United States v. Robinson , 23 F. Supp. 3d 15 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
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v. ) Criminal Action No. 91-432 (RWR)
)
MICHAEL D. ROBINSON, )
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Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Defendant Michael Robinson moves to expunge the record of
his criminal conviction from 1991. The government opposes
Robinson’s motion. Because Robinson presents no extreme
circumstances that would warrant expunging his record, his
motion will be denied.
In 1991, Robinson pled guilty to one count of unlawful
possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or more of cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii).
On May 14, 1992, Robinson was sentenced to 60 months of
incarceration, and four years of supervised release, and was
ordered to pay a $50.00 special assessment and complete 50 hours
of community service. Robinson says he has been employed in
good standing for 17 years by the same employer, but he now
moves to expunge his criminal record because it is “affecting
[his] ability to remain employed” in light of more extensive
background investigations being conducted on employees. Def.’s
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Mot. to Expunge Criminal Record at 1. Robinson emphasizes that
if he is “unable to maintain employment, it will be detrimental
to [his] family.” Id.The government argues that the controlling case law does
not support the requested relief. Specifically, the government
states that Robinson has not demonstrated that “extraordinary
circumstances” exist to justify his request to expunge his
criminal record. Govt.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Pro Se Mot. to Expunge
Crim. Record at 2.
“The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not
dependent on express statutory provision, and it exists to
vindicate substantial rights provided by statute as well as by
organic law[.]” Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (citation omitted); see also Chastain v. Kelley, 510 F.2d
1232, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“The federal courts are empowered
to order the expungement of Government records where necessary
to vindicate rights secured by the Constitution or by
statute.”). “Before expunging a criminal record, the Court must
find that, after examining the particular facts and
circumstances of the case, the ‘remedy is necessary and
appropriate in order to preserve basic legal rights.’” United
States v. Davis, Criminal Action No. 342-72 (TFH), 2006 WL
1409761, at *2 (D.D.C. May 23, 2006) (quoting Livingston v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). “[R]elief
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usually is granted only in ‘extreme circumstances,’ the finding
of which requires a ‘balancing of the equities between the right
of privacy of the individual and the right of law enforcement
officers to perform their necessary duties.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Absent a statutory basis authorizing expungement, courts
have granted motions to expunge only in extreme circumstances,
such as in cases involving flagrant constitutional violations.
See, e.g., Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(“[A]lthough there are indeed many instances in which courts
have ordered expungement of arrest records in the exercise of
their inherent equitable powers, all of these cases involved
either a lack of probable cause coupled with special
circumstances, flagrant violations of the Constitution, or other
unusual and extraordinary circumstances.” (footnotes omitted)).
Under this showing, even difficulties obtaining employment and
securing housing are not regarded as extreme circumstances.
See, e.g., United States v. Baccous, Criminal Action No. 99-0596
(DAR), 2013 WL 1707961, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2013) (“[The
court] finds that no such ‘extreme circumstances’ are present.
Defendant’s concerns regarding his employment and residential
opportunities are unquestionably valid; however, under existing
law, they do not afford the court discretion to expunge his
record.”); In re Reid, 569 F. Supp. 2d 220, 222 (D.D.C. 2008)
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(“[W]hile this Circuit has long recognized the fact that a
criminal record causes social disabilities, . . . the harm of
being unable to obtain employment is insufficient on its own[.]”
(citations omitted)).
Robinson seeks to expunge his criminal record in order to
ensure that he remains employed in light of the new policy
regarding background checks. However, this does not present an
extreme or unusual circumstance justifying expungement under the
case law in this circuit. See, e.g., In re Reid, 569 F. Supp.
2d at 222. Robinson has not demonstrated that the remedy he
seeks is “necessary and appropriate in order to preserve [his]
basic legal rights.” Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78. Specifically,
Robinson does not challenge the legality of his 1991 arrest or
conviction on constitutional or statutory grounds, or present
any other cognizable legal injury that the D.C. Circuit would
recognize as justifying granting Robinson’s motion to expunge
his criminal record. See, e.g., Webster, 606 F.2d at 1231(“[A]bsent specific statutory authority it would be wholly
inappropriate to order such an expungement in a case such as
this where there has been . . . a valid conviction.”); Davis,
2006 WL 1409761, at *2 (“The Court, while not unsympathetic to
Defendant’s dilemma as represented by him, can find no basis for
expunging his criminal record. The Defendant has cited no
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statutory authority for expunging his conviction, and the Court
is aware of none.”).
If Robinson has, as he says, remained a law-abiding citizen
as an employed family man, it would be unfortunate for
Robinson’s conviction from over 20 years ago to threaten his
livelihood and hinder his ability to support his family.
However, there is no legal basis to grant Robinson the relief he
seeks in his motion. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant Michael Robinson’s motion [39] to
expunge his criminal record be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 5th day of March, 2014.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge