Love v. United States Department of Homeland Security , 960 F. Supp. 2d 254 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_____________________________________
)
ABDUL LOVE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
v. ) Civil Action No. 12-1046 (KBJ)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )
HOMELAND SECURITY, )
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see
5 U.S.C. § 552, against the United States Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”),
seeking records maintained by the United States Secret Service (“Secret Service” or
“Agency”), a component of the DHS. This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 17]. For the reasons discussed below, the
motion will be GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was arrested on October 5, 2005, in Waukegan, Illinois, and was
charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. (Compl. ¶ 6.) 1 According to the
Waukegan police, officers had observed Plaintiff’s vehicle speeding, and after stopping
Plaintiff’s car, the officers spotted what was later determined to be approximately two
and a half kilograms of cocaine in plain view. (Compl., Ex. B, “Motion to Reconsider
1
Two paragraphs in the complaint are designated number 6; this reference is to the second paragraph 6.
1
Ruling on Def.’s Mot. For Supp. Discovery” at 3; Ex. H, “Pl.’s Letter to the Honorable
Fred Foreman dated July 4, 2008” at 1-2.)
During the pretrial process, Plaintiff vigorously disputed the officers’ account.
(Compl., Ex. H, at 1.) He maintained that he had not committed any traffic violations;
rather, the police had specifically targeted him for a warrantless vehicle search based on
information that one of Plaintiff’s acquaintances, Silas Peppel, most likely had given to
them prior to the traffic stop. (Id.; Compl., Ex. A, “Motion for Supp. Discovery,” at 1.)
Through discovery and by subpoena, Plaintiff sought to prove that Peppel was a police
informant who had not only alerted officers to the presence of drugs in Plaintiff’s
vehicle, but had set Plaintiff up to commit the drug offense in order to mitigate Peppel’s
own punishment for a counterfeiting ring in which both Peppel and Plaintiff had
previously been implicated. (Compl. ¶¶ 7, 12; see also Compl., Ex. D, “Carbondale
Police Department Investigations Supplement” at 4 (page number designated by the
Court); Ex. H, at 1-2.) 2 Ultimately, Plaintiff’s pretrial requests and arguments were
unavailing; he was convicted of the drug offense on July 15, 2009. (Compl. ¶ 11). But
presumably to prove his theory right, Plaintiff continued his quest to obtain law
enforcement records regarding the circumstances surrounding his narcotics arrest. (See
Compl., Ex. H, at 2 (“I know that [Peppel] was in contact with the police or some other
law enforcement agency. I know that if I was given the opportunity to cross-reference
his old cell phone number . . . against the records of the other officers[,] I am positive I
can prove my point.”)
2
Plaintiff filed a motion for discovery of information regarding Peppel prior to trial (Compl. ¶ 7; id.,Ex. A, “Motion for Supp. Discovery”), but the State objected, asserting that “[t]here is no reference to
the individual names Sylas in the People’s discovery . . .; no individual named Silas or Sylas is listed
on the State’s list of witnesses to be called at trial[,]” and “[t]here is no mention in the police reports of
a confidential informant.” (Id., Ex. B, at 3.) Plaintiff also subpoenaed Peppel to testify at his criminal
trial, but the trial court purportedly quashed the subpoena after in camera review of an affidavit that
Peppel submitted under seal as well as a sealed memorandum from the Waukegan police department.
(Compl. ¶¶ 9-11.)
2
A. Plaintiff’s Records Requests
On November 23, 2009, Plaintiff obtained a report dated May 13, 2005, from the
Carbondale, Illinois Police Department. (Compl. ¶ 12; see also id., Ex. D.) 3 The
report detailed a Carbondale police investigation of a local counterfeiting operation,
designated case # 20050424008, in which Peppel and Plaintiff were both identified.
(Compl. Ex. D., at 3.) The report states that investigators interviewed Peppel and that,
during the interview, Peppel indicated “that he wanted to talk to the Secret Service.”
(Id.) The investigating Carbondale police officer concluded the report by stating: “I
contacted Paul Foster, United States Secret Service Agent. Foster told me that he
would take over the case and investigate it. I provided Agent Foster with a copy of the
materials of my investigation.” (Id. at 4 (emphasis added).)
On May 18, 2010, Plaintiff submitted to the Secret Service the FOIA request that
is at issue in the instant case. (Compl., Ex. E, “Freedom of Information Act Request”;
see also Def.’s Mem of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem”),
“Decl. of Alvin T. Smith” (“Smith Decl.”) ¶ 5.) 4 The introduction to Plaintiff’s FOIA
request read:
Petitioner, upon information and belief that agent, Paul
Foster, of the United States Secret Service; Sgt[.] Chastain,
Sgt. Cappelluti, Dets. Sopia, Ulloa, Flores, Reed, Agallianos
and Novarro, of the Waukegan Police Dept.; Michael J.
