Surani v. Bankruptcy Court of the United States of America ( 2013 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
HABIB SURANI, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) CIVIL No. 13-931 (RMC)
)
U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT, )
)
Defendant. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Habib Surani and Maricruz Surani, acting pro se (without counsel) filed
this suit against the U.S. Bankruptcy Court. Compl. [Dkt. 1]. Plaintiffs seek $5,000,000 in
damages, alleging that the Bankruptcy Court failed to prevent the foreclosure of their business
located at 701 and 703 North Henderson, Fort Worth, Texas 76107. While the Complaint lists the
address of the Bankruptcy Court in Greenbelt, Maryland, public records show that the Suranis
filed two separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court located in Fort
Worth, Texas. See In re Surani, Bankr. Pet. 07-44888-dml13 (N.D. Tex. filed Nov. 5, 2007)
(dismissed for failure to pay trustee Dec. 16, 2008); In re Surani, Bankr. Pet. 08-46170-rfn13
(N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 31, 2008) (debtor dismissed for failure to make plan payments July 15,
2009).
Even though pro se complaints are construed liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) and United States v. Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2004), this Court
must have jurisdiction in order to adjudicate the claim. A complaint can be dismissed sua sponte
and at any time under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Jerez v. Republic of Cuba, 777 F. Supp. 2d 6, 15 (D.D.C.
2011). When determining whether a case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, a court
reviews the complaint liberally, granting the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be
derived from the facts alleged. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F. 3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
Nevertheless, “the Court need not accept factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences
are not supported by facts alleged in the complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s legal
conclusions.” Speelman v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Further, in
deciding whether it has jurisdiction, a court may consider materials outside the pleadings. Settles
v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005). No action of the parties can
confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court because subject matter jurisdiction is an
Article III and statutory requirement. Akinseye v. Dist. of Columbia, 339 F.3d 970, 971 (D.C. Cir.
2003). The party claiming subject matter jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that such
jurisdiction exists. Khadr v. United States, 529 F.3d 1112, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
This Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Complaint under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. This doctrine provides that the United States and its agencies cannot be
sued without the consent of Congress. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983)
(United States cannot be sued for damages without its consent); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S.
273, 287 (1983) (same); see also Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits of Fed. Reserve
Employee Benefits Sys., 357 F.3d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (federal agencies and instrumentalities
possess sovereign immunity). Sovereign immunity also applies to government employees acting
in their official capacities. Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
United States’ exemption from suit is expressed in jurisdictional terms––that is, federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over suits against the United States in the absence of a waiver. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Bush, 448 F. Supp. 2d 198, 200 (D.D.C. 2006). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court and
-2-
the Office of the U.S. Trustee are instrumentalities of the United States, and they are entitled to
sovereign immunity. Balser v. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the U.S. Trustee, 327 F.3d 903, 907 (9th
Cir. 2003); Taylor v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court, No. C.A. 3:03-4117-2, 2004 WL 3217865, *1
(D.S.C. Aug. 26, 2004). Because the Defendant here is the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and the
Bankruptcy Court is immune from suit, this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Furthermore, a court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) without notice where it is “patently obvious” that the plaintiff cannot
possibly prevail based on the facts alleged in the complaint. Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs cannot possibly prevail here because the
Complaint is based on the actions of the bankruptcy court judge, and the judge is entitled to
judicial immunity. Judges and court officers are immune from suits seeking damages for
performance of judicial functions unless those acts are done in the clear absence of jurisdiction.
Sindram v. Suda, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460-61 (D.C. Cir. 1993). “A judge will not be deprived of
immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his
authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (quotations omitted); see also
e.g., Moore v. Burger, 655 F.2d 1265, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (suit against four Supreme Court
justices dismissed as frivolous based on judicial immunity, since the justices had jurisdiction over
the subject matter before them). The purpose of judicial immunity is to protect the public, “whose
interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and
without fear of consequences.” Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
To the extent that Plaintiffs actually intend to complain about foreclosure
proceedings against their business property that occurred in Texas state court, this Court lacks
-3-
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman abstention doctrine, named for Rooker v. Fidelity Trust
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462(1983). This doctrine provides that a federal district court has no jurisdiction over actions which
essentially seek “appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on
the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); see also Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (Rooker-Feldman prohibits federal courts from “hearing cases that amount to the
functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court”); Tremel v. Bierman & Geesing, LLC, 251 F.
Supp. 2d 40, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2003) (suit challenging a state court’s ratification of foreclosure sale
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman).
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity and under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the case will be dismissed. Even if the Court had jurisdiction, the case
still would be dismissed because it is patently obvious that the Plaintiffs cannot prevail due to
judicial immunity. A memorializing Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: June 28, 2013 /s/
ROSEMARY M. COLLYER
United States District Judge
-4-