Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Justice ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JUDICIAL WATCH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 12-1510 (JDB)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Defendant.
ORDER
This Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case, concerning Operation Fast and Furious
documents, has been stayed pending developments in another case in this district—involving the
same documents—since February 2013. Plaintiff, Judicial Watch, Inc., (“Judicial Watch”) has
moved to lift the stay. For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant in part Judicial
Watch’s motion and partially lift the stay.
BACKGROUND
In 2011, the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee (the “House
Committee”) issued a subpoena to the Attorney General of the United States, seeking documents
related to a congressional investigation into a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives operation known as Operation Fast and Furious. In response, President Barack
Obama invoked executive privilege. The House Committee filed suit, seeking to enforce its
subpoena and to challenge the President’s assertion of executive privilege; that case is pending
before Judge Amy Berman Jackson, another judge in this district. See Comm. on Oversight &
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Gov’t Reform, U.S. House of Representatives v. Holder, No. 12-1332 (ABJ) (D.D.C. Aug. 13,
2012) (“House Committee”).
Soon after the President invoked executive privilege, Judicial Watch submitted a FOIA
request for all records subject to that claim of executive privilege (in other words, for the very
same records that are the subject of House Committee). See Pl.’s Compl. [ECF No. 1] at 2. The
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) denied that request. Id. at 2-3. Judicial Watch then filed suit,
challenging that denial. This Court stayed the case in February 2013, in part “to allow ongoing
settlement discussions [to continue] and, if a full settlement is not reached, to let the House
Committee court rule on the [then-pending] motion to dismiss.” Feb. 15, 2013 Order Staying
Case [ECF No. 20] at 4. In the Order granting the stay, this Court explicitly noted that DOJ
“does not seek, and the Court will not award, an indefinite stay pending ultimate resolution of the
House Committee litigation,” and that “the benefits of delaying this case might well [become]
too attenuated to justify any further delay.” Id. Since that Order, the Court has periodically
reconsidered whether to extend the stay, and has found each time that continuing the stay is
appropriate. See, e.g., Minute Order of Oct. 11, 2013. For a while, Judicial Watch opposed
extension of the stay, and after the Court again continued the stay in November 2013, Judicial
Watch appealed. Judicial Watch v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 13-5337 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2013).
The D.C. Circuit dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction, see May 27, 2014 Mandate [ECF
No. 34], after which Judicial Watch represented several times that continuing the stay was
appropriate, see, e.g., Joint Status Report [ECF No. 33] at 1-2.
While all this was going on, Judge Jackson denied DOJ’s motion to dismiss in House
Committee, and the parties in that case then fully briefed and argued cross-motions for summary
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judgment. Settlement discussions there, while ongoing, have not been fruitful, and Judge Jackson
has not ruled on the recently filed summary judgment motions.
Following oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment in House
Committee, Judicial Watch reversed its position on the propriety of the stay here. It now asks this
Court to lift the stay and for this litigation to proceed as a normal FOIA case would, starting with
an order from the Court that DOJ produce a Vaughn index. See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484
F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
DISCUSSION
Whether to grant or lift a stay is discretionary, but “[o]nly in rare circumstances will a
litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant in another settles the rule of law
that will define the rights of both.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936); see Am. Life Ins.
Co. v. Stewart, 300 U.S. 203, 215 (1937) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 255) (“in the exercise of a
sound discretion [a court] may hold one lawsuit in abeyance to abide the outcome of another,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same”); see also Colorado River Water
Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (“As between federal district
courts . . . the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation”); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 310 (1944) (noting that if “numerous parallel cases are filed, the courts have ample
authority to stay useless litigation until the determination of a test case”). Here, “[t]he
Government’s initial request for a stay was to avoid interference with another case—a case of
public importance—and this present[s] strong consideration for [a] stay.” Dellinger v. Mitchell,
442 F.2d 782, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971). And unlike in other cases where a stay could harm
plaintiff’s case, here, Judicial Watch risks little prejudice “resulting from the loss of evidence,
including the inability of witnesses to recall specific facts, or the possible death of a party.”
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Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). Nevertheless, Judicial Watch should be required to
sit on the sidelines here only for compelling reasons.
Avoiding interference with the House Committee case, and allowing negotiations
between two co-equal branches of government to proceed undisrupted, is this Court’s chief
concern in considering whether to lift the stay. There are many good reasons not to decide the
constitutional question(s) lurking here1 before Judge Jackson does. The litigants in House
Committee are competing branches of government. Resolution of subpoena disputes between the
legislature and the executive involves a sensitive process of negotiation and accommodation. See
United States v. AT&T Co., 567 F.2d 121, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“The Constitution contemplates
such accommodation. Negotiation between the two branches should thus be viewed as a dynamic
process affirmatively furthering the constitutional scheme.”). If any court is to resolve a dispute
between the political branches over executive privilege—and historically, such disputes have
been resolved through negotiation rather than by resort to the judiciary—it should be, in the first
instance, the court hearing the case in which both branches are represented. That is not this case.
