Daniels v. District of Columbia ( 2012 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
LASHAN DANIELS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action No. 11-cv-1331 (RLW)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs Lashan Daniels (“Daniels”) and her minor son (“M.C.”) bring this action
against Defendants the District of Columbia and District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Officers Napper, Alvarenga, and Salice in connection with the arrest of Daniels and the detention
of M.C. Defendants have moved for partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). For the following
reasons, Defendants’ motion is granted in part and denied in part.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On May 18, 2010, Daniels and M.C. returned home to their condominium and saw
Officer Napper speaking with a neighbor in one of the other units in the building. (Compl. ¶ 7).
As Plaintiffs walked by, the neighbor yelled at Daniels and told her that she was going to “beat
her ass!” (Id. ¶ 8). Daniels told Officer Napper she wished to file a complaint; however, Officer
Napper declined Daniels’ request and told her that the neighbor’s statement was not a threat.
(Id.). M.C., in attempting to defend his mother, became engaged in a shouting match with his
neighbor. (Id. ¶ 9). Plaintiffs allege that Officer Napper chased M.C. up the nearby stairs toward
his home, then placed M.C. in handcuffs and led him back down the stairs. (Id.). Officer
Napper also placed Daniels in handcuffs at this time. (Id.).
Shortly thereafter, Officers Alvarenga and Salice arrived on the scene. (Id. at ¶ 10).
Plaintiffs allege that Officers Alvarenga and Salice proceeded to “manhandle” Daniels, ignoring
her protests that she was six-months pregnant and would go peacefully. (Id. ¶ 10). According to
Plaintiffs, Officers Alvarenga and Salice “push[ed], shov[ed] and jerk[ed]” Daniels on their way
down the stairs and out of the building. (Id.). M.C. was initially placed in Officer Napper’s
patrol car, but was later released at the scene. Daniels, however, was not released, and Officer
Napper drove Daniels to Seventh District police precinct, subjecting Daniels to “an intentionally
violent ride.” (Id. ¶ 11). Daniels was released several hours later.
On May 18, 2011, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs’ three-count complaint includes the following claims: “Assault & Battery” (against all
defendants) (Count I); “Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress” (against all
defendants) (Count II); and “Deprivation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983” (against the
defendant officers) (Count III). (Compl. ¶¶ 14-22). On July 21, 2011, Defendants removed the
case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b).
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have moved for partial dismissal of the claims against them under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, acceptable as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Anderson v. Holder, 691 F.Supp.2d 57, 61
(D.D.C.2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, (2007)) (internal quotes omitted)).
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A court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion must construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and must accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from
well-pleaded factual allegations. In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans
Litig., 854 F. Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994). However, where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit a court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, to infer more than the
“mere possibility of misconduct,” the complaint has not shown that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
ANALYSIS
I. Count I (Assault & Battery) & Count III (Deprivation of Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983)
a. M.C.’s Claims
Officers Alvarenga and Salice argue that M.C.’s assault and battery and excessive force
claims asserted against them in Counts I and III should be dismissed because the complaint fails
to allege that either officer used any force against M.C. (Defs.’ Mot. at 4). The Court agrees that
dismissal of these claims is proper because the facts alleged in the complaint suggest that Officer
Napper alone had contact with M.C. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss M.C.’s claims against Officers Alvarenga and Salice in Counts I and III. 1
With respect to M.C.’s assault and battery claim against Officer Napper, Plaintiffs
allege that Officer Napper chased M.C. up the stairs, placed him in handcuffs, and put him in the
back of his patrol car. (Compl. ¶¶9-10). Defendants contend that Officer Napper’s actions were
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Plaintiffs urge the Court to deny as moot Defendants’ motion seeking dismissal of M.C.’s
assault and battery claim against Officers Alvarenga and Salice because M.C. is not advancing
such a claim against those two defendants. (Pls.’ Opp. at 4). However, the complaint makes no
such differentiation. Count I alleges that “defendant police officers” assaulted and battered
“plaintiff and her minor son.” Id. (emphasis added). Because it appears from the face of the
complaint that M.C. is advancing an assault and battery claim against Officers Alvarenga and
Salice, M.C.’s claims against these officers will be dismissed.
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justified because he was performing a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968)
(holding that “a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner
approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is
no probable cause to make an arrest”).
Although a police officer need only a “minimal level of objective justification” in order
to effect a Terry stop, United States v. Goddard, 491 F.3d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 2007), it is unclear
based on the present record whether Officer Napper was justified in his detention of M.C.
Relying on United States v. Wardlow, 582 U.S. 119 (2000), Defendants argue that M.C.’s
“unprovoked flight” provides sufficient justification for a Terry stop. However, the Supreme
Court in Wardlow did not adopt a per se rule authorizing the temporary detention of anyone who
flees upon seeing a police officer. Instead, the Court explicitly rejected the proposition that
flight is “necessarily indicative of wrongdoing.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Therefore, the fact
that M.C. ran upstairs does provide Officer Napper with sufficient justification standing alone to
justify a Terry stop.
