Robinson v. District of Columbia Government , 965 F. Supp. 2d 90 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
________________________________
)
CAROLINE ROBINSON, the Personal )
Representative of the Estate of )
Arnell Robinson, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Case No. 07-CV-1796 (EGS)
v. )
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is the District of Columbia’s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment on the
Pleadings. The District of Columbia argues, inter alia, that
plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be dismissed.
Upon consideration of the motion, the response and reply
thereto, the relevant case law, and the entire record, the
motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in part.
Specifically, the Court shall grant the motion insofar as it
requests dismissal of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim. The Court
will REMAND the remaining claims to the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia.
I. BACKGROUND
Arnell Robinson filed a complaint on October 3, 2007,
alleging various claims against the District of Columbia,
Officer Earl Brown, and various “John Doe” officers. Mr.
Robinson alleged that defendants violated his rights in
connection with an arrest at the 400 Block of O Street, NW in
Washington, DC on October 4, 2006. Specifically, Mr. Robinson
alleged that while he was walking home from school, Officer
Brown stopped his police cruiser, exited the vehicle, and began
to verbally harass Mr. Robinson. Compl. ¶¶ 7-9. Mr. Robinson
alleged that Officer Brown forcefully grabbed his right arm and
twisted it behind him, throwing him face first into an iron
fence. Compl. ¶ 10. Officer Brown also allegedly slammed his
arm across Mr. Robinson’s neck. Compl. ¶ 11. Several years
earlier, Mr. Robinson had been shot in the face and neck area
and this injury prevented Mr. Robinson from being able to yell,
scream, or speak in a loud voice, and also affected his ability
to hear in his right ear. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 16-17. Although Mr.
Robinson’s friends allegedly told Officer Brown about this
injury, Officer Brown refused to remove his arm from Mr.
Robinson’s neck. After he was arrested, Mr. Robinson was
allegedly treated for pain in his neck and ribs and for ringing
in his ears. Compl. ¶¶ 17-22.
Upon the unrelated death of Mr. Robinson in early 2009, the
Court granted plaintiff’s motion to substitute a party, and
substituted Caroline Robinson, Mr. Robinson’s mother, as the
Personal Representative of the Estate of Arnell Robinson. Jun.
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1, 2009 Minute Order. On November 18, 2009, the Court granted
as conceded Officer Brown’s motion to dismiss for failure to
serve Officer Brown with process in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Nov. 18, 2009 Minute Order. On
January 11, 2013, the District of Columbia, the only remaining
defendant in this case, filed the instant motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay
trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(c). A motion pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriately
granted when, at the close of the pleadings, “no material issue
of fact remains to be resolved, and [the movant] is clearly
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Montanans for
Multiple Use v. Barbouletos, 542 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citations omitted).
When evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), courts employ the
same standard that governs a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36
(D.D.C. 2004). A court must treat the complaint's factual
allegations as true, “even if doubtful in fact,” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but it need not accept as
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true legal conclusions set forth in a complaint. Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Accordingly, a court must
accept the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations to the
extent that “they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief,” id. at 679, and “may thus only grant judgment on the
pleadings if it appears, even accepting as true all inferences
from the complaint's factual allegations, that the plaintiff
cannot prove any set of facts entitling him to relief.” Lans v.
Adduci Mastriani & Schaumberg LLP, 786 F. Supp. 2d 240, 265
(D.D.C. 2011).
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the
“initial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). To defeat summary
judgment, the non-moving party must “designate specific facts
showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324
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(internal quotation marks omitted). The existence of a factual
dispute is insufficient to preclude summary judgment. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A dispute
is “genuine” only if a reasonable fact-finder could find for the
non-moving party; a fact is only “material” if it is capable of
affecting the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248; Laningham
v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In
assessing a party's motion, “[a]ll underlying facts and
inferences are analyzed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party.” N.S. ex rel. Stein v. District of Columbia, 709
F. Supp. 2d 57, 65 (D.D.C. 2010), citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Conceded Claims
In its motion, the District argues that plaintiff’s claims
for punitive damages should be dismissed because a plaintiff
cannot recover punitive damages against the District. The
District also argues that plaintiff’s claims for injunctive
relief must be dismissed because Mr. Robinson is deceased and
thus cannot be in danger of sustaining a direct injury from
Officer Brown. In his opposition, plaintiff agreed to dismiss
those claims. Pl.’s Opp. at 26. Accordingly, plaintiff’s
claims for punitive damages and for injunctive relief are
DISMISSED.
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B. Municipal Liability Under Section 1983
The District argues that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim,
alleged in Count I of the complaint, should be dismissed because
the District cannot be liable under a theory of respondeat
superior. The District is correct.
Section 1983 provides that
[any] person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To establish that a municipality is liable under section
1983, a plaintiff must prove both (1) “a predicate
constitutional violation” and (2) “that a custom or policy of
the municipality caused the violation.” Baker v. District of
Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Collins
v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 124 (1992)); see also Monell v.
