Prime Time International Company v. Johanns ( 2009 )


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  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ______________________________
    )
    SINGLE STICK, INC.,            )
    )
    Plaintiff,           )
    )
    v.                   )    Civil Action No. 06-1077 (RWR)
    )
    MICHAEL JOHANNS, et al.,       )
    )
    Defendants.          )
    ______________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff Single Stick, Inc. brought this action against the
    Secretary of Agriculture, and the United States Department of
    Agriculture (collectively “USDA”) challenging the USDA’s
    interpretation of The Fair and Equitable Tobacco Reform Act
    (“Tobacco Reform Act”), 
    7 U.S.C. §§ 518
    -519a, and alleging that
    the USDA violated the Information Quality Act (“IQA”), 
    44 U.S.C. § 3516
     note.   The USDA has moved under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure to state a claim and
    Single Stick has moved under Rule 56 for summary judgment.
    Because the USDA’s interpretation of the Tobacco Reform Act
    comports with congressional intent and is entitled to deference,
    and because the IQA does not create any individual right to the
    production or correction of information, the USDA’s motion to
    dismiss, treated in part as a motion for summary judgment, will
    be granted and Single Stick’s motion for summary judgment will be
    denied as moot.
    -2-
    BACKGROUND
    Single Stick manufactures and sells “small” cigars –- those
    that weigh less than three pounds per thousand cigars.       (See
    Compl. ¶ 5.)   Under the Tobacco Reform Act, Single Stick, as a
    tobacco manufacturer, must pay assessments to the Tobacco
    Transition Payment Program (“Payment Program”).       The funds
    obtained through the Payment Program are used to subsidize
    domestic tobacco farmers.    (See 
    id. ¶¶ 12-13
    .)     The Tobacco
    Reform Act identifies six classes of tobacco products, including
    cigarettes, cigars, snuff, roll-your-own tobacco, chewing
    tobacco, and pipe tobacco.    See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(c)(1).     The
    Commodity Credit Corporation (“CCC”), an agency within the USDA,
    determines the annual assessments for which each class of tobacco
    product will be responsible.    See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(c)(1).
    The Tobacco Reform Act sets forth how assessments are to be
    calculated.    “The assessment for each class of tobacco product
    . . . shall be allocated on a pro rata basis among manufacturers
    and importers based on each manufacturer’s or importer’s share of
    gross domestic volume.”1    7 U.S.C. § 518d(e)(1).    “The amount of
    the assessment for each class of tobacco product . . . to be paid
    1
    Gross domestic volume is determined by “the volume of
    tobacco products . . . removed[.]” 7 U.S.C. § 518d(a)(2)(A).
    Removed tobacco consists of “the removal of tobacco products
    . . . from internal revenue bond . . . and shall also include the
    smuggling or other unlawful importation of such articles into the
    United States.” 
    26 U.S.C. § 5702
    (j).
    -3-
    by each manufacturer or importer of that class of tobacco product
    shall be determined . . . by multiplying –- (1) the market share
    of the manufacturer or importer . . .; by (2) the total amount of
    the assessment . . . for the class of tobacco product.”     7 U.S.C.
    § 518d(f).    “The term ‘market share’ means the share of each
    manufacturer or importer of a class of tobacco product . . . of
    the total volume of domestic sales of the class of tobacco
    product[.]”    7 U.S.C. § 518d(a)(3).    For cigars, a manufacturer’s
    or importer’s “volume[] of domestic sales shall be measured by
    . . . the number of . . . cigars” it places into the domestic
    market.   7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(3).    Implementing these rules, the
    CCC derives the total number of cigars placed in the domestic
    market from excise tax reports provided to the CCC by
    manufacturers and importers.    (Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n to Summ. J.
    (“Defs.’ Opp’n”) at 3.)    See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(h); 
    7 C.F.R. § 1463.7
    .    The CCC then determines an individual manufacturer or
    importer’s pro rata share “by dividing the number of cigars from
    [the] particular manufacturer or importer by the total number of
    cigars [placed] in the domestic market [(“per-stick method”)].”
    (Defs.’ Opp’n at 3.)
