Cherokee Nation, the v. Nash ( 2010 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THE CHEROKEE NATION, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 09-CV-52-TCK-PJC
)
(1) RAYMOND NASH, )
(2) LARRY WASSON, )
(3) ROBERT ALLEN, )
(4) KATHY WASHINGTON, )
(5) LISA DUKE, )
(6) KEN SALAZAR, SECRETARY )
OF THE INTERIOR, AND )
(7) THE UNITED STATES )
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Ken Salazar and the United States Department of the
Interior’s Motion to Transfer Venue and to Suspend Obligation to Answer, or in the Alternative to
Stay (Docs. 18 and 22); and Motion of the Cherokee Freedmen to Transfer Or, in the Alternative,
Stay (Doc. 20). In these motions, Defendants move to transfer this action to the District Court for
the District of Columbia (“D.D.C.”), where the action of Vann v. Salazar, 1:03CV-1711-HHK, is
currently pending (“D.C. Action”) before the Honorable Henry H. Kennedy (“Judge Kennedy”).
I. Factual Background
On August 11, 2003, six individual plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of the United
States Department of the Interior (“Secretary”) and the United States Department of the Interior
(“DOI”) in the D.C. Action.1 The relief sought in the D.C. Action, as well as relevant background
1
The Secretary and DOI are collectively referred to as “Federal Defendants” in the D.C.
Action and this action.
facts, are comprehensively set forth in Vann v. Kempthorne, 467 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“Vann I”), and Vann v. Kempthorne, 534 F.3d 741, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Vann II ”), and will not
be repeated at length here. Essentially, the plaintiffs in the D.C. Action are descendants of persons
listed on the “Freedmen Roll” of the Cherokee Nation. Vann II, 534 F.2d at 744. The Freedmen Roll
was completed in 1907 after Congress directed the Dawes Commission to create membership rolls
for the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma, which included the Cherokee Nation. Id. As explained
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”), “[t]he rolls for the
Cherokees were completed in 1907 and resulted in two lists: a ‘Blood Roll’ for native Cherokees
and a ‘Freedmen Roll’ for former slaves [that had been owned by the Cherokee Nation] and their
descendants.” Id. In the D.C. Action, the plaintiffs allege “they were not permitted to vote in two
tribal elections because they lack an ancestral link to the Blood Roll.” Id.2 The plaintiffs in the D.C.
Action sued the Secretary and the DOI under the federal Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),
“alleging that their exclusion from the tribal elections, and the Secretary’s recognition of those
elections, violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, the Cherokee constitution,
the 1866 Treaty,3 the Principal Chiefs Act, and the Indian Civil Rights Act.” Id. at 745 (footnote
added). The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Secretary acted “arbitrarily and capriciously,”
see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), in recognizing the 2003 Elections and sought to enjoin the Secretary from
recognizing the results of the 2003 Elections or any future elections from which the plaintiffs were
excluded. Id.
2
Such elections are referred to herein as the “2003 Elections.”
3
The United States and the Cherokee Nation entered into this treaty in 1866 after the
Cherokee Nation voluntarily abolished slavery in 1863 (“1866 Treaty”).
2
On January 14, 2005, The Cherokee Nation (“Cherokee Nation”) moved to intervene in the
D.C. Action for the limited purpose of asserting that (1) it was a necessary party pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) (“Rule 19”); (2) it could not feasibly be joined because the Cherokee
Nation’s sovereign immunity barred its joinder; and (3) the entire D.C. Action should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 19(b), which provides that “[i]f a person who is required to be joined if feasible
cannot be joined, the court must determine whether, in equity and good conscience, the action
should proceed among the existing parties or should be dismissed.”4 The Cherokee Nation
alternatively argued, in its motion to dismiss, that the Secretary had not yet performed a “final
agency action” and that the APA issue was not ripe. The plaintiffs subsequently moved to amend
their complaint to add the Cherokee Nation, the Chief of the Cherokee Nation Chadwick Smith
(“Chief Smith”), and other tribal officials as defendants in the D.C. Action.
On December 19, 2006, with respect to the Cherokee Nation’s motion to dismiss, Judge
Kennedy held: (1) the Cherokee Nation was a necessary party that must be joined if feasible; (2) the
Cherokee Nation could be joined because Congress, in the 1866 Treaty and the Thirteenth
Amendment, “unequivocally indicated its intent to abrogate the tribe’s immunity with regard to
racial oppression prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment”; and (3) the Secretary’s decision to
recognize the leaders elected in the 2003 Elections constituted a final agency action for purposes of
the APA. Vann I, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 65-72. With respect to the plaintiffs’ motion to amend, Judge
4
The factors for a court to consider pursuant to Rule 19(b) include “(1) the extent to
which a judgment rendered in the person’s absence might prejudice that person or the existing
parties; (2) the extent to which any prejudice could be lessened or avoided by: (A) protective
provisions in the judgment; (B) shaping the relief; or (C) other measures; (3) whether a judgment
rendered in the person’s absence would be adequate; and (4) whether the plaintiff would have an
adequate remedy if the action were dismissed for nonjoinder.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(b)(1)-(4).
