Aucoin v. the Prudential Insurance Company of America , 959 F. Supp. 2d 185 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________________
)
MONIQUE AUCOIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-0321 (ABJ)
)
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE )
COMPANY OF AMERICA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This suit involves a claim for disability benefits pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Compl. [Dkt. # 1] ¶ 1. Plaintiff Monique Aucoin
sues the D.R. Horton Long Term Disability Plan (the “Plan”), the benefit plan sponsored and
administered by her former employer D.R. Horton Corp., and the Plan’s claims administrator,
Prudential Insurance Company of America, for denying her claim for disability benefits. See
Compl. ¶ 4. Prudential moves to transfer the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to either the
District of New Jersey, where Prudential is located, or the District of Arizona, where plaintiff
resides and was employed by D.R. Horton. See Mot. to Transfer Venue (“Mot.”) and Mem. in
Supp. of Mot. (“Mem.”) [Dkt. # 6]. D.R. Horton joins the motion, and plaintiff opposes it. See
Def. The D.R. Horton Long-Term Disability Plan’s Notice of Joining Prudential’s Mot. to
Transfer [Dkt. # 8]; Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer Venue (“Opp’n”) [Dkt. # 9]. For the
reasons stated below, Prudential’s motion to transfer will be granted, and the Court will transfer
the case to the District of New Jersey.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Aucoin sues defendants under Section 502 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1132, for
denying her claim for disability benefits. Compl. ¶ 1. Aucoin lives in Arizona and was
employed by defendant D.R. Horton until she became disabled. See id. ¶¶ 5–6, 11. D.R. Horton
Corp. is a home construction company with its principle place of business in Texas. D.R. Horton
Corp. Annual Report 2012 (“Annual Report”) [Dkt. # 9-3], Ex. 3 to Opp’n at 1. D.R. Horton
sponsored and administered the plan at issue in this case. See D.R. Horton, Inc. Long Term
Disability Coverage [Dkt. # 6-1], Ex. 1 to Mot. at 46. Defendant Prudential served as D.R.
Horton’s claims administrator. Id. at 47. Prudential is a New Jersey corporation with its
principal place of business in New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 7; Mot. ¶ 3.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought
. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The defendant, as the moving party, bears the burden of establishing
that transfer is proper. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 127
(D.D.C. 2001). The Court has “broad discretion to decide whether transfer from one jurisdiction
to another is proper.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Harvey, 437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D.D.C. 2006),
citing SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The decision to transfer
requires an “individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.” Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964).
The threshold question under section 1404(a) is whether the action “might have been
brought” in the transferee district. “In cases involving multiple defendants . . . all defendants
must have been subject to process in the transferee court before the case can be transferred.”
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Levin v. Majestik Surface Corp., 654 F. Supp. 2d 12, 15 (D.D.C. 2009), citing Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1960). ERISA permits nationwide service of process in “any . . . district
where a defendant resides or may be found.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2); see Peay v. BellSouth
Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (“There is no question that the last
clause of § 1132(e)(2) authorizes nationwide service of process.”). Service of process in turn
establishes personal jurisdiction, see Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A.,
119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997) (“When a federal statute provides for nationwide service of
process, it becomes the statutory basis for personal jurisdiction.”), as long as Fifth Amendment
due process is satisfied by the defendant’s having minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole, see Med. Mut. of Ohio v. deSoto, 245 F.3d 561, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2001); Lorelei Corp. v.
Cnty. of Guadalupe, 940 F.2d 717, 719–20 (1st Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Flynn v. Ohio Bldg.
Restoration, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 2d 156, 171–72 (D.D.C. 2003). Venue, in turn, is appropriate for
an ERISA claim, “where the plan is administered, where the breach took place, or where a
defendant resides or may be found.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(2). A corporation “shall be deemed to
reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
After meeting the threshold requirement, the Court must balance case-specific private-
interest and public-interest factors. See Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 104 F. Supp. 2d 10, 12
(D.D.C. 2000). Private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum,
unless the balance of convenience weighs strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the defendant’s
choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5)
the convenience of the witnesses but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be
unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof. Trout
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Unlimited v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). Public-interest
considerations include: (1) the transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative
congestion of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home. Id.ANALYSIS
Defendants’ motion seeks to transfer this case to either the U.S. District Court for the
District of New Jersey or the District Arizona. The Court will only consider the motion to
transfer to New Jersey because none of the parties has stated a preference between the two
proposed districts, and the defendants offer less evidence for the convenience of Arizona than
New Jersey. See Virts v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, No. 13-320 (JDB), 2013 WL
2994872, at *2 (D.D.C. June 18, 2013) (analyzing one of two possible transferee district
proposed by defendants).
