Gray v. D.C. Public Schools ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
___________________________________
PAULA GRAY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09-1806 (GK)
)
)
D.C. PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al. )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff, Paula Gray (“Plaintiff”), brings this action
against Defendants, D.C. Public Schools (“DCPS”) and D.C.
Government (collectively, “Defendants”), under the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415 et
seq. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to pay attorney’s
fees available under the IDEA after she prevailed in a due
process hearing involving benefits to which her child, a student
in the DCPS, was entitled under the Act.
This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Remand1 [Dkt. No. 6], Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the
1
Although it is not captioned as such, Plaintiff
clarified in later filings that she intended the “Plaintiff’s
Opposition to Defendants’ Notice of Removal” to be a Motion to
Remand. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A. in Resp. to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mot. to Remand at 2 [Dkt. No. 6]. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s
renaming of her Motion (which will be referred to in this opinion
as a “Motion to Remand”), and will rule on it. See Leitner v.
United States, Civ. No. 09-2342, 2010 WL 151985 at *2 (D.D.C.
Complaint [Dkt. No. 12] and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or
for More Definite Statement [Dkt. No. 2]. Upon consideration of
the Motions, Oppositions, Replies, the entire record herein, and
for the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand is
denied, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is
granted, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for More
Definite Statement is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff’s minor child is enrolled in the DCPS. Plaintiff
asserted that Defendants failed to provide Free and Appropriate
Public Education (“FAPE”) for her child, as required under the
IDEA. Compl. [Dkt. No. 1-2]. Parties participated in a due
process hearing. On February 16, 2009, the Hearing Officer
Determination (“HOD”) in Plaintiff’s due process hearing was
issued, granting Plaintiff the relief she sought. Am. Compl. at
¶ 9 [Dkt. No. 12-2]. Following the HOD, the Law Offices of
Christopher N. Anwah sent an invoice to Defendants for attorney’s
fees, on Plaintiff’s behalf. Id. at ¶ 4.
Jan. 18, 2010)(accepting plaintiff’s “Objection to Notice of
Removal” as a Motion to Remand).
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B. Procedural Background
On August 20, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the
Superior Court for the District of Columbia for nonpayment of
attorney’s fees. Compl. [Dkt. No. 1-2]. Defendants removed the
matter to this Court on September 18, 2009. Not. of Removal [Dkt.
No. 1]. Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for
More Definite Statement on September 25, 2009, arguing that the
Complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss and/or for More Definite
Statement at ¶ 1 (“Mot. to Dismiss”)[Dkt. No. 2]. Instead of
responding to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff first sought to
oppose removal, filing a Motion to Remand on October 1, 2009.
[Dkt. No. 3]. After the parties fully briefed the remand issue,
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint on
January 19, 2010. [Dkt. No. 12]. The parties have also fully
briefed the request to amend the Complaint. Plaintiff has not
yet formally responded to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, but, for
reasons that will be discussed below, the Amended Complaint
renders the Motion to Dismiss moot.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face” and to “nudge[ ][his or
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her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “[O]nce a claim
has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any
set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. at 563. A complaint will not suffice, however, if it
“tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
Under the Twombly standard, a “court deciding a motion to
dismiss must not make any judgment about the probability of the
plaintiffs’ success . . . must assume all the allegations in the
complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . [and] must
give the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences
derived from the facts alleged.” Aktieselskabet AF 21. November
2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2008)(internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Remand Is Not Appropriate Because the Removing Party
Has Demonstrated that Removal Was Proper
To determine whether remand is appropriate, the Court must
consider whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case
to support removal. See Republic of Venezuela v. Philip Morris
Inc., 287 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
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1447(c) for the proposition that “[w]hen it appears that a
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a case that
has been removed from a state court, the district court must
remand the case.”). Removal is permitted for “any civil action
brought in a state court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);
see Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The
removing party bears the burden of showing that federal subject
matter jurisdiction exists. See Your Girl Friday, LLC v. MGF
Holdings, Inc., Civ. No. 06-0385, 2006 WL 1028959, at *2 (D.D.C.
Apr. 18, 2006). Any ambiguities regarding the existence of
removal jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. Id.;
Nwachukwu v. Karl, 223 F. Supp. 2d 60, 66 (D.D.C. 2002).
1. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Exists Because
Plaintiff’s Claim Was Brought Under a Federal
Statute
This Court has original, federal question subject matter
jurisdiction over claims arising under federal statutes. 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Our Court of Appeals has stated that “[i]f a
plaintiff purports to assert a federal claim, the district court
has federal question jurisdiction unless the claim is ‘immaterial
. . . made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or
. . . wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” Herero People’s
Reparations Corp. v. Deutsche Bank, A.G., 370 F.3d 1192, 1194
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(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83
(1946)); see Leitner, 2009 WL 151985, at *3. The IDEA is a
federal statute which expressly creates a cause of action for
attorney’s fees, providing that “[t]he district courts of the
United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this section without regard to the amount in controversy.” 20
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A).
