Bergmann v. U. S. Department of Transportation ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
DIETRICH R. BERGMANN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) Civil Action No. 09-1378 (EGS)
v. )
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )
TRANSPORTATION, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is defendants’ motion to transfer
venue to the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan (the “Eastern District of Michigan”). Upon
consideration of the motion, the response and reply thereto, the
applicable law, and the entire record, the Court GRANTS
defendants’ motion to transfer venue.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Dietrich R. Bergmann (“Bergmann”) is a resident of
Ann Arbor and Gross Pointe Woods, Michigan. Am. Compl. ¶ 68. He
brings this action, pro se, challenging “two interrelated highway
construction projects that the Defendants and the Michigan
Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) propose for construction in
the City of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan.” Am. Compl. ¶ 1.
Specifically, plaintiff challenges defendants’ approval of
(1) the Detroit River International Crossing project (the “DRIC
project”), and (2) the Interstate Highway 94 Rehabilitation
project (the “I-94 Rehabilitation project”). See generally Am.
Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 5.
A. The Detroit River International Crossing Project
The DRIC project involves the construction of a new bridge
connecting Detroit, Michigan with Windsor, Ontario in Canada.
See Am. Compl. ¶ 14; see also Defs.’ Ex. C, DRIC Record of
Decision (“DRIC ROD”) at 1 (explaining that the DRIC project
“consists of an interchange connection from I-75 to a new U.S.
border inspections plaza and a new bridge to Canada”). The DRIC
project began in 2001, when representatives from the Federal
Highway Administration (“FHWA”), the MDOT, and two Canadian
government agencies met to discuss border transportation demand.
DRIC ROD at 1. The governments commissioned a planning study,
which determined that additional capacity was needed to meet
future transportation needs. Defs.’ Ex. C, DRIC ROD at 1.
Consequently, on March 24, 2003, a Notice of Intent to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for a border crossing was
published in the Federal Register. Defs.’ Ex. C, DRIC ROD at 1.
A “scoping meeting” was held in Detroit, Michigan in August 2005.
Defs.’ Ex. C, DRIC ROD at 1.
2
In February 2008, a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(“DEIS”) was signed by defendant James J. Steele (“Steele”)1 in
Lansing, Michigan, and a Notice of Availability was published in
the Federal Register. Defs.’ Ex. C, DRIC ROD at 1. Public
hearings on the DEIS were held in Detroit, Michigan, and comments
to the DEIS were solicited for a 90-day period. Defs.’ Ex. C,
DRIC ROD at 1; see also Defs.’ Ex. B, DRIC FEIS at ES-5
(discussing the steps taken to facilitate public involvement in
the DRIC project, including: holding “almost 100 public meetings,
hearings, and workshops”; opening a DRIC Study Information Office
at the Delray Community Center in Detroit “to provide information
and answer questions about the project”; mailing notices of
public meetings to “approximately 10,000 residences and
businesses”; and handing out fliers door-to-door “in Delray and
along the I-75 service drive north of the freeway”).
On November 21, 2008, defendant Steele signed the Final
Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) for the DRIC project.
See generally Defs.’ Ex. B. The FEIS identified the Delray
neighborhood of Southwest Detroit as the preferred alternative
for the DRIC project. See Defs.’ Ex. B, DRIC FEIS at ES-16 - ES-
26, 2-56. Two months later, on January 14, 2009, defendant
Steele signed the ROD, which approved the implementation of the
1
Defendant Steele is the Division Administrator of the
Michigan Division of the FHWA. See Docket No. 13, Declaration of
James J. Steele (“Steele Decl.”) ¶ 2.
3
pending DRIC project in the preferred Delray location. See
generally Defs.’ Ex. C. The DRIC project is currently in its
design phase, which is expected to take at least 18 months. See
Docket No. 13, Declaration of James J. Steele (“Steele Decl.”)
¶ 15 (explaining that the DRIC project moved from the project
assessment phase to the design phase, but noting that “[t]he
project will not move forward in a meaningful way unless and
until the Michigan state legislature authorizes and funds the
DRIC”).
B. The I-94 Rehabilitation Project
The I-94 Rehabilitation project is a highway construction
plan that involves the widening of a seven-mile segment of I-94
in Detroit, Michigan. Am. Compl. ¶ 17; see also Defs.’ Ex. E, I-
94 FEIS at 2 (“[T]he I-94 Rehabilitation Project would provide
transportation improvements to 6.7 miles of I-94 (“Edsel Ford
Freeway”) in the city of Detroit from just east of I-96 to east
of the Conner Avenue interchange.”). The I-94 Rehabilitation
project began in April 1994, Steele Decl. ¶ 4, in an attempt to
“preserve and enhance a vital component of Michigan’s
transportation infrastructure[.]” Defs.’ Ex. E, I-94 FEIS at 2.