Waller, State[’]s Attorney for Lake County, Illinois; Judge
3
The report was written nearly five months prior to Plaintiff’s arrest for the drug trafficking offense.
4
The undated FOIA request that is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit E is presumably the request
Plaintiff submitted to the Secret Service on May 18, 2010. According to Alvin T. Smith, Deputy
Director of the United States Secret Service, the Secret Service received this request on August 25,
2010, “and its supporting documentation appeared to be in response to its prior request for additional
information regarding the plaintiff’s earlier FOI/PA requests . . . [which] had been administratively
closed after the information requested from Plaintiff by the [Secret Service] was not timely provided.”
(Smith Decl. ¶ 5; see id., Ex. A, “Letter from Craig W. Ulmer, Special Agent in Charge, Freedom of
Information & Privacy Acts Officer, U.S. Secret Service, dated April 23, 2010,” at 1.) Upon receipt of
the request via facsimile on August 25, 2010, “the [Secret Service] assigned [it] a new file number,
20100679 – the file number giving rise to the instant litigation.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 5; see id., Ex. B
“Letter from Craig W. Ulmer dated September 9, 2010,” at 1.)
3
Fred Foreman, of the nineteenth judicial district of Lake
County, Illinois; Silas Peppel, and other, yet to be disclosed,
governmental actors, Jane and John Doe’s have manifestly
engaged in a “scheme or artifice” to imprison petitioner and
silence objections to criminal misconduct and constitutional
violations thereby, among other wrongdoing, obstructing
justice and the administration of justice[.]
(Compl., Ex. E, at 3 (page number designated by the Court).) The request generally
asked for “all information or arrest that resulted from information obtained as a result
of the Carbondale, Illinois police report.” (Compl. ¶ 13; see generally id., Ex. E.) It
also sought specific items, including any documents that the Secret Service maintained
“relating to [Plaintiff] and his alleged involvement in counterfeiting U.S. currency
discovered out of independent investigations and/or as a result of case #20050424008
originating out of Carbondale, Illinois . . . ,” as well as information “about Silas
Peppel[’]s involvement in [Plaintiff’s] criminal case/conviction in Lake County[,]
Illinois because of or in relation to case #20050424008 originating out of Carbondale,
Illinois.” (Id., Ex. E, at 5.)
B. The Secret Service's Search for Responsive Records
The Secret Service received Plaintiff’s FOIA request via facsimile on August 25,
2010. (Def.’s Mem. at 4; Smith Decl. ¶ 4.) According to Deputy Director Alvin T.
Smith (“Declarant”), the Secret Service assigned Plaintiff’s FOIA request to the
Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), which “is the division . . . that plans, reviews,
and coordinates domestic and international criminal investigations, such as those
involving counterfeiting of [U.S. currency]. ” (Id. ¶ 13.) The CID searched the Secret
Service Common Index (“CI”) with respect to Plaintiff’s request, and in so doing,
“perform[ed] computerized searches of information collected in [five] Agency
databases: [1]the Master Central Index (‘MCI’), [2]the Protective Research Information
System Management (‘PRISM’), [3] the Master Personnel System (‘MPS’), [4] the
4
White House Pass Holders and Tradesman (‘WV’) database, and [5] the Event Name
Check (‘EVNAME’) system.” (Id. ¶ 14.) Declarant explains that MCI “is an online
computer system used by Secret Service field offices, protective divisions, and
headquarters offices [and] is the central record keeping system for information in the
investigative and administrative files maintained by the Secret Service.” (Id. ¶ 15.)
“Information concerning individuals about whom the Secret Service maintains records
is indexed in the MCI by name, social security number, and/or date of birth.” (Id.)
PRISM “is the Agency’s database for protective intelligence data.” (Id. ¶ 16.) MPS
“contains organizational and personnel data.” (Id.) WV “contains information related
to individuals with or seeking access to the White House Complex.” (Id.) Lastly,
EVNAM “permits the Agency to determine if it has queried other internal and external
databases such as the MCI, PRISM, the National Crime Information Center, and the
Interstate Identification Index for a specific individual in the last thirty (30) days.”