Plaintiff makes a claim under the IDEA, citing the statute’s
provision “mandating payment” in her original Complaint. In her
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff specifies that “[t]he jurisdiction
of the court is based upon . . . § 1415(i)(3).” Am. Compl. at ¶
1. Because Plaintiff makes a claim under the IDEA, a federal
statute, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the
claim, and removal on this basis was appropriate.
2. Concurrent State Court Jurisdiction Does Not
Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff argues that because Defendants also violated the
law of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia
Superior Court has concurrent jurisdiction, and that remand
should be granted because the Superior Court could decide her
claim. Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at ¶ 5. As other courts have
recognized, “the fact that the IDEA provides the plaintiff with
the choice of state or federal court does not preclude the
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removal of the resulting action to federal court.” Ullmo v.
Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 680 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Dorsey
v. City of Detroit, 858 F.2d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding
that “[t]he weight of judicial authority supports the conclusion
that a Congressional grant of concurrent jurisdiction in a
statute does not imply that removal is prohibited.”).
Plaintiff claims attorney’s fees under both the IDEA and a
local municipal regulation, 5 D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, § 3032 et
seq. Compl.; Am. Compl. at ¶ 1. The local law, however, merely
provides a cause of action in the state court for claiming
attorney’s fees under the IDEA. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 5-E, §
3032.4. Thus, Plaintiff’s case turns on the resolution of one
issue, the amount of attorney’s fees to which she is entitled
under the IDEA. Although the claim could have remained in state
court, concurrent jurisdiction does not destroy this Court’s
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claim, and does not render removal
improper.
3. Plaintiff’s Claim Does Not Sound in Contract
Plaintiff also argues that her claim is actually a breach of
contract claim, which does not involve a federal question and
which therefore requires that the case be remanded. Pl.’s Mot.
to Remand at ¶¶ 3, 5. Other district courts in this circuit have
rejected this argument and ruled that claims for attorney’s fees
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brought pursuant to the IDEA are federal claims, not contract
claims. See, e.g., Elliot v. D.C. Pub. Sch., Civ. No. 09-1802,
2009 WL 4546618 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2009); Kirksey v. D.C. Pub. Sch.,
Civ. No. 09-1786, 2009 WL 4546629 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2009); Morgan
v. D.C. Pub. Sch., Civ. No. 09-1803, 2009 WL 4546624 (D.D.C. Dec.
2, 2009); Walker v. D.C. Pub. Sch., Civ. No. 09-1795, 2009 WL
4546615 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2009). This Court agrees that the relief
Plaintiff seeks is provided by federal statute, over which this
Court clearly has jurisdiction.
To support her argument that her claim sounds in contract,
Plaintiff cites Bowman v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 05-
01933, 2006 WL 2221703 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006). It is difficult to
understand why Plaintiff relies on Bowman. Not only did Bowman
refuse to extend federal jurisdiction to a contract issue related
to the IDEA, the case is inapposite because it concerned a
settlement agreement entered into by the parties, which is not
the situation in this case.
Plaintiff does not contend that she has entered into a
settlement agreement with Defendants. Defendants did tender
partial payment on other, similar claims for fees, and also
tendered partial payment to Plaintiff after she submitted a
payment voucher in this case. Pl.’s Mot. to Remand at ¶ 5, Pl.’s
Reply at ¶ 6. However, such payments do not present a breach of
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contract issue, and submission of a payment voucher is not
equivalent to a settlement agreement.2
4. Plaintiff’s Argument Regarding the Blackman-Jones
Consent Decree Does Not Support Remand.
The Blackman-Jones Consent Decree applies to two classes of
plaintiffs. The class to which Plaintiff claims membership
consists of persons whose HODs or settlement agreements have not
been timely implemented. Blackman-Jones Consent Decree
(“Decree”) at 10, Civ. No. 97-1629 [Dkt. No. 1762-4]. However,
Plaintiff has not indicated that she has entered into any
settlement agreement with Defendants, or that any provision of
her HOD has not been implemented in a timely fashion. Therefore,
the Decree does not govern Plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees
in this case.
Furthermore, the Decree provides that the federal district
court shall monitor and enforce the Decree. The text explicitly
2
If, in the alternative, the Court were to treat
Plaintiff as having made a breach of contract claim in addition
to her IDEA claim, this claim would still not render remand
improper. Where “a separate and independent claim or cause of
action . . . is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and
the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law
predominates.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). The Court would still have
jurisdiction to resolve the claim, and should do so, since the
central question remains the amount Plaintiff is owed under the
IDEA.