Defendant Steele signed the I-94 Rehabilitation project DEIS
on January 22, 2001, Steele Decl. ¶ 4, which set forth “the
alternatives that were evaluated to determine the best option to
address current and projected travel demands, reduce the number
4
of traffic crashes, and rehabilitate the pavement and bridges
along I-94.” Defs.’ Ex. F, I-94 ROD at 1. Public hearings were
held on the DEIS in Detroit, Michigan, as were numerous community
workshops and meetings. See Defs.’ Ex. E, I-94 FEIS at 24-25
(describing the comprehensive public participation and agency
coordination process initiated by the MDOT). Defendant Steele
signed the FEIS on December 21, 2004, in Lansing, Michigan, and
the ROD on December 15, 2005. Steele Decl. ¶ 4. Since its
approval, however, the I-94 Rehabilitation project has been
placed on hold by the MDOT due to lack of funding. Steele Decl.
¶ 14.
C. This Action
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on July 27, 2009,
alleging, inter alia, that defendants’ issuance of the RODs for
the DRIC and I-94 Rehabilitation projects violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”), and Sections 4(a) and 4(f) of the Department
of Transportation Act (the “DOT Act”). See Am. Compl. ¶ 2; Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. at 5-6. Through this lawsuit, plaintiff seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5-7. On
December 2, 2009, defendants filed a motion to transfer this
action to the Eastern District of Michigan, which plaintiff
opposed on January 25, 2010. The motion is now ripe for
determination by the Court.
5
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),
provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The district court has
discretion to adjudicate motions to transfer according to an
“‘individualized case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29
(1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964));
see also Demery v. Montgomery County, 602 F. Supp. 2d 206, 210
(D.D.C. 2009) (“Because it is perhaps impossible to develop any
fixed general rules on when cases should be transferred[,] . . .
the proper technique to be employed is a factually analytical,
case-by-case determination of convenience and fairness.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The moving party bears the
burden of establishing that transfer of the action is proper.
Devaughn v. Inphonic, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 68, 71 (D.D.C. 2005);
see also SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (noting that district court’s ruling denying motion to
transfer “was effectively a ruling that [appellant] had failed to
shoulder his burden”).
Defendants must make two showings to justify transfer.
First, defendants must establish that the plaintiff could have
6
brought suit in the proposed transferee district. Devaughn, 403
F. Supp. 2d at 71-72; Trout Unlimited v. United States Dep't of
Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D.D.C. 1996). Second, defendants
must demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the
interests of justice weigh in favor of a transfer. Devaughn, 403
F. Supp. 2d at 72; Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Where the Case Could Have Been Brought
Before the Court transfers an action to another venue, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff could have brought the
action in the proposed transferee district. Devaughn, 403 F.
Supp. 2d at 72. As plaintiff concedes, this action could have
been brought in the Eastern District of Michigan because (i) a
significant number of events giving rise to plaintiff’s claims
occurred in the Eastern District of Michigan, and (ii) plaintiff
is a resident of Michigan. See Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 7 (“The answer
to whether the Plaintiff could have filed [this action] in the
Eastern District of Michigan is ‘yes[.]’”); see generally 28
U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2) (“A civil action in which a defendant is an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof
acting in his official capacity or under color of legal
authority, or an agency of the United States . . . may . . . be
brought in any judicial district in which . . . a substantial
7
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred
. . . or the plaintiff resides . . . .”).
B. The Balance of Private and Public Interests
As this action could have been brought in the Eastern
District of Michigan, the Court must now determine whether
equitable factors support defendants’ requested transfer. In
determining whether transfer is justified, the Court weighs a
number of private-interest and public-interest factors. See
Devaughn, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 72. In this case, these factors
weigh in favor of transfer to the Eastern District of Michigan.
1. Private-Interest Factors
The private-interest considerations the Court looks to when
deciding whether to transfer a case include: “(1) the plaintiff’s
choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s choice of forum; (3) where
the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the
convenience of witnesses, particularly if important witnesses may
actually be unavailable to give live trial testimony in one of
the districts; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.”
Demery, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
With regard to the first factor, the Court typically accords
“substantial deference” to a plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 104 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2000);
see also Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (“[A] trial judge must give considerable, but not
8
conclusive, weight to the plaintiff’s initial forum choice.”).
