Marbury-Bey v. United States ( 2012 )

FILED
JUN 1 1 2012
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Courts for the District of Columbia
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MILTON W. MARBURY-BEY, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
V. )
)
Civil Action No. 12 0947
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the petitioner's application to proceed in forma
pauperis and his pro se petition. The Court will grant the application and dismiss the petition.
It appears that petitioner waived his right to a trial, see Pet., Attach. 2 (Waiver of Trial by
Jury or Court Upon Entry of Guilty Plea dated November 17, 2003), and entered a plea of guilty
to one count of attempted distribution of heroin for which the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia imposed a term of incarceration. See id., Attach. 4 (Judgment in a Criminal Case,
United States v. Marbury, No. F8069-02 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2004)). Generally, petitioner
alleges that errors occurred regarding his guilty plea: ineffective assistance of defense counsel on
whose advice petitioner accepted the plea offer, proceedings which did not comport with Rule 11
of the Superior Court Criminal Rules, and breach of the plea agreement through the imposition
of a sentence which differed from that set out in the agreement. See Pet. at 3.
"Under D.C. Code§ 23-110, a prisoner may seek to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence
on any of four grounds: (1) the sentence is unconstitutional or illegal; (2) the Superior Court did
not have jurisdiction to impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeded the maximum authorized
by law; or (4) the sentence is subject to collateral attack." Alston v. United States, 590 A.2d 511,
513 (D.C. 1991). Such a motion must be filed in the Superior Court, see D.C. Code§ 23-110(a),
{N)
and "shall not be entertained ... by any Federal ... court if it appears that the [prisoner] has
failed to make a motion for relief under this section or that the Superior Court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
legality ofhis detention." D.C. Code§ 23-110(g); see Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998
(D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Section 23-11 O(g)'s plain language makes clear that it only divests federal
courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims
pursuant to section 23-110(a).").
The claims set forth in the petition properly are addressed by the Superior Court.
Nothing in the petition suggests that the petitioner's available remedy under D.C. Code§ 23-110
is inadequate or ineffective. His lack of success in his previous attempt to collaterally attack his
conviction and sentence does not render his local remedy inadequate or ineffective. See Wilson
v. Office ofthe Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277,280 (D.D.C. 1995).
The petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and it will be
dismissed. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
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United States District Judge