United States v. Williams , 953 F. Supp. 2d 68 ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
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v. ) Criminal No. 09-0114 (PLF)
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WILLIE D. WILLIAMS, )
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Defendant. )
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the defendant, Willie D.
Williams, to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Upon consideration of the
parties’ papers, the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record in the case, the Court will
deny Mr. Williams’ motion.1
I. BACKGROUND
On July 10, 2009, Mr. Williams pled guilty to (1) unlawful possession of a
firearm and ammunition by a person previously convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) distribution of
cocaine base or crack, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C)(iii). Opp’n at 2-3.
Mr. Williams acknowledged in his plea agreement that he was accountable for more than five
grams but less than 20 grams of crack cocaine. Plea at 2.
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The papers reviewed in connection with the pending motion include: the plea
agreement (“Plea”) [Dkt. No. 20]; the judgment and commitment (“Judgment”) [Dkt. No. 33];
the transcript of Mr. Williams’ September 24, 2009 sentencing (“Tr.”) [Dkt. No. 34]; the
defendant’s motion to reduce sentence (“Mot.”) [Dkt. No. 36]; the government’s opposition
(“Opp’n”) [Dkt. No. 39]; and the defendant’s reply (“Reply”) [Dkt. No. 40].
The Court held a sentencing hearing on September 24, 2009. At the hearing, the
Court calculated Mr. Williams’ sentence according to the three-step approach it had outlined in
United States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45-47 (D.D.C. 2009), the case in which the Court, as
a matter of policy, adopted a 1-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio. Tr. at 4-5. First, the Court calculated
Mr. Williams’ sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. With an offense
level of 24 that applied to the crack offense, a two-level upward adjustment for multiple offenses
under the grouping guidelines, a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility, and a criminal history category of IV, Mr. Williams’ guidelines sentencing range
was 70 to 87 months. Id. at 4-6; see United States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 47. The Court
then varied from the Guidelines under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007), determining an alternative sentencing range
using a 1-to-1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine ratio. At a 1-to-1 ratio, the offense level for the
crack cocaine offense was 12; with a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, Mr.
Williams’ total offense level was 10 and his overall sentencing range was 15 to 21 months. Tr. at
6-7; see also United States v. Lewis, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 47.
This alternative calculation, however, took no account of Mr. Williams’ plea to
the gun charge. So the Court looked to the applicable guideline for the weapons offense, which
would put Mr. Williams at offense level 22. With a three-level downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility to level 19, and a criminal history category of IV, Mr. Williams’
guideline sentencing range was 46 to 57 months. Tr. at 7. The Court sentenced Mr. Williams to
51 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, Judgment at 3, substantially less
than what his sentence would have been under the crack cocaine guidelines. In doing so, the
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Court acknowledged that it had given Mr. Williams the benefit of its 1:1 crack-to-powder ratio
policy and imposed “not a strictly guideline sentence.” Id. at 8. Rather, the Court used the
Guidelines as a reference point, giving Mr. Williams the benefit of the 1-to-1 crack-to-powder
ratio while applying the Guidelines for the gun offense. Id. The 51-month sentence was in the
middle of that range.
