Munn Bey v. Department of Corrections ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ______________________________
    WILLIAM G. MUNN BEY,           )
    )
    Plaintiff,           )
    )
    v.                        )    Civil Action No. 10-1334 (GK)
    )
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,     )
    et al.,                        )
    )
    Defendants.          )
    ______________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff William G. Munn Bey brings this action pro se
    against Defendants the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Executive
    Director of DOC Devon Brown, Deputy Director of DOC Pat Britton,1
    and Warden Simon Wainwright for violations of his rights under the
    First Amendment, pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , and for violations
    of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. This
    matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
    [Dkt. No. 17] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
    Pleadings   [Dkt   No.   21].   Upon   consideration   of   the   Motions,
    Oppositions, supplemental briefs, and the entire record herein, the
    Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and
    Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
    1
    To the extent that they are sued in their official
    capacities, Devon Brown and Pat Britton are replaced by Thomas N.
    Faust and Carolyn Cross pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    25(d).
    I. Background2
    Munn Bey is currently a prisoner at the Federal Correctional
    Institution   (“FTC”),   in   Talladega,   Alabama.   At   the   time   the
    relevant events transpired, however, Munn Bey was held at the
    District of Columbia Jail.
    Munn Bey is a practicing Muslim and member of the Moorish
    Science Temple of America. Munn Bey observes Friday as a Holy Day
    and, until sometime in the fall of 2009, Munn Bey and fellow
    members of the Moorish Science Temple of America were permitted to
    hold services every Friday. However, at some time prior to October
    7, 2009, Munn Bey was informed that the Moorish Science Temple of
    America would no longer be allowed to hold services each Friday,
    but would instead have to hold their services every other Monday,
    in order to accommodate conflicting demands on limited space. At
    the same time, the Sunni Muslim community was permitted to continue
    their Friday “Jumah” services and to hold two other classes on
    Fridays.
    On October 7, 2009, Munn Bey sent an inmate request slip or
    otherwise asked for assistance to address the decision not to
    permit his group to hold services on Fridays. See Defs.’ Mot., Ex.
    2
    For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
    allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
    liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
    21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 
    525 F.3d 8
    , 15 (D.C. Cir.
    2008); Shear v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 
    606 F.2d 1251
    , 1253 (D.C.
    Cir. 1979). Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth
    herein are taken from the Complaint.
    -2-
    2 [Dkt. No. 17-2]. On January 7, 2010, Munn Bey filed an inmate
    complaint seeking informal resolution. 
    Id.
     In response, the D.C.
    Jail’s Chaplain met with Munn Bey, but “Brother Munn did not accept
    explanation    relative   to    scheduled      day   for   MSOA   religious
    observance.” 
    Id.
     On a form dated March 5, 2010, Munn Bey filed an
    “Appeal Level 2" directly to the Director of the Department of
    Corrections. On that form, Munn Bey wrote, “On 2-5-2010, my Appeal
    Level 1 was filed, On 1-19-2010 the Warden’s Administrative Remedy
    neither answered.” 
    Id.
     Whether these actions sufficed to properly
    exhaust Munn Bey’s administrative remedies is in dispute.
    On April 2, 2010, Munn Bey was removed from the D.C. Jail and
    transferred to the Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional Center.
    Five weeks later, he was sent to FTC.
    On August 9, 2010, Munn Bey filed this Complaint, alleging
    that “he was denied the right to freely exercise his religion under
    the   First   Amendment   of   The   Federal    Constitution,”    and   that
    Defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, by
    refusing to allow Friday services and by transferring him to a
    prison without access to a law library in retaliation for his
    grievances. Compl. at 1, 6, 7 [Dkt. No. 1]. On January 12, 2011,
    Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”). On February
    16, 2011, Munn Bey filed an Opposition [Dkt. No. 20]. On June 21,
    2011, Munn Bey filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 18,
    2011, Defendants filed an Opposition [Dkt. No. 26]. On December 12,
    -3-
    2011, and at the direction of the Court, Defendants filed a
    supplemental praecipe further explaining the factual basis for
    their argument that Munn Bey failed to exhaust his administrative
    remedies [Dkt. No. 30]. On December 23, 2011, Munn Bey filed a
    reply to Defendants’ Praecipe [Dkt. No. 31].
    II.   Standard of Review
    To   survive   a    motion   to   dismiss        under   Rule   12(b)(6),   a
    plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
    that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims
    across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
    v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been
    stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
    consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” 
    Id. at 563
    .
    Under the Twombly standard, a “court deciding a motion to dismiss
    must not make any judgment about the probability of the plaintiffs’
    success . . . [,] must assume all the allegations in the complaint
    are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . [, and] must give the
    plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the
    facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans
    Inc., 
    525 F.3d 8
    , 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
    citations omitted). A complaint will not suffice, however, if it
    “tenders    ‘naked       assertion[s]’        devoid     of    ‘further   factual
    enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    129 S.Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009)
    (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ) (alteration in Iqbal).
    -4-
    The allegations of a pro se complaint are held “to less
    stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
    Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520 (1972). Nonetheless, “[e]ven
    given    the   special   liberality    with   which   we   consider   pro   se
    complaints, we need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts
    alleged in the complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of
    factual allegations.’” Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 
    553 F.3d 669
    , 677
    (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 
    29 F.3d 682
    ,
    684 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
    III. Analysis
    Defendants advance ten separate grounds for dismissal. Defs.’
    Mot. 1-2. However, it is clear upon review of certain of these
    arguments and the Complaint itself that the case must be dismissed
    for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Munn Bey has requested
    three forms of relief: (1) punitive damages against Defendants
    Brown and Britton in their personal and official capacities; (2)
    compensatory damages for stress and emotional injuries against
    Defendants Brown, Britton, and Wainwright in their personal and
    official capacities; and (3) injunctive relief.3 Compl. at 7-8.
    3
    Munn Bey also requests a declaratory judgment. Compl. at 7.
    However, “it is a ‘well-established rule that the Declaratory
    Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.
    Rather, the availability of [declaratory] relief presupposes the
    existence of a judicially remediable right.’” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 
    649 F.3d 762
    , 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting C & E Servs., Inc. of
    Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 
    310 F.3d 197
    , 201 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002) (alteration in Ali)). Therefore, Munn Bey’s request for
    (continued...)
    -5-
    Because neither punitive nor compensatory damages are available and
    the claim for injunctive relief is moot, the Complaint must be
    dismissed. See Kaur v. Chertoff, 296 F. App’x 80, 80 (D.C. Cir.
    2008) (“If this case is moot, we are barred from reviewing it under
    Article III’s case or controversy requirement and therefore lack
    subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing N.C. v. Rice, 
    404 U.S. 244
    ,
    246 (1971))).
    A.   Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
    1.    Official Capacity Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
    Defendants argue that Munn Bey’s claim for punitive damages
    should be struck from the Complaint. Defs.’ Mot. 7-8. Defendants
    are absolutely correct that punitive damages are not available
    against the District of Columbia. See City of Newport v. Fact
    Concerts, Inc., 
    453 U.S. 247
    , 260 n.21, 271 (1980) (“The general
    rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed unless expressly
    authorized by statute.”); Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 
    227 F.3d 443
    , 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Reed v. District of Columbia,
    
    474 F. Supp. 2d 163
    , 166 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007); Finkelstein v. District
    of Columbia, 
    593 A.2d 591
    , 599 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). Because “[a]
    3
    (...continued)
    declaratory judgment will not rescue his Complaint.
    Additionally, it should be noted that the Department of
    Corrections is not a suable entity. Chandler v. District of
    Columbia, Civil Action No. 07-2010 (PLF), 
    2009 WL 27782865
    , at *1
    (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2009); Arnold v. Moore, 
    980 F. Supp. 28
    , 33
    (D.D.C. 1997). For this reason, as well as the reasons explained
    below, DOC is dismissed from the action.
    -6-
    section 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their
    official capacities is . . . equivalent to a suit against the
    municipality itself,” Munn Bey’s claim for punitive damages against
    Defendants Brown and Britton in their official capacities must be
    dismissed. Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 
    73 F.3d 418
    , 424
    (D.C. Cir. 1996); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 
    403 F. Supp. 2d 39
    , 49 (D.D.C. 2005).
    2.   Personal Capacity Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
    Defendants also argue that Munn Bey has failed to adequately
    plead a claim against Britton, Brown, or Wainwright in their
    personal capacities. Defs.’ Mot. 24. Munn Bey claims that he should
    receive punitive damages from Defendants Britton and Brown for
    retaliating against him for making use of the administrative
    complaint system.4 Compl. at 8.
    “An individual may be personally liable under Section 1983
    only if it is shown that he or she directly participated in the
    wrongful acts.” Waker v. Brown, 
    754 F. Supp. 2d 62
    , 64 (D.D.C.
    2010); see also Cameron v. Thornburgh, 
    983 F. 2d 253
    , 258 (D.C.
    Cir. 1993); Elkins v. District of Columbia, 
    610 F. Supp. 2d 52
    , 64
    4
    Munn Bey also seeks punitive damages for Britton and Brown’s
    failure to respond to his filed grievances. Compl. at 8. Nowhere in
    the Complaint, however, does Munn Bey explain how Britton and
    Brown’s failure to personally respond to his grievances is a
    constitutional violation. Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 
    93 F.3d 861
    , 869 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff cannot
    “allege a procedural due process violation without even suggesting
    what sort of process is due”).
    -7-
    (D.D.C. 2009). Moreover, “[p]ublic officials are not vicariously
    liable for the actions of their subordinates; respondeat superior
    liability does not apply in § 1983 cases.” Elkins, 610 F. Supp. 2d
    at 64 (citing Haynesworth v. Miller, 
    820 F.2d 1245
    , 1259 (D.C. Cir.
    1987)). Further, “[a] supervisor who merely fails to detect and
    prevent a subordinate's misconduct . . . cannot be liable for that
    misconduct.” Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 
    365 F.2d 20
    , 28
    (D.C. Cir. 2004).
    First, Munn Bey has made no factual allegations demonstrating
    retaliation. Munn Bey simply alleges, with no supporting facts,
    that he “was removed from the D.C. Jail general population upon a
    Federal transfer that was requested in retaliation for exercising
    his Constitutional rights.” Compl. at 6. The Court “need not accept
    inferences unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint or
    legal   conclusions   cast   in   the   form   of   factual   allegations.”
    Kaemmerling, 
    553 F.3d at 677
     (internal quotations omitted); Iqbal,
    