Moreover, it is not clear from factual record whether the interaction between M.C. and
Officer Napper extended beyond a Terry stop and into an arrest which requires probable cause.
See Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141, 154 (D.C. 2004) (discussing the “[f]actors relevant
in distinguishing between [a Terry stop and an arrest] are, among others, the length of detention,
the place of detention, the use of handcuffs, the use of weapons and the announcement of an
intent to arrest”). At bottom, Defendants are asking the Court to conclude that Officer Napper’s
encounter with M.C. was a Terry stop and that Officer Napper had sufficient justification for that
stop—essentially asking the Court to draw the inferences in the Defendants’ favor. However, at
this stage in the proceedings, where the Plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit off all reasonable
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inferences, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that M.C. was
subjected to an unjustified Terry stop. Accordingly, M.C.’s assault and battery claim against
Officer Napper will stand, and the motion to dismiss this claim will be denied.
b. Daniels’ Claims
Officers Alvarenga and Salice move for dismissal of Daniels’ common law assault and
battery claims against them because the force they allegedly used was not “clearly excessive or
unreasonable.” (Defs.’ Mot at 5). The officers also argue that the common law assault and
battery claims are barred by the privilege afforded officers assisting in an arrest. Finally, the
officers also maintain that they are entitled to a qualified immunity defense on Daniels’
excessive force claims in Count III.
In the District of Columbia, an assault has been defined as “an intentional and unlawful
attempt or threat, either by words or acts, to do physical harm[.]” Holder v. District of
Columbia, 700 A.2d 738, 741 (D.C. 1997). A battery is “an intentional act that causes a harmful
or offensive bodily contact.” Id. at 741.
Taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the facts alleged in the complaint are
consistent with an assault and battery claim against Officers Alvarenga and Salice. Plaintiffs
allege that the officers rushed into the building and “manhandled” Daniels, and that the officers
“pushed, shoved, and jerked” Daniels while they brought her out of the building. Thus, one
could easily infer based on these facts that Daniels was assaulted and battered by Officers
Alvarenga and Salice during these interactions. Defendants urge the Court to find that the force
used by these officers was not clearly excessive or unreasonable. However, making such a
finding would require the Court to draw the inferences in the Defendants’ favor, which the Court
cannot do on a motion to dismiss. Viewing the Plaintiffs’ allegations in the light most favorable
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to them, and giving them the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Court concludes that
Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Daniels was assaulted and battered by Officers Alvarenga
and Salice.
For Officers Alvarenga and Salice to have qualified immunity under the fellow officer
rule, they must have been relying on Officer Napper’s assessment at the scene, and such reliance
must have been objectively reasonable at the time. See Bolger v. District of Columbia, 608 F.
Supp. 2d 10, 24 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Barham v. Salazar, 556 F.3d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2009));
see also, Bilida v. McCleod, 211 F.3d 166, 174-75 (1st Cir. 2000) (“Plausible instructions from a
superior or fellow officer support qualified immunity where, viewed objectively in light of the
surrounding circumstances, they could lead a reasonable officer to conclude that the necessary
legal justification for his actions exists (e.g., a warrant, probable cause, exigent
circumstances).”). Precisely when Officers Alvarenga and Salice arrived and what knowledge
they possessed when they effectuated the arrest of Daniels is currently a matter of speculation. A
more complete factual record is required before the Court can determine whether Officers
Alvarenga and Salice were acting on information provided by Officer Napper, and if so, whether
that reliance was reasonable. See Zhi Chen v. Dist. of Columbia, 808 F. Supp. 2d 252, 260
(D.D.C. 2011) (Freidman, J) (denying in part motion for summary judgment when the record
was unclear whether the assisting officer was acting on the request of the arresting officer).
Likewise, the current record does not support a finding that Officers Alvarenga and
Salice are entitled to qualified immunity. “A police officer has a qualified privilege to use
reasonable force to effect an arrest, provided that the means employed are not in excess of those
which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary.” Etheredge v. District of Columbia, 635
A.2d 908, 916 (D.C. 1993) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Plaintiffs allege that Officers
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Alvarenga and Salice “pushed, shoved, and jerked” Daniels as they walked her to Officer
Napper’s vehicle. Once could easily infer from the facts alleged, that the force used by Officers
Alvarenga and Salice was “in excess of [the force] which the actor reasonably believe[d] to be
necessary,” thus depriving Officers Alvarenga and Salice of any applicable qualified immunity.
Therefore, the Court denies the Defendants’ motion to dismiss Daniels’ claims against Alvarenga
and Salice in Counts I and III.
II. Count II (Intentional/Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)
a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs have also sought relief under the common law tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”). Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff seeking relief for IIED
must show: (1) extreme or outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant that (2) either
intentionally or recklessly (3) caused plaintiff severe emotional distress. Pitt v. Dist. of
Columbia, 491 F.3d 494, 505-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The Defendants argue that Plaintiffs IIED claims fail as a matter of law because Plaintiffs
have alleged no facts that exhibited behavior that rises to the level of outrageousness required for
an IIED claim. When determining whether specific conduct rises to the extreme and outrageous
level, courts are guided by “(1) applicable contemporary standards of offensiveness and decency,
and (2) the specific context in which the conduct took place.” Kind v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 668
(D.C. 1993).
Plaintiffs argue that they have adequately stated a claim for IIED as to M.C. because they
have alleged that Officer Napper chased M.C. down, placed him in handcuffs and put him in the
back of a police cruiser for no legitimate reason. (Pls.’s Opp. at 7). Arguably, Officer Napper’s
conduct may be viewed as extreme or outrageous, especially in light of the fact that M.C. is a
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minor. However, the Court need not decide this issue because the complaint does not contain
any allegation that M.C. suffered severe emotional distress. In order to qualify as severe
emotional distress, the alleged distress must be “of so acute a nature that harmful physical
consequences might be not unlikely to result.” Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33,
37 (D.C. 1982) (quoting Clark v. Associated retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir.
1939)). Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that M.C. “suffered . . . emotional distress[] and mental
anguish” does not adequately state a claim for IIED. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss M.C.
IIED claim.
Daniels, however, has stated a claim for IIED because the allegations, as they pertain to
her, satisfy all three elements of an IIED claim. According to the complaint, Officers Alvarenga
and Salice pushed, shoved, and jerked Daniels as they brought her out of the apartment building.
After Daniels informed the officers of her pregnant condition and told them she was willing to go
peacefully, Officer Alvarenga responded “who cares bitch,” and Officer Salice told her to “shut
the fuck up.” Even after they were informed of Daniels’ condition, Officers Alvarenga and
Salice continued to push, shove, and jerk Daniels. Daniels was then placed into a police car
where Officer Napper subjected her to an “intentionally violent ride” to the precinct. The day
after the events described above, Daniels visited her doctor who informed her that her unborn
child was experiencing stress. Daniels was subsequently hospitalized in order to stabilize her
pregnancy. Assuming the truth of Plaintiffs allegations, the Court concludes that Daniels has
adequately stated a claim for IIED. Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim will be denied.
b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims negligent infliction of emotional distress
against all Defendants because the complaint does not articulate a viable negligence theory. The
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Court agrees. First, “it is impossible to negligently commit assault and/or battery as the states of
mind are separate and incompatible.” District of Columbia v. Chinn, 839 A.2d 701, 708 (D.C.
2003). Moreover, when a negligence claim involves use of excessive force by a police officer,
the “negligence must be distinctly pled and based upon at least one factual scenario that presents
an aspect of negligence apart from the use of excessive force itself and violative of a distinct
standard of care.” Chinn, 839 A.2d at 705, 711. The complaint is devoid of any allegation of
negligence or any violation of a standard of care. Indeed, the allegations in the complaint evince
only intentional tortious conduct by Defendants. (Compl.¶¶ 9-11). Plaintiffs attempt to save
Daniels negligent infliction of emotional distress claim by arguing that her claim is not premised
on the use of excessive force, but instead premised on the fact that Daniels was not afforded
accommodations for her condition after she was arrested. However, this theory of negligence
was not articulated in the complaint. Because “[i]t is axiomatic that a complaint may not be
amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss[,]” Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de
C.V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297 F.Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C.2003) (quotation marks omitted),
Plaintiffs’ negligent infliction of emotional distress claim must fail.
III. Counts I & II and Section 12-309 Notice Requirement
Plaintiffs allege that the District of Columbia is liable for the common law torts of the
defendant police officers under a theory of respondeat superior. (Compl. ¶ 13). Defendants
argue that Plaintiffs’ common law claims against the District are barred because Plaintiffs failed
to comply with the notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-309. Section 12-309 provides:
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia
for unliquidated damages to person or property unless, within six
months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his
agent, or attorney has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the
District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and
circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the
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Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a
sufficient notice under this section.
D.C. Code § 12-309 (2001). According to the D.C. Court of Appeals, the purpose of the
provision is to “provide an early warning to District of Columbia officials regarding litigation
likely to occur in the future.” Pitts v. Dist. of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C. 1978).
