Long v. United States of America ( 2010 )


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  •                         UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________________
    )
    HAROLD D. LONG and                   )
    SHERRIE K. LONG,                   )
    )
    Plaintiffs,              )
    )
    v.                   )         Civil Action No. 08-849 (PLF)
    )
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., )
    )
    Defendants.              )
    ____________________________________)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    This matter is before the Court on the government’s motion for partial summary
    judgment on its counterclaims against plaintiffs (“Mot.”). The Court previously granted the
    government’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. See Long v. United States, 
    604 F. Supp. 2d 119
     (D.D.C. 2009). The government’s counterclaims against plaintiff Harold Long are all that
    remain in this case.
    Plaintiffs, who are now pro se, have not responded to the government’s motion,
    even though the Court issued an Order pursuant to Fox v. Strickland, 
    837 F.2d 507
     (D.C. Cir.
    1988) and Neal v. Kelly, 
    963 F.2d 453
    , 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992), directing plaintiffs to respond to
    the motion by March 1, 2010, and informing plaintiffs of the risks of failing to respond. See
    Order, Dkt. No. 38 (Jan. 26, 2010). Plaintiffs still have not responded to the government’s
    motion, made any request for an extension of time, or made any other filing with the Court in the
    time since the Court’s Order. The Court therefore may treat the government’s motion as
    conceded. The Court also has considered the substance of the government’s motion and, after
    careful consideration of the motion, the accompanying exhibits, and the relevant case law and
    statutes, it has concluded that the motion should be granted on its merits.
    I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    Summary judgment may be granted if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
    materials on file, and any affidavits [or declarations] show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED . R. CIV . P.
    56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v.
    Powell, 
    433 F.3d 889
    , 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect
    the outcome of a suit under the governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or
    unnecessary’ do not affect the summary judgment determination.” Holcomb v. Powell, 
    433 F.3d at 895
     (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. at 248
    ). An issue is “genuine” if the
    evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott
    v. Harris, 
    550 U.S. 372
    , 380 (2007); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. at 248
    ; Holcomb
    v. Powell, 
    433 F.3d at 895
    . Because plaintiffs have not responded to the government’s motion,
    the Court has treated all of the facts identified in defendant’s Statement of Material Facts as to
    Which There is No Genuine Issue as admitted pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1). The only
    question before the Court, therefore, is whether these conceded facts entitle the government to
    judgment as a matter of law. See FED . R. CIV . P. 56(c).1
    1
    That having been said, because plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court has
    evaluated their filings under “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
    Chandler v. W.E. Welch & Associates, Inc., 
    533 F. Supp. 2d 94
    , 102 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting
    Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520, (1972)); see also Gray v. Poole, 
    275 F.3d 1113
    , 1115 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002).
    2
    II. DISCUSSION
    The United States moves for summary judgment based on its tax assessments
    against Mr. Long. These assessments are the IRS’s determination that Mr. Long owes the federal
    government a certain amount of unpaid taxes. See United States v. Fior D’Italia, 
    536 U.S. 238
    ,
    242 (2002). The tax assessments are presumptively correct. See Buaiz v. United States, 
    521 F. Supp. 2d 93
    , 96 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing United States v. Fior D’Italia, 
    536 U.S. at 242-43
    ). A
    certified transcript which reflects the assessment (known as Form 4340) is presumptive proof of
    a taxpayer’s liability. See 
    id.
     The certified transcripts are self-authenticating and need no
    extrinsic evidentiary support as a predicate to admissibility. See 
    id.
     (citing Fed. R. Ev. 902).
    They may provide a sufficient basis for summary judgment against Mr. Long. See 
    id.
    The government’s tax assessments, which are attached to its motion, establish that
    as of September 28, 2009, Mr. Long owed $13,647 in taxes, interest, and penalties for the tax
    year ending December 31, 1992. See Mot., Declaration of Benjamin J. Weir, (“Weir Decl.”) Ex.
    1. He owed $10,397 in taxes, interest, and penalties for the tax year ending December 31, 1994.
    See Weir Decl., Ex. 2. He owed $30,714 in taxes, interest, and penalties for the tax year ending
    December 31, 1994. See Weir Decl., Ex. 3. As of September 28, 2009, Mr. Long owed a total
    amount of $54,758, with additional penalties and interest accruing thereafter. See Weir Decl.
    ¶ 7. The government sent notices and demand for payment for these tax liabilities in compliance
    with 
    28 U.S.C. § 6303
    . See Mot., Ex. A. Mr. Long has not paid the full amount due and owing.
    3
    No genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Mr. Long’s liability for unpaid
    income tax, interest, and penalties for the tax years 1992, 1994, and 1995. Accordingly, the
    Court will grant the government’s motion for partial summary judgment. An Order to
    accompany this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this same day.
    _/s/______________________
    PAUL L. FRIEDMAN
    United States District Judge
    DATE: April 21, 2010
    4