In 2010, the Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines in
response to the enactment by Congress of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which lowered the
crack-to-powder ratio from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321,
2328-29 (2012) (discussing Fair Sentencing Act and subsequent changes to crack cocaine
guidelines). Amendment 750 to the Guidelines made the crack cocaine amendments permanent,
and, through Amendment 759 in November 2011, the Commission subsequently made them
retroactive by adding Amendment 750 to the list of amendments in Section 1B1.10 of the
Guidelines. See Reply at 2 (referring to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10
(2011)); see also Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. at 2329; Davis v. United States Sentencing
Comm’n, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 2302542, at *1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Mr. Williams now argues that because the Court initially imposed a sentence that
was 19 months below the guidelines sentencing range of 70 to 87 months for the crack cocaine
offense, he is entitled to a reduction of 19 months from the amended guidelines range of 57 to 71
months, leading to a sentence of 38 months. Mot. at 1-2. The government contends (1) that the
Court has no authority to modify Mr. Williams’ sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), and (2) that
if the Court sentenced Mr. Williams to 38 months it would be violating Section 1B1.10(b)(2) of
the Guidelines. See Opp’n at 2. Mr. Williams maintains, however, that Section 1B1.10(b)(2)
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“violates the Sentencing Reform Act and the separation of powers doctrine, and was promulgated
without proper notice and comment.” Reply at 3. He argues that in enacting amendments to
Section 1B1.10(b)(2), effective November 2011, the Sentencing Commission “impermissibly
assumed the power of both Congress and the sentencing court, without utilizing any
administrative procedure – such as notice and comment – to maintain . . . accountability.” Id.
at 4-6.
II. DISCUSSION
A district court does not have inherent authority to modify a sentence once it has
been imposed. Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2683, 2687 (2010). 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
provides a “narrow exception to [that] rule of finality.” Id. at 2692; see also United States v.
Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 909 (11th Cir. 2003). Under that statute, a court may modify a
sentence only when the defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment that was “based on”
a guideline sentencing range that subsequently has been lowered. Dillon v. United States, 130
S. Ct. at 2687. “To be eligible for a sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a
defendant must show (1) that he was initially sentenced ‘based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered’ by the Sentencing Commission; and (2) that the reduction is
‘consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” United
States v. Sweet, 756 F. Supp. 2d 94, 95 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting United States v. Berry, 618 F.3d
13, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010)); see Dillon v. United States, 130 S. Ct. at 2687 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2)).
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A. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)’s “Based on” Requirement
Mr. Williams contends that his sentence was premised on the “range determined
based on the cocaine base [crack] offense level applicable at the time of his sentencing . . .
despite the fact that the Court looked to another offense level and range.” Reply at 2 n.1 (citing
United States v. Berry, 618 F.3d at 18). The Court disagrees. Mr. Williams was not sentenced
“based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and he therefore fails to meet Section 3582(c)(2)’s first
requirement.
For a sentence to be “based on” a guideline sentencing range, the guideline range
at issue must have been “‘a relevant part of the analytic framework’ used in the district court’s
sentencing calculus.” In re Sealed Case, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 3305706, at *3 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(quoting Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2692-93 (plurality opinion)); see also United
States v. Tepper, 616 F.3d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (to meet the “based on” requirement, “the
guideline calculation at issue must have actually played a role in determining that range. It is not
enough that a guideline was merely calculated or considered along the way.”) (emphasis in
original). Applying this standard, the Court finds that Mr. Williams’ sentence was not “based
on” the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines.
When determining Mr. Williams’ sentence, the Court initially performed the
guidelines calculation for crack cocaine, but it then exercised its discretion under Booker and
Kimbrough not to impose a guideline sentence. Rather than adhering to the crack guidelines, it
made a policy decision “within [its] discretion” to apply a 1-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio when
considering the drug charge. Tr. at 6. It then varied upwards to take account of the weapons
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offense. The sentence the Court ultimately imposed was based not on the guidelines offense
level for crack cocaine, but rather on a variance from the Guidelines by reference to the
guidelines sentencing range for the gun offense. Tr. at 8; see Tr. 4-6, 8. Thus, although the crack
guideline range was calculated by the Court, it was not, practically speaking, a “relevant part of
the analytic framework” used in the Court’s sentencing determination. See In re Sealed Case,
2013 WL 3305706, at *3. Because Mr. Williams’ sentence therefore would not have been
affected by the amendments to the crack cocaine guidelines, he is not eligible for a Section
3582(c)(2) sentence modification. See, e.g., United States v. King, Crim. No. 00-340, 2010 WL
5394907, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2010) (denying Section 3582(c)(2) relief to a defendant
sentenced under the career offender provisions of the Guidelines); United States v. Sweet, 756 F.
