Braga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation , 910 F. Supp. 2d 258 ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
STEPHEN L. BRAGA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 12-139 (JEB)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In May 1993, three boys were murdered in West Memphis, Arkansas. Three men,
subsequently knows as the “West Memphis Three,” were ultimately convicted of the murders
and sentenced to death or life in prison. Yet, after lengthy post-conviction proceedings, all were
released from prison in 2011. The only one of the three initially sentenced to death was Damien
Echols, who was represented in the collateral proceedings by Stephen L. Braga. Braga has
brought this suit under the Freedom of Information Act, seeking documents from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation related to the case. He contends that the 484 pages that were released,
either in full or in part, are insufficient. Disagreeing, the FBI now moves for summary judgment.
Because the Bureau’s document search was adequate and because its withholdings were proper
under FOIA Exemption 7(C), the Court will grant the Motion and enter judgment for Defendant.
I. Background
Since March 2011, Plaintiff has submitted four FOIA requests to the FBI. See Compl.,
¶¶ 12-30. Under the first and broadest, sent on March 17, Plaintiff sought
copies of all records relating to the FBI’s involvement with West
Memphis, Arkansas in an investigation into the murders of three
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young boys named Steven Branch, Michael Moore and
Christopher Byers on May 5, 1993. . . . [T]he FBI’s Universal File
Case Number for this matter was 252B-LR-34807. . . . The
requested records include any FBI interactions with any other law
enforcement or forensic agencies such as the Arkansas State Police
and the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory concerning this
investigation.
Id., ¶ 13. At the beginning of the first request, Plaintiff also advised Defendant that “the
requested information is pertinent to certain issues to be addressed by the Arkansas Circuit Court
at an evidentiary hearing later this year on Mr. Echols’ motion for a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence.” Id. (brackets omitted). On March 24, the FBI responded to this request
by (1) releasing 190 pages of information it had previously released to a prior FOIA requester;
and (2) advising Plaintiff to resubmit his request should he want the documents to be reprocessed
under the new Attorney General guidelines. See id., ¶ 14.
On April 4, Plaintiff sent a second FOIA request to the FBI, this time seeking “[a]ll
records relating to communications to the FBI, or from the FBI, between January 1, 2000 and
April 4, 2011 relating to FBI File Number 252B-LR-34807.” Id., ¶ 19. In June, the FBI in
response released 26 pages and withheld 25 pages under FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and/or 7(D).
See id., ¶ 20.
On May 11, Plaintiff submitted a third request, looking for “[a]ll records relating to the
FBI’s testing and/or analysis of soil, fiber, hair, blood, tissue, semen, clothing, polygraph
examinations or other evidence in connection with . . . the Misskelley, Echols or Baldwin cases.”
Id., ¶ 23. Defendant responded that the 190 pages of information released on March 24 satisfied
this request. Id., ¶ 24.
On June 24, Plaintiff sent his fourth and final request to Defendant. In this one, he asked
the FBI to reprocess Plaintiff’s first request under the new Attorney General guidelines,
following Defendant’s advice on March 24. See id., ¶ 27. In November, Defendant released to
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Plaintiff 458 pages of information and withheld 239 pages under FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), and/
or 7(D). See id., ¶ 28.
Plaintiff appealed each of the FBI’s responses to his four FOIA requests. As to the first,
the FBI offered further clarification of its reasons, but otherwise denied the appeal. See id., ¶ 18.
The FBI affirmed its actions on Plaintiff’s second request, but rejected any reliance on
Exemption 7(D). See id., ¶ 22. The FBI also affirmed its action on the third request. See id.,
¶ 26. As of the filing of the Complaint on January 27, 2012, the FBI had not decided Braga’s
December 7 appeal of the FBI’s action on his fourth request. See id., ¶ 30. Because Plaintiff
waited more than 20 days after this fourth appeal before filing suit, he exhausted his
administrative remedies. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6).
In bringing this suit, Braga contends both that the FBI did not conduct an adequate search
for responsive records and that certain records were improperly withheld. The FBI has now
moved for summary judgment on both of these issues.
