Richardson v. American Security Mortgage Corporation ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
ALVIN B. RICHARDSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1786 (RWR)
)
AMERICAN SECURITY MORTGAGE )
CORP., et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Alvin Richardson brings this suit
challenging the legality of the foreclosure by defendant Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A. on real property in North Carolina. Richardson
names as additional defendants American Security Mortgage
Corporation, the Law Offices of John T. Benjamin, P.A., Chicago
Title Insurance Company, Joanne Romano, Trustee Services of
Carolina, LLC, and David Simpson, each of whom allegedly was
involved in some respect in the foreclosure of his property.
Each of the defendants, with the exception of Simpson,1 has moved
to dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
Because Richardson’s suit seeks review of an adverse state court
1
Simpson has not responded to the complaint. The
resolution of the other defendants’ motions to dismiss disposes
of the case against Simpson.
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judgment, the suit will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2
BACKGROUND
The complaint, materials to which it refers, and the public
record set forth the following background and allegations.
Richardson owned property at 3927 Caldwell Ridge Parkway,
Charlotte, North Carolina. (Compl. ¶ 6.) Richardson purchased
the property in 2007 with the assistance of a home mortgage loan
secured by a deed of trust establishing a lien on the property
in favor of American Security Mortgage Corp. (Compl., Ex. P.)
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. later instituted foreclosure proceedings
on the property. (Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and Law Offices of
John T. Benjamin, P.A.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Wells Fargo Mot.”),
Ex. A, Notice of Foreclosure Sale.)3 Richardson filed a motion
for a temporary restraining order in the Superior Court of
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, in order to prevent the
foreclosure proceedings, which the Superior Court denied. (Id.,
Ex. B, Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order.) Subsequently, Mecklenburg County Assistant
2
In light of the finding that there is no subject matter
jurisdiction, this opinion does not address defendants’
arguments for dismissal for failure to state a claim.
3
American Security Mortgage Corp. stated that the deed of
trust of which it was the original holder was subsequently
assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (American Security Mortgage
Corp.’s Stmt. P. & A. in Support of Mot. to Dismiss at 1.)
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Clerk of Superior Court Joanne Romano held a hearing and issued
an order allowing the foreclosure sale of the property. (Id.,
Ex. C, Order to Allow Foreclosure Sale; Compl. ¶ J.)4 After the
property was sold at auction, Richardson filed a complaint in
Superior Court challenging the foreclosure. (Wells Fargo Mot.,
Ex. E, Superior Court Complaint.) Richardson then filed the
instant action and voluntarily dismissed the Superior Court
suit. (Id., Ex. F, Notice of Motion for Voluntary Dismissal.)
Richardson alleges that the defendants played various roles
in the foreclosure. According to the complaint, American
Security Mortgage Corp. improperly recorded the promissory note.
(Compl. ¶¶ A-C.) Richardson further alleged that the Law
Offices of John T. Benjamin, acting as counsel for Wells Fargo
Bank, “interfer[ed] with private communications between
[Richardson] and Defendant/Trustee/Servicer.” (Compl. ¶ K.) He
also challenges the decision of Joanne Romano, the assistant
clerk, to issue the order allowing the foreclosure sale. (Id.
¶ J.) He alleges that Chicago Title Insurance Company, along
with closing attorney David Simpson, “did knowingly and
willfully act and conspire to oppress, and injure [him] by
withholding vital information that would establish legal title
to property at 3927 Caldwell Ridge Pkwy . . . and that property
4
Under North Carolina law, foreclosure proceedings are
special proceedings over which the Clerk of Superior Court has
jurisdiction. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 45-21.16 (West 2011).
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was paid in full at closing.” (Compl. ¶ M.) Finally,
Richardson alleges that Trustee Services of Carolina, LLC
“presented gross misrepresentations of documents into the public
record purporting appointments of trustees as legal and factual
[sic].” (Id. ¶ L.)
Richardson challenges the legality of the foreclosure on
various grounds. He asserts that he was the victim of predatory
lending practices engaged in by defendant American Security
Mortgage Corp. (Compl. ¶ 7.) He further maintains that he has
suffered twenty one types of “personal injury” as a result of
the lien that was placed on his property. (Id. ¶ 8.)
Richardson alleges that this court has jurisdiction because the
suit seeks redress for constitutional violations and because
defendants have breached various fiduciary duties. (Id. at 4.)
Richardson seeks various forms of relief affirming his ownership
of the property at issue, including an order quieting title to
the foreclosed property and an order declaring the foreclosure
proceeding and the transfer of property null and void. (Id.,
Prayer for Special Relief ¶¶ 5, 7.)
