United States v. Cobble ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
v. ) Criminal Action No. 13-200 (RWR)
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JEROME COBBLE, )
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Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant Jerome Cobble moves for a judgment of acquittal,
or in the alternative, a new trial on his conviction for
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. Defendant Cobble’s
Mot. for a J. of Acquittal, or in the Alternative, a New Trial,
ECF No. 390 (“Cobble’s Mot.”). The government opposes, arguing
that Cobble was properly convicted of conspiracy to launder
monetary instruments, and that it is not in the interest of
justice to grant Cobble a new trial. United States’ Mem. in
Opp’n to Def. Jerome Cobble’s Mot. for J. of Acquittal, or in
the Alternative, a New Trial, ECF No. 400 (“Gov’t Opp’n”).
Because a rational trier of fact viewing all the trial evidence
most favorably to the government could find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Cobble conspired to launder monetary instruments, and
because Cobble does not present circumstances compelling a new
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trial in the interest of justice, Cobble’s motion will be
denied.
BACKGROUND
Jerome Cobble was indicted on one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute one hundred
grams or more of heroin and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846, and one count of conspiracy to
launder monetary instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h). Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 259. 1 After a jury
trial, Jerome Cobble was acquitted of the drug conspiracy count
and found guilty of conspiring to launder monetary instruments.
Cobble and Jermaine Washington, an admitted veteran drug
dealer, shared a uniquely close relationship; although actually
cousins, they were raised in the same household by Cobble’s
mother as brothers from a young age. Gov’t Opp’n at 6-7;
Cobble’s Mot. at 5, 7. Cobble maintained a relationship
throughout Washington’s various stints of incarceration. Gov’t
Opp’n at 6-7. In or about July 2012, Washington reached out to
Cobble to help Washington purchase a new vehicle. Gov’t Opp’n
at 9-10; Cobble’s Mot. at 5. Washington had been using a Nissan
Altima that was titled in Cobble’s name. Cobble’s Mot. at 6.
1 He was also charged with one count of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349. That count was
severed prior to trial and remains pending. See 11/12/2014
Minute Entry.
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He wanted to trade it in, though, since it had been damaged in a
car accident and thus had become “under water” on the loan.
Gov’t Opp’n at 9; Cobble’s Mot. at 6. Washington shopped around
the Washington, D.C. area for a vehicle to purchase, ultimately
settling on a Lexus SUV at a car dealership in Vienna, Virginia.
Gov’t Opp’n at 9; Cobble’s Mot. at 5-6. Washington made a down
payment to the dealership of approximately $3,000. He
testified, and the government did not refute, that the $3,000
came from the proceeds of gambling in Atlantic City, New Jersey.
Gov’t Opp’n at 9; Cobble’s Mot. at 6. The Lexus SUV was titled,
registered, and insured in Cobble’s name. Cobble’s Mot. at 5.
Washington testified that he and Cobble agreed that Washington
would deposit the monthly loan payments for the Lexus SUV into
Cobble’s bank account. Gov’t Opp’n at 9. The Lexus SUV was
stolen, though, before any initial loan payment was made.
Cobble’s Mot. at 6.
At trial, during cross-examination of Washington by
Cobble’s counsel, Washington engaged in an unsolicited,
emotional, and inconsolable diatribe expressing his regret for
getting Cobble “caught up” in this matter. Gov’t Opp’n at 26;
Cobble’s Mot. at 18-20.
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The jury found Cobble guilty of conspiring to launder
monetary instruments, and Cobble now timely moves for a judgment
of acquittal or a new trial. 2
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 requires “the court
on the defendant’s motion [to] enter a judgment of acquittal for
any offense for which the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). “The motion for judgment
of acquittal may be granted where ‘there is no evidence upon
which a reasonable mind might find guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” United States v. Gray-Burriss, Criminal Action No. 10-
178 (RWR), 2013 WL 460220 at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2013) (quoting
United States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
“The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
government.” Id. (same).
The statute criminalizing conspiring to launder monetary
instruments, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), provides that “[a]ny person
who conspires to commit any offense defined in this section or
section 1957 shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the
2 Cobble initially moved for a judgment of acquittal after
the close of the government’s evidence, and again immediately
after the verdict was returned by the jury. The Court reserved
ruling on both of those motions.
