any of the challenged actions.
Second, he does not plausibly allege that an official with policymaking authority (1) determined
what punishment, if any, to impose on the African American inmates that Plaintiff alleges were
subject to “less severe punishment” than he was, see Dkt. 19 at 7 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 43) (“The
other inmates involved were African Americans and received less severe punishment.”); (2)
denied him legal or medical assistance, see id. (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 44) (“[P]laintiff was denied
legal counsel and medical treatment.”); or (3) sprayed him with mace or requested or allowed
anyone else to spray him with mace, see id. at 5 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 30) (“Sergeant Ekwanna
sprayed Mr. Laureys with mace . . . .”). Third, Plaintiff does not allege that any of these actions
occurred repeatedly or consistently; to the contrary, he alleges that each occurred only once.
Finally, Plaintiff does not allege facts that would support a plausible inference that the District
knowingly adopted through inaction or was deliberately indifferent to any of these actions.
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The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Plaintiff’s Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims for
racial discrimination, failure to provide access to legal counsel, failure to provide medical
assistance, and for the use of excessive force (i.e., the excessive use of mace).
B. Count II: “Violation of Title 42 Section 1981 of the United States Code Violation of
Equal Rights Under the Law”
Count II alleges that
[t]he defendant, through its agents and employees, failed to give the plaintiff equal
rights under the law based upon his race. He was denied civil rights and due
process. The other inmates involved in the March 28, 2010 incident were African-
Americans, three (3) were the perpetrators and received less severe punishment.
Dkt. 19 at 8 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 48). Plaintiff premises this claim on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. The
claim fails for multiple reasons.
To begin, as the District points out, the D.C. Circuit has held that § 1983 remains the only
remedy available to Plaintiffs who allege that state actors have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See
Brown v. Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016, 1020–21 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Therefore, the violation that
Plaintiff alleges in Count II is only actionable through the statutory route addressed in Count I,
and the same municipal liability limitations apply. Olatunji v. District of Columbia, 958 F. Supp.
2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2013).
Moreover, as discussed above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to state a
municipal liability claim for racial discrimination under the Monell framework, and, even beyond
that difficulty, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support a plausible claim of
racial discrimination. The “court must first ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state [the] claim to relief, and then determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded those elements
with adequate factual support to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Blue v.
District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 678)
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(internal citations omitted) (alterations in original). One element of a racial discrimination claim
under § 1981 (or under the Equal Protection Clause component of the Fifth Amendment) is that
“the defendant intended to discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of race.” Wilson v. DNC
Servs. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 3d 392, 399–400 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Mazloum v. District of
Columbia Metro. Police Dep’t, 522 F. Supp. 2d 24, 37 (D.D.C. 2007)). To withstand a rule
12(b)(6) motion on such a claim, a plaintiff “must allege some facts to show that race was the
reason for the defendant’s action,” such as facts indicating “that he was treated less favorably
than another similarly situated person of a different race.” Id. at 400. Plaintiff alleges no such
facts here. His only relevant factual allegation—that the three African American inmates who
assaulted him were not subjected to solitary confinement following the incident—does not
support his claim. Based on Plaintiff’s own allegations, the alleged assailants were not similarly
situated comparators; rather, Plaintiff was allegedly placed in solitary confinement because he
refused to waive his potential claim against Defendants and because he refused to identify his
assailants. The complaint does not even suggest that Plaintiff’s attackers were similarly situated.
Because Plaintiff has failed to plead any other facts that would support a plausible claim
under § 1981 or that would support a plausible inference of intentional racial discrimination, the
Court will dismiss Count II.1
C. Count IV: “Negligent Failure to Supervise, Hire, Train and Properly Retain
Correctional Officers”
Count IV alleges that “the defendants failed properly to supervise, train, hire, fire and
monitor the actions of correctional officers” and “improperly retained certain correctional
1
Because Plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim of racial discrimination and because the
parties did not brief the issue, the Court does not address whether Count II states a claim for a
violation of his right to “make and enforce contracts,” as is required under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
See Olatunji, 958 F. Supp. 2d at 31.
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officers.” Dkt. 19 at 10 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 58). The District moves to dismiss this count,
arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that the District was on notice of any
inadequate performance by the officers.
In order to state a claim for negligent supervision or training under D.C. law, a plaintiff
must allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer “knew or should have known
its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer,
armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise the employee”
or train him. District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 794 (D.C. 2010) (quoting Giles v.