3
Kennedy held: (1) the plaintiffs need not exhaust tribal remedies prior to naming the proposed
defendants; and (2) tribal officials are not shielded by sovereign immunity because (a) the Cherokee
Nation’s immunity was abrogated by Congress, and (b) alternatively, tribal officials are amenable
to suit under the Ex parte Young5 doctrine. Id. at 72-74. The Cherokee Nation and tribal officials
filed an interlocutory appeal of Judge Kennedy’s denial of their asserted sovereign immunity from
suit.
On July 17, 2007, while the appeal was pending, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended
Complaint, adding the Freedmen Band of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (“Freedmen Band”)6
as a plaintiff to the D.C. Action.7 On July 29, 2008, the D.C. Circuit reversed Judge Kennedy’s
holding that the Cherokee Nation was amenable to suit, reasoning that Congress had not
unequivocally abrogated the Cherokee Nation’s immunity in either the text of the Thirteenth
Amendment or the 1866 Treaty. Vann II, 534 F.3d at 748-49. The court found, however, that tribal
officials, including Chief Smith, were amenable to suit pursuant to the Ex parte Young doctrine. Id.
at 749-56. The court remanded with instructions that the “district court must determine whether ‘in
equity and good conscience’ the suit can proceed with the Cherokee Nation’s officers but without
5
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
6
According to the current version of the complaint in the D.C. Action, which is the
Fourth Amended Complaint, the Freedmen Band is “a political entity organized under a
constitution and represented by leaders who as individuals can trace ancestry to the Cherokee
Freedmen Dawes Rolls of 1906.” (See Freedmen Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer, Ex. B, at ¶ 11.)
7
When necessary to distinguish between the individual plaintiffs and the organizational
plaintiff in the D.C. Action, the Court refers to the individuals as “D.C. Individual Plaintiffs” and
the organization as “Freedmen Band.” Otherwise, the plaintiffs in the D.C. Action are
collectively referred to as “D.C. Plaintiffs.”
4
the Cherokee Nation itself” pursuant to Rule 19(b). Id. at 756. The court did not reach any other
issues decided in Vann I.
Following remand, on December 19, 2008, the D.C. Plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended
Complaint in accordance with Vann II, naming only Federal Defendants and Chief Smith. On
January 30, 2009, Chief Smith filed a motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, arguing:
(1) the action should not proceed in the absence of the Cherokee Nation and should be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 19(b); (2) there exists no private right of action upon which the plaintiffs can
premise their claims, and the action should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) the
plaintiffs failed to allege facts establishing the court’s venue over Chief Smith, and claims against
him should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3). (See Freedmen’s Mot. to Transfer, Ex. C., at
1-2.)
Shortly after Chief Smith filed his motion to dismiss in the D.C. Action, on February 3, 2009,
the Cherokee Nation filed this action in the Northern District of Oklahoma. The Cherokee Nation
filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief against five individual Freedmen (“Freedmen
Defendants”),8 the Secretary, and DOI. According to the Complaint, Freedmen Defendants are non-
Indian descendants of former slaves of the Cherokee Nation who publicly claim rights as citizens
of the Cherokee Nation pursuant to the 1866 Treaty. The Cherokee Nation alleges, however, that
the 1866 Treaty was modified by a subsequent act of Congress known as the Five Tribes Act, ch.
1876, §3, 34 Stat. 137 (1906) (“Five Tribes Act”):
As a result of the U.S. Government’s action in modifying the Treaty of 1866 by the
Five Tribes Act, Freedmen not living in the Cherokee Nation before February 11,
8
The five individual Freedmen Defendants in this case are different individuals than
those comprising the D.C. Individual Plaintiffs.
5
1867, a Freedmen’s descendant not living in the Cherokee Nation at that time did not
possess any rights of native Cherokees conferred by the 1866 Treaty. Further, no
child born of a citizen would be entitled to citizenship after that date.
(Compl. ¶ 12.) The Cherokee Nation seeks a declaration that the “Five Tribes Act and federal
statutes modified the Treaty of 1866 thereby resulting in non-Indian Freedmen descendants,
including the individual defendants, no longer, as a matter of federal law, having rights to citizenship
of the Cherokee Nation and benefits derived from such citizenship.” (Id. ¶ 18.)
On February 6, 2009, in the D.C. Action, Chief Smith filed a supplement to his motion to
dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, informing Judge Kennedy that the Cherokee Nation filed
this action. Chief Smith argued that the pendency of this action was relevant to the fourth factor of
the Rule 19(b) analysis, which is whether the plaintiff would have an adequate remedy if the D.C.
Action were dismissed pursuant to Rule 19(b). (See Freedmen’s Mot. to Transfer, Ex. I, at 2.)