    Using the per-stick method, the CCC assessed Single Stick
    $339,719 for the period of October to December 2004 based on a
    market share of 4.81 percent, $455,373 for the period of January
    to March 2005 based on a market share of 6.45 percent, and
    -4-
    $1,152,530 for the period of April to June 2005 based on a market
    share of 7.78 percent.2   (See Compl. ¶ 20.)   Single Stick timely
    appealed these assessments, alleging that the USDA “substantially
    overstated [its] ‘stick count’ market share and improperly
    inflated [its] Payment Program obligation” because the per-stick
    method resulted in an assessment “far in excess of Single Stick’s
    pro rata share of the removed volume of cigar tobacco.”    (Id.
    ¶¶ 21, 23-24.)   Single Stick also filed a Freedom of Information
    Act (“FOIA”) request seeking the CCC’s primary data sources
    underlying the CCC’s calculations and an IQA petition seeking
    both data source disclosure and information correction.    (Id.
    ¶¶ 26-27.)   The USDA denied Single Stick’s FOIA request3 and did
    not respond to the IQA petition.4     (Id.)
    Single Stick filed this action challenging the calculation
    methods used by the USDA to determine Single Stick’s Payment
    2
    On administrative appeal, the USDA determined that Single
    Stick was paying more than its proportional share because of “the
    CCC’s admitted failure to meet [the Tobacco] Reform Act
    requirements when it issued an initial round of assessments.”
    (Compl. ¶ 35.) The USDA has since recalculated Single Stick’s
    assessments, and, as a result, raised Single Stick’s October to
    December 2004 assessment to $351,007.23 based on a market share
    of 5.32 percent, raised its January to March 2005 assessment to
    $472,017.47 based on a market share of 7.15 percent, and reduced
    its April to June 2005 assessment to $1,135,353.46 based on a
    market share of 7.78 percent. (See 
    id. ¶ 38
    .)
    3
    Single Stick does not challenge the FOIA request denial in
    this action.
    4
    Single Stick also filed an IQA Request for Reconsideration
    that went unanswered.
    -5-
    Program assessments.   Specifically, Single Stick argues that the
    USDA violated the Tobacco Reform Act by assessing Single Stick in
    excess of its pro rata share of removed tobacco product, by
    assessing Single Stick without regard to its share of gross
    domestic volume, by calculating market share without regard to
    tobacco that was smuggled or unlawfully imported, and by
    calculating Single Stick’s volume of domestic sales on a per-
    stick basis.   (See 
    id. ¶ 44
    (a).)   As a result, Single Stick
    contends that the USDA over-estimated Single Stick’s market
    share.   (See 
    id. ¶ 44
    (b).)   Single Stick also alleges that the
    USDA violated the IQA by “refus[ing] to respond or otherwise
    acknowledge Single Stick’s IQA Petition and Request for
    Reconsideration” and “by failing to correct influential
    information [publicly] disseminated . . . and/or to make
    available data and data sources Single Stick needed and requested
    to test and reproduce the [USDA’s] estimate of market share.”
    (Id. ¶¶ 44(c)-(d).)    Finally, Single Stick contends that, because
    the USDA failed to disclose the data underlying its market share
    calculations, Single Stick’s due process right to a full and fair
    administrative hearing was denied.     (Id. ¶¶ 29, 44(e).)
    The USDA has moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Single
    Stick’s claims, arguing that the USDA’s method of calculating
    assessments was permitted under the Tobacco Reform Act, the IQA
    did not create a right to production or correction of data, and
    -6-
    the APA does not provide a remedy because “IQA production and
    correction of data is ‘committed to agency discretion.’”5       (See
    Defs.’ Mem. in Support of Its Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at
    2-3 (citing 
    5 U.S.C. § 701
    (a)(2) and Heckler v. Chaney, 
    470 U.S. 821
    , 830 (1985)).)       Single Stick has moved for summary judgment
    in its favor under Rule 56.       In its opposition to Single Stick’s
    summary judgment motion, the USDA suggests without opposition
    that its motion to dismiss be converted to a motion for summary
    judgment.       (Defs.’ Opp’n at 2 n.1.)