Dep't of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
Indeed, the policy or custom must be “the moving force behind
the constitutional violation.” Carter v. District of Columbia,
795 F.2d 116, 122 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at
694); see also Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985)
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(requiring an affirmative link between the city's policy and the
alleged constitutional violation).
A municipality cannot be liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of its employees based simply on a theory of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693; see
also City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989); Pembaur
v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“[W]hile
Congress never questioned its power to impose civil liability on
municipalities for their own illegal acts, Congress did doubt
its constitutional power to impose such liability in order to
oblige municipalities to control the conduct of others.”). “The
‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts
of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,
and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to
action for which the municipality is actually responsible.”
Pembaur, 475 U.S at 479. This requirement flows directly from
the statute itself. There are four basic categories of municipal
action plaintiff may rely on to establish municipal liability:
(1) express municipal policy; (2) adoption by municipal
policymakers; (3) custom or usage; and (4) deliberate
indifference. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-94.
Although plaintiff did not allege a “custom or policy”
theory of Section 1983 liability in the complaint, plaintiff
responds to the District’s motion and argues that the District
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had a custom or policy of violating constitutional rights. 1
Plaintiff also argues that liability is appropriate because of
the District’s deliberate indifference to constitutional
violations. Section 1983 liability is not appropriate against
the District under either theory.
1. Custom and Policy
Plaintiff argues that two documents put the District on
notice that there were MPD customs that violated constitutional
rights. The first document is a 2001 Memorandum of Agreement
(“2001 MOA”) between the Department of Justice and the
Metropolitan Police Department regarding the use of excessive
force by MPD officers. The second document is a 2003 report
issued by the Citizen Complaint Review Board (“2003 CCRB
Report”). Plaintiff argues that the reports put the District on
notice of the problems with its officers’ use of excessive force
and that they “establish the liability of the District” or at
the very least, establish that there are genuine issues of
material fact in dispute.
The Court disagrees. Several courts have considered, and
rejected, similar arguments regarding the 2001 MOA and the 2003
1
Because plaintiff did not allege this theory in his complaint
and also because he relies on documents outside of the
complaint, the Court will consider the “custom and policy” issue
under the summary judgment standard. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d)
(when matters outside of the pleadings are presented to and not
excluded by the court, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
must be treated as one for summary judgment).
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CCRB Report. See, e.g., Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403
F. Supp. 2d 39, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying plaintiff’s claim
that the 2001 MOA established a “custom or policy”); Byrd v.
District of Columbia, 297 F. Supp. 2d 136, 140 (D.D.C. 2003)
(rejecting plaintiff’s “lame attempt to transform the mere
existence of a MOA into a policy or custom” of the District and
noting that, if anything, the MOA indicated the District’s
efforts to improve); Dormu v. District of Columbia, 795 F. Supp.
2d 7, 25-27 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the mere awareness of an
issue and need for improvement, as indicated in 2003 CCRB
report, was not sufficient to impose municipal liability for
conduct that occurred at a later date); Hunter v. District of
Columbia, 824 F. Supp. 2d 125, 134 (D.D.C. 2011) (2003 CCRB
Report was insufficient to establish a District custom or policy
in favor of the use of excessive force and false arrest for
conduct that occurred prior to arrival at the police station).
Plaintiff relies heavily on Huthnance v. District of
Columbia for the proposition that the 2003 CCRB Report “put the
District on notice that there was a problem with its police
officers using excessive force and improper disorderly conduct
arrests.” 793 F. Supp. 2d 183, 199 (D.D.C. 2011). Plaintiff
argues that such conduct was precisely what happened to
plaintiff and, thus, are the proper basis for municipal
liability under Section 1983. In Huthnance, however, the
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alleged constitutional violation was the specific practice that
was discussed in the 2003 CCRB Report. Specifically, the 2003
CCRB Report detailed the “post and forfeiture” procedure used by
MPD, under which an arrestee posted $25 in collateral and was
released from custody several hours later. After resolving the
charge by paying $25, little or no review occurred after the
arrests were completed, and CCRB believed that there was “the
potential for a significant number of improper or unlawful
disorderly conduct arrests in the District that could go
unnoticed.” CCRB Rep. at 24, ECF No. 106-28. In Huthnance, the
court focused on the similarity between the arrest in that case
and the problem identified in the 2003 CCRB Report. 793 F.
Supp. 2d at 200. The court concluded that the 2003 CCRB Report
put the MPD on constructive notice regarding the problems with
its post and forfeiture policy. The court also noted, however,
that there were several other ways in which the District could
have been on notice of problems with its post and forfeiture
policy.