Substantially less deference is warranted, however, when a
plaintiff choose a forum other than his home forum. See Reiffin,
104 F. Supp. 2d at 52 (“Deference to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum is particularly strong where the plaintiff has chosen his
home forum. Conversely, substantially less deference is
warranted when the forum preferred by the plaintiff is not his
home forum.”). The Court may also give less deference when
“‘most of the relevant events occurred elsewhere.’” Greene v.
Nat’l Head Start Ass’n, 610 F. Supp. 2d 72, 75 (quoting Aftab v.
Gonzalez, 597 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2009)).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff in this case is not a
resident of the District of Columbia. Indeed, “[p]laintiff is a
long-time resident and voter in southeast Michigan.” Am. Compl.
¶ 4. As plaintiff has proffered no ties connecting himself with
the District of Columbia, the Court need not afford plaintiff the
substantial deference given to litigants in their “home forum.”
See, e.g., Reiffin, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 52; Shawnee Tribe v.
United States, 298 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 2002).
Plaintiff’s choice of forum is also entitled to less
deference where, as here, the majority of operative facts took
place outside the District of Columbia. As defendants explain,
“[a]ll of the challenged acts or omissions occurred in the State
of Michigan, and almost all of them occurred in the Eastern
9
District of Michigan, where the challenged environmental
documents were prepared, where the proposed DRIC will be, and
where the segment of I-94 to be widened lies.” Defs.’ Br. at 9.
While plaintiff argues that his claims “arose principally at the
headquarters offices of the Defendants in Washington, D.C.,”
Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 8, defendants persuasively counter that “‘the
only real connection [the] lawsuit has to the District of
Columbia is that a federal agency headquartered here . . . is
charged with generally regulating and overseeing the
[administrative] process.’” Defs.’ Br. at 14 (quoting DeLoach v.
Philip Morris Co., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 22, 25 (D.D.C. 2000)).
With regards to the DRIC project, the Court acknowledges
that Washington-based federal officials had a role in the events
underlying plaintiff’s lawsuit. See Steele Decl. ¶ 6 (explaining
that he “secured the legal review of any prior concurrence of
officials in FHWA’s headquarters in Washington, D.C. before
signing the DEIS, FEIS and ROD”); see also Defs.’ Reply Br. at 6-
10 (describing the supporting role played by officials from the
United States Department of Transportation in Washington, D.C.).2
Nevertheless, the Court finds that the majority of events
relevant to plaintiff’s action occurred in or around the Eastern
District of Michigan - not the District of Columbia. See Steele
2
Mr. Steele did not obtain prior concurrence from Washington-
based FHWA officials for the I-94 Rehabilitation project. See
Steele Decl. ¶ 8.
10
Decl. ¶ 6 (“Although FHWA officials from D.C. were involved in an
advisory capacity, they did not participate in the decision
making for the DRIC, or direct the planning process for it. I
had . . . ultimate supervisory authority over the project
assessment and was responsible for final decisions for both
projects.”). In particular, in addition to Mr. Steele’s
Michigan-based supervisory role of the DRIC and I-94
Rehabilitation projects,3 this Court is persuaded by the fact
that (i) the environmental impact statements for both projects
were prepared in Michigan, Steele Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, 9; (ii) the RODs
for both projects were signed in Michigan, Steele Decl. ¶¶ 3-4,
9; (iii) the environmental studies supporting the DEIS, FEIS and
ROD for both projects were conducted in Michigan, Steele Decl. ¶¶
9, 10; (iv) the United States’ public hearings, meetings, and
workshops on the DRIC project were held in Michigan, see Defs.’
Ex. B, DRIC FEIS at 6-13 - 6-15;4 (v) the outreach efforts to
solicit public input on both projects were targeted at Michigan
residents, Steele Decl. ¶ 12; (vi) the planning process for both
projects were coordinated with state and local officials in
Michigan, Steele Decl. ¶ 11; (vii) the administrative records for
3
See Steele Decl. ¶ 3 (“I worked on the DRIC project
assessment exclusively in Michigan.”); Steele Decl. ¶ 4 (“I
worked on [the I-94 Rehabilitation Project] documents exclusively
in Michigan.”).
4
See also www.partnershipborderstudy.com/meetings_us.asp.
11
both projects are located in Michigan, where they were originally
compiled, Steele Decl. ¶ 11; and (viii) the State of Michigan
will own and operate the portion of the DRIC project on United
States soil and will continue to own and operate the section of
I-94 where the I-94 Rehabilitation project will occur, Steele
Decl. ¶¶ 15-16. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
concurring role of some Washington-based officials is simply
insufficient to overcome Michigan’s substantial ties to the DRIC
and I-94 Rehabilitation projects.
Therefore, because plaintiff lacks a connection to the
District of Columbia, and because the majority of operative
events underlying plaintiff’s action occurred outside the
District of Columbia, the Court accords less deference to
plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Next, the Court considers the second private-interest factor
- defendants’ choice of forum. Defendants have legitimate
reasons for preferring the Eastern District of Michigan. For
instance, Defendant Steele, who had “ultimate supervisory
authority” over the DRIC project assessment, has his principal
place of business in Michigan, see Steele Decl. ¶¶ 2, 6; the
majority of operative events occurred in Michigan, see supra at
9-12; and the outcome of this case will be felt most directly in
Michigan. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of transfer.
12
As to the third factor — where the claim arose — it is clear
that the majority of events underlying this lawsuit occurred in
or around the Eastern District of Michigan. In addition, as
discussed above, the contested environmental studies and NEPA
reports were prepared and signed in Michigan by a Michigan-based
federal official who was “responsible for final decisions for
both projects.” See Steele Decl. ¶¶ 6, 9, 11; cf. Greater
Yellowstone Coal., No. 07-2111, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33641, at
*14-15 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2008) (“[T]he Court also finds that the
claim did not ‘arise elsewhere,’ but rather arose in this
District, where the Rule was drafted and published . . . . The
Final Rule was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Interior
for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, who is based in Washington,
D.C.”). Accordingly, this factor also weighs in favor of
transfer.
The fourth private-interest factor the Court considers is
the convenience of the parties. Plaintiff in this action is a
resident of Michigan, as is defendant Steele. Because the
remaining federal defendants are located in the District of
Columbia, however, this factor is neutral in the Court’s
analysis.5
5
Plaintiff asserts that “although he resides in Ann Arbor and
Grosse Pointe Woods, Michigan, [he] finds the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia more convenient inasmuch as he will
be obliged to pay the travel costs of any witnesses he calls and
the majority of witnesses he will call for a deposition, hearing,
and or/trial have their primary office within the District of
13
The final private-interest factors for the Court to consider
are convenience of witnesses and the ease of access to sources of
proof. Because this case is an action for review of an
administrative record where a trial is unnecessary and live
testimony is unlikely, the Court finds that it need not consider
these factors. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 33641, at *14-15 (explaining that in an APA action, these
factors are not relevant to the court’s venue analysis); Trout
Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 18 (explaining that because “judicial
review will be limited to the administrative record,” these
factors have “less relevance”). To the extent these factors are
relevant, however, the Court concludes that they weigh slightly
in favor of transfer to the forum in which the administrative
records reside - the Eastern District of Michigan. See Steele
Decl. ¶ 11 (“The documents that will constitute the
administrative records are in Michigan.”); see generally, e.g.,
Intrepid Potash-New Mexico, LLC v. United States DOI, 669 F.
Supp. 2d 88, 98 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In a case involving review of an
agency action, ‘the location of witnesses is not a significant
Columbia.” Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 8. As discussed infra, however,
because this action is based on the review of administrative
records neither trial nor witness testimony is likely. See,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C.
2003) (“Because this action involves an administrative review
that the court is likely to determine on the papers . . . the
location of witnesses is not a significant factor.”). The Court
therefore finds plaintiff’s convenience argument unpersuasive.
14
factor,’ but ‘[t]he location of the administrative record,
however, carries some weight[.]’” (quoting Sierra Club v.
Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 69 (D.D.C. 2003)).
2. Public-Interest Factors
Having concluded that plaintiff’s choice of forum is
entitled to less deference and that the other private-interest
factors are neutral or favor transfer to the Eastern District of
Michigan, the Court now turns to the public-interest factors.
The public-interest factors include: (1) the transferee’s
familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion
of the calendars of the potential transferee and transferor
courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local
controversies at home. Devaughn, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
The first two public-interest factors are neutral in the
Court’s analysis. With regard to the transferee’s familiarity
with the governing laws, the Court notes that this case involves
the interpretation of federal statutes. Because no issues of
state law have been raised, there is no advantage to having a
federal court familiar and experienced with the state law of
Michigan adjudicate plaintiff’s claims. See Defs.’ Br. at 16;
Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 9. Moreover, it appears that a transfer to
the Eastern District of Michigan would lead neither to
unnecessary delay nor to more rapid resolution. See Defs.’ Br.
at 16 n.14 (noting “no appreciable difference in the median time
15
from filing to disposition in civil cases between the Eastern
District of Michigan and the District of Columbia”).6
Accordingly, these factors are neutral.