    DISCUSSION
    I.   TOBACCO REFORM ACT
    Summary judgment may be granted only where “the pleadings,
    the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any
    affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
    fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.”       Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).   The relevant inquiry “is the
    threshold inquiry of determining whether there is a need for a
    trial -- whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual
    issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact
    5
    The USDA also argued that the USDA was statutorily
    prohibited from releasing the information that Single Stick
    requested. However, the USDA withdrew this argument in light of
    a recent Federal Register notice, see Tobacco Transition Payment
    Program; Release of Records, 
    73 Fed. Reg. 23,065
     (Apr. 29, 2008),
    explaining that the market share information reported to the CCC
    by manufacturers and importers is not confidential tax
    information. (Defs.’ Notice of Withdrawal of Argument at 2.)
    -7-
    because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
    party.”   Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 250
    (1986).   In considering a motion for summary judgment, all
    evidence and inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts
    must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing
    the motion.   Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
    
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986).
    “When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the
    statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
    questions.”   Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
    Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842 (1985).    The first question is “whether
    Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”
    
    Id.
       If it has, “the court, as well as the agency, must give
    effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”     
    Id. at 842-43
    .    However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
    respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
    whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
    construction of the statute.”   
    Id. at 843
    .   In these
    circumstances, a court “‘must defer to the agency’s
    interpretation of the ambiguous statutory term if it represents a
    reasonable accommodation of the conflicting policies that were
    committed to the agency’s care by statute.’”    Back Country
    Horsemen of Am. v. Johanns, 
    424 F. Supp. 2d 89
    , 95 (D.D.C. 2006)
    (quoting New York v. EPA, 
    413 F.3d 3
    , 23 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
    -8-
    (internal quotation marks omitted)).    The agency’s construction
    of the statute is given deference when “there is an express
    delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
    provision of the statute by regulation.”    Chevron, 467 U.S. at
    843-44.
    Congress expressly delegated authority under the Tobacco
    Reform Act to the Secretary of the USDA to “promulgate such
    regulations as are necessary to implement” the statute.    7 U.S.C.
    § 519a(a).    Single Stick’s claims that the USDA’s implementation
    of the Tobacco Reform Act is impermissible amount to assertions
    that: (1) the USDA was not authorized to assess Single Stick on a
    per-stick basis, but rather was required by the statute to
    consider “the disparity in gross domestic volume between small
    and large cigars,” and (2) the USDA should have accounted for
    smuggled or unlawfully imported tobacco in calculating market
    share.    (See Compl. ¶ 44(a)(iii)-(iv).)
    A.     Per-stick method of calculating assessments
    The USDA contends that the Tobacco Reform Act “dictates that
    . . . assessments are based on the number of cigars, and not on
    the weight of tobacco in the cigars.”    (Defs.’ Mem. at 13.)   They
    ground their argument in support of a per-stick measurement of a
    manufacturer’s volume of domestic sales in the plain language of
    the Tobacco Reform Act, which provides that “volumes of domestic
    sales shall be measured by -- in the case of cigarettes and
    -9-
    cigars, the number of cigarettes and cigars[.]”    7 U.S.C.
    § 518d(g)(3)(A).   Single Stick contends that such a reading of
    the Tobacco Reform Act fails to take into account the requirement
    that volume of domestic sales be measured by gross domestic
    volume, see 7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(2), which considers the amount of
    tobacco products removed, see 7 U.S.C. § 518d(a)(2)(A), and that
    each manufacturer is to be assessed its pro rata share of gross
    domestic volume.   See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(e)(1).   Even if ambiguity
    exists as to whether the Tobacco Reform Act requires a per-stick
    calculation method, the USDA’s method is a permissible
    construction of that Act given the clear support for it in the
    directive of 7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(3)(A).
    The USDA further maintains that by using a per-stick
    calculation method, Single Stick is not being assessed in excess
    of its pro rata share of gross domestic volume.    (See Defs.’ Mem.
    at 13-14.)   Instead, the USDA argues that Single Stick’s pro rata
    share of gross domestic volume is determined by calculating
    Single Stick’s volume of domestic sales, and that such a
    calculation, utilizing the per-stick method, is warranted under
    the Tobacco Reform Act.   (See id.)   The Tobacco Reform Act
    requires that each class of tobacco product be assessed under the
    Payment Program.   See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(c)(1).   The statute does
    not differentiate between small and large cigars, but groups all
    cigars into a class of tobacco product from which assessments are
    -10-
    to be obtained.   See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(c)(1)(B).   With respect to
    individual manufacturers, the Tobacco Reform Act specifies that
    assessments are to be made based in part on that manufacturer’s
    market share, see 7 U.S.C. § 518d(f), which is measured using the
    manufacturer’s volume of domestic sales.   See 7 U.S.C.
    § 518d(a)(3).   The statute explains that volume of domestic sales
    for cigar manufacturers is measured by the number of cigars.     See
    7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(3)(A).   Additional support for the per-stick
    method of calculating cigar manufacturer’s assessments is found
    in the language of the Tobacco Reform Act that separates cigars
    and cigarettes from other classes of tobacco products whose
    volume of domestic sales is measured “in terms of pounds[.]”     7
    U.S.C. § 518d(g)(3)(B).   Thus, the USDA’s interpretation of the
    Tobacco Reform Act to allow for a per-stick calculation method is
    not contrary to clear congressional intent, but is a permissible
    construction of the statute and will be accorded deference.
    B.   Smuggled or unlawfully imported tobacco
    Single Stick alleges that the USDA violated the Tobacco
    Reform Act by calculating volume of domestic sales based solely
    on information submitted to the agency, and not taking into
    consideration cigars smuggled or unlawfully imported.     (See
    Compl. ¶ 44(a)(iii).)   In response, the USDA argues that the
    Tobacco Reform Act does not require that smuggled or unlawfully
    -11-
    imported cigars be considered in calculating market share.     (See
    Defs.’ Mem. at 14-15.)
    Although Single Stick cites the definition of gross domestic
    volume in support of its contention that the Tobacco Reform Act
    dictated that smuggled and unlawfully imported cigars be included
    in the USDA’s calculation of market share (see Pl.’s Opp’n at
    14), market share is not measured by gross domestic volume, but
    by the volume of domestic sales.   See 7 U.S.C. § 518d(a)(3).      The
    Tobacco Reform Act provides that “the calculation of the volume
    of domestic sales . . . shall be . . . based on information
    provided by the manufacturers and importers . . ., as well as any
    other relevant information provided to or obtained by the
    Secretary.”   7 U.S.C. § 518d(g)(1).   Tobacco manufacturers and
    importers are asked to submit information relating to “the
    removal of tobacco products into domestic commerce,” 7 U.S.C.
    § 518d(h)(2), which includes “the removal of tobacco products
    . . . from internal revenue bond . . . and shall also include the
    smuggling or unlawful importation of such articles into the
    United States.”   
    26 U.S.C. § 5702
    (j).    The Tobacco Reform Act
    does not specify whether the Secretary is required to
    affirmatively seek information about smuggled or unlawfully
    imported tobacco products in determining the volume of domestic
    sales, or whether the Secretary is simply required to incorporate
    this information if it is available.     The Tobacco Reform Act’s
    -12-
    implementing guidelines state that the calculation is to be based
    on “reports filed by domestic manufacturers and importers of
    tobacco with the Department of Treasury and the Department of
    Homeland Security and shall correspond to the quantity of the
    tobacco product that is removed into domestic commerce by each
    such entity[.]”   
    7 C.F.R. § 1463.7
    (b).   As such, the USDA’s
    decision to calculate market share based on information submitted
    does not contradict clear congressional intent.
    The plain language of the Tobacco Reform Act and its
    implementing guidelines support the reasonableness of the USDA’s
    interpretation that the statute did not require incorporation of
    smuggled or unlawfully imported cigars in the USDA’s calculation
    of volume of domestic sales where that information had not been
    provided by manufacturers or importers.    While an interpretation
    of the Tobacco Reform Act to require a calculation based on
    amount of removed tobacco volume -- both reported and smuggled or
    unlawfully imported -- may also be reasonable, the USDA need not
    prove that the “agency construction was the only one it
    permissibly could have adopted [for a court] to uphold the
    construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if
    the question initially had arisen in judicial proceeding.”
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 n.11.    Thus, the USDA’s interpretation
    of the Tobacco Reform Act as not requiring inclusion of all
    smuggled or unlawfully imported cigars in calculating volume of
    -13-
    domestic sales constitutes a permissible construction of the
    statute and will be given deference.
    C.   Administrative hearing
    Single Stick claims that its “due process right[] to a full
    and fair hearing” was impaired by the USDA’s failure to disclose
    the market share data underlying its assessments.   (Compl. ¶ 9.)
    This claim must fail because Single Stick has not shown any
    prejudice resulting from the USDA’s lack of disclosure.    See
    Throckmorton v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 
    963 F.2d 441
    , 446 (D.C.
    Cir. 1992) (finding no due process violation where plaintiff
    failed to show prejudice caused by alleged errors in the
    administrative proceeding).   To the extent Single Stick
    challenged the CCC’s calculation methodology, access to the
    market share data for the per-stick method was irrelevant and,
    for the reasons already stated, the administrative law judge
    correctly concluded that the CCC’s per-stick calculation method
    was a permissible interpretation of the Tobacco Reform Act.
    Single Stick advanced on appeal two other arguments that,
    under the per-stick method, CCC’s assessments were incorrect.
    The first argument was the CCC did not include tobacco companies
    that failed to report production data to the CCC in the total
    market calculation, but such companies’ excise tax information
    was available and should have been used.   (Pl.’s Mot. for Summ.
    J., Ex. 7 at 4-6.)   However, the CCC conceded that it should
    -14-
    have used unreported but accessible data and recalculated its
    assessments.   (Id. at 5-6.)   The second argument was the CCC
    unlawfully exempted small manufacturers and importers with a
    market share of .000049 or less.    (Id. at 7-8.)    The Tobacco
    Reform Act states that market share must be “expressed as a
    decimal to the fourth place.”    7 U.S.C. § 518d(a)(3).      The
    statute does not discuss when or how the CCC may round
    calculation figures to reach the market share figure.        The CCC’s
    practice at the time of the challenged assessments was to round
    up fractional digits of 50 or more after the fourth decimal place
    by adding one to the fourth decimal place and dropping fractional
    digits of 49 or less beyond the required four decimal places to
    result in the exclusion of manufacturers and importers with
    market shares of .000049 or less.      (Pl.’s Ex. 7 at 8.)    Because
    the statute does not instruct the CCC how to reach the final
    four-decimal market share figure and the CCC’s rounding rule is a
    permissible interpretation, it will be accorded deference.         As
    Single Stick has not alleged that access to the market share data
    information would have altered the outcome of its administrative
    claim, there is no showing of any prejudice caused by the USDA’s
    failure to disclose its data.    Thus, Single Stick has neither
    alleged nor shown a due process violation.
    -15-
    II.   IQA
    Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint
    for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).   “On review of a 12(b)(6) motion a
    court ‘must treat the complaint's factual allegations as true
    . . . and must grant plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that
    can be derived from the facts alleged.’”   Holy Land Found. for
    Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 
    333 F.3d 156
    , 165 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
    (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 
    216 F.3d 1111
    , 1113
    (D.C. Cir. 2000)).   “While a complaint attacked by a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
    allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of
    his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and
    conclusions . . . .”   Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 545
    ,
    555 (2007) (citations and internal quotations omitted).   “Factual
    allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
    speculative level . . . on the assumption that all of the
    allegations in the complaint are true . . . .”   
    Id.