II. Legal Standard
Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A genuine issue of material fact is one that would change the outcome of the litigation.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.”). In the event of conflicting evidence on a material issue, the Court is to
construe the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See
Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Factual assertions in the
moving party’s affidavits or declarations may be accepted as true unless the opposing party
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submits his own affidavits, declarations, or documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly,
963 F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary judgment.
Defenders of Wildlife v. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009); Bigwood v. U.S.
Agency for Int’l Dev., 484 F. Supp. 2d 68, 73 (D.D.C. 2007). In FOIA cases, the agency bears
the ultimate burden of proof. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The Court may grant summary
judgment based solely on information provided in an agency’s affidavits or declarations when
they describe “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific
detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed exemption,
and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency bad
faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Such affidavits or
declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely
speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.’” SafeCard
Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc.
v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
III. Analysis
Congress enacted FOIA in order to “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open
agency action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361
(1976) (citation omitted). “The basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to
the functioning of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.” John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146,
152 (1989) (citation omitted). The statute provides that “each agency, upon any request for
records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with
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published rules . . . shall make the records promptly available to any person.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3)(A). Consistent with this statutory mandate, federal courts have jurisdiction to order
the production of records that an agency improperly withholds. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B);
Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989).
“Unlike the review of other agency action that must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence and not arbitrary and capricious, the FOIA expressly places the burden ‘on the agency
to sustain its action’ and directs the district courts to ‘determine the matter de novo.’” Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 755 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). “At all times, courts must bear in
mind that FOIA mandates a ‘strong presumption in favor of disclosure’ . . . .” Nat’l Ass’n of
Home Builders v. Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502
U.S. 164, 173 (1991)).
The Court must resolve three issues in ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. First, was the FBI’s search for documents reasonable and adequate? Second, did the
Bureau properly combine its application of FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), and, if so, did it
correctly balance the public and private interests at stake? Third, did the FBI correctly apply
Exemption 7(D) in relation to implied assurances of confidentiality? The Court will address
each in turn.
A. Search Scope and Methods
“An agency fulfills its obligations under FOIA if it can demonstrate beyond material
doubt that its search was ‘reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.’” Valencia-
Lucena v. Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897
F.2d 540, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also Steinberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 23 F.3d 548, 551 (D.C.
Cir. 1994). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether there might exist any other documents
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possibly responsive to the request, but rather whether the search for those documents was
adequate.” Weisberg v. Dep’t of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in
original). The adequacy of an agency’s search for documents requested under FOIA “is judged
by a standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon the facts of each case.” Id.To meet its burden, the agency may submit affidavits or declarations that explain the scope and
method of its search “in reasonable detail.” Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Absent contrary evidence, such affidavits or declarations are sufficient to show that an agency
complied with FOIA. See id. “If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as to the
sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the agency is not proper.” Truitt, 897 F.2d at
542.
Attached to its Motion here, the FBI submitted the Declaration of David M. Hardy,
Section Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Service, which explains in detail, inter
alia, the steps the Bureau took to search for responsive records. Hardy first describes the FBI’s
Central Records System (CRS) and how searches of CRS are conducted through its Automated
Case Support System. See Hardy Decl., ¶¶ 27-32. He then discusses the manner in which
searches responsive to Braga’s requests were conducted. For example, Hardy states that the FBI
“initially searched [the FOIPA Document Processing System] to determine whether [the Record/
Information Dissemination Section] had previously responded to similar requests about the
[three] murders . . . .” Id., ¶ 34. Indeed, “responsive material had been processed and released
previously in 2007,” and copies of those 190 pages were released to Braga. Id. The FBI also
“physically obtained the file [from which the earlier records were produced] from the Little Rock
Field Office” to search for records postdating 2007. Id., ¶ 35. The Bureau, moreover, conducted
additional searches of CRS for “cross-references responsive to plaintiff’s request.” Id., ¶ 36.
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The FBI also performed searches in the FBI Laboratory “because of plaintiff’s specific
references to records about forensic and scientific testing in his requests.” Id.