Moreover, it is not efficient for two judges in the same district to simultaneously resolve the
same complex privilege question. What is more, House Committee is the earlier-filed suit, and
that case has advanced to the point where the issues may be decided in the near future (subject to
any appeals).
But this Court now concludes that this case may proceed without interfering with House
Committee or upsetting the delicate balance of power between the branches. To fully resolve this
FOIA dispute, absent any settlement, the Court will have to determine many issues logically
antecedent to any constitutional question. That is because House Committee and this case are in
very different procedural postures. In House Committee, DOJ is refusing to produce any
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Those questions involve the validity and scope of the executive privilege asserted by the President.
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documents to the House Committee pursuant to a claim of executive privilege. The parties are
litigating whether that privilege claim was proper, whether it covers all the documents being
withheld, and whether the House Committee may defeat that privilege. Constitutional issues are
thus teed up for resolution there.
Here, DOJ is withholding every document under FOIA Exemption 5. That provision
exempts from disclosure any “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). So if, for example, a document is protected by a valid claim of attorney-
client privilege, it will normally and properly be withheld under Exemption 5. See NLRB v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975). So too if a document is protected by a valid
claim of executive privilege. Id. Another frequently cited rationale for withholding documents
under Exemption 5 is the common-law “deliberative process” privilege. Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
Food & Drug Admin., 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under that privilege, documents may
be withheld if they are “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Id. Other reasons justify withholding
documents under Exemption 5 as well (e.g., attorney work-product), as its text makes plain.
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
DOJ claims here that, in addition to other Exemption 5 rationales, at least two distinct
forms2 of executive privilege justify withholding documents: a “deliberative process” privilege
of constitutional dimensions and a “congressional response work-product” privilege. See Mem.
in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., House Committee, No. 12-1332 [ECF No. 63] (“House
Committee Def.’s Mot.”) at 21-27, 27-30. It appears that neither form has been expressly
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DOJ contends that these are differing justifications for, not forms of, executive privilege. House
Committee Def.’s Mot. at 20 (“[t]here is only one Executive Privilege, grounded in the Constitution”). Without
opining on the correctness of DOJ’s formulation, the Court notes that it will refer to different forms of executive
privilege for simplicity’s sake.
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recognized by any court. Id. (citing Senate Select Comm. on Pres. Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). The contours of the constitutionally based “deliberative process”
privilege seem plain: a document must, at minimum, be “predecisional” and “deliberative.” See
House Committee, No. 12-1332, May 15, 2014 Tr. of Oral Arg. [ECF No. 79] at 52-53 (attorney
representing DOJ confirming that those are two elements of constitutional deliberative process
privilege). The purported “congressional response work-product” privilege would cover a
broader range of documents. See House Committee Def.’s Mot. at 27-30.
Importantly, the narrower constitutional privilege claimed by DOJ—the constitutional
“deliberative process” privilege—appears to overlap with the traditional FOIA “deliberative
process” privilege. In other words, if a document is both “predecisional” and “deliberative,” it
may be withheld under FOIA; it also would qualify as privileged under DOJ’s conception of
executive privilege.3 But because DOJ could refuse to release that document to Judicial Watch in
this case simply because it is exempt under garden-variety deliberative process privilege, the
Court need not reach the constitutional privilege question for that document.
Setting aside documents that would be exempt under FOIA’s deliberative process
privilege, DOJ might withhold other documents in this case under Exemption 5 for reasons other
than executive privilege. Imagine a document that is not predecisional and deliberative but that is
protected by the attorney-client privilege. Other documents might also be protected from
disclosure by other FOIA exemptions, to the extent DOJ has not waived its right to assert them.
Perhaps these exemption claims will permit DOJ to properly withhold all documents in
this case. If so, that would end this case without any inquiry into executive privilege. But perhaps
3
The Court does not opine on the existence or scope of that privilege; instead, the Court simply notes
DOJ’s arguments that a constitutionally-based “deliberative process” privilege exists and that it encompasses, at
least, “predecisional” and “deliberative” documents. See House Committee, No. 12-1332, May 15, 2014 Tr. of Oral
Arg. [ECF No. 79] at 52-53.
