Brooks v. Goodwill of Greater Washington ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHARLES O. BROOKS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 14-0419 (KBJ)
)
GOODWILL OF )
GREATER WASHINGTON, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Charles D. Brooks, proceeding pro se, has filed suit against his former
employer, Goodwill of Greater Washington (“Goodwill”) under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Brooks alleges that Goodwill failed to accommodate his
disabilities and that, as a result, he “unwillingly submitted a written resignation of
employment.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2.) Before this Court at present is Goodwill’s
motion to dismiss the complaint, which argues that the complaint is time-barred and
that Brooks has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (See generally Def.’s
Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 4.) Because this Court agrees with Goodwill that the instant
suit has not been filed within the applicable statute of limitations, it will GRANT
Goodwill’s motion to dismiss. A separate order consistent with this opinion will issue.
Analysis
A litigant may bring an action in federal court alleging employment
discrimination under the ADA only if he files suit within 90 days of receiving notice
from the EEOC of his right to sue. See Redding v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp.
2d 272, 279 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Hammel v. Marsh USA Inc.,
No. 14cv943, 2015 WL 525765, at *5 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2015) (“[T]he 90-day clock
begins the day after the date of receipt of the EEOC right to sue letter.” (citations
omitted)). This 90-day period operates as a statute of limitations, and thus is an
affirmative defense that a defendant can raise in a pre-answer dispositive motion. See
Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia, 155 F.3d 575, 577-78 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As an
affirmative defense, the 90-day period is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
tolling; however, it is a plaintiff’s burden to show why he should be excused from this
deadline. See id. at 578-79; Jordan v. Quander, 882 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94-95 (D.D.C.
2012) (citing cases).
In this matter, Brooks attached to his complaint an EEOC right-to-sue letter
dated August 19, 2013, which advised him that he had 90 days to file suit based on his
charge of discrimination. (Dismissal and Notice of Rights, ECF No. 1 at 4.) The
complaint does not state when Brooks received this document; therefore, the Court will
presume that the EEOC issued and mailed the right-to-sue letter on the same date,
Hammel, 2015 WL 525765, at *5, and that Brooks received the letter “either three or
five days” thereafter, Mack v. WP Co., LLC, 923 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (D.D.C. 2013)
(citation omitted). Because the 90 th day following August 24, 2013, fell on a Saturday,
Brooks had, at the latest, until Monday, November 25, 2013, to file this lawsuit.
However, Brooks did not file his complaint and in forma pauperis application until
approximately two months later—on January 22, 2014—which renders his filing
untimely under federal law.
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The fact that Brooks is a pro se plaintiff who filed this action without the
assistance of a lawyer is immaterial. Cf. Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp.
2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (pro se status does not give a plaintiff “a license to ignore”
the rules applicable in federal court) (citation omitted). Furthermore, it appears that
Brooks has conceded the untimeliness argument, given that he failed to address
Goodwill’s statute of limitations defense in his opposition to the motion to dismiss,
notwithstanding the Court’s exhortations to respond to Goodwill’s motion (see May 5,
2014 Order, ECF No. 6), and Brooks has not otherwise provided this Court with any
reason to excuse his untimely filing. See, e.g., Davis v. Vilsack, 880 F. Supp. 2d 156,
160 (D.D.C. 2012) (dismissing employment discrimination case filed after the 90-day
deadline because plaintiff failed to establish any “extraordinary facts warranting
equitable tolling of the time bar[]”); House v. Salazar, 598 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D.D.C.
2009) (finding plaintiff conceded his complaint was untimely when he failed to respond
to untimeliness argument in opposing defendant’s motion to dismiss).
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Goodwill’s motion to dismiss the complaint as time-
barred will be GRANTED, and the complaint will be dismissed in its entirety, as set
forth in the separate, final order that accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: March 25, 2015 Ketanji Brown Jackson
KETANJI BROWN JACKSON
United States District Judge
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