On March 14, 2009, D.C. Plaintiffs moved for leave to file a Fifth Amended Complaint to
re-name the Cherokee Nation as a defendant in the D.C. Action. D.C. Plaintiffs argued that, by
filing the action before this Court, the Cherokee Nation “has abused its immunity privilege by
attempting to invoke it for unfair tactical advantage, has therefore waived its immunity, and should
be added to this action as a defendant.” (Id., Ex. J, at 1-2.) D.C. Plaintiffs further contended that
“[b]y bringing its own suit in a federal forum seeking relief on the facts at the heart of this case, the
Cherokee Nation has made a clear declaration of its intention to submit itself to federal jurisdiction
and has thus waived its right to assert immunity with regard to the subject matter of this case – not
only in the Oklahoma court, but in [the D.C. Action].” (Id., Ex. J, at 6 (internal quotations omitted).)
On May 29, 2009, Federal Defendants and Freedmen Defendants filed the motions to transfer
currently pending before this Court, requesting transfer of this action to the D.D.C. pursuant to (1)
6
the “first to file” rule (“first to file rule”); and (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“§ 1404(a)”).9 Alternatively,
Federal Defendants and Freedmen Defendants move the Court to stay this action pending resolution
of all proceedings or certain relevant proceedings in the D.C. Action, pursuant to the first to file rule.
The Cherokee Nation filed one combined response to both motions.
On June 18, 2009, Freedmen Defendants filed their Amended Answer, Counterclaims
Against the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, and Cross-Claims Against Federal Defendants. (See
Doc. 31.) In their counterclaims, Freedmen Defendants allege that the Cherokee Nation violated
various treaties, tribal laws, and federal laws by implementing policies denying Freedmen the right
to vote and perpetuating badges of slavery. They seek numerous forms of declaratory and injunctive
relief, including a declaration of Freedmen Defendants’ rights under the 1866 Treaty and other laws,
and an injunction enjoining the Cherokee Nation from holding any further elections until all
Freedmen are entitled to vote. (See id. ¶¶ 21, 91-114.) In their cross-claims, Freedmen Defendants
allege five causes of action against Federal Defendants, including violations of the APA, and
ultimately seek a declaration that Federal Defendants may not approve any election or other act by
the Cherokee Nation that violates Freedmen Defendants’ rights as Cherokee citizens. (See id. ¶¶ 22,
115-150.) The Court granted the Cherokee Nation’s and the Federal Defendants’ motions to stay
their deadlines to file a responsive pleading to Freedmen Defendants’ counterclaims and cross-
claims until following the Court’s rulings on the motions to transfer or stay.
9
Freedmen Defendants principally relied on the first to file rule as grounds for transfer
and relied on § 1404(a) in the alternative. In contrast, Federal Defendants principally relied on §
1404(a) and relied on the first to file rule in the alternative. For reasons explained below, the
Court transfers this case to the D.D.C. pursuant to the discretionary first to file rule and does not
reach the issue of whether § 1404(a)’s requirements are met.
7
On June 10, 2010, the Court ordered Federal Defendants to provide a Status Report of any
relevant events or orders in the D.C. Action occurring since May 29, 2009. According to such
report, there have been no relevant events in the D.C. Action. (See Doc. 47.) Thus, Judge Kennedy
has not decided whether the Cherokee Nation may be re-named as a defendant in the D.C. Action
based on the Cherokee Nation’s filing of this action; whether the D.C. Action may, in equity and
good conscience, proceed in the absence of the Cherokee Nation; or whether venue is proper in the
D.D.C. over Chief Smith.
II. Motions to Transfer Or, Alternatively, Stay Pursuant to the First to File Rule
A. General Principles of First to File Rule
The Tenth Circuit generally follows the first to file rule. See Hospah Coal Co. v. Chaco
Energy Co., 673 F.2d 1161, 1163 (10th Cir. 1982) (explaining “general rule that when two courts
have concurrent jurisdiction, the first court in which jurisdiction attaches has priority to consider the
case”); O'Hare Int’l Bank v. Lambert, 459 F.2d 328, 331 (10th Cir. 1972) (“It is well established in
this Circuit that where the jurisdiction of a federal district court has first attached, that right cannot
be arrested or taken away by proceedings in another federal district court.”) (holding that district
court erred by denying motion to stay second-filed action until conclusion of first-filed action);
Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689, 692 (10th Cir. 1965) (“The rule is that the first federal
district court which obtains jurisdiction of parties and issues should have priority and the second
court should decline consideration of the action until the proceedings before the first court are
terminated.”); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., No. 98-4098, 1999 WL
682883, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1999) (unpublished) (“Federal courts have recognized that, as
courts of coordinate jurisdiction and equal rank, they must be careful to avoid interfering with each
8
other’s affairs in order to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon
the authority of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform
result. To aid in achieving this goal, the ‘first-to-file’ rule permits a district court to decline
jurisdiction where a complaint raising the same issues against the same parties has previously been
filed in another district court.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). However, the Tenth
Circuit has not provided a comprehensive explanation of the doctrine or its exceptions. Courts
within the Tenth Circuit have discussed and applied the first to file in various situations. See, e.g.,
Shannon’s Rainbow, LLC v. Supernova Media, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1279 (D. Utah 2010)
(applying first to file rule in case involving similar parties and issues and enjoining defendants from
pursuing any further action in second-filed case pending in New York); Ed Tobergte Assocs., Inc.
v. Zide Sport Shop of Ohio, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199 (D. Kan. 1999) (applying first to file rule
and staying its proceedings in deference to first-filed case pending in Ohio that presented
substantially similar issues) (reasoning that judicial economy was served by stay because one court
would “decide the duplicative issues of venue, interpretation of the contractual provisions for
jurisdiction and venue, and the allegations of bad faith and inequitable conduct” against certain
defendants).
The Fifth Circuit has provided a comprehensive explanation of the first to file rule. See
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Michael Cicero,
First-to-File and Choice-of-Forum Roots Run Too Deep for Micron to Curb Most Races to the
Courthouse, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 547, 560 (2008) [hereinafter “Cicero”] (citing Cadle
9
as leading case on first to file rule).10 According to the Fifth Circuit, “[u]nder the first-to-file rule,
when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed
may refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap.” Cadle, 174 F.3d at 603.
“The rule rests on principles of comity and sound judicial administration.” Id. “The concern
manifestly is to avoid the waste of duplication, to avoid rulings which may trench upon the authority
of sister courts, and to avoid piecemeal resolution of issues that call for a uniform result.” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Courts utilize the first to file rule “to maximize judicial economy and
minimize embarrassing inconsistencies by prophylactically refusing to hear a case raising issues that
might substantially duplicate those raised by a case pending in another court.” Id. at 604. The first
to file rule is a “discretionary doctrine,” and a lower court’s decision to apply the first to file rule
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 603.
The general rule of deference to a first-filed court presented with substantially overlapping
parties and issues is not “an invariable mandate.” Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Fox Entertainment
Group, Inc., 522 F.3d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 2008). “The inquiry still requires selection of the more
appropriate forum, since the first-filed rule is only a presumption that may be rebutted by proof of
the desirability of proceeding in the forum of the second-filed action.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted). Indeed, there are recognized exceptions to the first to file rule, which must be proved by
the second-filing party. Id. For example, the Second Circuit has recognized two exceptions: (1)
where the balance of convenience favors the second-filed action, and (2) where special
10
This article addresses the impact of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Micron
Technology, Inc. v. MOSAID Technologies, Inc., 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008), on the first to
file rule as applied to patent infringement actions and concludes that Micron will not radically
alter the first to file rule in such cases. See id. at 549-50. This Court utilized the article primarily
for its discussion of general background principles of the first to file rule. See id. at 550-564.
10
circumstances warrant giving priority to the second suit, such as where a first-filing party engages
in forum shopping or anticipatory filing. Id. at 275-76 (internal quotations and citations omitted).11
If any exceptions apply, a court may, in its discretion, “dispense with the first-filed principle for
reasons of equity” and allow the second-filed case to proceed in the second-filed forum. See
Alltrade, Inc., 946 F.2d at 628.
B. Second-Filed Court’s Role
In Cadle, the Fifth Circuit indicated that a second-filed court plays a limited role when
presented with a motion to transfer or stay based on the first to file rule. See Cadle, 174 F.3d at 605.
This role is to decide whether the moving party in the second-filed court has demonstrated a
“substantial overlap” between the two suits. Id. If the moving party satisfies this overlap
requirement, the second-filed court allows the first-filed court to “resolve the question of whether
both [cases] should be allowed to proceed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (explaining that first-
filed court performs the “balancing act” in deciding how to maximize judicial economy between two
suits and that, by playing a limited role, the second-filed court avoids “entrenching on the authority
of its sister court”).
The Tenth Circuit has not expressly spoken on the role of the second-filed court when
presented with a motion to transfer pursuant to the first to file rule. District courts within the Tenth
Circuit have stated that “the preference is for the court of first-filing to decide the application of the
11
The Cherokee Nation relies upon the “special circumstances” exception identified in
Employers Insurance of Wausau, which is why the Court focused on Second Circuit law setting
forth exceptions. Other courts are substantially in accord as to the relevant exceptions. See, e.g.,
Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Products, Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The circumstances
under which an exception to the first-to-file rule typically will be made include bad faith,
anticipatory suit, and forum shopping.”) (internal citations omitted).
11
first to file rule.” See Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 679 F.
Supp. 2d 1287, 1296 (D. Kan. 2010) (explaining general preference for first-filed court to decide
where second-filed case will proceed, but finding that the second court may exercise its discretion
to enforce (or decline to enforce) the first to file rule in the first instance); Johnson v. Pfizer, Inc.,
No. 04-1178, 2004 WL 2898076, at *2 (D. Kan. 2004) (unpublished) (explaining that “[a]pplication
of these or any other exception [to the first to file rule] is usually left to the first-filed court” and that
“[l]ikewise, any jurisdictional defects, or objections to venue would be decided by that court”); see
also Ed Tobergte Assocs., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (explaining that, when second-filed court is
presented with motion to stay or transfer pursuant to the first to file rule, “[t]he immediate question
before the court is not whether jurisdiction and venue are proper in the [second-filed case] or the
[first-filed case], but which court should decide those issues”).
Second-filed courts in other jurisdictions have also expressed a general preference for
deferring to first-filed courts for deciding where the second case should proceed. See Daimler-
Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“It is more
appropriate, as a matter of judicial comity, for the court of first filing to determine whether to retain
or relinquish jurisdiction, rather than leave it to the court of later filing to make that decision.”);
Cicero, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y at 561-62 (explaining that courts generally “grant forms
of relief deferring to the first-filed court to determine the fate of the second-filed action” and that
the first to file rule functions as a “traffic regulator” dictating “which forum would decide the fate
of the second-filed case”). This general rule of deference includes deferring to first-filed courts for
the application of any equitable exceptions to the first to file rule, once the second-filed court has
determined that there is a sufficient overlap between the two cases. See id. at 561-62 (explaining
12
that the “first-filed court decides not only venue issues generally [such as convenience factors
presented by § 1404(a) motions], but also specifically whether the second-filer sustained its burden
to establish exceptions to the [first to file rule].”) (citing cases); id. at 563 (explaining flow chart
attached to article and stating that “most courts require that analysis of [first to file rule] exceptions
occur in the first-filed courts”). But see Sotheby’s, Inc. v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058, 1065-66
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (second-filed court deciding that movant had demonstrated “special circumstances”
exception to the first to file rule and enjoining proceedings in first-filed court).
Based on the above law, the Court concludes that: (1) a second-filed court presented with
a motion to transfer or stay pursuant to the first to file rule must make the initial determination of
whether the first to file rule generally applies, i.e., whether there is sufficient overlap of parties and
issues between the two cases; (2) if the second filer argues for application of an equitable exception
to the first to file rule, a second-filed court within the Tenth Circuit has discretion to either (a) allow
the first-filed court to decide whether an exception applies, or (b) decide for itself whether an
exception applies; and (3) there is a preference for allowing the first-filed court to decide whether
an exception applies.
C. Does First to File Rule Generally Apply?
As an initial matter, the Court must determine if movants Freedmen Defendants and Federal
Defendants have shown that the first to file rule generally applies. This requires analysis of three
considerations: (1) the chronology of actions; (2) the similarity of parties, and (3) the similarity of
issues. See Shannon’s Rainbow, LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 1278 (citing Alltrade, Inc., 946 F.2d at
625); Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 1296 (“In determining
whether the first-to-file rule applies, the court should examine the chronology of the actions, the
13
similarity of the parties involved, and the similarity of the issues at stake.”). It is well accepted that
“the parties do not need to be identical” and that “[o]nly similarity or substantial overlap is
required.” Shannon’s Rainbow, LLC, 683 F. Supp. at 1278-79 (internal quotations omitted) (citing
cases). “Similarly, the issues must only be substantially similar in that they seek like forms of relief
and hinge on the outcome of the same legal/factual issues.” Id. at 1279; Wallace B. Roderick
Revocable Living Trust, 679 F. Supp. 2d at 1298 (explaining that “the first-to-file rule does not
require identity of claims”).
1. Chronology of Actions
The D.C. Action was filed in 2003, and this action was filed in 2009. Nonetheless, the
Cherokee Nation argues that this action should be considered the “first filed” action because the
“[t]he D.C. Court never acquired jurisdiction of the Cherokee Nation.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to
Transfer 15.) According to the Cherokee Nation, the case before this Court was the “first, and only
to acquire jurisdiction over all the parties to the 1866 Treaty as modified by statute,” and therefore
the first to file rule should “not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over this action.” (Id.)
In essence, the Cherokee Nation argues that this case should be considered the “first-filed” action
because the first-filed court currently lacks jurisdiction over it.12
This argument misses the mark for two reasons. First, as explained below, the parties need
not be identical in order to transfer pursuant to the first to file rule. The inquiry is whether there is
12
The Cherokee Nation’s argument that this case should be considered the “first filed”
action consisted of only one paragraph and was confusingly positioned between two other
paragraphs discussing equitable “exceptions” to the first to file rule. (See Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to
Transfer 15.) Based on the Court’s understanding of this argument, it is best addressed as a
challenge to general application of the first to file rule, rather than an exception. Therefore, the
Court has treated the argument in the “chronology of actions” analysis.
14
a substantial overlap between the parties and issues, and the overarching goal is to avoid inconsistent
rulings between the two cases. Therefore, the Cherokee Nation’s current absence from the D.C.
Action does not mandate a finding that this was the “first-filed” action between the two cases.
Second, this Court need not address the D.C. Action’s jurisdiction, or lack thereof, before
taking action pursuant to the first to file rule. See Cadle, 174 F.3d at 603 (party seeking to avoid
application of the first to file rule argued that rule did not apply because first-filed court “never had
jurisdiction over the claims”) (rejecting argument that the first to file rule includes a “precondition
that requires the district court to find proper jurisdiction in the first-filed court before applying the
rule at all”). The Cadle court explained that such a requirement would undercut the “values of
economy, consistency, and comity that the rule is designed to maximize” because any “jurisdictional
ruling of the second-filed court would either conflict with a ruling already made, rehash an issue
already decided, or trench on a sister court’s treatment of the issue before it has been reached there.”
Id. at 604. In this case, were the Court to preclude application of the first to file rule based on the
D.D.C.’s lack of jurisdiction over the Cherokee Nation, it would be both (1) “rehashing” the D.C.
Circuit’s ruling regarding the Cherokee Nation’s immunity, and (2) “trenching” on motions currently
pending before Judge Kennedy regarding whether the Cherokee Nation has waived its immunity and
may indeed be re-named as a defendant in the D.C. Action. The Court need not decide or pass upon
jurisdictional issues present in the D.C. Action prior to application of the first to file rule, and it
declines to do so.13
13
The Court acknowledges general statements in Tenth Circuit law that “the first federal
district court which obtains jurisdiction of parties and issues should have priority and the second
court should decline consideration of the action until the proceedings before the first court are
terminated.” Cessna Aircraft Co., 348 F.2d at 692 (emphasis added). However, the Court does
not interpret such statements as requiring the second-filed court to conduct a full-fledged
15
2. Similarity of Parties
In its current procedural posture,14 the D.C. Plaintiffs are: (1) D.C. Individual Plaintiffs,
consisting of eight individual Freedmen; and (2) Freedmen Band, a political entity representing the
interests of Freedmen. D.C. Defendants are: (1) Secretary; (2) DOI; and (3) Chief Smith,
individually and in his official capacity. The sole plaintiff in this action is the Cherokee Nation, a
non-party to the D.C. Action. The defendants in this action are: (1) Secretary; (2) DOI; and (3)
Freedmen Defendants, consisting of five individual Freedmen, all of whom are members of
Freedmen Band but none of whom are also D.C. Individual Plaintiffs. The common parties in both
actions are the Secretary and DOI. The question is whether the remaining parties are “substantially
similar.”
The Court concludes that D.C. Individual Plaintiffs are substantially similar to Freedmen
Defendants in this case because they are all representative Freedmen who desire a certain status
within the Cherokee Nation. Further, the D.C. Individual Plaintiffs and Freedmen Defendants are
represented by the same counsel. For purposes of deciding the questions presented in both lawsuits,
it makes little difference which individual Freedmen are parties. D.C. Individual Plaintiffs are
simply other Freedmen asserting rights contrary to the declaratory relief sought by the Cherokee
Nation in this case, and they could be readily substituted as the defendants in this case without
effecting any substantive change in the declaratory action. In addition, the presence of Freedmen
jurisdictional analysis of all parties present in both actions prior to taking any action pursuant to
the first to file rule. In this case, the D.D.C. currently has jurisdiction over similar parties and
similar issues, and this is sufficient for a transfer pursuant to the first to file rule.
14
There are pending motions in the D.C. Action that may impact the identity of parties in
that case.
16
Band as a plaintiff in the D.C. Action renders the parties in the two suits even more similar because
all Freedmen Defendants are members of this political organization, as evidenced by the
uncontroverted affidavits of Freedmen Defendants. (See Freedmen’s Mot. to Transfer, at Exs. N-Q;
Freedmen’s Resp. to Mot. to Intervene, at Ex. I.)
The Court further concludes that Chief Smith is “substantially similar” to the Cherokee
Nation for purposes of the first to file rule. Chief Smith and Cherokee Nation are represented by the
same counsel in both suits, and the Court has no reason to believe Chief Smith has any conflicting
interests with the Cherokee Nation. In other words, Chief Smith’s position in the D.C. Action with
respect to Freedmen’s status and rights under the 1866 Treaty is identical to the Cherokee Nation’s
position asserted in this declaratory judgment action. There is of course one glaring difference
between the Cherokee Nation and Chief Smith – the Cherokee Nation is, at least as of the time of
this Order, immune from suit in the D.C. Action while Chief Smith is not. However, the Cherokee
Nation’s immunity is not particularly relevant in analyzing the similarity of parties between the two
actions for purposes of the first to file rule. Because the Cherokee Nation has waived its immunity
in this case, it is similarly situated to its non-immune counterpart (Chief Smith) in the D.C. Action
for purposes of prosecuting or defending the legal positions being asserted in each case.
3. Similarity of Issues
With respect to the issues presented in each suit, Federal Defendants contend that “both cases
involve a single core merits issue – whether the Treaty of 1866 guarantees the Cherokee Freedmen
certain rights within the Cherokee Nation.” (Fed. Defs.’ Mot. to Transfer 12.) Similarly, Freedmen
Defendants argue:
The core legal issue raised by the Cherokee Nation in [this action] – whether the
Cherokee Nation remains bound by the 1866 Treaty to accord its Freedmen full
17
citizenship rights – is at the heart of the D.C. Action. In fact . . . Chief Smith has
already suggested in the D.C. Action that [this action] provides a ‘procedurally
appropriate venue’ for the concerned parties to resolve the issues presented in the
D.C. Action. The converse is even more true because the D.C. Action is broader
than [this action] and certainly encompasses [it].
(Freedmen’s Mot. to Transfer 9.) Freedmen Defendants are referring to Chief Smith’s “supplement”
to his motion to dismiss in the D.C. Action, wherein he argues that the pendency of this action is
relevant to the fourth factor of his Rule 19(b) motion. Specifically, Chief Smith argued:
Because the Northern District of Oklahoma action will proceed pursuant to a waiver
of sovereign immunity both as to that Court and the legal effect of the 1866 Treaty
and subsequent federal statutes on non-Indian Freedmen descendants’ claim to
citizenship of the Cherokee Nation, and because the United States through the
Secretary and the Department of the Interior are parties, the Plaintiffs here have an
existing forum to fully contest the present effect of the 1866 Treaty and subsequent
federal statute on them, if they choose to avail themselves of the opportunity.
(Freedmen’s Mot. to Transfer, Ex. I, at 2 (emphasis added).)
Thus, the Cherokee Nation has conceded in the D.C. Action that there is a substantial overlap
of core issues and that D.C. Plaintiffs’ claims in the D.C. Action would be proper counterclaims in
this action. In addition, the Freedmen Defendants have asserted counterclaims in this case against
the Cherokee Nation that are nearly identical to those asserted by D.C. Individual Plaintiffs against
Chief Smith in the D.C. Action. Based on these admissions by Chief Smith and review of pleadings
in both cases, the Court finds that there is a sufficient degree of overlap and similarity between the
issues presented in each case. Both actions ultimately turn on interpretation of the 1866 Treaty and
subsequent congressional actions, and both cases seek a resolution to the question of whether
Freedmen are entitled to rights originally bestowed in the 1866 Treaty.
For the above-stated reasons, Federal Defendants and Freedmen Defendants have met their
initial burden of showing: (1) the D.C. Action was first filed; (2) there is sufficient similarity
18
between the current parties in this action and the D.C. Action; and (3) there is sufficient similarity
between the issues presented in this action and the D.C. Action. Therefore, the Court concludes that
the first to file rule generally applies.
D. “Special Circumstances” Exception
The Cherokee Nation’s main argument against application of the first to file rule is that
“special circumstances” exist, such that this action should proceed here despite the pendency of the
D.C. Action. Specifically, the Cherokee Nation argues that “[s]overeign immunity is one of those
special circumstances that warrants a departure from the first-filed rule here.” (Pl.’s Resp. to Mots.
to Transfer 12.) The Cherokee Nation relies principally on two district court decisions in support
of its argument: Sotheby’s Incorporated v. Garcia, 802 F. Supp. 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding
“special circumstances” warranted giving priority to the second-filed suit because, inter alia, first-
filed suit did not include one of the defendants in the second-filed action; because such defendant
was not amenable to suit in first-filed court; and because first-filed court did not intend to resolve
issue of title relevant to the second-filed proceeding); and MEI Technologies. v. Detector Networks
International, Memorandum Opinion and Order, at * 6 (D.N.M. July 24, 2009) (not available on
electronic database) (attached as Ex. O to Pl.’s Resp. to Mots. to Transfer) (holding that party
“cannot circumvent a forum selection clause simply by filing a lawsuit in a different forum and then
asserting that the first-filed doctrine prevents a subsequent lawsuit in the proper forum”). The
Cherokee Nation analogizes the forum selection clause at issue in MEI Technologies to its sovereign
immunity.
As explained above, a second-filed court may defer to the first-filed court to determine
whether the second action qualifies for any “exceptions” to the first to file rule, see supra Part II.B,
19
and the Court finds it proper to do so here. In motions currently pending in the D.C. Action, D.C.
Plaintiffs have argued that filing this action functions as a waiver of the Cherokee Nation’s
immunity in all federal forums, including in the D.C. Action. Thus, the “special circumstances”
argued by the Cherokee Nation in support of a first to file exception – its immunity in the first-filed
forum – may become non-existent if Judge Kennedy decides that filing of this action functions as
a waiver of immunity in the D.C. Action. This issue is essentially whether the Cherokee Nation
enjoys some type of “forum immunity” from suit, such that it may select not just whether it will
allow adjudication of an issue against it but in what forum that issue must be adjudicated. (See Pl.’s
Resp. to Mots. to Transfer 10 (arguing that “a tribe can be sued in one particular federal court on a
claim and be protected by sovereign immunity from the claim proceeding forward against it in that
court, but can waive its sovereign immunity to litigate that very claim in a different federal court”).)
The Cherokee Nation urges this Court to resolve that question prior to Judge Kennedy, grant a
“special circumstances” exception to the first to file rule, and allow this case to proceed despite the
existence of the D.C. Action. However, the first to file “exception” question being argued before
this Court is completely intertwined with similar legal issues that are also pending before the first-
filed court. Under these somewhat unique circumstances, the Court exercises its discretion to defer
to the first-filed court to determine whether the Cherokee Nation’s sovereign immunity from suit
in the D.C. Action warrants an exception to the first to file rule.
E. Transfer or Stay?
After determining whether the first to file rule generally applies, courts within the Tenth
Circuit have the option of staying the second-filed action pending the outcome of the first-filed
action, rather than immediately transferring the case to the first-filed court. See, e.g., Cessna
20
Aircraft Co., 348 F.2d at 692 (granting writ to stay second-filed cases until termination of related
cases pending in another district); Ed Tobergte Assocs., Inc., 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1199 (staying
proceedings pending final termination of related proceedings in first-filed action). In contrast, the
Fifth Circuit has indicated that transfer is always the “proper course” because a second-filed court
should allow a first-filed court to determine the fate of the second action. Cadle, 174 F.3d at 606
(explaining that “[o]nce the district court found that the issues might substantially overlap, the
proper course of action was for the court to transfer the case to the [first-filed court] to determine
which case should, in the interests of sound judicial administration and judicial economy, proceed”).
In this case, the Court concludes that transfer is superior to a stay. First, this Court has
exercised its discretion to defer to Judge Kennedy as to whether the Cherokee Nation can
demonstrate an exception to the first to file rule. A transfer more readily accomplishes this objective
than a stay. Second, Judge Kennedy is in the best position to determine where this second-filed
action (1) legally must proceed, and/or (2) in the interests of justice should proceed. This decision
will be informed by relevant proceedings and rulings in the D.C. Action, and efficiency is advanced
by having one judge decide the issues. Judge Kennedy knows the history of the D.C. Action, is
intimately familiar with all appellate rulings, and has pending before him several motions that will
impact the overall appearance and posture of the D.C. Action. Finally, the Court is not, as argued
by the Cherokee Nation, depriving the Cherokee Nation of “the incidents of its sovereign immunity”
by transferring this action pursuant to the first to file rule. The Cherokee Nation voluntarily filed
this action and waived its immunity from suit. It did so while the D.C. Action was still pending.
A transfer to the D.D.C., for that court to decide the proper venue for this action, does not somehow
21
inject the Cherokee Nation as a party into the D.C. Action or otherwise deprive the Cherokee Nation
of immunity asserted in the D.C. Action. This Court is simply allowing the first-filed court, which
has been dealing with these parties and issues since 2003, to decide the consequences of the
Cherokee Nation’s decision to file this case while the D.C. Action was still pending. In short, for
purposes of deciding whether this Court or Judge Kennedy should decide the proper venue for this
action, the Cherokee Nation has presented no persuasive reason for ignoring the general rule of
deference to the first-filed court.
By transferring this action pursuant to the first to file rule, the Court is not refusing to hear
the merits, declining to hear the merits, or in any way indicating that it should not ultimately decide
the merits. Nor is the Court making any rulings as to which forum is legally proper and/or will
better serve the interests of justice. The Court is simply deferring to the first-filed forum to
determine whether the related actions must and/or should proceed in the D.D.C., must and/or should
proceed simultaneously in two different forums, must and/or should proceed in this Court, or some
other formulation. See generally Cicero, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y at 562 (explaining that
first to file rule merely functions as a “traffic regulator” and that “cases transferred [to the first-filed
forum] pursuant [to the first-filed rule] may be freely re-transferred under § 1404(a), provided that
one satisfies the requisites for such re-transfer”). Oklahoma may indeed be the proper or more
desirable forum for adjudication of this action; however, the Court will defer to Judge Kennedy on
this question due to the long history of similar litigation before him and the general rule of deference
to a first-filed court.
22
III. Conclusion
Federal Defendants and Freedmen Defendants have met their burden of showing that the first
to file rule generally applies to this action and the D.C. Action. Therefore, the Court exercises its
discretion to transfer this action to the D.D.C. based on the first to file rule.15 The Court does not
reach the question of whether the Cherokee Nation has demonstrated an equitable exception to the
first to file rule, and this issue may be re-urged in the transferee court.
Federal Defendants and Freedmen Defendants’ motions to transfer (Docs. 18 and 20) are
GRANTED pursuant to the first to file rule. This action is hereby TRANSFERRED to the District
Court for the District of Columbia as related to the first-filed case of Vann v. Salazar, 1:03CV-1711-
HHK. Alternative requests to stay this action (Doc. 22) are DENIED as moot. This Order starts the
clock for the Cherokee Nation and Federal Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to Freedmen
Defendants’ counterclaims and cross-claims. Cherokee Freedmen Class Representatives’ Motion
to Intervene (Doc. 8) remains pending.
SO ORDERED this 2nd day of July, 2010.
______________________________________
TERENCE C. KERN
United States District Judge
15
The Court does not reach the question of whether transfer is proper pursuant to §
1404(a). See White v. Peco Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 2d 339, 343 (S.D. Miss. 2008) (“Because
the Plaintiff’s action will be transferred under the first-to-file rule, the Court does not address,
and expresses no opinion on, whether a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) would be proper.”); see
also Cicero, 90 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y at 562 (cautioning that “[c]ourts would do well to
clearly articulate whether they are ordering a transfer pursuant to the [first to file rule] or,
instead, § 1404(a)” due to different effects for purposes of appellate review).
23