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object of the conspiracy.” In order to sustain Cobble’s
conviction, there must be sufficient evidence such that a
rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable
doubt that Cobble (1) agreed to commit a money laundering
offense, and (2) knowingly and voluntarily participated in that
agreement. See United States v. Broughton, 689 F.3d 1260, 1280
(11th Cir. 2012) (“[U]nder 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), only two
elements of a conspiracy need be proven: (1) agreement between
two or more persons to commit a money-laundering offense; and
(2) knowing and voluntary participation in that agreement by the
defendant.”); see also United States v. Farrell, Criminal Action
No. 03-311-1 (RWR), 2005 WL 1606916 at *8 (D.D.C. July 8, 2005)
(“[The defendant] stands convicted of a conspiracy to commit
money laundering in which the government’s required proof
included simply the existence of the unlawful agreement and [the
defendant’s] willful joinder in it.”). A defendant knowingly or
willfully participates in the conspiracy when he knows and
intends to further its purpose. See United States v. Fuchs, 467
F.3d 889, 906 (5th Cir. 2006) (“To establish conspiracy to
commit money laundering, the government must prove (1) that
there was an agreement between two or more persons to commit
money laundering and (2) that the defendant joined the agreement
knowing its purpose and with the intent to further the illegal
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purpose.”); United States v. Wittig, 575 F.3d 1085, 1103 (10th
Cir. 2009) (same).
There are two money laundering offenses that Count Two of
the indictment alleges that Cobble conspired to commit with the
Lexus purchase. One is using illegal drug proceeds to promote
illegal drug sales, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The other is using illegal drug sale
proceeds to conceal and disguise the source of drug sale
proceeds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Cobble
argues that “the government has utterly failed to show any
effort or intent to disguise that illegal funds formed any part
of the transaction,” and therefore no rational trier of fact
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cobble is guilty of
conspiracy to launder monetary instruments. Cobble’s Mot. at
17.
Cobble attacks only one potential purpose for the money
laundering conspiracy - - disguising or concealing the source of
the proceeds. But since the indictment charged him with two
potential purposes, either if proven is sufficient to uphold the
conviction. At trial, the government elicited testimony,
primarily from Washington, that Washington sold and distributed
heroin both before and after purchasing the Lexus SUV, Cobble’s
Mot. at 13-14, and presented evidence that Washington on various
occasions used a vehicle to deliver narcotics to buyers.
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Cobble’s Mot. at 14 n.3. This evidence along with evidence of
Cobble’s close relationship with Washington could lead a
rational trier of fact to infer that Cobble knew that the
purpose of buying the Lexus SUV was for Washington to continue
to be able to distribute drugs - - satisfying the proof of
conspiring to violate § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Accordingly, Cobble’s
motion for a judgment of acquittal will be denied.
II. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that “[u]pon
the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any judgment and
grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 33(a). The defendant must carry the burden in
demonstrating that a new trial is “in the interest of justice.”
United States v. Machado-Erazo, 986 F. Supp. 2d 39, 44 (D.D.C.
2013) (citing United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d 1270, 1285
(D.C. Cir. 1982)). “However, a new trial should be granted only
if the error was not harmless and affected the defendant’s
substantial rights.” Id. (citing United States v. Walker, 899
F. Supp. 14, 15 (D.D.C. 1995)). Once an error affecting a
defendant’s substantial rights is uncovered, the government
bears the burden of proving that the error was harmless. See
United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1183-1184 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (explaining that when a defendant timely objects to an
alleged error in the district court the harmless error standard
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applies and “[t]he government bears the burden of proving that
prejudice did not result from the error.”). The decision to
grant a new trial is “committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge, and is subject to reversal only for abuse of
discretion or misapplication of the law.” Machado-Erazo, 986 F.
Supp. 2d at 44 (quoting United States v. Reese, 561 F.2d 894,
902 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).
Cobble requests a new trial “based on the testimony and
demeanor of Jermaine Washington.” Cobble’s Mot. at 17.
Essentially, Cobble argues that Washington’s unsolicited rant
prejudiced the jury and placed Cobble in a “’can’t win’
position.” Id. at 21. While dramatic, Washington’s unsolicited
outburst expressed Washington’s remorse for getting Cobble
involved in the legal jeopardy that brought Cobble to trial. It
is also not extraordinary that a testifying government informant
would yield incriminating testimony or evidence, be it on direct
examination or cross-examination. That outburst did not rise to
a level that warrants a new trial. United States v. Bamberger,
456 F.2d 1119, 1128 (2d Cir. 1972) (“Courtroom outbursts and
disruptions . . . although regrettable and deplorable, cannot be
seized upon in and of themselves as justifications for
retrials.”). Accordingly, Cobble’s motion for new trial will be
denied.
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CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because sufficient evidence was presented at trial such
that a rational factfinder could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Cobble conspired to launder monetary instruments, and
Washington’s unsolicited outburst is not a sufficient basis for
finding that a new trial is in the interest of justice, it is
hereby
ORDERED that Cobble’s Motion for a Judgment of Acquittal
or, in the Alternative, a New Trial [390] be, and hereby is,
DENIED.
SIGNED this 2nd day of September, 2015.
/s/
________________________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge