Hardy v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. , 953 F. Supp. 2d 150 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
)
LA TRICIA HARDY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-0362 (ABJ)
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NORTHERN LEASING SYSTEMS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended
complaint filed on behalf of Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. [ECF No. 11]. For the reasons
discussed below, the motion will be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises from efforts by Northern Leasing Systems, Inc. (“NLS”) to enforce an
equipment finance lease, personally guaranteed by the plaintiff, for the rental of equipment for
processing non-cash payments at the plaintiff’s business, Capitol Hill Beauty LLC. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 12–14; Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (“Def.’s Mem.”); id., Ex. 1 (New York Civil Court Summons and Verified Complaint and
Non Cancelable Equipment Finance Lease Agreement (“Lease Agreement”)) at 5–10 (page
numbers designated by ECF).
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NLS is a “corporation located in the state of New York” which “finances the equipment
needs of . . . business[es] . . . .” Def.’s Mem. at 1. NLS represents that it “has no ties to the
District of Columbia,” that it “does not have an office in the District of Columbia, and that it
does not “solicit or engage in persistent conduct aimed at deriving revenue from good or services
from the District of Columbia.” Id. at 3.
The plaintiff entered into the Lease Agreement with NLS on October 14, 2010. See
Def.’s Mem. at 1; Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Denying Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 3. She thereby agreed to “individually, absolutely and
unconditionally guarant[ee] to [NLS] prompt payment when due” of all obligations under the
lease. Lease Agreement at 2. The plaintiff “abid[ed] by her contract for over two years,” Am.
Compl. ¶ 12, at which time she “stopped the automatic payment deductions from her bank
account,” id. ¶ 14, and “requested that said contract be cancelled due to inequities within said
contract.” 1 Id. ¶ 12. When the plaintiff defaulted on her payment obligations, NLS “filed a
lawsuit against the [her] . . . in New York State Court[.]” Def.’s Mem. at 1; see id., Ex. 1
(Verified Complaint). “[A] judgment was entered in favor of [NLS].” Def.’s Mem. at 1; Pl.’s
Opp’n, Ex. B (Civil Judgment entered on October 26, 2012).
The plaintiff alleges that NLS “placed negative information on [her] credit reports with
all three (3) Credit Bureaus,” Am. Compl. ¶ 15, and “placed two (2) inquiries on [p]laintiff’s
credit reports to reflect her account as being a charge off for non-payment,” id. ¶ 21. These
actions allegedly “brought her credit down drastically.” Id. Due to what the plaintiff describes
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According to the plaintiff, “due to [her] business being cash only . . . she had made
numerous requests . . . to cancel the[] contract.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. She further asserted that the
serial numbers of the equipment she received were different from the serial numbers on the
Lease Agreement. See id.
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as “erroneous placements on [her] credit reports,” she further alleges that “she has been unable to
secure any type of loan,” causing her “undue hardship.” Id. ¶ 22.
According to the plaintiff, NLS violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), see 15
U.S.C. § 1681, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), see 15 U.S.C. § 1692, certain
District of Columbia criminal statutes, see D.C. Code §§ 22-3401 to -3403, the D.C. Consumer
Protections Act (“Consumer Act”), see D.C. Code § 28-3814, and the D.C. Consumer Protection
Procedures Act (“CPPA”), see D.C. Code § 28-3904. See generally Am. Compl. ¶¶ 23–28
(Counts I–IV). She demands a declaratory judgment and monetary damages. See id. at 5 (page
number designated by ECF).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court recognizes its ongoing obligation to ensure that “it is acting within the scope
of its jurisdictional authority,” Ha v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 608 F. Supp. 2d 45, 46 (D.D.C. 2010)
(internal citations omitted), and begins its discussion with NLS’s motion to dismiss the
complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s FDCPA and Consumer Act claims.
According to NLS, neither statute applies, and therefore, “the Court lacks power to hear [these
claims].” Def.’s Mem. at 4. The plaintiff responds that the Court has jurisdiction because
“liability and damages are founded on [f]ederal question jurisdiction.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. The
Court concurs.
It is apparent that the plaintiff’s causes of action arise in part under two federal statutes --
the FDCPA and the FCRA -- and these are matters over which this Court has subject matter
jurisdiction. Whether the statutes are applicable is a different question which the Court will
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address in the context of NLS’s motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure
to state claims upon which relief can be granted.
B. Personal Jurisdiction
NLS moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it.
See Def.’s Mem. at 2. Because “the [p]laintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing of
personal jurisdiction over [NLS],” it argues that “the suit must be dismissed.” Id. at 4. The
plaintiff counters that NLS falls within the scope of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute
because the equipment “was that of [NLS], it was set-up on behalf of [NLS] and any payment
made regarding this lease was made to [NLS]. . . . [T]his is evidence of them doing business
within the District of Columbia.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.
The plaintiff bears the “burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over each defendant.”
Thompson Hine LLP v. Smoking Everywhere, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 138, 141 (D.D.C. 2012)
(citing Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1990). She cannot rely
on bare allegations or conclusory statements, but “must allege specific acts connecting [the]
defendant with the forum.” Second Amendment Found. v. U.S. Conference of Mayors, 274 F.3d
521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). The plaintiff’s pro se status does not
relieve her of her obligation to “plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for [her] claims.”
Donnelly v. Sebelius, 851 F. Supp. 2d 109, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
The Court determines whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised “by reference to
District of Columbia law.” United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995). “A
District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person domiciled in . . . or
maintaining . . . its principal place of business in, the District of Columbia as to any claim for
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relief.” D.C. Code § 13-422. Nowhere in the complaint does the plaintiff allege that NLS either
is domiciled in or maintains its principal place of business in the District of Columbia.
The Court next engages in a two-part inquiry to determine whether a non-resident
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia. See GTE New Media
Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Court “first
examine[s] whether jurisdiction is applicable under the [District of Columbia’s] long-arm statute
and then determine[s] whether a finding of jurisdiction satisfies the constitutional requirements
of due process.” Id. (citing Ferrara, 54 F.3d at 828). To this end, the plaintiff may show that
NLS has “minimum contacts” with this forum, such that “the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). These minimum contacts must arise from “some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities with the [District of
Columbia], thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd.
v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1988) (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)). In other words, “the defendant’s conduct and connection
with the [District of Columbia] are such that [it] should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court there.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
In relevant part, the long-arm statute allows a court in the District of Columbia to
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with regard to a claim arising from
the defendant’s conduct in:
(1) transacting business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act
or omission in the District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act
or omission outside the District of Columbia if he regularly
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does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent
course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from
goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the
District of Columbia.
D.C. Code § 13-423(a). 2 Although the plaintiff alleges that “the conduct complained of occurred
here,” Am. Compl. ¶ 7, she does not indicate which provision of the long-arm statute applies in
this case. Her opposition to the defendant’s motion, however, suggests that she relies on the
“transacting business” provision. She “contends that due to the fact that no one other than [NLS]
provided the equipment, installed it or received payment, that this is evidence of [NLS] doing
business within the District of Columbia. Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.
Section 13-423(a)(1) is “interpreted to be coextensive with the Constitution’s due process
limit.” First Chicago Int’l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F. 2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (internal
citations omitted). “To establish personal jurisdiction under the ‘transacting business’ clause of
the long-arm statute . . . a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the defendant transacted business in
the District; (2) the claim arose from the business transacted in the District . . . ; (3) the defendant
had minimum contacts with the District; and (4) the Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
would not offend ‘traditional notions of fair, play and substantial justice.’” COMSAT Corp. v.
Finshipyards S.A.M., 900 F. Supp. 515, 521 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
In the face of NLS’s arguments that it neither engages in persistent conduct aimed at
deriving revenue from goods or services from the District of Columbia or transacts any business
here, see Def.’s Mem. at 3, the plaintiff gives no indication that NLS has the requisite contacts,
ties, or relation to the District of Columbia. Missing from the amended complaint are any factual
allegations to show that NLS “‘purposefully directed’ any activities at residents of the District of
2
The alternative bases set forth under the long-arm statute are inapplicable.
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Columbia . . . [or] that it has any ‘contacts, ties, or relation’ to the District of Columbia.”
Buesgens v. Brown, 567 F. Supp. 2d 26, 36 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at
472).
If the plaintiff were to rely on D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(2) as a basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction, she still cannot prevail. “[T]he mere existence of a contract between a non-resident
and a resident is not sufficient basis on which to claim jurisdiction over the non-resident in the
District of Columbia.” COMSAT, 900 F. Supp. at 524 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235(1958)); Willis v. Willis, 655 F.2d 1333, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Lease Agreement is a
particularly weak justification for invoking the D.C. long-arm statute. By its terms, New York
law governs, and any litigation shall be brought in the federal or state courts in New York. See
Lease Agreement at 5. 3
If the Court were to consider NLS’s alleged threats to sue the plaintiff, see id. ¶ 19,
telephone calls to her workplace, id. ¶ 20, and the “undue hardship” she allegedly suffers, id. ¶
22, as tortious injury suffered in the District of Columbia caused by NLS’s actions outside of the
District of Columbia, the plaintiff cannot rely on section 13-426(a)(4) either. The plaintiff fails
to establish “any of subsection (a)(4)’s so-called ‘plus factors’: “regularly do[ing] or solicit[ing]
business, engag[ing] in any other persistent course of conduct, or deriv[ing] substantial revenue
3
Paragraph 20 of the Lease Agreement provides:
THIS LEASE SHALL BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS FO THE STATE OF NEW YORK
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE CONFLICT OF LAW, RULES OR PRINCIPLES THEREOF.
ALL ACTIONS, PROCEEDINGS OR LITIGATION BROUGHT BY [NLS OR THE
GUARANTOR] ARISING FROM OR IN ANY WAY RELATED TO THIS LEASE SHALL BE
INSTITUTED AND PROSECUTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS
LOCATED IN THE STATE AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
OTHER COURTS MAY HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT
MATTER.
Lease Agreement at 5 (emphasis in original).
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from goods used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.” McIntosh v.
Gilley, 753 F. Supp. 2d 46, 59 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(4)).
NLS is neither subject to the District’s long-arm statute nor maintains sufficient contacts
with the District so as to render it subject to this Court’s jurisdiction. 4 Its motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction will be granted.
C. Failure to State Claims Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
NLS moves to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure on the ground that the pleading fails to state claims under the FCRA, the
FDCPA, and the Consumer Act upon which relief can be granted. See Def.’s Mem. at 6-9. To
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
In other words, it must “plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron
Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation omitted). Although a complaint
filed by a pro se plaintiff is “to be liberally construed,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
4
It does not appear that D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(3) applies in this case, as the amended
complaint does not allege that NLS caused tortious injury by an action originating in the District
of Columbia. Nor can the plaintiff rely on 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), see Pl.’s Opp’n at 5, as a basis
for establishing personal jurisdiction. Section 1692k(d) does not confer jurisdiction and instead
establishes the limitations period within which to bring an action under the FDCPA “in any
appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any
other court of competent jurisdiction . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d). Lastly, the plaintiff cannot
rely on Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as support for the proposition that
“serving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction.” Pl’s Mot. to Amend ¶ 3. Rather,
under Rule 4(k), “[s]erving a summons . . . establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant . . .
who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state where the district
court is located.” Id. (emphasis added). Service on a non-resident defendant by mail to a New
York address might establish personal jurisdiction only if NLS otherwise were subject to this
Court’s jurisdiction.
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(2007), it, too, must set forth factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
1. Fair Credit Reporting Act
NLS moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s claims under the FCRA on the ground that the
complaint “has not alleged any facts which would make the FCRA applicable to this action . . . .”
Def.’s Mem. at 7. “Congress enacted FCRA to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote
efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr,
551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007) (internal citations omitted). In order to show a violation of the FCRA,
the plaintiff must allege that NLS is a “consumer reporting agency,” 5 or that it creates “consumer
report[s],” 6 or that it “regularly engages in . . . assembling or evaluating consumer credit
information, or other information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports
to third parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Although information originating from NLS may have
been reported to the credit bureaus, see Am. Compl. ¶ 24, the amended complaint fails to make
any factual allegations showing that NLS is a consumer reporting agency, or that it creates
consumer reports, or that it otherwise engages in conduct within the scope of the FCRA. Her
claim under the FCRA therefore will be dismissed.
5
“The term ‘consumer reporting agency’ means any person which . . . regularly engages in
whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .”
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f) (emphasis added).
6
“The term ‘consumer report’ means any written, oral, or other communication of any
information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness
[creditworthiness], credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in
part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer's eligibility for (A) credit
or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; (B) employment
purposes; or (C) any other purpose authorized under section [1681b].” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)
(emphasis added).
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2. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
NLS also moves to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA which, it alleges,
“do[es] not apply to the facts of this case.” Def.’s Mem. at 8. NLS asserts that it is not a “debt
collector” and the plaintiff’s debt is not a “debt” as these terms are defined in the FDCPA. See
id. at 7-8.
“The FDCPA is a consumer protection statute that prohibits certain abusive, deceptive,
and unfair debt collection practices,” and it “authorizes any aggrieved person to recover damages
from any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of the FDCPA.” Marx v.
General Revenue Corp., __ U.S. __, __, 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1171 n.1 (2013) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). A “debt collector” is any person in any business “the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(6). Excluded from the FDCPA’s coverage is activity that “concerns a debt obtained by
such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.” 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iv). Rather, the FDCPA concerns debt collection practices for “consumer
debt[s]” that are primarily for “personal, family, or household purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
The plaintiff’s allegations regarding NLS’s debt collection activities are vague at best.
For example, she contends that “many of these practices are widespread for the Defendants,”
Am. Compl. ¶ 3, yet she does not articulate or describe these practices. And even if NLS failed
to respond to her “numerous requests of reporting of unsubstantiated credit inaccuracies . . . to
all three . . . Credit Bureaus,” id. ¶ 4; see id. ¶¶ 17-20, none of these allegations indicate that NLS
is a debt collector for purposes of the FDCPA. The Lease Agreement pertains to financing for
non-cash payment processing equipment for the plaintiff’s business, such that the underlying
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debt not is a “consumer debt” for purposes of the FDCPA, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s
unsupported assertion that “said equipment, if used, was for personal use only.” Id. ¶ 2. “[T]he
burden rests on [the plaintiff], at this stage, to allege facts sufficient to support [her] claim[s]”
under the FDCPA, Winstead v. EMC Mortgage Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010)
(internal citations omitted), and she fails to establish that the underlying debt was a consumer
debt primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
3. The Consumer Act and the Consumer Protection Procedures Act
NLS argues that “the underlying obligation . . . is a Commercial lease in which the
[p]laintiff acted as guarantor,” such that the District’s Consumer Act does not apply. Def.’s
Mem. at 8. Had NLS acknowledged the plaintiff’s claim under the CPPA, presumably it would
have moved to dismiss it, too.
“[T]he [Consumer Act is] designed to police trade practices arising only out of consumer-
merchant relationships . . . , and [it] does not apply to commercial dealings outside the consumer
sphere.” Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 81 (D.C. 2006) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). It is limited to addressing “conduct and practices in connection with
collection of obligations arising from consumer credit sales, consumer leases, and direct
installment loans.” D.C. Code § 28-3814; see id. § 28-3802 (defining “consumer credit sale” as
the “sale of goods or services in which . . . (C) the goods or services are purchased primarily for
a personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose . . . .”). The Consumer Act “does not
protect merchants in their commercial dealings with suppliers or other merchants.” Ford, 908
A.2d at 83 (internal citation omitted).
Similarly, “[t]he purpose of the CPPA is to protect consumers from a broad spectrum of
unscrupulous practices by merchants,” and “[d]espite its broad reach the CPPA applies only to
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consumer-merchant relationships.” Busby v. Capital One, N.A., 772 F. Supp. 2d 268, 279
(D.D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For purposes of the CPPA, a
“consumer” is “a person who does or would purchase, lease (from), or receive consumer goods
or services.” D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2). The term “consumer” used as an adjective “describes
anything, “without exception, which is primarily for personal, household, or family use.” Id.According to the plaintiff, “the equipment that is at the core of this Complaint[] was
delivered to a place of business,” yet “if used, was for personal use only.” Am. Compl. ¶ 2.
Notwithstanding this assertion, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations to indicate
that the underlying equipment finance lease was primarily for personal, household, or family use.
The pleading neither describes the equipment, nor explains its function, nor offers an alternative
interpretation of the Lease Agreement, the plain language of which establishes the commercial
nature of the transaction. The plaintiff fails to state claims under the Consumer Act and the
CPPA upon which relief can be granted, and both claims will be dismissed.
4. Criminal Statutes
Although NLS fails to address them, the amended complaint also includes allegations
that NLS violated certain criminal laws of the District of Columbia. See Am. Compl. ¶ 27
(Count III). The sections at issue, see D.C. Code §§ 22-3401 to –3403, pertain to persons
engaged in the business of debt collection and prohibit such persons from using the words
“‘District of Columbia,’ ‘District.’ the initials ‘D.C.’, or any emblem or insignia utilizing any of
the said terms as part of its design, in such manner as reasonably to convey the impression or
belief that such business is a department, agency, bureau, or instrumentality of the municipal
government of the District of Columbia . . . .” D.C. Code § 22-3401. A penalty for such an
offense is “a fine of not more than $300 or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or by
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both.” D.C. Code § 22-3402. Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff may bring a civil suit
under these provisions, her claim necessarily fails because the amended complaint sets forth no
factual allegations that NLS has taken any action to create the erroneous impression that it is an
agency or instrumentality of the District government.
D. Attorney’s Fees and Costs
Finally, NLS “move[s] the Court to award . . . costs and attorney’s fees,” Def.’s Mem. at
10, under the FDCPA which in relevant part provides that, “[o]n a finding by the court that an
action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court
may award to the defendant attorney’s fees . . . .” 15 U.S.C. 1692k(a)(3). According to NLS, the
plaintiff filed this action “in retaliation of the proper New York claim,” and thus has acted in
“bad faith . . . or for the purpose[] of harassing” the defendant. Def.’s Mem. at 10.
The plaintiff not only strains the Court’s limited resources, but also forces NLS to incur
expenses in responding to the complaint. But where “the plaintiff is a pro se litigant . . . , courts
should afford greater leniency and rarely award attorney’s fees.” Scott-Blanton v. Universal City
Studio Prods. LLP, 593 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5,
15 (1980)). Generally, “[a]n unrepresented litigant should not be punished for [her] failure to
recognize subtle factual or legal deficiencies in [her] claims.” Hughes, 449 U.S. at 15. It is far
more likely that the plaintiff misconstrues the law, and the filing of a lawsuit by a person with
limited knowledge of the law is not an act of bad faith. The Court will deny NLS’s motion for
attorney’s fees and costs.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the NLS in this matter and
that the amended complaint fails to state claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Fair
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Debt Collection Practices Act, the D.C. Consumer Act and Consumer Protection Procedures Act,
and the D.C. Criminal Code upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly, NLS’s motion to
dismiss will be granted. Its motion for an award of attorney’s fees and costs will be denied. An
Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/
AMY BERMAN JACKSON
United States District Judge
DATE: July 12, 2013
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