Ankhamen v. United States ( 2012 )

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION;
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ANPU ANKHAMEN, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1747 (RLW)
)
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
In this action for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner, proceeding pro se, challenges his
sentence imposed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia on November 18, 2010,
following his plea of guilty. Pet. at 2. For the following reasons, the Court finds that it lacks
jurisdiction over the petition and, therefore, will dismiss the case.
District of Columbia offenders must challenge their convictions in the Superior Court
under D.C. Code § 23-110, which states:
[an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who
is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall
not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that
the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his
detention.
D.C. Code §23-110(g). “Since passage of the Court Reform Act [of 1970] . . . a District of
Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his sentence must do so by motion in the
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This is a summary opinion intended for the parties and those persons familiar with the facts
and arguments set forth in the pleadings; not intended for publication in the official reporters.
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SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION;
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS.
sentencing court -- the Superior Court -- pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110,” Byrd v. Henderson,
119 F.3d 34, 36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and absent a showing of an inadequate or ineffective local
remedy, “a District of Columbia prisoner has no recourse to a federal judicial forum.” Garris v.
Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986) (internal footnote
omitted); see Williams v. Martinez, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Section 23-110(g)'s plain
language makes clear that it [] divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by
prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-110(a).”); Byrd, 119 F.3d
at 37 (observing that “[i]n order to collaterally attack [a] sentence in an Article III court a District
of Columbia prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not.”); see also Ibrahim v. U.S.,
661 F.3d 1141, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (clarifying that “§ 23–110(g) is not a procedural bar to
otherwise available federal habeas claims; it is Congress's deliberate channeling of
constitutional collateral attacks on Superior Court sentences to courts within the District's
judicial system (subject to Supreme Court review), with federal habeas available only as a safety
valve.”) (alteration in original).
As grounds for relief, petitioner claims that his sentence was too harsh, that he was
coerced into a guilty plea, and that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. See
Pet. at 5. He has not asserted – and the Court does not find -- that those claims are outside the
scope of D.C. Code § 23-110, which states:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of the Superior Court claiming the
right to be released upon the ground that (1) the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution of the United States or the laws of the District
of Columbia, (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence,
(3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, (4) the
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SUMMARY MEMORANDUM AND OPINION;
NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTERS.
sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court to
vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence.
D.C. Code § 23-110(a); see Reyes v. Rios, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Section 23-110
provided the petitioner with a vehicle for challenging his conviction based on the alleged
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.”); accord Garmon v. U.S., 684 A.2d 327, 329 n.3 (D.C. 1996)
(“A motion to vacate sentence under section 23-110 is the standard means of raising a claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.) (citation omitted); see also Kyle v. U.S., 759 A.2d 192,
202 (D.C. 2000) (“constru[ing] . . . ruling [denying motion for appointment of counsel to
challenge guilty plea] as a denial of a substantive motion for relief under § 23-110.”) (citation
omitted).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over the instant
petition. A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Digitally signed by Judge Robert
Date: March 1, 2012 L. Wilkins
DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins,
o=U.S. District Court,
ou=Chambers of Honorable
Robert L. Wilkins,
email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US
Date: 2012.03.01 19:39:12 -05'00'
_________________
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States District Judge
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