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a Vaughn index or further litigation would reveal that some documents are not covered by
deliberative process privilege—constitutionally based or otherwise—and are not exempt for any
other reason under FOIA except perhaps for the congressional-response-work-product executive
privilege claim DOJ has identified. Picture a document that is not predecisional and deliberative,
that does not otherwise satisfy Exemption 5, and that is not covered by any other FOIA
exemption.4 DOJ might continue to withhold that document only because it is arguably the
subject of a congressional-response-work-product executive privilege claim, and thus exempt
under Exemption 5. To decide whether that document must be released, the Court would have to
determine whether the executive privilege claim is valid and that it covers the document. Put
differently, this Court needs to consider the executive privilege issue in this case only if no other
reason permits DOJ to withhold a particular document under FOIA.
Thus, much is left to do here before this Court would reach any issues being addressed in
House Committee or in the negotiations between the political branches. In this circuit, when an
agency is withholding documents under exemption claims, courts require that the agency provide
a Vaughn index so that the FOIA requester—at a distinct informational disadvantage—may test
the agency’s claims. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422, 432 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Vaughn indices were designed to allow the agency “to justify its actions without compromising
its original withholdings by disclosing too much information. . . . By allowing the agency to
provide descriptions of withheld documents, the index gives the court and the challenging party a
measure of access without exposing the withheld information.” Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449
F.3d 141, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2006). True, nothing in the subpoena enforcement context of House
Committee would require DOJ to produce a particularized description of the withheld
documents. See Comm. on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d
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Again, to the extent DOJ has not waived its right to assert other exemptions.
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53, 107 (D.D.C. 2008). But this is a FOIA case, and since 1973, when Vaughn was decided,
courts in this circuit have required agencies to justify their FOIA withholdings on a
particularized basis.5 And doing so here will not prematurely expose or resolve the executive
privilege issues ahead of Judge Jackson and the political branches; it will merely permit the
parties and this Court to cull from the dispute any documents as to which a valid, non-executive-
privilege reason for withholding exists, thereby narrowing or perhaps even resolving the case. To
the extent DOJ argues that the mere production of the Vaughn index—not involving the release
of any documents in dispute—would alter the historical balance of powers between the branches,
any unbalancing would result from FOIA itself, a law passed by Congress and signed into law by
the President, and which this Court cannot ignore forever.
Because many of the issues to be resolved in this case do not overlap with House
Committee, and because resolving those issues will not risk upsetting the delicate balance of
powers in subpoena disputes between the political branches, the Court will require DOJ to
produce a Vaughn index here. That index should satisfy the law of this circuit, permitting
Judicial Watch to test DOJ’s exemption claims without exposing the withheld information. See
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 710 F.3d at 432-433 (describing requirements of a Vaughn index).
DOJ should focus in particular on explaining its reasons, if any, other than executive privilege6
for withholding documents. Once Judicial Watch has a chance to review that index, and engage
in discussions with DOJ to narrow the issues, the Court will set a briefing schedule to resolve
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Agencies frequently assert in FOIA litigation that “categorical withholding” of documents is proper, and
that they need not even produce a Vaughn index as a result. But categorical withholding is appropriate “[o]nly when
the range of circumstances included in the category ‘characteristically support[s] an inference’ that the statutory
requirements for exemption are satisfied.” Nation Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. U.S. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 893
(D.C. Cir. 1995). A common example is documents withheld under FOIA Exemption 7(C)—not at issue in this
case—involving investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, disclosure of which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. Id.
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To be precise, reasons other than DOJ’s claimed “deliberative process” privilege of constitutional
dimensions, since documents fitting into that category very likely may be withheld under the common-law
deliberative process privilege.
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any outstanding non-constitutional issues. Only after the Court has resolved those issues will it
turn to any issues involving executive privilege; by that time, Judge Jackson will likely have
ruled on the issue, providing this Court with guidance, or the political branches may have settled
their dispute.
To be clear, the Court is not ordering the release of any documents currently being
withheld in this litigation or in House Committee. But it is time for this case to move forward.
Upon consideration of [35] Judicial Watch’s motion to lift the stay, the various memoranda filed
by the parties, the hearing held on July 8, 2014, and the entire record herein, and for the reasons
explained above, it is hereby
ORDERED that [35] Judicial Watch’s motion to lift the stay is GRANTED IN PART;
it is further
ORDERED that the Department of Justice shall submit a Vaughn index in accordance
with this Order and the law of this circuit by not later than October 1, 2014; it is further
ORDERED that this case shall remain STAYED, except for the further proceedings set
out in this Order; it is further
ORDERED that the parties shall file a joint status report with the Court within fourteen
days of any significant development in House Committee, but in any event by not later than
October 15, 2014, at which time the Court will assess the future course of this case, including
whether any further stay is appropriate; and it is further
ORDERED that a party seeking an extension of the production deadline for the Vaughn
index shall file a motion in accordance with the Local Rules.
SO ORDERED.
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/s/
JOHN D. BATES
United States District Judge
Dated: July 18, 2014
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