Roberts v. District of Columbia , 134 F. Supp. 3d 404 ( 2015 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SHANTAE ROBERTS,
as Parent/Guardian of D.R,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 14-1842 (DAR)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shantae Roberts brings this action to recover $38,086 in attorneys’ fees and
costs that she incurred in connection with administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. Complaint
(Document No. 1). Pending for determination are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(“Plaintiff’s Motion”) (Document No. 11) and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment (“Defendant’s Motion”) (Document No. 13). Upon consideration of the motions, the
memoranda in support thereof and opposition thereto, the attached exhibits, and the entire record
herein, the court will grant Plaintiff’s motion in part, and deny Defendant’s motion as moot.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Shantae Roberts is the parent of D.R., a minor student residing in the District of
Columbia who is eligible to receive special education and related services. See Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgement (“Plaintiff’s Memorandum”) (Document No. 11-1) at 2. Plaintiff filed an
Roberts v. District of Columbia 2
administrative due process complaint against District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) on
April 11, 2014, in which she raised a number of issues “alleg[ing] that [DCPS] failed to comply
with its affirmative obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate [D.R.] over several years to
determine her need for special education based on [D.R.’s} problem behaviors in school and
repeated requests for evaluation . . . .” Hearing Officer Determination (Document No. 11-5) at 1.
After conducting a hearing on Plaintiff’s complaint, the Hearing Officer issued a determination
(“HOD”) on June 3, 2014, finding in Plaintiff’s favor. Id. at 1-13. 1
Following the hearing officer’s determination, Plaintiff commenced an action in this
court seeking $38,086 in attorneys’ fees and costs that she incurred in the underlying
administrative proceedings. Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 7.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
Plaintiff submits that she was the prevailing party in this action and is, therefore, entitled
to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs as provided by the applicable authorities. See Plaintiff’s
Memorandum (Document No. 11-1) at 3. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks a total of $38,086, which
reflects $37,350 in attorneys’ fees at a rate of $450 per hour. See Plaintiff’s Invoice (Document
No. 11-6) at 1. Plaintiff avers that the hourly rates billed by her counsel are reasonable, given
her 17 years of experience in special education law and applicable prevailing market rates
established by the Laffey matrix. 2 Plaintiff’s Memorandum (Document No. 11-1) at 4-5.
Plaintiff further contends that the number of hours requested are also reasonable. Id. at 5.
1
The Hearing Officer did find, however, that Plaintiff’s claim with regard to the 2011-2012 school year was time-
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Hearing Officer Determination (Document No. 11-5) at 9.
2
The Laffey matrix is “a schedule of charges based on years of experience developed in Laffey v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1021 [] (1985).” Covington v. Dist. of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (footnote omitted).
The Civil Division of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia updates and maintains a
Laffey matrix, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/divisions/Laffey_Matrix 2014.pdf.
Roberts v. District of Columbia 3
Defendant concedes that Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the underlying
administrative proceedings, and makes no argument with regard to the reasonableness of the
number of hours claimed. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgement and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Memorandum”) at 3. That
being said, Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff’s request of attorneys’ fees at a rate of $450 per
hour. Id. at 1. Defendant contends that Plaintiff has “failed to set forth a scintilla of evidence
that the matter upon which this suit is based was particularly complicated or somehow not the
ordinary run-of-the-mill IDEA matter.” Id. at 2-3. Defendant argues, therefore, that an award of
attorney’s fees at three-quarters of the applicable Laffey rate is warranted under these
circumstances, yielding a rate of $337.50 per hour. Id. at 9. The only issue that Defendant raises
with regard to costs is that an award representing travel time should be at 50 percent of the
reduced applicable Laffey rate. Id. at 9-10.
