Sampson v. D.C. Department of Corrections , 20 F. Supp. 3d 282 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________
)
WALTER SAMPSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1933 (RWR)
)
D.C. DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, )
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Walter Sampson, a corrections officer employed by
the defendant District of Columbia Department of Corrections
(“DOC”), filed a one-count amended complaint against the DOC
alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1991 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.
The DOC moves to dismiss Sampson’s amended complaint for naming a
defendant that cannot be sued and for untimely service of process
upon the defendant. Because service of process was timely and
the District of Columbia can be substituted as the defendant, the
motion will be denied.
BACKGROUND
The amended complaint alleges the following facts. The DOC
hired Sampson as a corrections officer in January 2000. Am.
Compl. ¶ 6. In August 2006, an inmate threw feces into Sampson’s
face. Sampson was later diagnosed by a psychiatrist,
Dr. David Fischer, with post-traumatic stress disorder and
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permanently restricted to light duty without inmate contact. In
December 2007, Dr. Bruce Smoller conducted an independent medical
examination of Sampson, and he also concluded that Sampson should
have no direct contact with inmates. Id. ¶¶ 7-9. Sampson
returned to work in September 2008. He was assigned to a light
duty position escorting contractors to their work sites, a
position that did not involve contact with inmates. In
December 2008, Sampson was assigned to another position that did
not require inmate contact. However, on January 2, 2009, Sampson
was reassigned to a position at the Central Detention Facility at
the District of Columbia jail, where he would transport inmates
from the jail to Southeast Hospital, or transport inmates from
halfway houses to the jail. Dr. Fisher did not approve of this
assignment. Id. ¶¶ 10-13. Dr. Fisher treated Sampson on
January 6, 2009, and informed Sampson that he was a danger to
himself and others and not fit for duty. Sampson was admitted
for in-patient treatment to the Washington Hospital Center on
February 23, 2009 for “depression and suicidal tendencies.” He
was discharged on March 2, 2009, but continued weekly sessions
with Dr. Fisher through September 2009. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
According to the amended complaint, in March 2009, the DOC
“denied reinstatement” of Sampson’s temporary total disability
benefits. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. In September 2009, the District’s
Office of Workers’ Compensation Office found that Sampson
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incurred a work-related injury based upon his January 2009
reassignment. In September 2011, the EEOC determined that the
DOC violated the ADA when it stopped accommodating his
disability. Id. ¶ 17.
Sampson filed the original complaint in this action on
November 29, 2012. He filed his amended complaint on March 26,
2013 alleging that the DOC denied him a reasonable accommodation
in violation of the ADA by removing him from a position where he
did not have contact with inmates. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19. The DOC
has since moved to dismiss Sampson’s amended complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the DOC
lacks the capacity to be sued, and under Rule 4(m), arguing that
Sampson failed to serve the complaint within 120 days. Sampson
opposes dismissal, arguing that the complaint was timely served,
and seeking leave to amend his complaint again by substituting
the District for the DOC as a defendant.
DISCUSSION
“‘A complaint can be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) when a
plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.’” Howard Univ. v. Watkins, 857 F. Supp. 2d 67, 71
(D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Peavey v. Holder, 657 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185
(D.D.C. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))). Motions to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) test the legal sufficiency of a
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complaint. Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia, 657 F. Supp. 2d
123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true,
to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” . . . A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007)).
“The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and ‘the court must assume the truth of all
well-pleaded allegations.’” Watkins, 857 F. Supp. 2d at 71
(quoting Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2004)).
A motion dismiss for “failure to properly serve process may
be granted when a plaintiff fails to ‘demonstrate that the
procedure employed satisfied the requirements of Rule 4 and any
other applicable provision of law.’” Brookens v. United States,
Civil Action No. 12-502 (RWR), 2013 WL 5518903, at * 3 (D.D.C.
October 7, 2013) (quoting Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C.
Cir. 1987)). After a motion to dismiss for insufficient process
is filed, “the plaintiff is obligated to establish that he has
properly effected service.” Brookens, 2013 WL 5518903, at *3
(citing Strong-Fischer v. Peters, 554 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C.
2008)).
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I. DOC
The DOC moves to dismiss Sampson’s amended complaint in its
entirety arguing that the DOC, as an agency of the District of
Columbia, lacks the capacity to be sued. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of
Mot. to Dismiss, at 3-4. When a plaintiff erroneously names as a
defendant a District of Columbia agency instead of the District
of Columbia itself, a court may substitute the District as a
defendant for its agency. See Hunter v. D.C. Child & Family
Servs. Agency, 710 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing
Ennis v. Lott, 589 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 (D.D.C. 2008)). Therefore,
the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint against the DOC
will be construed as a motion to substitute the District of
Columbia for the DOC as the defendant. See Bennett v. Henderson,
Civil Action No. 10-1680 (RWR), 2011 WL 285871, at * 1 (D.D.C.
January 28, 2011) (construing motion to dismiss as one for
substitution, and substituting the District of Columbia for the
District of Columbia Public Schools as defendant). Accordingly,
the District of Columbia will be substituted for the DOC as the
defendant in this action, and the amended complaint will be
construed as one alleging claims against the District of
Columbia.
II. TIMELY SERVICE
The DOC next moves to dismiss Sampson’s amended complaint
because, according to the DOC, Sampson failed to comply with Rule
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4(m)’s requirement that a plaintiff serve a complaint within 120
days after it was filed. Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to
Dismiss, at 4-5. Service of the complaint must be effected
“within 120 days after the complaint is filed” unless “the
plaintiff shows good cause for the failure” to meet this
deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Strong-Fischer v.
Peters, 554 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that
plaintiffs carry the burden of showing good cause for failure to
meet the deadline). Here, the docket reflects that the original
complaint was filed on November 29, 2012, and that the amended
complaint was served on the District 119 days later, on March 28,
2013. See docket entries # 6, # 7. Accordingly, service was
timely, and the District’s motion will be denied.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Sampson timely served the amended complaint, but because the
DOC is non sui juris, the District of Columbia will be
substituted for the DOC as the defendant. Therefore, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the District of Columbia be, and hereby is,
SUBSTITUTED for DOC as a defendant, and the defendant’s motion
[8] to dismiss be, and hereby is, DENIED.
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SIGNED this 4th day of March, 2014.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge