White v. Lappin ( 2010 )


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  •                             UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    CHARLES WHITE,                                )
    )
    Plaintiff,                     )
    )
    v.                             )       Civil Action No. 08-1376 (RWR)
    )
    HARLEY LAPPIN, Director,                      )
    Federal Bureau of Prisons,                    )
    )
    Defendant.                     )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Plaintiff brings this action under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see 5 U.S.C.
    § 552. Plaintiff has moved for an award of costs1 and defendant has renewed his motion to
    dismiss. Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss will be granted as conceded. Plaintiff is not
    eligible for or entitled to an award of costs, and his motion will be denied.
    BACKGROUND
    On April 8, 2008, plaintiff submitted a request to the Director of the Federal Bureau of
    Prisons (“BOP”) under the FOIA for the following:
    1.      All medical records, files, notes and any other documents that
    the [BOP] has in its possession regarding Charles White.
    2.      All dental records, files, notes and any other documents that
    the [BOP] has in its possession regarding Charles White.
    Compl., Ex. 1 (April 8, 2008 Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Request) (exhibit number
    designated by the Court). Because he had not received a timely response to his FOIA requests,
    see Compl. ¶ 6; Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for
    1
    Plaintiff also moved for sanctions but later withdrew that request.
    1
    Sanctions and Costs (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, he filed this civil action in order to obtain the requested
    records. Because of defendant’s untimely response, plaintiff demanded an award of costs to
    cover the portion of the filing fee he has paid, and typewriter ribbon and copy fees. Mem. in
    Supp. of Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. #8] at 4; Pl.’s Resp. to the Court’s Order of April
    29, 2009 and Contemporaneous[] Request for Sanctions [Dkt. #11] (“Pl.’s Resp.”) at 2-3; Pl.’s
    Opp’n at 6.
    Defendant has shown, and plaintiff has acknowledged, that the requested medical and
    dental records, except for throat, chest, and head x-rays, have been released. White v. Lappin,
    No. 08-1376, 
    2009 WL 1921337
    , at *2 (D.D.C. July 2, 2009). Pursuant to the Court’s July 2,
    2009 Order, defendant has filed “a renewed motion with respect to plaintiff's request for x-rays
    and . . . an opposition . . . to plaintiff’s motion[] . . . for costs.” 
    Id. Plaintiff concedes
    that he has
    received the requested records. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1-2. The sole matter for resolution, then, is
    plaintiff’s motion for costs.
    DISCUSSION
    The FOIA permits a district court to “assess against the United States . . . other litigation
    costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the [plaintiff] has substantially prevailed.” 5
    U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i). A party substantially prevails if he “has obtained relief through either
    . . . a judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree[,] or . . . a voluntary
    or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 5
    U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). The latter provision “essentially codifies the so-called ‘catalyst
    theory’ for determining a fee request against the United States, under which a plaintiff is deemed
    to have ‘substantially prevailed’ for purposes of § 552(a)(4)(E) if the ‘litigation substantially
    2
    caused the requested records to be released.’” N.Y.C. Apparel F.Z.E. v. U.S. Customs and
    Border Prot. Bureau, 
    563 F. Supp. 2d 217
    , 221 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Chesapeake Bay Found.
    v. Dep’t of Agric., 
    11 F.3d 211
    , 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993)); see Zarcon, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor Relations
    Bd., No. 06-3161-CV-S-RED, 
    2009 WL 4960224
    , at *2 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 25, 2008). “The
    catalyst theory assumes that a voluntary or unilateral change in an agency’s position is induced
    by the complainant’s lawsuit.” Wildlands CPR v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
    558 F. Supp. 2d 1096
    , 1098
    (D. Mont. 2008).
    The decision to award attorneys’ fees and costs is left to the Court’s discretion. See
    Nationwide Bldg. Maint., Inc. v. Sampson, 
    559 F.2d 704
    , 705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (commenting
    that the § 552(a)(4)(E) “contemplates a reasoned exercise of the courts’ discretion taking into
    account all relevant factors”). In making this decision, the Court considers “(1) the public
    benefit derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the
    plaintiff’s interest in the records; and (4) the reasonableness of the agency’s withholding of the
    requested documents.” Davy v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 
    550 F.3d 1155
    , 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
    (citations omitted). “No one factor is dispositive, although the [C]ourt will not assess fees when
    the agency has demonstrated that it had a lawful right to withhold disclosure.” 
    Id. Plaintiff asserts
    that he has “obtained the desired relief, the release of his records, due to a
    voluntary change in position by the [d]efendant: [a]cknowledging his FOIA request, once he
    filed a complaint in the Court[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 (internal parentheses omitted). He argues that
    he has substantially prevailed and therefore is entitled to an award of costs because defendant
    “forced [him] to move in the Court to force the Defendant’s compliance with the [FOIA, and] the
    Defendant is responsible for all incurred court cost[s].” Pl.’s Resp. at 3.
    3
    Defendant counters that plaintiff has not substantially prevailed for purposes of the
    FOIA. Def.’s Renewed Mot. to Dismiss and Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Sanctions and Costs
    (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 14. In defendant’s view, because plaintiff obtained the requested records
    without a court order, enforceable written agreement, or consent decree, he is not eligible for an
    award of costs. 
    Id. Defendant further
    argues that it did not change its position due to plaintiff’s
    complaint. 
    Id. at 15.
    Rather, defendant states that it did not become aware of plaintiff’s FOIA
    request until plaintiff filed suit. 
    Id. “In essence,”
    defendant argues, plaintiff’s complaint “has
    served as a proxy for the administrative complaint that [p]laintiff never filed.” Def.’s Mot. at 15.
    In sum, defendant asserts that plaintiff fails to establish a nexus between the filing of a civil
    action and release of agency records. See 
    id. Defendant demonstrates
    that the BOP had no record of “any FOIA request being
    accepted and processed by or on behalf of the [p]laintiff” at the time the complaint was filed.
    Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. To Dismiss, Attach. (Tafelski Decl.) ¶ 4. “If no FOIA
    request is received, an agency has no reason to search or produce records and similarly has no
    basis to respond.” Carbe v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, No. 03-1658, 
    2004 WL 2051359
    , at *8 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004); see Antonelli v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
    591 F. Supp. 2d 15
    , 26 (D.D.C. 2008) (“An agency’s disclosure obligations are not triggered . . . until it has
    received a proper FOIA request in compliance with its published regulations.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. §
    552(a)(3) and 552(a)(6)(A)(i)); West v. Jackson, 
    448 F. Supp. 2d 207
    , 211 (D.D.C. 2006)
    (concluding that the requester had no viable FOIA claim where the agency had no record of
    having received a FOIA request), aff’d, 
    2007 WL 1723362
    (D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 2007) (per
    4
    curiam). On the record of this case, plaintiff cannot show that the BOP voluntarily or
    unilaterally changed its position because of the lawsuit.
    Moreover, the Davy factors to not weigh in favor of an award of costs. It is apparent that
    plaintiff filed this action in order to obtain the release of medical and dental records for
    plaintiff’s personal use only. Although plaintiff derives no commercial benefit from these
    records, it does not appear that the public benefits in any way from their release. The BOP has
    shown that the reason it had not released the medical records, dental records and x-rays before
    White sued was reasonable: it had not received plaintiff’s FOIA requests. However, when the
    BOP became aware of the requests, its staff acted promptly to arrange for the release of
    plaintiff’s medical and dental records at no charge to him. Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1 (Considine Decl.)
    ¶¶ 3-5. Once it became clear that plaintiff demanded release of copies of the x-ray films
    themselves, BOP staff promptly provided him “the opportunity to view all of the medical x-ray
    films . . . maintained by [the] BOP.” 
    Id., Considine Decl.
    ¶ 7. In addition, BOP staff made
    arrangements for copying the films and sending them to the physician of plaintiff’s choice, upon
    payment of $5.00 per film copied. 
    Id. ¶¶ 8-9.
    Likewise, these considerations do not establish
    that plaintiff’s claim is not insubstantial, a threshold for being eligible for an award of costs that
    plaintiff fails to meet. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii); see Dasta v. Lappin, 
    657 F. Supp. 2d 29
    , 33
    (D.D.C. 2009) (denying a requester’s demand for costs where his interest in and intended use of
    the requested records was personal, and where the public derived no benefit from the FOIA
    request or subsequent litigation).
    5
    CONCLUSION
    Defendant’s renewed motion to dismiss will be granted as conceded. Because plaintiff
    does not establish that he is eligible for or entitled to an award of costs, his request will be
    denied. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
    Signed this 29th day of July, 2010.
    /s/
    RICHARD W. ROBERTS
    United States District Judge
    6