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue that must be resolved
before the merits of the case may be considered. On a motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the plaintiff’s factual
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allegations are subject to closer scrutiny than they would be on
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Flynn v.
Veazey Constr. Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 186, 190 (D.D.C. 2004);
see also 5B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane
& Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350
(3d ed. 2011). In addition, “[i]n 12(b)(1) proceedings, it has
been long accepted that the [court] may make appropriate inquiry
beyond the pleadings to satisfy itself [that it has] authority
to entertain the case.” Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotations omitted). “It is the
burden of the party claiming subject matter jurisdiction to
demonstrate that it exists.” Georgiades v. Martin-Trigona, 729
F.2d 831, 833 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
The Supreme Court has held that the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts does not extend to cases mounting
constitutional or other challenges to state court judgments.
See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (holding
federal district courts lacked jurisdiction to hear
constitutional challenges to a state court judgment); D.C. Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (reaffirming Rooker).
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court was guided by the
fact that Congress authorized jurisdiction only for the Supreme
Court, and not lower federal courts, to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over state court judgments. See Feldman, 460 U.S.
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at 476 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a)). The D.C. Circuit
recognizes that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, derived from the
two seminal Supreme Court decisions articulating this principle,
“prevents lower federal courts from hearing cases that amount to
the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court.”
Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine further “bars lower federal
courts from considering not only issues raised and decided in
the state courts, but also issues that are ‘inextricably
intertwined’ with the issues that were before the state court.”
Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486); see also Stanton v. D.C.
Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[E]ven a
constitutional claim pled as a general attack may be so
inextricably intertwined with a state court decision that the
district court is in essence being called upon to review the
state-court decision.”) (internal quotations omitted). An issue
is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment if
“success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that
‘the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.’” Phyler
v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Charchenko
v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995)). The
Supreme Court has held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is
confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired
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its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The
doctrine therefore does not prevent federal district courts from
exercising jurisdiction over claims that are truly independent
of a state court judgment. Stanton, 127 F.3d at 75-76.5
Richardson’s suit effectively seeks to collaterally attack
the state court judgments permitting the foreclosure and sale of
the North Carolina property. That Richardson presents such a
challenge to the previous judgments is apparent from the
complaint, which, although unclear in many respects, explicitly
seeks an order declaring the foreclosure proceedings null and
void and affirming Richardson’s title to the property. (Compl.,
Prayer for Special Relief ¶¶ 5, 7.) The substance of
Richardson’s suit -- the legality of the foreclosure action --
was already raised and decided in the Superior Court in North
Carolina. Moreover, Richardson’s claims regarding the
defendants’ actions in furtherance of the foreclosure are
inextricably linked with the state court judgment allowing the
foreclosure to proceed. Richardson’s claims therefore are not
5
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine was asserted as a basis for
dismissal in the defendants’ various motions. Richardson did
not address the doctrine in any of his three oppositions.
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truly independent of the previous judgment but “invit[e]
district court review and rejection,” Exxon Mobil Corp., 544
U.S. at 284, of state court decisions that harmed him.
The D.C. Circuit recently affirmed a dismissal under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine of a suit substantially similar to
Richardson’s. Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 407 F. App’x 489
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam), aff’g 698 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C.
2010). In that case, plaintiff Hunter challenged the legality
of a foreclosure sale of property that was instituted in state
court. Hunter v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 94, 96
(D.D.C. 2010). Just as Richardson did here, Hunter filed a suit
challenging the foreclosure in state court and then subsequently
withdrew the suit and filed instead in federal district court.
Id. at 97. The district court found that, although the claim
was “not styled as an appeal from the foreclosure action,” the
claim was “based entirely on the alleged impropriety of the
foreclosure.” Id. at 100. Because “[a]ll of the injuries
alleged . . . stem[med] from the foreclosure of the Property”
and Hunter “explicitly [sought] a judgment . . . that would have
the effect of modifying the state court’s judgment of
foreclosure,” the court found there were no independent claims
over which it could exercise jurisdiction. Id.; see also Tremel
v. Bierman & Geesing, LLC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.D.C. 2003)
(finding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded subject matter
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jurisdiction over claims of injury from foreclosure proceedings
in state court). For the same reasons, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine requires dismissing this suit.
CONCLUSION
Richardson’s suit effectively seeks appellate review of a
state court judgment permitting foreclosure on property in North
Carolina. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district
courts from reviewing such state court decisions or issues that
were inextricably intertwined with those decisions. The
complaint therefore will be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. A final order accompanies this memorandum
opinion.
SIGNED this 11th day of June, 2012.
__________/s/_______________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge