Munn Bey v. Department of Corrections ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
WILLIAM G. MUNN BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-1334 (GK)
)
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff William G. Munn Bey brings this action pro se
against Defendants the Department of Corrections (“DOC”), Executive
Director of DOC Devon Brown, Deputy Director of DOC Pat Britton,1
and Warden Simon Wainwright for violations of his rights under the
First Amendment, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and for violations
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. This
matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
[Dkt. No. 17] and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the
Pleadings [Dkt No. 21]. Upon consideration of the Motions,
Oppositions, supplemental briefs, and the entire record herein, the
Court concludes that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
1
To the extent that they are sued in their official
capacities, Devon Brown and Pat Britton are replaced by Thomas N.
Faust and Carolyn Cross pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
25(d).
I. Background2
Munn Bey is currently a prisoner at the Federal Correctional
Institution (“FTC”), in Talladega, Alabama. At the time the
relevant events transpired, however, Munn Bey was held at the
District of Columbia Jail.
Munn Bey is a practicing Muslim and member of the Moorish
Science Temple of America. Munn Bey observes Friday as a Holy Day
and, until sometime in the fall of 2009, Munn Bey and fellow
members of the Moorish Science Temple of America were permitted to
hold services every Friday. However, at some time prior to October
7, 2009, Munn Bey was informed that the Moorish Science Temple of
America would no longer be allowed to hold services each Friday,
but would instead have to hold their services every other Monday,
in order to accommodate conflicting demands on limited space. At
the same time, the Sunni Muslim community was permitted to continue
their Friday “Jumah” services and to hold two other classes on
Fridays.
On October 7, 2009, Munn Bey sent an inmate request slip or
otherwise asked for assistance to address the decision not to
permit his group to hold services on Fridays. See Defs.’ Mot., Ex.
2
For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss, the factual
allegations of the complaint must be presumed to be true and
liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff. Aktieselskabet AF
21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir.
2008); Shear v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 606 F.2d 1251, 1253 (D.C.
Cir. 1979). Therefore, unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth
herein are taken from the Complaint.
-2-
2 [Dkt. No. 17-2]. On January 7, 2010, Munn Bey filed an inmate
complaint seeking informal resolution. Id. In response, the D.C.
Jail’s Chaplain met with Munn Bey, but “Brother Munn did not accept
explanation relative to scheduled day for MSOA religious
observance.” Id. On a form dated March 5, 2010, Munn Bey filed an
“Appeal Level 2" directly to the Director of the Department of
Corrections. On that form, Munn Bey wrote, “On 2-5-2010, my Appeal
Level 1 was filed, On 1-19-2010 the Warden’s Administrative Remedy
neither answered.” Id. Whether these actions sufficed to properly
exhaust Munn Bey’s administrative remedies is in dispute.
On April 2, 2010, Munn Bey was removed from the D.C. Jail and
transferred to the Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional Center.
Five weeks later, he was sent to FTC.
On August 9, 2010, Munn Bey filed this Complaint, alleging
that “he was denied the right to freely exercise his religion under
the First Amendment of The Federal Constitution,” and that
Defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, by
refusing to allow Friday services and by transferring him to a
prison without access to a law library in retaliation for his
grievances. Compl. at 1, 6, 7 [Dkt. No. 1]. On January 12, 2011,
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”). On February
16, 2011, Munn Bey filed an Opposition [Dkt. No. 20]. On June 21,
2011, Munn Bey filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 18,
2011, Defendants filed an Opposition [Dkt. No. 26]. On December 12,
-3-
2011, and at the direction of the Court, Defendants filed a
supplemental praecipe further explaining the factual basis for
their argument that Munn Bey failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies [Dkt. No. 30]. On December 23, 2011, Munn Bey filed a
reply to Defendants’ Praecipe [Dkt. No. 31].
II. Standard of Review
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims
across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been
stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts
consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563.
Under the Twombly standard, a “court deciding a motion to dismiss
must not make any judgment about the probability of the plaintiffs’
success . . . [,] must assume all the allegations in the complaint
are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . [, and] must give the
plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences derived from the
facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans
Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). A complaint will not suffice, however, if it
“tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in Iqbal).
-4-
The allegations of a pro se complaint are held “to less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, “[e]ven
given the special liberality with which we consider pro se
complaints, we need not accept inferences unsupported by the facts
alleged in the complaint or ‘legal conclusions cast in the form of
factual allegations.’” Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 677
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Henthorn v. Dep’t of Navy, 29 F.3d 682,
684 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
III. Analysis
Defendants advance ten separate grounds for dismissal. Defs.’
Mot. 1-2. However, it is clear upon review of certain of these
arguments and the Complaint itself that the case must be dismissed
for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Munn Bey has requested
three forms of relief: (1) punitive damages against Defendants
Brown and Britton in their personal and official capacities; (2)
compensatory damages for stress and emotional injuries against
Defendants Brown, Britton, and Wainwright in their personal and
official capacities; and (3) injunctive relief.3 Compl. at 7-8.
3
Munn Bey also requests a declaratory judgment. Compl. at 7.
However, “it is a ‘well-established rule that the Declaratory
Judgment Act is not an independent source of federal jurisdiction.
Rather, the availability of [declaratory] relief presupposes the
existence of a judicially remediable right.’” Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649
F.3d 762, 778 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting C & E Servs., Inc. of
Washington v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (alteration in Ali)). Therefore, Munn Bey’s request for
(continued...)
-5-
Because neither punitive nor compensatory damages are available and
the claim for injunctive relief is moot, the Complaint must be
dismissed. See Kaur v. Chertoff, 296 F. App’x 80, 80 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (“If this case is moot, we are barred from reviewing it under
Article III’s case or controversy requirement and therefore lack
subject matter jurisdiction.” (citing N.C. v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244,
246 (1971))).
A. Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
1. Official Capacity Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
Defendants argue that Munn Bey’s claim for punitive damages
should be struck from the Complaint. Defs.’ Mot. 7-8. Defendants
are absolutely correct that punitive damages are not available
against the District of Columbia. See City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 260 n.21, 271 (1980) (“The general
rule today is that no punitive damages are allowed unless expressly
authorized by statute.”); Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227
F.3d 443, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Reed v. District of Columbia,
474 F. Supp. 2d 163, 166 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007); Finkelstein v. District
of Columbia, 593 A.2d 591, 599 (D.C. 1991) (en banc). Because “[a]
3
(...continued)
declaratory judgment will not rescue his Complaint.
Additionally, it should be noted that the Department of
Corrections is not a suable entity. Chandler v. District of
Columbia, Civil Action No. 07-2010 (PLF), 2009 WL 27782865, at *1
(D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2009); Arnold v. Moore, 980 F. Supp. 28, 33
(D.D.C. 1997). For this reason, as well as the reasons explained
below, DOC is dismissed from the action.
-6-
section 1983 suit for damages against municipal officials in their
official capacities is . . . equivalent to a suit against the
municipality itself,” Munn Bey’s claim for punitive damages against
Defendants Brown and Britton in their official capacities must be
dismissed. Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d
39, 49 (D.D.C. 2005).
2. Personal Capacity Punitive Damages Are Unavailable
Defendants also argue that Munn Bey has failed to adequately
plead a claim against Britton, Brown, or Wainwright in their
personal capacities. Defs.’ Mot. 24. Munn Bey claims that he should
receive punitive damages from Defendants Britton and Brown for
retaliating against him for making use of the administrative
complaint system.4 Compl. at 8.
“An individual may be personally liable under Section 1983
only if it is shown that he or she directly participated in the
wrongful acts.” Waker v. Brown, 754 F. Supp. 2d 62, 64 (D.D.C.
2010); see also Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F. 2d 253, 258 (D.C.
Cir. 1993); Elkins v. District of Columbia, 610 F. Supp. 2d 52, 64
4
Munn Bey also seeks punitive damages for Britton and Brown’s
failure to respond to his filed grievances. Compl. at 8. Nowhere in
the Complaint, however, does Munn Bey explain how Britton and
Brown’s failure to personally respond to his grievances is a
constitutional violation. Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 93
F.3d 861, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that a plaintiff cannot
“allege a procedural due process violation without even suggesting
what sort of process is due”).
-7-
(D.D.C. 2009). Moreover, “[p]ublic officials are not vicariously
liable for the actions of their subordinates; respondeat superior
liability does not apply in § 1983 cases.” Elkins, 610 F. Supp. 2d
at 64 (citing Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1259 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). Further, “[a] supervisor who merely fails to detect and
prevent a subordinate's misconduct . . . cannot be liable for that
misconduct.” Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.2d 20, 28
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
First, Munn Bey has made no factual allegations demonstrating
retaliation. Munn Bey simply alleges, with no supporting facts,
that he “was removed from the D.C. Jail general population upon a
Federal transfer that was requested in retaliation for exercising
his Constitutional rights.” Compl. at 6. The Court “need not accept
inferences unsupported by the facts alleged in the complaint or
legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.”
Kaemmerling, 553 F.3d at 677 (internal quotations omitted); Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. at 1949 (complaint will not suffice if it “tenders ‘naked
assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in Iqbal)). Therefore, Munn
Bey’s allegations of retaliation are insufficient to state a claim.
Second, even if Munn Bey had properly alleged retaliation
against the District of Columbia, he has made no allegation that
any of the named Defendants personally retaliated against him. Munn
Bey fails to allege that Britton or any of the Defendants actually
-8-
had any involvement with his transfer. Munn Bey does claim that
“Ms. Pat Britton has a history of transferring Department of
Corrections inmates to the Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional
Center.” Compl. at 6. But a history or a relationship with
Youngstown Eastern Ohio Correctional Center does not show that
Britton had any input in Munn Bey’s transfer or that the transfer
to Youngstown was retaliatory. Therefore, Munn Bey has failed to
make sufficient allegations of personal liability. Waker v. Brown,
754 F. Supp. 2d at 64.
In sum, Munn Bey has failed to state a claim against
Defendants in their individual capacities. Consequently, Munn Bey’s
claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
B. Damages for Stress and Emotional Injuries Are Unavailable
Defendants contend that Munn Bey’s “claims of ‘stress and
emotional injuries’ warrant dismissal, as he failed to plead or
prove a physical injury.” Defs.’ Mot. 9 (quoting Compl. at 8).
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o Federal
civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see Duncan v. Williams, No.
01-7123, 2002 WL 1364380, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2002); Davis v.
District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Banks
v. York, 515 F. Supp. 2d 89, 105-06 (D.D.C. 2007). Because Munn Bey
-9-
has not alleged any physical injury, his claims for damages based
on stress or emotional injury are dismissed.
C. Injunctive Relief Is Unavailable
Finally, Munn Bey seeks an injunction ordering Defendants to
permit his religious group, the Moorish Science Temple of America,
to hold Holy Day services on Fridays, to improve the administrative
grievance system, and to arrange for the Moorish Science Temple to
have religious material at the D.C. Jail. Compl. at 8. However, “a
prisoner’s transfer or release from a prison moots any claim he
might have for equitable relief arising out of the conditions of
his confinement in that prison.” Scott v. District of Columbia, 139
F.3d 940, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Burke v. Lappin, ___F. Supp. 2d___,
Civil Action No. 11-0717 (CKK), 2011 WL 5024197, at *4 (D.D.C. Oct.
21, 2011); Webman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civil Action No. 03-
0172 (CKK), 2005 WL 6088711, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2005).
As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals explained in finding
that the transfer of prisoners to another prison mooted their claim
under the free exercise clause, “unaccompanied by any continuing,
present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury,
[plaintiffs’] past exposure to illegal conduct at [their former
prison] does not show a pending case or controversy regarding
injunctive relief, and we must vacate as moot that portion of their
prayer for relief.” Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir.
1991) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)).
-10-
Because Munn Bey has been transferred to FTC, his claim for
injunctive relief to remedy harms allegedly ongoing at the D.C.
Jail is moot.5
Therefore, Munn Bey’s claim for injunctive relief must be
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”);
Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d 66, 79
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (“If it becomes ‘impossible for the court to grant
any effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party’ on a
particular claim, that claim must be dismissed.” (quoting Church of
Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992))); Kaur, 296 F.
App’x at 80 (“If this case is moot, we are barred from reviewing it
under Article III’s case or controversy requirement and therefore
lack subject matter jurisdiction.”); Scott, 139 F.3d at 941(plaintiff’s release from confinement renders case moot in absence
of claim for damages).
5
Although Defendants did not raise the mootness argument in
their papers, “a district court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte
. . . pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) when, as here, it is
evident that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Evans v.
Suter, No. 09-5242, 2010 WL 1632902, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 28,
2010); Hurt v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir., 264 F.
App’x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s dismissal
of pro se complaint because “[i]t was proper for the district court
to analyze its own jurisdiction sua sponte and dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.”); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
-11-
IV. CONCLUSION
Because, for the reasons stated above, the claims for damages
have been dismissed and the claim for injunctive relief has been
dismissed as moot, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted and
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.
/s/
March 16, 2011 Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
and
William G. Munn Bey
R03099-000
Gilmer Federal Correctional Institution
Inmate Mail/Parcels
P.O. BOX 6000
Glenville, WV 26351
-12-