(Id.) 5
In regard to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, Secret Service staff first searched the CI
using Plaintiff’s name as a search term (id. ¶ 14) because “[i]nformation provided by
Plaintiff indicated that he believed that the Secret Service had responsive records
because he had been implicated in an alleged counterfeiting scheme that was referred to
the Secret Service for further investigation by a local law enforcement agency in 2005”
(id. ¶ 11). That search “failed to identify any case files concerning Plaintiff or his
involvement in any alleged counterfeiting scheme.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
5
According to Declarant, “[i]f the Secret Service maintains records on a particular individual involved
in a criminal investigation” in any of its databases, “a search of that individual’s name and/or personal
identifiers in the CI should result in a list of the file number(s) for the investigative or administrative
file(s) associated with that individual’s name or other personal identifiers.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 17.)
Therefore, Declarant avers, “if the [Secret Service] maintained records on Plaintiff regarding his
alleged involvement in a counterfeiting scheme, a search of the CI should identify the responsive . . .
records.” (Id.)
5
On September 20, 2010, the Secret Service informed Plaintiff by letter that its
initial CI search using his name as a search term yielded no records. (Id. ¶ 6; see id.,Ex. C, “Letter from Craig W. Ulmer dated Sept. 20, 2010,” at 1.) At the Secret
Service’s invitation to “provide more specific information concerning when, where, or
why [he believed he had] come to the attention of, or in contact with the Secret Service
so as to have resulted in the generation of a record . . . ,” (id.), Plaintiff supplemented
his request. 6 On December 20, 2010, the Secret Service informed Plaintiff by letter
that the Secret Service’s search of its main indices yielded no responsive records and
advised him of his right to an administrative appeal. (Id., Ex. E, “Letter from Craig W.
Ulmer dated Dec. 20, 2010.”)
Plaintiff administratively appealed the Secret Service’s initial determination on
February 16, 2011. (Smith Decl. ¶ 9; see id., Ex. F., “Pl.’s FOIA Appeal.”) In response
to the appeal, the Secret Service took three further steps: first, the agency conducted a
second CI search. (Smith Decl. ¶ 19.) Secret Service staff queried the CI for Plaintiff’s
name, date of birth, social security number, and for “the names of the alleged informer
and counterfeiter,” yet “[n]o responsive records were identified.” (Id.) Second, “the
Secret Service sent Plaintiff’s initial request and appeal to the Resident Agent in
Charge” of the Agency’s Springfield, Illinois office. (Id. ¶ 20.) Both the Resident
Agent in Charge and the Administrative Officer “manually reviewed the office’s
investigative files” (id. ¶ 21) and no records pertaining to Plaintiff or any other aspect
of his specific request for information were found. (Id. ¶ 22.) Third, the Secret Service
contacted the agent to whom the Carbondale police purportedly had referred the alleged
counterfeiting scheme. (Id. ¶ 23.) The agent reported “that he was not personally
maintaining any material concerning investigations he conducted while reporting to the
6
In a letter dated September 23, 2010, Plaintiff maintained that Peppel “was working with [Secret
Service] Agent Paul Foster, [the] Waukegan police and other yet to be disclosed law enforcement
agencies in order to soften the impact of his involvement” in counterfeiting activity. (Smith Decl., Ex.
D, “Letter to Letita Payne from Pl. dated Sept. 23, 2010,” at 3-5.)
6
Springfield . . . office.” (Id.) On March 18, 2011, the Secret Service wrote to Plaintiff
to inform him that the administrative appeal process had confirmed the Secret Service’s
initial determination that no responsive records could be located. (Smith Decl., Ex. G,
“Letter from Keith L. Prewitt, Deputy Director, Secret Service, dated Mar. 18, 2011.”)
On June 26, 2012, after the conclusion of the Secret Service’s administrative
appeal process, Plaintiff filed the instant civil action. (Compl. ¶ 1.) 7 Plaintiff demands
injunctive relief in the form of a court order requiring “the [d]efendants to turn over all
records requested” (id. ¶ 27) and “recovery of all cost[s] in this suit” (id. ¶ 29). 8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment in a FOIA Case
“FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary
judgment.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87
(D.D.C. 2009) (collecting cases). 9 The Court grants summary judgment “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he agency bears the burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact, even when the underlying
facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the requester.” Weisberg v. Dep’t of
7
The Clerk of Court received Plaintiff’s complaint and application to proceed in forma pauperis on June 4, 2012.
His application was granted on June 21, 2012, and the Clerk officially entered both documents on the Court’s
electronic docket on June 26, 2012.
8
Plaintiff also demands “a declaration that the [Secret Service] violated his rights under the
Constitution . . . of the United States,” (Compl. ¶ 26), but that request is not viable in this context.