    129 S.Ct. at 1949
     (complaint will not suffice if it “tenders ‘naked
    assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” (quoting
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 557
    ) (alteration in Iqbal)). Therefore, Munn
    Bey’s allegations of retaliation are insufficient to state a claim.
    Second, even if Munn Bey had properly alleged retaliation
    against the District of Columbia, he has made no allegation that
    any of the named Defendants personally retaliated against him. Munn
    Bey fails to allege that Britton or any of the Defendants actually
    -8-
    had any involvement with his transfer. Munn Bey does claim that
    “Ms. Pat Britton has a history of transferring Department of
    Corrections inmates to the Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional
    Center.”   Compl.   at   6.    But    a    history    or   a   relationship   with
    Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional Center does not show that
    Britton had any input in Munn Bey’s transfer or that the transfer
    to Youngstown was retaliatory. Therefore, Munn Bey has failed to
    make sufficient allegations of personal liability. Waker v. Brown,
    
    754 F. Supp. 2d at 64
    .
    In    sum,   Munn   Bey    has   failed     to   state     a   claim   against
    Defendants in their individual capacities. Consequently, Munn Bey’s
    claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
    B.     Damages for Stress and Emotional Injuries Are Unavailable
    Defendants contend that Munn Bey’s “claims of ‘stress and
    emotional injuries’ warrant dismissal, as he failed to plead or
    prove a physical injury.” Defs.’ Mot. 9 (quoting Compl. at 8).
    Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o Federal
    civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
    prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional
    injury suffered     while      in custody       without a      prior   showing   of
    physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Duncan v. Williams, No.
    01-7123, 
    2002 WL 1364380
    , at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2002); Davis v.
    District of Columbia, 
    158 F.3d 1342
    , 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Banks
    v. York, 
    515 F. Supp. 2d 89
    , 105-06 (D.D.C. 2007). Because Munn Bey
    -9-
    has not alleged any physical injury, his claims for damages based
    on stress or emotional injury are dismissed.
    C.   Injunctive Relief Is Unavailable
    Finally, Munn Bey seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to
    permit his religious group, the Moorish Science Temple of America,
    to hold Holy Day services on Fridays, to improve the administrative
    grievance system, and to arrange for the Moorish Science Temple to
    have religious material at the D.C. Jail. Compl. at 8. However, “a
    prisoner’s transfer or release from a prison moots any claim he
    might have for equitable relief arising out of the conditions of
    his confinement in that prison.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 
    139 F.3d 940
    , 941 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Burke v. Lappin, ___F. Supp. 2d___,
    Civil Action No. 11-0717 (CKK), 
    2011 WL 5024197
    , at *4 (D.D.C. Oct.
    21, 2011); Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 03-
    0172 (CKK), 
    2005 WL 6088711
    , at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2005).
    As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in finding
    that the transfer of prisoners to another prison mooted their claim
    under the free exercise clause, “unaccompanied by any continuing,
    present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury,
    [plaintiffs’] past exposure to illegal conduct at [their former
    prison] does not show a pending case or controversy regarding
    injunctive relief, and we must vacate as moot that portion of their
    prayer for relief.” Young v. Lane, 
    922 F.2d 370
    , 373 (7th Cir.
    1991) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 
    414 U.S. 488
    , 495-96 (1974)).
    -10-
    Because Munn Bey has been transferred to FTC, his claim for
    injunctive relief to remedy harms allegedly ongoing at the D.C.
    Jail is moot.5
    Therefore, Munn Bey’s claim for injunctive relief must be
    dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
    subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”);
    Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 
    661 F.3d 66
    , 79
    (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“If it becomes ‘impossible for the court to grant
    any    effectual      relief    whatever   to   a   prevailing     party’    on    a
    particular claim, that claim must be dismissed.” (quoting Church of
    Scientology v. United States, 
    506 U.S. 9
    , 12 (1992))); Kaur, 296 F.
    App’x at 80 (“If this case is moot, we are barred from reviewing it
    under Article III’s case or controversy requirement and therefore
    lack       subject   matter    jurisdiction.”);     Scott,   
    139 F.3d at 941
    (plaintiff’s release from confinement renders case moot in absence
    of claim for damages).
    5
    Although Defendants did not raise the mootness argument in
    their papers, “a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte
    . . . pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when, as here, it is
    evident that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Evans v.
    Suter, No. 09-5242, 
    2010 WL 1632902
    , at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 28,
    2010); Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir., 264 F.
    App’x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s dismissal
    of pro se complaint because “[i]t was proper for the district court
    to analyze its own jurisdiction sua sponte and dismiss the case for
    lack of jurisdiction.”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the
    court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
    jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
    -11-
    IV.   CONCLUSION
    Because, for the reasons stated above, the claims for damages
    have been dismissed and the claim for injunctive relief has been
    dismissed as moot, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and
    Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
    /s/
    March 16, 2011                 Gladys Kessler
    United States District Judge
    Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
    and
    William G. Munn Bey
    R03099-000
    Gilmer Federal Correctional Institution
    Inmate Mail/Parcels
    P.O. BOX 6000
    Glenville, WV 26351
    -12-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2010-1334

Judges: Judge Gladys Kessler

Filed Date: 3/16/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014

Authorities (24)

Waker v. Brown , 754 F. Supp. 2d 62 ( 2010 )

Banks v. York , 515 F. Supp. 2d 89 ( 2007 )

Theodore Roosevelt Conservation Partnership v. Salazar , 661 F.3d 66 ( 2011 )

Richard Atchinson v. District of Columbia , 73 F.3d 418 ( 1996 )

Haines v. Kerner , 92 S. Ct. 594 ( 1972 )

Robinson v. District of Columbia , 403 F. Supp. 2d 39 ( 2005 )

Jane Doe, a Minor Child, by Next Friend, Leslie G. Fein v. ... , 93 F.3d 861 ( 1996 )

Davis v. District of Columbia , 158 F.3d 1342 ( 1998 )

Aktieselskabet Af 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc. , 525 F.3d 8 ( 2008 )

Josiah Haynesworth and Fred Hancock v. Frank P. Miller, ... , 820 F.2d 1245 ( 1987 )

North Carolina v. Rice , 92 S. Ct. 402 ( 1971 )

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 127 S. Ct. 1955 ( 2007 )

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 129 S. Ct. 1937 ( 2009 )

Reed v. District of Columbia , 474 F. Supp. 2d 163 ( 2007 )

Richard W. Shear v. The National Rifle Association of ... , 606 F.2d 1251 ( 1979 )

C&E Servs., Inc. v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer ... , 310 F.3d 197 ( 2002 )

James Cameron v. Richard Thornburgh, Attorney General , 983 F.2d 253 ( 1993 )

Kaemmerling v. Lappin , 553 F.3d 669 ( 2008 )

john-wesley-young-iii-laurence-mack-martin-d-kracht-calvin-s-carter , 922 F.2d 370 ( 1991 )

Church of Scientology of California v. United States , 113 S. Ct. 447 ( 1992 )

View All Authorities »