Even though the FBI has located a total of 748 responsive pages, Braga contends that the
above-detailed search was inadequate. In support, he argues that the Complaint appends
responsive documents that were never produced; as a result, the search must not have been
sufficiently thorough. See Opp. at 3. Plaintiff particularly seeks documents relating to forensic
testing and suggests different terms the FBI might employ in conducting further searches.
There are two responses to Plaintiff’s argument, one legal and one factual. As to the
former, the test for adequacy is not whether every potentially responsive document was located;
it is, instead, whether the methods employed in the search were appropriate. See Iturralde v.
Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“[T]he adequacy of a FOIA
search is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the
methods used to carry out the search.”) (emphasis added). As just set out, the FBI’s search was
sufficiently thorough, even though it may not have located certain documents.
On the factual point – namely, whether the FBI could have located documents if it had
used different search terms – the Bureau has now put that question to rest. Accompanying its
Reply, Defendant has provided the Declaration of Dennis J. Argall, who is the Assistant Section
Chief of the Record/Information Dissemination Service. See Argall Decl., ¶ 1. Argall avers that,
in response to Plaintiff’s arguments, the FBI Lab “conducted additional searches to determine
whether it had any responsive records that were not located in the case file.” Id., ¶ 6. He
explains those searches in detail and states that they were unsuccessful. See id. The FBI also
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conducted additional word searches using some of the terms suggested by Plaintiff and retrieved
no documents. See id., ¶ 7. 1
The Court, therefore, finds summary judgment proper on the adequacy of the search.
B. Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
Plaintiff next challenges the FBI’s withholding of certain documents or portions of
documents under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). His main complaint is that the FBI has
improperly consolidated its analysis under these two Exemptions: “The analysis of these
exemptions simply must be conducted separately in order to have any integrity and to effect the
clear statutory differences between the two of them.” Opp. at 6. Braga misunderstands FOIA
law here.
Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(6). Exemption 7(C) excludes “records of information compiled for law enforcement
purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information . . .
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). Both provisions require agencies and reviewing courts to “balance the
privacy interests that would be compromised by disclosure against the public interest in the
release of the requested information.” Beck v. Dep’t of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1491 (D.C. Cir.
1993) (quoting Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
Although both Exemptions require agencies and reviewing courts to undertake the same
weighing of interests, the balance tilts more strongly toward nondisclosure in the context of
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The only possible exception concerns documents relating to FBI Inspector Gary Gitchell, as “it is the FBI’s policy
to neither confirm nor deny the existence of records indexed by third parties’ names in the absence of privacy
waivers or proofs of death, and where there is no overriding public interest, pursuant to FOIA Exemptions (b)(6) and
(b)(7)(C).” Id. As explained in Section III.B, infra, such overriding interest does not exist here.
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Exemption 7(C) because “Exemption 7(C)’s privacy language is broader than the comparable
language in Exemption 6 in two respects.” Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756. First, Exemption
6 encompasses “clearly unwarranted” invasions of privacy, while Exemption 7(C) omits the
adverb “clearly.” See id. Second, Exemption 6 prevents disclosures that “would constitute” an
invasion of privacy, while Exemption 7(C) targets disclosures that “could reasonably be
expected to constitute” such an invasion. See id. Both differences are the result of specific
amendments, reflecting Congress’s conscious choice to provide greater protection to law-
enforcement materials than to personnel, medical, and other similar files. See id. Courts have
accordingly held that Exemption 7(C) “establishes a lower bar for withholding material” than
Exemption 6. ACLU v. Dep’t of Justice, 655 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also Beck, 997 F.2d
at 1491.
As a result, if the records and information the FBI seeks to withhold in this case were
“compiled for law enforcement purposes,” the Court need only address whether the agency has
properly withheld these documents under Exemption 7(C). If so, there is no need to consider the
higher bar of Exemption 6. Here, Braga never argues that the FBI records were not compiled for
law-enforcement purposes. Nor would he have much luck doing so given that the records all
concededly relate to the FBI’s work on a murder investigation. See Hardy Decl., ¶ 39
(responsive records here compiled for law-enforcement purpose). This threshold question
answered, the Court must now consider the privacy interests at stake in disclosure and the public
interest in release.