Plaintiff counters Defendant’s assertions by claiming that the administrative proceeding
was sufficiently complex as evidenced by the amount of time spent in preparation for the
administrative hearing and requisite knowledge. Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendant’s Response in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition
to Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Reply”) (Document No. 14) at
2-3. Moreover, Plaintiff reasserts her position that an award at the full Laffey rate represents the
prevailing market rate for an attorney of her counsel’s experience, and is, therefore, wholly
appropriate. Id. at 3-4. Lastly, as alternate relief, Plaintiff requests that the Court award her
attorneys’ fees at three-quarters of the current Laffey rate or $345 per hour. Id. at 5. 3
3
Plaintiff offers no argument as to why the award of attorneys’ fees should represent the current Laffey rate as
opposed to the Laffey rate in effect at the time her counsel provided services. See Tillman v. District of Columbia,
Roberts v. District of Columbia 4
APPLICABLE STANDARDS
Determination of a Reasonable Billing Rate
In actions for attorneys' fees that are brought pursuant to the IDEA, “the court, in its
discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs” to the prevailing party. 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(I). In evaluating such a request, the court must first determine “whether
the party seeking attorney's fees is the prevailing party,” and if so, must then evaluate whether
the requested fees are reasonable. Wood v. District of Columbia, 72 F. Supp. 3d 13, 18 (D.D.C.
2014) (citing Staton v. District of Columbia, No. 13–773, 2014 WL 2700894, at *3 (D.D.C. June
11, 2014), adopted by, 2014 WL 2959017; Douglas v. District of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d 36,
40 (D.D.C. 2014)).
As the Circuit recently observed, “[t]he IDEA provides no further guidance for
determining an appropriate fee award.” Eley v. District of Columbia, 793 F.3d 97, 100 (D.C. Cir.
2015). Thus, the common mechanism for the determination of a reasonable award is generally
“the number of hours reasonably expended” multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Wood, F.
Supp. 3d at 18 (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The party requesting
fees bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the hours expended, and “may
satisfy this burden by submitting an invoice that is sufficiently detailed to permit the District
Court to make an independent determination whether or not the hours claimed are justified.” Id.
(citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433). The party requesting fees “also bears the burden of
establishing the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought,” and in doing so, “must submit
evidence on at least three fronts: the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience,
No. 14-1542, 2015 WL 5011656, at *7 n.6 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015) (awarding attorneys’ fees at three-quarters of the
Laffey rate in effect at the time the services were provided).
Roberts v. District of Columbia 5
and reputation; and the prevailing market rates in the relevant community.” Wood, 72 F. Supp.
3d at 18-19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing In re North, 59 F.3d 184, 189 (D.C. Cir.
1995)); see generally Covington, 57 F.3d at 1107. If the party requesting fees satisfies its
burden, “there is a presumption that the number of hours billed and the hourly rates are
reasonable,” and “the burden then shifts to the [opposing party] to rebut” this presumption. Id.
(citations omitted) (quoting another source) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4
In this jurisdiction, the Laffey Matrix serves as the commonly accepted benchmark for the
determination of prevailing market rates for attorneys' fees in complex federal court litigation.
See Eley, 793 F.3d at 100. “The prevailing market rate provides merely a starting point for
determining the reasonableness of a billing rate . . . . The fee applicant should also submit
evidence, including affidavits, regarding her counsel's general billing practices, skill, experience
and reputation.” Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 21 (quoting Baker v. District of Columbia Pub. Sch.,
815 F. Supp. 2d 102, 114 (D.D.C. 2011)) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks and
alterations omitted).
Nonetheless, judges of this court have adopted varying approaches to determining the
prevailing market rate for attorneys' fees in IDEA actions. Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 19. “While
some judges of this court have applied the full Laffey rates in IDEA cases, others have applied a
rate equal to three-fourths of the Laffey Matrix rate . . . where the underlying administrative
proceedings did not involve particularly complex matters.” Id. (quoting Haywood v. Dist. of
Columbia, No. 12–1722, 2013 WL 5211437, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2013)) (citations omitted)
4
The traditional summary judgment standard is not applicable to the Plaintiff's motion, although it is styled as a
motion for summary judgment. Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 18; see also Gardill v. District of Columbia, 930 F. Supp.
2d 35, 37 n. 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Although the plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees in a motion for summary judgment, the
typical summary judgment standard is inapplicable here. . . .”).