Shell Oil Corp., 487 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1985)); Blakeney v. O’Donnell, 117 F. Supp. 3d 6, 20–
21 (D.D.C. 2015) (subjecting failure to train and failure to supervise claims to similar analysis);
Spiller v. District of Columbia, 302 F. Supp. 3d 240, 254–55 (D.D.C. 2018) (same). Here, the
complaint alleges that correctional officers at the D.C. jail let inmates out of their cells at
improper times and allowed them to enter the incorrect cell blocks; “improperly protected”
Plaintiff; and “improperly supervised” other inmates, allowing him to be injured by other
inmates on two different occasions. Dkt. 19 at 4, 6 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 33). But, as
discussed above, Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating that the District had actual or
constructive knowledge of any such behavior and, accordingly, “notice that the officers required
additional supervision or training.” Spiller, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 255; see also Blakeney, 117 F.
Supp. 3d at 21 (dismissing negligent failure to train and supervise claims where plaintiff “has not
alleged any facts to support the inference that the District had knowledge of MPD officers’
tendency to use excessive force”). Absent any such factual allegations, he cannot state a claim
for negligent supervision or training.
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The Court will, therefore, dismiss Count IV.2
D. Count VI: “Violation of the District of Columbia Human Rights Act”
Finally, Count VI alleges that “the defendants, through their agents and employees,
violated the [DCHRA] by [their] actions or inaction.” Dkt. 19 at 11 (3d Amd. Compl. ¶ 67).
The District responds that Plaintiff has not identified which provision of the DCHRA he believes
it violated, and further argues that the DCHRA does not extend to inmates in a jail setting. See
Dkt. 20 at 15 (citing D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq.). Plaintiff counters that he “need not specify
what part of the [DCHRA] is applicable” and that the law extends to those who, like, Plaintiff
live “in the jail and [participate in] educational classes” there. Dkt. 21 at 3 (Pl. Opp. ¶ 15). In
addition, he argues that his allegations that “he was improperly classified with hardened
criminals and discriminated against by being placed in solitary confinement” are sufficient to
survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.The DCHRA was enacted “to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination
for any reason other than that of individual merit, including . . . discrimination by reason of
race.” D.C. Code § 2-1401.01. It prohibits discriminatory practices in a variety of settings and
contexts, including employment, housing and commercial space, public accommodations, and
educational institutions. D.C. Code § 2-1401 et seq.; see, e.g., Lemmons v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 431 F. Supp. 2d 76, 86 (D.D.C. 2006) (discussing intentional race discrimination claims
2
The District also argues that Count IV must be dismissed because its “decisions concerning
training, supervision, hiring and employee retention policies are policy judgments for which it is
entitled to discretionary immunity.” Dkt. 20 at 15. Because Plaintiff has failed to plead
sufficient facts to plausibly allege a claim for negligent failure to train or supervise, the Court
need not reach this argument.
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under the DCHRA); Mitchell v. DCX, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47–48 (D.D.C. 2003) (discussing
unintentional disparate-impact discrimination claims under the DCHRA).
The Court need not decide whether the DCHRA applies to inmates held in the D.C. jail
because, even if it does, Plaintiff’s complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a [discrimination] claim . . . that is plausible on its face.’”3 Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plaintiff’s bare allegation that, on a single
occasion, he was subjected to solitary confinement while three differently-situated African
American inmates were not does not plausibly support the inference that the District
discriminated against him based on his race. Id. (raising the “sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully” is not enough to defeat a motion to dismiss).
The Court will, accordingly, dismiss Count VI for failure to state a claim.
3
In Moonblatt v. District of Columbia, the district court considered a prisoner’s claims of race-,
religion-, and sexual orientation-based discrimination under the DCHRA and noted:
It is conceivable—although unlikely—that Moonblatt’s allegations could fall under
D.C. Code § 2-1402.31, which prohibits discrimination in all places of public
accommodation. Similarly, the housing portion of the DCHRA found in D.C. Code
§ 2-1402.01 may embrace Moonblatt’s allegations here, although the Court is
skeptical regarding the viability of that option as well.
572 F. Supp. 2d at 28. The court’s analysis proceeded by “assum[ing] at this juncture that a
cause of action exists.” Id.14
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 20, is hereby GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part. As to Count I, Plaintiff may proceed only on his claim that the
District violated his First Amendment rights. His other constitutional claims against the District
under § 1983 are dismissed. Counts II, IV, and VI against the District are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: September 25, 2017
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