The first step in the Exemption 7(C) analysis is to determine whether there is, in fact, a
privacy interest in the materials sought. See ACLU, 655 F.3d at 6. In this context, the Supreme
Court has rejected a “cramped notion of personal privacy” and emphasized that “privacy
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encompass[es] the individual’s control of information concerning his or her person.” Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 763. To constitute a privacy interest under FOIA, the claimed interest must
be “substantial.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. USDA, 515 F.3d 1224, 1229-30 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see
also Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “[S]ubstantial,” however,
“means less than it might seem. A substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de
minimis privacy interest.” Multi Ag Media, 515 F.3d at 1229-30.
The FBI here identifies the privacy interests of six categories of people “whose names or
other identifying information appear in the responsive records,” Mot. at 10: “FBI Special Agents
and support personnel,” “third parties of investigative interest,” “state or local law enforcement
personnel,” “third parties merely mentioned,” “third party victims,” and “third parties who
provided information to the FBI.” Id. (citing Hardy Decl., ¶ 43 and accompanying chart).
Hardy’s Declaration spells out the different privacy interests involved with each group. See
Hardy Decl., ¶¶ 49-57. The Court finds each of these interests substantial, a decision consistent
with D.C. Circuit law. For example, “third parties who may be mentioned in investigatory files,
as well as . . . witnesses and informants who provided information during the course of an
investigation,” have a privacy interest in the contents of law-enforcement records. Nation
Magazine, Wash. Bureau v. Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also
Kimberlin v. Dep’t of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“It almost goes without
saying, moreover, that individuals other than [the target of the investigation] whose names
appear in the file retain a strong privacy interest in not being associated with an investigation
involving professional misconduct . . . .”). Indeed, this interest is so strong that our Circuit has
“adopted a categorical rule permitting an agency to withhold information identifying private
citizens mentioned in law enforcement records, unless disclosure is ‘necessary in order to
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confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity.’” Schrecker
v. Dep’t of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206).
In response, Plaintiff argues only that a significant public interest exists in the potential
exoneration of those sentenced to death. See Opp. at 7. He cites Roth, in which our Circuit did
indeed hold that there is a substantial public interest in “knowing whether the FBI is withholding
information that could help exonerate a potentially innocent death-row inmate.” 642 F.3d at
1178. Here, in contrast, Echols is no longer a death-row inmate or a prisoner at all; he is now a
free man. The public’s interest, at this point, is diminished and cannot overcome the substantial
privacy interests Roth itself outlines for “not only the targets of law-enforcement investigations,
but also witnesses, informants, and investigating agents.” Id. at 1174 (internal quotation marks
and ellipsis omitted). The FBI, therefore, appropriately withheld the documents under
Exemption 7(C).
C. Exemption 7(D)
Exemption 7(D) protects from disclosure “records or information compiled for law
enforcement purposes . . . to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source . . .
[who] furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information
compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation,
information furnished by a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). “A source is
confidential within the meaning of exemption 7(D) if the source provided information under an
express assurance of confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance could be
reasonably inferred.” Williams v. FBI, 69 F.3d 1155, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotation
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marks omitted). “[I]t is not enough for the [FBI] to claim that all sources providing information
in the course of a criminal investigation do so on a confidential basis.” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184.
The analysis must be more searching. For example,
[w]hen no express assurance of confidentiality exists, courts
consider a number of factors to determine whether the source
nonetheless spoke with an understanding that the communication
would remain confidential. These factors include the character of
the crime at issue, the source’s relation to the crime, whether the
source received payment, and whether the source has an ongoing
relationship with the law enforcement agency and typically
communicates with the agency only at locations and under
conditions which assure the contact will not be noticed. Even
when the FBI contends that a source received an express assurance
of confidentiality, it must, in order to permit meaningful judicial
review, present sufficient evidence that such an assurance was in
fact given.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It is also important to note that, unlike
Exemption 7(C), “Exemption 7(D) requires no balancing of public and private interests. If the
FBI’s production of criminal investigative records ‘could reasonably be expected to disclose the
identity of a confidential source’ or ‘information furnished by’ such a source, that ends the
matter, and the FBI is entitled to withhold the records under Exemption 7(D).” Id. at 1184-85(citation omitted) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D)).
