Hill v. Samuels ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
__________________________________________
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HOWARD L. HILL, II, )
)
Plaintiff, )
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v. ) Civil Action No. 13-0165 (RWR)
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CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR. et al., )
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Defendants. )
__________________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue [Doc. #
13]. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and “counterclaim for summary judgment” [Doc. # 17], and
defendants have filed a reply [Doc. # 19]. For the following reasons, the complaint will be
dismissed in part and transferred.
Plaintiff is a prisoner who was once housed at the United States Penitentiary in
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania (“USP Lewisburg”). He sues the warden there and certain high-level
officials of the Bureau of Prisons, including Director Charles Samuels, under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff purports to
challenge the constitutionality of BOP’s Program Statement (“PS”) 1315.07 governing the legal
activities of inmates. See www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1315_007. He alleges that the policy as
applied to him has hindered his pursuit of a collateral challenge to his conviction in the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia. See generally Compl. at 8-13.
Under Bivens, a plaintiff has “an implied private action for damages against federal
officers alleged to have violated [his] constitutional rights.” Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
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U.S. 61, 66 (2001). Critical to a Bivens claim is an allegation “that the defendant federal official
was personally involved in the illegal conduct.” Simpkins v. District of Columbia Gov't, 108
F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (explaining
that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens . . . suits, a plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated
the Constitution”).
1. The Claim Against Defendants Samuels and Watts
Plaintiff purports to sue the District of Columbia-based defendants, Director Samuels and
National Inmate Appeals Administrator Harrell Watts, in their “individual/personal capacity”
because “they are in charge of implementing and affecting BOP Policy Statements and
Regulations on a national or nationwide level . . . .” 1 Compl. at 4, ¶ 10. This premise does not
implicate either defendant as a participant in the alleged misconduct at USP Lewisburg, and the
challenged Program Statement leaves it to “[t]he Warden [to] establish an inmate law library,
and procedures for access to legal reference materials and to legal counsel, and for preparation of
legal documents.” PS 1315.07, ¶ 1. The allegations are insufficient to hold either Samuels or
Watts personally liable under Bivens. See Ballard v. Holinka, 601 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C.
2009) (“Lappin's supervisory role as the BOP's Director does not render him personally liable for
the alleged wrongful acts of the BOP's employees.”); Thomas v. U.S., 779 F. Supp. 2d 154, 157-
58 (D.D.C. 2011 ) (concluding that “the claim against Watts, predicated only on his issuance of
an adverse decision on plaintiff's administrative appeal, does not establish the requisite personal
involvement of Watts in any decisions about plaintiff's medical care” to support a Bivens claim).
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Plaintiff mistakenly identifies Watts as BOP’s General Counsel. Compl. Caption; Compl. at
4, ¶ 10. Judicial notice is taken of the fact that Kathleen M. Kenney is BOP’s General Counsel.
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Hence, the motion to dismiss the complaint against Director Samuels and Administrator Watts
will be granted for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
2. Improper Venue
“Courts in this jurisdiction must examine challenges to . . . venue carefully to guard
against the danger that a plaintiff might manufacture venue in the District of Columbia.”
Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Under the circumstances of this
case, venue is proper in a judicial district where “a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Since none of the alleged events
occurred in the District of Columbia, the remainder of this case will be transferred in the interest
of justice to a judicial district “where the court may exercise personal jurisdiction [over the
individuals directly responsible for the alleged misconduct], where venue is proper, and where
the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims occurred.” Ballard, 601 F. Supp. 2d at 123; see
Zakiya v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 2d 47, 59 (D.D.C. 2003) (transferring case involving
challenge to national BOP policy to the district where “actual implementation” of the policy
occurred). A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
_________/s/_____________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
DATE: November 20, 2013 Chief Judge
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