Roberts v. District of Columbia 6
(emphasis supplied); see also Gardill, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 42 (citations omitted) (“Some courts
find that the Laffey rate is presumptively reasonable. . . . Other courts treat the Laffey Matrix as
providing ‘the highest rates that will be presumed to be reasonable when a court reviews a
petition for statutory attorneys' fees' . . . [and] impose lower rates where ‘the defendant shows
that the proceedings for which compensation is sought were straightforward or otherwise not
demanding of counsel's skills and experience.’”).
“[D]ecisions from this Circuit have identified a number of indicia of complexity, such as
(1) the length of the administrative hearing; (2) the number of documents and witnesses
presented at the administrative hearing; (3) the amount of discovery required; (4) the presence of
novel legal issues; (5) the quantity of briefing required, and (6) the use of expert testimony.”
Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 20 (quoting Gardill, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 43); see also Thomas v. District
of Columbia, 908 F. Supp. 2d 233, 247 (D.D.C. 2011) (criticizing a magistrate judge’s omission
of a fact-specific determination of complexity as a prerequisite to a finding regarding the
appropriate billing rate).
More recently, this Court has cautioned that IDEA cases “take a variety of litigation
paths” and cannot be dismissed as categorically routine or simple.” Sweatt v. District of
Columbia, 82 F. Supp. 3d 454, 459 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Thomas, 908 F. Supp. 2d at 243). By
way of illustration, the Court has observed that “IDEA cases require ‘testimony from education
experts regarding whether a student has been denied a free and public education,’ . . . and
plaintiffs' counsel must ‘understand the bureaucratic workings of [DCPS] . . . and . . . become
conversant with a wide range of disabling cognitive, emotional, and language-based disorders
and the corresponding therapeutic and educational approaches.’” Id. at 460 (citations omitted).
Moreover, “[s]ince an attorney's total fee award is determined by multiplying the number of
Roberts v. District of Columbia 7
hours expended by the hourly rate, reducing the Laffey rates to reflect the brevity of the case
improperly accounts for the length of the proceedings twice.” Id. Therefore, “[t]he complexity
of the case is accounted for by the number of hours expended and should not be accounted for by
a blunt reduction of rates before applying the rates to the number of hours expended.” Id. While
the Circuit thus far has declined to decide “whether IDEA litigation is in fact sufficiently
‘complex’ to use [some version of the Laffey Matrix][,]” it has criticized the mechanical
application of the proposition “that IDEA cases, as a subset of civil rights litigation, fail to
qualify as ‘complex federal litigation.’” Eley, 793 F.3d at 105. 5
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff Has Not Met Her Burden
The Court finds that an award of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff’s counsel at the full Laffey
rate is not warranted under these circumstances. As discussed by Sweatt, this Court similarly
rejects the notion that IDEA cases by their very nature are somehow “categorically routine or
simple,” thus warranting reduced compensation. See Sweatt, 82 F. Supp. 3d at 459 (quoting
Thomas v. District of Columbia, F. Supp. 2d 233, 243 (D.D.C.2012). That said, it has not yet
been established that full Laffey rates will be appropriate in every IDEA case. See Sweatt, 82 F.
Supp. 3d at 450; see also Gaston v. District of Columbia, 2015 WL 5029328, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug.
26, 2015), adopted by, 2015 WL 5332111. The burden is still upon the party seeking attorneys’
fees to demonstrate “the reasonableness of the hourly rate sought.” Wood, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 18
(internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the reasonableness of the rate rests on an analysis
of the attorneys' billing practices; the attorneys' skill, experience, and reputation; and the
5
In a concurring opinion, a member of the Eley panel wrote that “I would simply add that in my view, the United
States Attorney’s Laffey Matrix is appropriate for IDEA cases.” 793 F.3d at 105.
Roberts v. District of Columbia 8
prevailing market rates in the relevant community, in conjunction with the complexity of the
particular administrative proceeding.
With regard to the aforementioned criteria, in reference to her attorney, Plaintiff submits
1. Billing Practices: Since 1997 and at all times relevant to this case,
Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing practice has consistently been detailed
and recorded in either the billing software program “Timeslips” or,
most recently, the software provided by DCPS.
2. Experience: Carolyn Houck, Esq. is trained and knowledgeable
and has practiced exclusively in the field of special education since
1997.
3. Prevailing Rate: The prevailing market rates in the District of
Columbia special education community, as determined by several
judges in this Court, is the Laffey Matrix, described below.