The final factor for the Court to consider is the local
interest in deciding local controversies at home. Plaintiff
argues that the DRIC and I-94 Rehabilitation projects do not
present a “local controversy.” Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 10. Instead,
he argues that his action is “first and foremost a dispute over
whether Defendants complied with the federal statutes governing
the actions they were required to take to comply with NEPA and
the DOT Act.” Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 10. While this is undoubtedly
true, the fact that plaintiff’s cause of action arises under
federal law does not mean that the subject of his lawsuit does
not present an issue of local controversy. To the contrary,
there can be no doubt that the projects at issue in this case
will directly affect the lives of Michigan residents. As this
Court recently recognized, “[b]ecause it is the jobs, homes,
businesses, churches, parks, and historical properties of the
people of Southwest Detroit that will be directly affected by the
DRIC project . . . the Eastern District of Michigan has a much
stronger interest in this action than the District of Columbia.”
See Latin Americans for Soc. & Econ. Dev. v. Adm’r of the FHWA,
6
While plaintiff asserts that “transferring this case to
Michigan at this time probably will lead to a two month to three
month delay in adjudicating this case,” Pl.’s Opp’n Br. at 9-10,
he provides no support for this generalized assertion.
16
No. 09-897, Docket No. 35 at 19 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 2009), motion
for reconsideration denied, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122819 (D.D.C.
Dec. 14, 2009) (transferring related action challenging the DRIC
project to the Eastern District of Michigan). Likewise, there is
a much stronger interest in having the I-94 Rehabilitation
project decided in the forum where the challenged road will be
built. See, e.g., Env’t Def. v. United States Dep’t of Transp.,
No. 06-2176, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36059, at *13-14 (D.D.C. May
17, 2007) (“The most persuasive factor supporting transfer is
Maryland’s localized interest in the dispute. The case
constitutes a far greater ‘matter of great public concern’ to the
citizens of Maryland than to the citizens of the District of
Columbia. The highway will be located solely in the State of
Maryland. . . . The [highway] will displace Maryland homes and
provide a transportation option for Maryland residents. Its
center of gravity is in Maryland. Transfer to Maryland will
facilitate the ability of ‘local citizens to attend and observe
the proceedings in this case.’” (citations omitted)).7 The Court
7
See also Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (acknowledging that
the health of the Florida Everglades “has a national aspect,” but
concluding that “there is a strong local interest in having [the]
action decided in the Southern District of Florida”); Nat’l
Wildlife Fed. v. Harvey, 437 F. Supp. 2d 42, 49 (D.D.C. 2006)
(“While the fact that Plaintiffs’ claims invoke federal law,
relate to the Everglades ecosystem, and are brought by a national
environmental organization suggests that the case has a ‘national
aspect,’ the extent and degree of Florida’s interest is
undisputable. . . . As the interests of justice are promoted when
a localized controversy is resolved in the region it impacts, the
Court concludes that the final public interest factor supports
17
concludes, therefore, that the interests of justice would be
served by transfer of this action to the Eastern District of
Michigan.
In sum, having balanced plaintiff’s choice of forum in the
District of Columbia against the relevant private- and public-
interest factors, the Court concludes that the balance of private
and public interests counsels in favor of transferring this
action to the judicial district with the greatest stake in the
pending litigation - plaintiff’s home forum and the site of the
proposed DRIC and I-94 Rehabilitation projects – the Eastern
District of Michigan. This conclusion is further bolstered by
the fact that a related action is pending in the Eastern District
of Michigan - Latin Americans for Social and Economic Development
v. Administrator of the Federal Highway Administration, No. 10-
10082-AC (E.D. Mich.).8 See FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 551 F. Supp.
2d 21, 29 (D.D.C. 2008) (“The interests of justice are better
transfer.” (internal citations omitted)); Trout Unlimited, 944 F.
Supp. at 19 (“Plaintiffs challenge a decision made by a Forest
Service official located in Colorado, which directly affects
[natural resources] located in the mountains of Colorado. A
clear majority of the operative events took place in Colorado.
As a result, the State of Colorado has a substantial interest in
the resolution of the claims of this lawsuit.”).
8
At the time this Court transferred the Latin Americans for
Social and Economic Development case to the Eastern District of
Michigan another related case was pending in that District -
Detroit International Bridge Company v. Federal Highway
Administration, No. 09-13805 (E.D. Mich.). This case was closed
on February 17, 2010, however, after the Court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss.
18
served when a case is transferred to the district where related
actions are pending.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’
motion to transfer venue. A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SIGNED: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Court Judge
May 7, 2010
19