A Section 1404(a) transfer is valid if (1) venue is appropriate in the district from which
transfer is sought; (2) venue is appropriate in the district to which transfer is sought; and (3) the
convenience of the parties, witnesses, and the interest of justice are satisfied in light of the
private and public interest factors. See, e.g., Gipson v. Wells Fargo, 563 F. Supp. 2d 149, 156
(D.D.C. 2008).
I. Venue is Appropriate in the District of Columbia
The parties do not dispute that this case could have been filed in the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff properly served process on defendants in the District of Columbia. Valid service of
process on defendants in the District of Columbia pursuant to the nationwide service of process
provision confers personal jurisdiction over defendants in other federal courts as well, including
in the District of New Jersey. See Med. Mut. of Ohio, 245 F.3d at 567 (“Congress has the power
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to confer nationwide personal jurisdiction; and we hold that it conferred such jurisdiction under
§ 1132(e)(2) . . . .”); see also Ohio Bldg. Restoration, 260 F. Supp. 2d at 171–72 (“Where
Congress has authorized nationwide service of process, a federal court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over any United States resident, without regard to whether its sister state court could
assert jurisdiction under minimum contacts principles.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, venue is appropriate in the district from which transfer is sought.
II. Venue is Appropriate in the District of New Jersey.
Pursuant to Section 1132(e)(2), venue is also appropriate in the District of New Jersey.
Defendant Prudential “resides” there, see 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (defining corporate residency
“[f]or all venue purposes” as where the corporation is subject to a court’s personal jurisdiction),
and D.R. Horton can be “found” there, see Annual Report at 2 (listing New Jersey among the
states where it conducts homebuilding operations). Thus, venue is appropriate in the district to
which transfer is sought.
III. All the Interests Warrant Transfer
The convenience of parties and witnesses and the interest of justice warrant transfer of
this case.
A. Private Interest Factors
1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum
Aucoin argues her choice of forum receives “special weight” because this is an ERISA
case. Opp’n at 6–7, citing Int’l Bhd. of Painters and Allied Trades Union and Indus. Pension
Fund v. Best Painting and Sandblasting, Co., 621 F. Supp. 906, 1118 (D.D.C. 1985), Holland v.
ACL Transp. Servs., LLC, 815 F. Supp. 2d 46, 56 (D.D.C. 2011); Joyce v. E. Concrete Paving
Co., Civ. 96-1343 (PLF), 1996 WL 762323, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 1996). It is true that in
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ERISA cases, a plaintiff’s choice of forum usually receives special weight in a Section 1404(a)
transfer analysis, see Flynn v. Veazey Constr. Corp., 310 F. Supp. 2d 186, 193 (D.D.C. 2004),
especially if the plaintiff has chosen the venue where the plan is administered. See, e.g.,
Holland, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (suggesting “heightened” deference when a plan is administered
in plaintiff’s chosen forum). But “this deference is not absolute.” Virts v. Prudential, 2013 WL
2994872 at *3 (quoting Gipson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 157). Plaintiff’s chosen forum receives
“diminished consideration” if it has “no meaningful ties to the controversy.” Virts at *3, citing
Sheldon v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 355 F. Supp. 2d 174, 178 (D.D.C. 2005). For example,
when the ERISA plan is administered outside the forum, the weight of plaintiff’s choice is
weakened. Virts at *3, citing Campbell v. Consol. Bldg. Specialties, 683 F. Supp. 271, 273
(D.D.C. 1987) (granting motion to transfer ERISA case where plan administration took place
outside the plaintiff’s selected forum). Deference to the plaintiff’s chosen forum is further
reduced when the forum is not the plaintiff’s home district. Virts at * 3, citing Boers v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 64, 65 (D.D.C. 2001) (giving “substantially less deference” when
plaintiff brought suit outside plaintiff’s home forum).