See Plaintiff’s Memorandum (Document No. 11-1) at 4. With regard to the complexity of the
administrative proceeding, Plaintiff contends
The plaintiff had to participate in a due process hearing in order to
obtain relief. In order to prevail at the hearing, undersigned counsel
was required to have knowledge of the psychological and academic
issues involved in the student’s disabilities, understand the
procedural rules and substantive legal issues, and [] have the ability
to present all of this information in a cohesive and logical manner.
This was not a simple hearing, as defendant implies. A detailed
Complaint was filed (after thoroughly researching the facts and
applicable laws of each case), a pre-hearing conference was held, a
pre- hearing Order was issued, and materials were disclosed
(including witness lists and exhibits). The hearing itself involved
the preparation of opening and closing statements, as well as direct
and cross-examination of all witnesses. This was not an open and
shut case.
Plaintiff’s Reply (Document No. 14) at 3. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
fallen short of her burden. Here, for example, Plaintiff has not described her counsel's billing
practices; instead, she states that her “counsel's billing practice has consistently been detailed and
recorded in either the billing software program ‘Timeslips' or, most recently, the software
Roberts v. District of Columbia 9
provided by DCPS.” Plaintiff’s Memorandum at 5; see Haywood, 2013 WL 5211437, at *7
(citing Santamaria v. Dist. of Columbia, 875 F. Supp. 2d 12, 21 (D.D.C. 2012)) (applying rates
equal to three-quarters of the Laffey rates for the same counsel where plaintiffs did not describe
“complexities in their proceedings” or provide evidence of counsel's actual billing practices); see
also Clay, 2014 WL 322017, at *6 n.5 (citations omitted).
In addition, Plaintiff’s proffer is not sufficient to show that the administrative proceeding
was adequately complex to warrant an award at the full Laffey rate. An independent review of
the administrative record also has produced no evidence that the issues before the Hearing
Officer were sufficiently complex or novel to justify such an award. Plaintiff pled four claims in
a four–page due process complaint, and the claims were heard during a one day of hearing in
which Plaintiff called two witnesses and the Defendant called one witness. See Hearing Officer
Determination (Document No. 11-5) at 1-3; see also Due Process Complaint (Document No. 11-
4) at 1-4. At the hearing, testimony was elicited from Plaintiff, an Educational
Advocate/Consultant, and the Vice Principal from D.R.’s middle school regarding D.R.’s
behavioral issues, emotional/mental state, and the necessity of an evaluation. See Hearing
Officer Determination (Document No. 11-5) at 3-7. While the preparation for this hearing as
described by Plaintiff’s counsel obviously is important and necessary, and certainly integral to all
IDEA proceedings, Plaintiff, nevertheless, has not described any complexity specific to her case.
See Gardill, 930 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (D.D.C.2013) (applying three-quarters of the Laffey rates where
“the plaintiffs [ ] neither argued nor provided evidence that the underlying IDEA litigation
presented any novel legal issues or difficult complexities,” but awarding full Laffey rates for two
matters for which the plaintiffs had demonstrated that the “cases were sufficiently complex”).
These circumstances present a stark contrast to the factual scenario presented in Gaston, in
Roberts v. District of Columbia 10
which the Gaston court found that the lengthy, complex proceeding, a voluminous record, the
presence numerous novel issues of law, as well as a significant deal of expert testimony, all
compelled the conclusion that the administrative proceeding was complex. 2015 WL 5029328,
at *6-7.
Accordingly, the Court will award attorneys’ fees at three-quarters of the Laffey rate to
Plaintiff at the hourly rate of $337.50 for Ms. Houck in the amount of $28,350, plus costs in the
amount of $567.75, for a total award of $28,917.75. 6
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Document
No. 11) will be granted in part, and Defendant District of Columbia's Cross–Motion for
Summary Judgment (Document No. 13) will be denied by order filed contemporaneously
herewith.
/s/ .
DEBORAH A. ROBINSON
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: September 30, 2015
6
Here, travel time is awarded at 50 percent of the $337.50 rate. McAllister v. District of Columbia, 21 F. Supp. 3d
94, 106 (D.D.C. 2014).