In this case, the facts are not those specifically
identified in the 2003 CCRB Report. Plaintiff was arrested but
was not subject to the post and forfeiture procedure. Similarly,
in Hunter, the court noted that even if the 2003 CCRB Report
established a policy or custom relevant to a plaintiff’s release
from custody (the post and forfeiture procedure), it would not
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make the District liable for the alleged false arrest and use of
excessive force that plaintiff alleges occurred prior to his
arrival at the police station. 824 F. Supp. 2d at 134. The
Court agrees and finds that the 2003 CCRB Report did not put the
District on notice of a custom or policy of constitutional
violations such that municipal liability under Section 1983 can
be imposed on the District. Similarly, the Court finds that the
2001 MOA also does not establish a custom or policy sufficient
to impose municipal liability on the District.
2. Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff also claims that the District acted with
deliberate indifference to the constitutional violations of the
MPD. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the District’s failure
to accept and investigate citizen complaints about Officer Brown
and failure to take disciplinary action against Officer Brown”
amounts to deliberate indifference of plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
For there to be municipal liability under a theory of
deliberate indifference, a jury must find from admissible
evidence that the District was “the moving force” behind the
alleged constitutional violations based on a theory of
deliberate indifference to a known risk of such harm. Muhammad
v. District of Columbia, 584 F. Supp. 2d 134, 138 (D.D.C. 2008).
“Deliberate indifference means that ‘faced with actual or
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constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate
constitutional rights, the city may not adopt a policy of
inaction.’” Coleman v. District of Columbia, 828 F. Supp. 2d
87, 94 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Warren v. District of Columbia,
353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Furthermore, a
municipality's failure to train its officers or employees
adequately qualifies as a custom or policy that violates Section
1983 only when that failure “amounts to deliberate indifference
towards the constitutional rights of persons in its domain.”
Kivanc v. Ramsey, 407 F. Supp. 2d 270, 278 (D.D.C. 2006)
(quoting Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441
(D.C. Cir. 2000)) (other citation omitted). Similarly, the
failure to investigate complaints cannot support a deliberate
indifference theory unless the conduct was suggestive of the
unconstitutional behavior on hand and put the District on notice
of the possibility of constitutional violations. Muhammad v.
District of Columbia, 881 F. Supp. 2d 115, 123 (D.D.C. 2012)
(investigation of 13 complaints against officer did not
constitute deliberate indifference where only two of the
complaints were sustained and none of the complaints were for
conduct suggestive of the asserted unconstitutional behavior in
the case at hand).
Here, there is no evidence that the MPD would have been
aware of Officer Brown’s alleged likelihood of violating
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constitutional rights. Plaintiff avers that Mr. Butler, who had
been with Mr. Robinson at the time of his arrest, attempted to
file a complaint against Officer Brown on October 4, 2006, the
day of the arrest, but was deterred from doing so. Even
assuming this to be true, it does not provide evidence of the
District’s prior knowledge of Officer Brown’s alleged propensity
to violate constitutional rights. Plaintiff also argues that
Officer Brown made false statements regarding the arrest under
oath. Again, even assuming this is true, it does not provide
any evidence of the District’s prior knowledge of Officer
Brown’s conduct. Nor would a false statement under oath have
been “suggestive” of the alleged constitutional violation in
this case. See Muhammad, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 123. Accordingly,
because none of the evidence cited by plaintiff would have
provided the District with knowledge of Officer Brown’s alleged
propensity to violate the constitutional rights of arrestees,
the Court finds that the District cannot be held liable under
Section 1983 under a “deliberate indifference” theory.
Accordingly, Count I of plaintiff’s complaint, alleging a
Section 1983 violation against the District, will be DISMISSED.
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C. Supplemental Jurisdiction
In light of the dismissal of the Section 1983 claim, the
complaint contains no further federal causes of action over
which this court has original subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court must therefore consider whether to continue to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over these remaining claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides, in pertinent part, that
“in any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims
in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy[.]” “Whether to retain
jurisdiction over pendent . . . claims after the dismissal of
the federal claims is a matter left to the sound discretion of
the district court[.]” Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d
1088, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
In determining whether to dismiss supplemental state law
claims, “the district court is to be ‘guided by consideration of
the factors enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).’” Shekoyan v.
Sibley Int’l, 409 F.3d 414, 424 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations
omitted). “’[I]n the usual case in which all federal law claims
are dismissed before trial, the balance of factors to be
considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward
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declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.’” Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
Here, although the claims have been pending for several
years, most of that time has been spent in discovery, with very
little Court involvement. The Court has thus not yet invested
significant time and resources on the state law claims, and the
District of Columbia Superior Court would naturally have greater
familiarity and interest in the issues that remain, insofar as
they require interpretation of the District’s own statutory and
common law. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is in the
interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity
to remand the remaining state law claims to the Superior Court
for the District of Columbia.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the District of
Columbia’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Judgment on
the Pleadings is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED WITHOUT PREDJUDICE
IN PART. Specifically, the Court shall grant the motion for
summary judgment insofar as it requests dismissal of plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claim. The Court will also grant as conceded the
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to plaintiff’s claims
for punitive damages and for injunctive relief. The Court, in
its discretion, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining claims. Instead, this case is hereby
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REMANDED for further proceedings to the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
August 30, 2013
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