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states that the federal court shall retain jurisdiction. Decree
at 57. Thus, remand to the local court would be inappropriate,
even if the Decree governed Plaintiff’s claim.
B. Plaintiff May Amend the Complaint Because It Is In the
Interest Of Justice and Will Not Unduly Prejudice
Defendants.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), “a party may amend its pleading
once as a matter of course within . . . 21 days after service of
a motion under Rule 12(b) [or] (e).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 3
Thereafter, a party must obtain leave from the court or written
consent from the adverse party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
Plaintiff sought to amend her Complaint more than 21 days
after service of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Defendants
refused to consent to the filing of an amended Complaint.
Therefore, Plaintiff now seeks leave from the Court. Mem. Pl.’s
Mot. for Am. Compl. at ¶ 3 [Dkt. No. 12-1].
The district court has discretion to grant or deny leave.
Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
“When a party requests leave from the court . . . the leave
3
Rule 15 is quoted as amended, effective December 1,
2009. Prior to the amendment, the rule permitted a party to
amend its pleading once as matter of course at any time before a
responsive pleading was served. A Motion to Dismiss was not
considered a responsive pleading for purposes of amending the
complaint. Boyd v. District of Columbia, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3
(D.D.C. 2006).
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sought should . . . be freely given” in the absence of factors
including “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive . . .
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, futility of
amendment, etc.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962);
Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 425-26 (D.C. Cir.
1996); Caribbean Broad. Sys., Ltd. v. Cable & Wireless P.L.C.,
148 F.3d 1080, 1083-85 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
None of these factors are present in this case. Defendants
do not claim that the Amended Complaint demonstrates bad faith or
dilatory motive or that the amendment is futile, and the
Amendment submitted by Plaintiff is her first attempt to cure the
deficiencies of the original Complaint. Mot. to Am. Compl.
Defendants contend that granting the amendment will cause
them undue delay and prejudice. Defs.’ Opp’n. to Pl.’s Mot. to
Amend Compl. at ¶ 10. [Dkt. No. 13]. They argue that the 21-day
limit contained in the recently amended Rule 15(a) adds a new
factor to those that the courts must consider in deciding motions
to amend. They argue that because Plaintiff’s request to amend
occurred after the 21-day window had closed, undue delay will
result if Plaintiff’s Motion is granted. Defs.’ Opp’n at ¶¶ 7-8.
Defendants misinterpret the new wording of the rule.
Plaintiff has, as Defendants point out, exceeded the 21-day limit
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for amending the Complaint as a matter of course under Rule
15(a)(1). However, this does not preclude amendment. Plaintiff’s
Motion falls under Rule 15(a)(2), which imposes no time limit and
instead leaves the decision whether to permit an amendment to the
discretion of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) provides that
subsection (a)(2) applies “[i]n all other cases,” except
amendments by right under subsection (a)(1). Thus, the Court
need not consider the 21-day time limit as a factor in
determining whether to grant Plaintiff’s Motion. Furthermore, “a
court should not deny leave to amend based solely on time elapsed
between the filing of the complaint and the request for leave to
amend.” Bancoult v. McNamara, 214 F.R.D. 5, 8 (D.D.C.
2003)(citing Atchinson, 73 F.3d at 426).
Our Court of Appeals has permitted an amendment requested
two years after the complaint was filed, and explained that
“[w]here an amendment would do no more than clarify legal
theories or make technical corrections, we have consistently held
that delay, without a showing of prejudice, is not a sufficient
ground for denying the motion.” Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249,
253 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Plaintiff’s Motion, submitted five months
after the initial Complaint was filed, which seeks to add only
clarifications and details requested by Defendants in their
Motion to Dismiss and to increase the requested amount of fees in
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light of removal, does not create undue delay or undue prejudice
to Defendants.
C. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Renders Defendants’
Motion To Dismiss Moot.
When a plaintiff amends her complaint, it renders a motion
to dismiss that complaint moot. Wultz v. Rep. of Iran, Civ. No.
08-1460, 2009 WL 4981537 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2009) (citing Myvett v.
Williams, 638 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 n.1 (D.D.C. 2009) (ruling that
“[b]ecause the plaintiff filed an amended complaint after the
defendants moved to dismiss the original complaint, the court
denies as moot the defendants’ motion to dismiss the original
complaint.”); P & V Enterprises v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
466 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 n.1 (D.D.C. 2006); Bancoult v. McNamara,
214 F.R.D. 5, 13 (D.D.C. 2003). Because the Court is granting
Plaintiff’s request to amend her Complaint, the court need not
reach the substance of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Therefore,
the Motion is denied as moot, as is the alternative Motion for a
More Definite Statement.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand is
denied, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint is
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granted, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and/or for More
Definite Statement is denied.
/s/
February 25, 2010 Gladys Kessler
United States District Judge
Copies to: attorneys on record via ECF
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