The FOIA “provides requesters with the potential for injunctive relief only, either to enjoin the
withholding of documents or to compel production of agency records.” Johnson v. Exec. Office for
U.S. Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
9
The plaintiff’s demand for a jury trial (Compl. ¶ 28) is denied. “Summary judgment is the procedural
vehicle by which FOIA cases typically are resolved,” Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 681 F. Supp.
2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation omitted), and there is no reason why this case cannot be resolved on
summary judgment. See Skinner v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 744 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 n.1 (D.D.C. 2010).
7
Justice, 705 F.2d 1344, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 1983). To prevail in a FOIA case, “the
defending agency must prove that each document that falls within the class requested
either has been produced, is unidentifiable, or is wholly exempt from the [FOIA’s]
inspection requirements.” Founding Church of Scientology of Wash., D.C., 610 F.2d
824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (quoting Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183,
186 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
“When, as here, responsive records are not located, an agency is entitled to
summary judgment if it establishes ‘beyond material doubt [ ] that it conducted a search
reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” Blunt-Bey v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 612 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Weisberg, 705 F.2d at 1351);
see Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641 F.3d 504, 514 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (stating that an agency “fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate
beyond material doubt that its search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant
documents”). To this end, “the court may rely on a reasonably detailed affidavit,
setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that all
files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched.”
Valencia-Lucena v. U.S. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations,
internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d
548, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that affidavits or declarations must describe “what
records were searched, by whom, and through what processes”). In the absence of
contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to demonstrate an
agency’s compliance with the FOIA. Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
8
If the record “leaves substantial doubt as to the sufficiency of the search,
summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540,
542 (D.C. Cir. 1990). However, “the [mere] fact that a particular document was not
found does not demonstrate the inadequacy of a search.” Boyd v. Criminal Div. of U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 390-91 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see Moore
v. Aspin, 916 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996) (“The issue in a FOIA case is not whether
the [agency’s] searches uncovered responsive documents, but rather whether the
searches were reasonable.”).
B. Analysis
Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s summary judgment motion on the ground that
“questions surrounding the steps taken by the Secret Service in its attempts to obtain
records responsive to [his FOIA] request create a genuine issue of material fact making
summary judgment inappropriate.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (“Pl.’s
Opp’n”) at 2.)
Plaintiff’s first objection arises from a misreading of Declarant’s description of
the EVNAME database. Declarant avers that an EVNAME search “permits the Agency
to determine if it has queried other internal and external databases such as the MCI,
PRISM, the National Crime Information Center, and the Interstate Identification Index
for a specific individual in the last thirty (30) days.” (Smith Decl. ¶ 16.) However,
Plaintiff apparently reads this statement to mean that “the Common Index system only
searches [MCI, PRISM, MPS, WV and EVNAME] databases for information on
individuals that ha[d] been previously checked by the Secret Service in the last
THIRTY (30) days.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 7 (emphasis added).) Because the information
that Plaintiff seeks “dates as far back as April 23, 2005”—long before the Secret
Service searched for information responsive to Plaintiff’s August 25, 2010, FOIA
9
request—Plaintiff asserts that searching the CI “was inappropriate.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff
is clearly mistaken under the plain language of the declaration. As Declarant describes
the databases at issue, the 30-day limit applies the EVNAME system, not the CI, and
the EVNAME system only indicates whether a query of other databases was made
within the relevant period. When properly understood, Declarant’s description of the
EVNAME database raises no question of material fact about the appropriateness of the
Secret Service’s CI query.
Plaintiff’s second objection is rooted in his belief that the Secret Service may
have once stored responsive records at a now-shuttered Secret Service facility in
Belleville, Illinois, and that those records either were not transferred to the Springfield
office that was the locus of the agency’s additional manual records search or were
somehow not retrieved during the manual search. Plaintiff focuses on the fact that
Agent Foster, to whom the Carbondale Police Department supposedly referred the
counterfeiting matter, had been “assigned to the Secret Service[’]s field office in
Belleville . . . and that said office is now closed.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiff faults
the Secret Service for its failure to “confirm that all the documents from the defunct
Belleville, Illinois Secret Service field office were sent to the Springfield[,] Illinois
Resident Office,” and he deems it “unreasonable to assume . . . that the integration of
documents from the Belleville, Illinois Secret Service field office to the Springfield,
Illinois Resident Office was done by one person or that all the documents from the
Belleville, Illinois field office stayed at the Springfield[,] Illinois Resident Office.”
(Id. at 9-10.) Plaintiff also opines that “[a] computerized search of records responsive
to [his FOIA] request at the Springfield[,] Illinois Resident Office would [have] been a
more appropriate approach.” (Id. at 10.)
Nothing in the record of this case indicates that the defunct Belleville field office
ever maintained any records responsive to Plaintiff’s FOIA request, much less that the
integration of any such records into the Springfield office’s recordkeeping system was
10
mishandled once the Belleville office closed. In any event, speculative assertions such
as these have no bearing on the adequacy of the agency’s search. See Concepción v.
FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[S]peculation as to the existence of
additional records . . . does not render the searches inadequate.”). Plaintiff also fails to
recognize that, according to the Secret Service’s supporting declaration, a computerized
records search was undertaken with respect to the agency’s entire inventory of
documents and that no responsive records were found in any office. (Def.’s Mem,
“Smith Decl.,” ¶¶ 12-23.) This representation is accorded a presumption of good faith
that Plaintiff’s conjecture as to the possible location and existence of allegedly missing
records is insufficient to rebut. See Vento v. IRS, 714 F. Supp. 2d 137, 145 (D.D.C.
2010) (finding that the plaintiffs’ speculation that other documents exist did not rebut
presumption of good faith accorded to agency’s declaration).
Plaintiff’s final argument regarding the inadequacy of the Secret Service’s
document search is based on other documents that Plaintiff received in response to a
similar FOIA request made to a different agency. Plaintiff argues that, because the
Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) found responsive documents, the Secret
Service “has not made a good faith effort to obtain records and are withholding
records.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at 13.) 10 But none of the records that Plaintiff received from the
DEA references any Secret Service investigation into counterfeiting or otherwise. And
it is well established that the existence of records maintained by another agency is not
dispositive of either the issue of the adequacy of an agency’s search or the question of
its good faith. See Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 681 F. Supp. 2d 76, 85 n.6
(D.D.C. 2010) (rejecting requester’s argument that agency’s failure to produce a
10
In his request to the DEA, Plaintiff sought “any and all documents and communications agent Paul
Foster had . . . relating to [the plaintiff] and his alleged involvement in counterfeiting U.S. currency
discovered out of independent investigation and/or as a result of case # 20050424008 originating out of
Carbondale, Illinois.” (Pl.’s Opp’n. at 13.) The DEA responded by providing Plaintiff with copies of
local police reports regarding Plaintiff’s narcotics arrest. (Id., Ex. F, “Letter from Katherine L. Myrick
dated October 22, 2012.”)
11
particular record is evidence of bad faith); Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. NTSB, No. 03-cv-
0024, 2006 WL 826070, at *8 (D.D.C. March 29, 2006) (finding that plaintiff’s
showing of omitted documents “does not mean that they exist now or that the agency
has possession of them”); see also Chambers v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 568 F.3d
998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting that substantial weight traditionally is accorded to
agency affidavits in FOIA “adequacy of search” cases). Indeed, “particular documents
may have been accidentally lost or destroyed, or a reasonable and thorough search may
have missed them”; thus, courts have long held that “the adequacy of a FOIA search is
generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the
methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d
311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Steinberg, 23 F.3d at 551).
This is not to say that Plaintiff’s showing of the existence of responsive records
is entirely irrelevant; to be sure, “a court may place significant weight on the fact that a
records search failed to turn up a particular document in analyzing the adequacy of a
records search” in certain circumstances. See, e.g., id. at 315 (discussing inadequate
search FOIA cases in which an agency neglected “to search particular offices or files
where the document might well have been found” ; “failed or refused to interview
government officials for whom there was strong evidence that they might have been
helpful in finding the missing documents” ; “ignored indications in documents found in
its initial search that there were additional responsive documents elsewhere”; or ignored
evidence “that . . . there was reason to believe” that responsive records existed in its
files (citations omitted)). But no such circumstances are present here. Taken at its
word, the Secret Service twice searched agency-wide computer databases; conducted a
manual search of its Springfield, Illinois, office; interviewed the Secret Service agent
who allegedly received copies of records from the Carbondale police; and sought
additional information from Plaintiff in order to address, rather than ignore, the
Carbondale police report that Plaintiff had appended to his FOIA request. (Smith Decl.
12
¶¶ 7, 12-23). This effort clearly meets the criteria for an adequate search, and
Plaintiff’s “[m]ere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not
undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.”
Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 316 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
III. CONCLUSION
To satisfy the FOIA, an agency need only adequately describe the scope and
methods of its searches and demonstrate that the places most likely to contain
responsive materials were searched. See Davidson v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 121 F. Supp.
2d 38, 39 (D.D.C. 2000). The Court finds that the Secret Service has met that burden in
this case. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to the agency’s compliance with
the FOIA; accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and its
motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED. An Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
DATE: August 16, 2013
Ketanji Brown Jackson
Ketanji Brown Jackson
United States District Judge
13