In this case the FBI relied on both express and implied assurances of confidentiality.
Braga does not question the former. See Opp. at 8 n.2. In fact, in a conference call with the
Court held on December 19, 2012, in which the Court sought clarification of the labeling of
documents, Braga made clear that the only 7(D) documents he challenges are those mentioned in
footnote 24 of the Hardy Declaration – namely, those pages numbered “Braga-334, 354-396, and
414-415.” Hardy Decl. at 25 n.24. These are documents the FBI describes as “Information
Provided by a Local Law Enforcement Agency Under an Implied Assurance of Confidentiality.”
Id. at 25.
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As the parties also explained on the conference call, the Exemptions upon which the FBI
relies for each paragraph in a document are set out in somewhat fainter type in the right-hand
margin of each page next to the applicable paragraph. In addition, the “Braga-numbered” pages
are noted, usually, in the bottom right corner of the page, and they do not correspond to the ECF
page numbers. For example, the page labeled “Braga-334” in the lower right corner is ECF p.
396, and the first redacted paragraph contains the notations in the right margin “b6-4 b7c-4 b7D-
2,” which translates as the fourth category of Exemption 6, the fourth category of Exemption
7(C), and the second category of Exemption 7(D). The categories are described in the Hardy
Declaration. See Hardy Decl. at 14 (chart). Where a document is withheld in its entirety, a
cover sheet so indicates and marks the boxes next to the applicable Exemption(s). See, e.g., id.at ECF p. 421 (relating to Braga-391).
The Court has now reviewed each of the pages listed in footnote 24 of the Hardy
Declaration or, when the pages were withheld in their entirety, the relevant FBI’s cover sheet.
Such review reveals that every single time the FBI invoked Exemption 7(D) in relation to these
pages, it also invoked 7(C). Since the Court has already held that 7(C) applies here, its inquiry is
at an end. There is no need to separately address 7(D)’s application.
Plaintiff also argues in his Opposition that a “VHS Crime Scene Video Tape” must be
released because “the crime scene here was a public space.” Opp. at 9 n.3. He relies on Cottone
v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1999), for the proposition that “information in the public
domain is usually not exempt from disclosure.” Opp. at 9 n.3. Cottone concerned wiretaps, and
the opinion said nothing about public space. It merely held that wiretapped recordings that were
actually played in open court during a public criminal trial generally must be released. See 193
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F.3d at 552. Here, on the contrary, there is no indication that the FBI has publicly released the
videotape.
D. Segregability
Although Plaintiff does not challenge the FBI’s segregation of releasable from withheld
material, the Court has a sua spone obligation to ensure that this has been done properly. See
Trans-Pac. Policing Agreement v. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(instructing that district court has “an affirmative duty to consider the segregability issue sua
sponte” if not otherwise raised by parties). It is, in fact, the Government’s burden to demonstrate
that no reasonably segregable material exists in the withheld documents. See Army Times
Publ’g Co. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 998 F.2d 1067, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The FBI must
“provide[ ] a detailed justification and not just conclusory statements to demonstrate that all
reasonably segregable information has been released.” Valfells v. CIA, 717 F. Supp. 2d 110,
120 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the
President, 97 F.3d 575, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (determining government affidavits explained non-
segregability of documents with “reasonable specificity”). “Reasonable specificity” can be
established through a “combination of the Vaughn index and [agency] affidavits.” Johnson v.
Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
In this instance, the Court’s review of the redacted documents, coupled with the Hardy
Declaration, establishes that no segregability problem exists here. The documents have careful
and pinpointed redactions of names, words, clauses, and sentences. This easily clears the
required hurdle.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will issue a contemporaneous Order granting
Defendant’s Motion.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: December 21, 2012
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