Supp. 2d 94 (rejecting a Section 3582(c)(2) motion on the ground that the defendant was
sentenced as a career offender); see also United States v. Berry, 618 F.3d at 18; United States v.
Tepper, 616 F.3d at 587.
B. Mr. Williams’ Section 1B1.10 Claim
Mr. Williams also is ineligible for Section 3582(c)(2) relief because providing
such relief would impermissibly reduce his sentence “to a term that is less than the minimum of
the amended guideline range,” in violation of the policy statement set forth in Section
1B1.10(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines. Before the November 2011 revisions to the
Sentencing Guidelines, Section 1B1.10 “provided that a district court could reduce a sentence
below the amended guideline range if the defendant had originally received a below guideline
sentence.” United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d 585, 588 (8th Cir. 2012) (citing U.S.
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SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2010)). After holding a public hearing on
June 1, 2011, the Sentencing Commission amended the policy statement “to provide that a
district court may only reduce a defendant’s sentence below the bottom of the amended guideline
range if the reduction would be ‘comparable’ to one given earlier for providing substantial
assistance to authorities.” Id. (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)
(2011)).
Although Mr. Williams argues that the Sentencing Commission did not have the
authority to limit sentencing reductions below the bottom of the sentencing guidelines range in
this way, Congress in fact granted the Commission such authority in 28 U.S.C. § 994(u). That
statute gives the Commission authority “to specify in what circumstances and by what amount
the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment . . . may be reduced.” United States v.
Anderson, 686 F.3d at 589 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 944(u)). The Commission has exercised that
authority in Section 1B1.10, which specifies the “circumstances and by what amount” a sentence
may be reduced. Id. “The statutory framework does not require the Commission to make all
downward departures and variances applied to the original sentence available when creating a
basis for sentencing reduction.” Id. at 589-90. And despite the sentencing discretion courts now
have under Booker, the Supreme Court has made plain that such discretion is not implicated
when a motion to modify a sentence is made under Section 3582(c). Dillon v. United States, 130
S. Ct. at 2687. That statute does not provide for a “plenary resentencing”; rather, it operates as “a
narrow exception to the rule of finality” that permits a sentence modification “within the narrow
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bounds established by the Commission” under its grant of authority from Congress. Id. at 2692,
2694.
Finally, Mr. Williams’ argument notwithstanding, courts routinely have “upheld
the Commission’s powers against a separation of powers challenge.” United States v. Anderson,
686 F.3d at 590 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)); see also United
States v. Dukes, 420 F. App’x 237, 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting defendant’s arguments that his
sentence should be reduced below his amended guideline sentencing range because the 2010
version of Section 1B1.10 “violate[s] the separation of powers doctrine”); United States v. Fox,
631 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dryden, 563 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (10th Cir.
2009); United States v. Atwell, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (“In delegating
authority to the Commission, enacting § 3582(c)(2), and promulgating ‘applicable policy
statements,’ neither Congress nor the Commission have assumed an adjudicatory role.”). As the
Eighth Circuit has noted, the Supreme Court in Mistretta held that “there was no constitutional
problem because the [Sentencing] Commission does not act as a court and is not controlled by
the judiciary.” United States v. Anderson, 686 F.3d at 590 (discussing Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. at 393). This is true whether the Commission “is issuing a guideline or a policy
statement.” Id. at 591. And while Congress has made proposed guidelines subject to the APA’s
notice and comment provisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(x), Congress has not required that policy
statements comply with these requirements. See United States v. Colon, 707 F.3d 1255, 1261
(11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting defendant’s challenge to Section 1B1.10 based on Commission’s
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purported failure to issue the policy statement in accordance with APA’s notice and comment
procedures); United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 526-27 (3d Cir. 2012) (same).
For all of these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Mr. Williams’ motion to reduce his sentence [Dkt. No. 36] is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/
PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
DATE: July 11, 2013 United States District Judge
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