Here, Aucoin’s chosen forum receives little weight because the key factors that would
warrant giving it special weight are not present. The plan is administered outside the District of
Columbia. See D.R. Horton, Inc. Long Term Disability Coverage, Ex. 1 to Mot. at 46 (stating
the plan administrator is located in Fort Worth, Texas). Further, plaintiff’s claim for benefits
arose outside the District of Columbia: Aucoin resides in Arizona where she filed for disability
benefits, D.R. Horton administered the plan under which she sought benefits in Texas, and
Prudential administered her claim for benefits in New Jersey. Aucoin’s only asserted tie to the
District of Columbia area is the location of her counsel. See Opp’n at 11–12, 15. But “[t]he
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location of counsel carries little, if any, weight in an analysis under § 1404(a).” Armco Steel Co.
v. CSX Corp., 790 F. Supp. 311, 324 (D.D.C. 1991). Given this, Aucoin’s chosen forum is given
diminished consideration.
2. Defendants’ Choice of Forum
“[T]he presumption [in favor of plaintiff’s choice of forum] may switch to defendants’
favor in the District of Columbia when neither party resides in the chosen forum and the cause of
action arises elsewhere.” Turner & Newall, PLC v. Canadian Universal Ins. Co., 652 F. Supp.
1308, 1310 (D.D.C. 1987). This case has strong ties to the proposed transferee District of New
Jersey. Prudential’s principal place of business is in New Jersey, and a defendant’s principal
place of business in the transferee venue is a “legitimate reason[]” for granting a § 1404(a)
motion. See Bergmann v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 710 F. Supp. 2d 65, 74 (D.D.C. 2010). Further,
none of the parties to this case reside in the District of Columbia, and the cause of action arose
outside this District. Given this fact, the District of New Jersey has stronger ties to this case than
the District of Columbia, where the only connection to the matter is the location of counsel. This
is not a case where transfer will “merely shift the balance of inconvenience from Defendant to
Plaintiff.” See Int’l Painters & Allied Trades Indus. Pension Fund v. Tri-State Interiors, Inc.,
357 F. Supp. 2d 54, 57 (D.D.C. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, transfer
reduces net inconvenience, and this factor thus favors transfer.
3. Whether the Claim Arose Elsewhere
The question of where the claim arose turns on whether there is a nexus between the
underlying transactions and the forum. Gipson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 158. There is no dispute that
Aucoin’s claim arose outside in the District of Columbia. Defendants argue that Aucoin’s claim
arose in Arizona, where she suffered the disability. See Mot. ¶ 2; Mem. at 6 (arguing that her
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claim arose in Arizona where she lives and worked). Plaintiff does not make any argument
about where her claim arose, only that the lawsuit “has arisen by the failure of Defendant,
[Prudential], to pay disability benefits to the Plaintiff in accordance with The D.R. Horton Long
Term Disability Plan.” Opp’n at 1. Some courts consider an ERISA claim to arise where the
plan is administered, which in this case is Texas. See, e.g. Gipson at 158 (finding that claim for
breach of fiduciary duty occurred where the plan was administered). Other courts consider it to
be where the decision was made to deny benefits, which in this case is New Jersey. Berenson v.
Nat’l Fin. Servs., LLC, 319 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2004) (holding that an ERISA claim arose
where the actions that caused plaintiffs’ economic harm occurred). The Court considers
plaintiff’s claim to have arisen in New Jersey, where Prudential, as the claims administrator,
denied plaintiff’s disability claim. This factor, thus, favors transfer.
4. Convenience of the Parties
When analyzing convenience to the parties, the Court considers “potential travel cost and
lost work impact.” Gipson, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 159. New Jersey is a more convenient location
for Prudential because its headquarters are located there, and personnel key to the challenged
decision are located nearby. Mem. at 7. See Verosol B.V. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 806 F. Supp.
582, 593 (E.D. Va. 1992) (transferring to District of New Jersey because of factors “in New
Jersey or its environs”). Although Arizona is presumably more convenient for plaintiff and D.R.
Horton since they are both located there, Aucoin does not argue that it is more convenient for her
or that New Jersey is less convenient. Instead, she contends only that the District of Columbia
will be convenient for counsel because “both law firms have attorneys who practice in this Court
and are located nearby.” Opp’n at 15. But, again, convenience to counsel is given little, if any,
weight. Armco Steel Co., 790 F. Supp. at 324. Moreover, although plaintiff resides in Arizona,
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she has filed her lawsuit here and thus, has already assumed the burden of spending time and
money to travel to this District for potential court appearances. See Treppel v. Reason, 793 F.
Supp. 2d 429, 437 (D.D.C. 2011) (granting a defendant’s motion to transfer in part because the
plaintiff made clear he was willing to forego the convenience of a forum closer to home).
Because plaintiff has shown she is prepared to assume the burden of travelling across country to
litigate this case, and litigating the case in New Jersey is more convenient for defendants, the
Court concludes that the District of New Jersey is more convenient for the parties than the
District of Columbia.
5. Convenience of Witnesses
The parties expect this matter to be decided on the administrative record, without
discovery, see Mem. at 2 n. 2, Opp’n at 15, and no party provides the names and locations of
witnesses it would intend to call. 1 Accordingly, the Court has no basis on which to evaluate this
factor, and this factor is not likely to become relevant in this case. See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal
Workers Nat’l Fund v. Baylor Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (E.D.
Va. 1988) (“influence of this factor cannot be assessed in the absence of reliable information
identifying the witnesses involved”).
6. Ease of Access to the Sources of Proof
Defendants contend that certain Prudential documents are located in New Jersey, and
proof regarding Aucoin’s disability is located in Arizona, Mem. at 2 and 6, although all parties
expect this case to be decided on the record. Mem. at 2 n. 2; Opp’n at 15. Plaintiff does not
contend that any sources of proof are located in the District of Columbia – only that this case will
1 Defendants do state that any witnesses for Prudential will be located in New Jersey.
Mem. at 2.
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be determined on summary disposition based on the claim record. Opp’n at 14. Because “the
location of documents has been made increasingly insignificant by the availability of electronic
discovery,” see, e.g., Holland, 815 F. Supp. 2d at 58, the Court does not consider this factor to
weigh heavily in its analysis. No party claims that any sources of proof are in this District,
however, so this factor tips in slightly favor of transfer to the District of New Jersey, where “the
bulk of discoverable information lies.” Defs.’ Reply in Support of Mot. to Transfer Venue [Dkt.
# 10] at 3 n. 1.
B. Public Interest Factors
1. Transferees’ Familiarity with the Governing Laws
The familiarity of the District of New Jersey with the governing laws does not affect the
transfer analysis because this factor loses force when the issue involves federal law and all
federal courts are “competent to decide federal issues correctly.” Sierra Club v. Flowers, 276
F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 n.6 (D.D.C. 2003), quoting In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,
829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). Given this and the
fact that none of the parties present argument on this factor, the Court does not consider this
factor to influence the analysis.
2. Relative Congestion of the Courts
No party has presented facts on this factor. Defendants contend there is no concern
regarding the relative congestion of the courts, Mot. at 8, while Aucoin asserts the lack of a trial
in an ERISA case undermines this factor in the analysis, Opp’n at 8. Although publically
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available data suggests that this District may be marginally more congested that the District of
New Jersey, 2 this factor does not weigh heavily in the Court’s analysis.
3. Local Interests in Deciding Local Controversies
Finally, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home favors
transfer. Defendants contend that the District of Columbia has no particular interest in this case
because it is a private dispute about entitlement to ERISA plan benefits. Mem. at 7. Plaintiff
makes no argument on this issue. Defendants are correct that the District of Columbia has no
particular interest in this dispute: Aucion’s claim arose outside this District, the plan is
administered outside the district, and plaintiff’s claim for disability was determined outside the
District. Thus, this factor favors transfer.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant Prudential’s motion for transfer and
transfer this action to the District of New Jersey. A separate order will issue.
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: August 14, 2013
2 “If the case ends without trial, [the District of Columbia] averages a disposition time of
9.7 months, while the District of New Jersey averages a disposition time of 3.7 months. If the
case does proceed to trial, [the District of Columbia] averages a disposition time of 50.3 months,
while the District of New Jersey averages a disposition time of 32.3 months.” See Virts, 2013
WL 2994872, at *2 (footnotes omitted).
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