    Single Stick alleges that the USDA violated the IQA by
    failing to correct or disclose its data sources underlying its
    market share calculations and by failing to respond to Single
    Stick’s petition and request for reconsideration.   To allow a
    plaintiff to seek review of an agency’s violation of a statute,
    the court must examine “whether or not Congress intended to
    -16-
    confer individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries” in
    enacting the statute.   Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
    536 U.S. 273
    , 285
    (2002).   “The question is not simply who would benefit from the
    Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon
    those beneficiaries.”   California v. Sierra Club, 
    451 U.S. 287
    ,
    294 (1981).   To make this determination, a court should focus on
    whether the statute contains “rights-creating language,” see
    Gonzaga Univ., 
    536 U.S. at 287
    , which is language that emphasizes
    the individuals protected rather than simply dictating the
    actions an agency should take.    See Alexander v. Sandoval, 
    532 U.S. 275
    , 289 (2001) (holding that “[s]tatutes that focus on the
    person regulated rather than the individuals protected create ‘no
    implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class
    of persons’” (quoting Sierra Club, 
    451 U.S. at 294
    )).
    The IQA “creates no legal rights in any third party,” and
    “does not create a legal right to access to information or to
    correctness.”   Salt Inst. v. Leavitt, 
    440 F.3d 156
    , 159 (4th Cir.
    2006).    Both the actual text of the statute and its implementing
    guidelines dictate the actions that agencies must take and do not
    contain “individually focused terminology.”    Gonzaga Univ., 
    536 U.S. at 287
    ; see 
    44 U.S.C. § 3516
     note (“The Director [of the
    Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)] shall . . . issue
    guidelines . . . that provide policy and procedural guidance to
    Federal agencies . . . ”); see also Guidelines for Ensuring and
    -17-
    Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity of
    Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 
    67 Fed. Reg. 8452
    ,
    8458 (Feb. 22, 2002) (republication) (ordering that agencies
    should “[i]ssue their own information quality guidelines[,] . . .
    [e]stablish administrative mechanisms[, and] . . . report to the
    Director of OMB the number and nature of complaints”).   The focus
    of the IQA is the communication between agencies and the
    development of internal procedures for ensuring quality of
    information.   While the statute obligates agencies to establish a
    process by which individuals can alert an agency to a need for
    information correction to improve information quality, the
    statute does contain any indication that individuals choosing to
    participate in such a process have a right to seek or correct
    information.   See 67 Fed. Reg. at 8458-59.   Because the IQA lacks
    any rights-creating language, Single Stick has no right under
    that statute to seek review of the USDA’s actions.
    In addition, Single Stick’s challenge under the APA to the
    USDA’s failure to respond to its IQA petition and request for
    reconsideration cannot stand because there was no final agency
    action.   An agency action is reviewable under the APA only if the
    action is a final agency action.   Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness
    Alliance, 
    542 U.S. 55
    , 61-62 (2004).   A final agency action is
    one where “‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ or from
    which ‘legal consequences will flow[.]’”   Bennett v. Spear, 520
    -18-
    U.S. 154, 178 (1997) (quoting Port of Boston Marine Terminal
    Ass’n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 
    400 U.S. 62
    , 71
    (1970)).   Because the IQA does not vest any party with a right to
    information or to correction of information, see Salt Inst., 
    440 F.3d at 159
    , the USDA’s actions under the IQA did not determine
    Single Stick’s rights or cause any legal consequence.    See Ams.
    for Safe Access v. HHS, No. C 07-01049 WHA, 
    2007 WL 2141289
    , at
    *4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2007) (holding that because the IQA does
    not grant any legal rights, there was no legal consequence
    flowing from the defendant’s response to the plaintiff’s IQA
    petition).   Accordingly, the USDA’s lack of response was not a
    final agency action and cannot be reviewed under the APA.    See
    
    id.
    CONCLUSION
    The USDA’s interpretations of the Tobacco Reform Act are
    entitled to Chevron deference and the USDA’s failure to provide
    the market share data underlying its assessments did not alter
    the outcome of Single Stick’s administrative action.    Since no
    material facts are in dispute regarding Single Stick’s claims
    under the Tobacco Reform Act and the USDA is entitled to
    judgment, the defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim, treated
    as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted.   Because the
    IQA does not confer any rights to individuals, the defendants’
    -19-
    motion to dismiss plaintiff’s IQA claims will be granted.    Single
    Stick’s motion for summary judgment will be denied as moot.
    A final, appealable Order accompanies this Memorandum
    Opinion.
    SIGNED this 10th day of March, 2009.
    ________/s/_________________
    RICHARD W. ROBERTS
    United States District Judge