On November 18, 2010, Plaintiffs’ counsel sent a letter to the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, purportedly giving the District notice of Plaintiffs’ claims. The letter provides many
of the details that are set forth in the complaint, including the names and badge numbers of the
three defendant officers. The letter also states that Daniels intends to file a lawsuit “seeking
monetary damages for what she believes were negligent, intentional and reckless actions and/or
omissions taken by the District of Columbia and the individual police officers[.]” (Defs.’ Mot,
Ex 1).
Defendants contend that the letter submitted to the Mayor is inadequate to place the
District on notice of Plaintiffs’ claims because the letter does not state the place of the alleged
injury. In particular, Defendants note that Daniels’ address does not appear anywhere in the
letter. While the letter does contain some detailed information, and one could infer from the
letter that the events occurred at Daniels’ “home,” one can only speculate where Daniels’
“home” is located. Although “precise exactness” is not absolutely necessary to give sufficient
notice to the District, Romer v. Dist. of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097, 1101 (D.C. 1982), the letter
submitted on Plaintiffs’ behalf clearly falls short of the location requirement in Section 12-309.
Winters v. Dist. of Columbia, 595 A.2d 960 (D.C. 1991) (finding location described as “District
of Columbia Jail in Lorton, Virginia” too uncertain, since the D.C. Jail is located in the District
of Columbia and there are seven correctional facilities in Lorton).
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Nonetheless, Plaintiffs attempt to invoke the “police report” alternative notice provision
of the statute, stating that the “plaintiff’s police report most assuredly contains her address.”
(Pls.’ Opp. at 11). In order to satisfy Section 12-309, a police report must contain the same
information that the statute expressly requires of a letter, “with at least the same degree of
specificity.” Cambell v. Dist. of Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076, 1078-79 (D.C. 1990). As the record
in this case has not yet been developed, the Court cannot determine whether a police report
exists, and, if such a report does exist, whether the report contains sufficiently detailed
information to satisfy Section 12-309. Therefore, Plaintiffs will be given the opportunity to
discover whether there exists a police report that could serve as notice of their claim.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ common law claims against the District
for failure to satisfy Section 12-309 will be denied without prejudice.
IV. Punitive Damages
As a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages for the claims asserted
against the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is a municipal corporation, see D.C.
Code § 1-102 (2001), and is, therefore, immune from punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). In addition, this Circuit has
held that, absent “extraordinary circumstances,” punitive damages are unavailable against the
District of Columbia under District of Columbia law. Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d
418, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Here, Plaintiffs make no allegation that any “extraordinary
circumstances” exist to support an award of punitive damages against the District. Indeed,
Plaintiffs have conceded that they are not seeking punitive damages against the District of
Columbia. (Pls.’ Opp. at 9). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for
punitive damages against the District of Columbia will be granted.
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Defendants have moved to dismiss M.C.’s punitive damages claim against Officers
Alvarenga and Salice because the complaint fails to allege facts that establish the requisite state
of mind for a punitive damages award. Plaintiffs did not address this argument in their
opposition brief. Therefore, the Court will treat this argument as conceded and dismiss M.C.’s
punitive damages claim against Officers Alvarenga and Salice. FDIC v. Bender, 127 F.3d 58,
67–68 (D.C. Cir.1997).
However, Daniels’ punitive damages claims against Officers Alvarenga and Salice will
stand because she has alleged enough facts to support an award of punitive damages. Under
District of Columbia law, an award of punitive damages is appropriate when “the defendant
commits a tortious act ‘accompanied with fraud, ill will, recklessness, wantonness,
oppressiveness, willful disregard of the plaintiff's rights, or other circumstances tending to
aggravate the injury.’ ” Jemison v. Nat'l Baptist Convention, USA, Inc., 720 A.2d 275, 285 n. 10
(D.C. 1998) (quoting Washington Med. Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1284 (D.C.1990)). Proof
of the elements establishing a right to punitive damages may be inferred from the acts of the
defendant and from circumstantial evidence. Parker v. Stein, 557 A.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. 1989).
Here, Plaintiffs have alleged that when Daniels advised Officers Alvarenga and Salice
that she was six months pregnant, Officer Alvarenga responded “who cares bitch,” and Officer
Salice advised her to “shut the fuck up.” (Compl. ¶ 10). Moreover, even after Daniels advised
the officers of her condition, they “continued pushing, shoving and jerking [Daniels] down the
stairs and out the building in full view of other residents and [Daniels’] children.” Id. Because
the Court is satisfied that these allegations support a plausible inference that Officers Alvarenga
and Salice committed a tortious act with the requisite scienter to warrant a punitive damages
award, Daniels’ claim for punitive damages against these officers survives the motion to dismiss.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants’
motion to dismiss. A separate order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
Digitally signed by Judge Robert L.
Wilkins
SO ORDERED. DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins,
o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers
of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins,
email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US
Date: 2012.09.30 15:58:04 -04'00'
September 30, 2012 __________________________
Robert L. Wilkins
United States District Judge
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