Bennett-Bey v. Stiff ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
TANYA BENNETT-BEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 08-328 (RWR)
)
DOUGLAS SHULMAN, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se plaintiff Tanya Bennett-Bey has sued the Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service1 (“IRS”) for a refund of taxes
withheld from her paycheck and to enjoin the Commissioner to
change her tax status. The defendant has moved to dismiss the
complaint. Because this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over Bennett-Bey’s refund claim, and because Bennett-Bey has
otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
I. REFUND
Bennett-Bey appears to be seeking a refund of taxes that
have been withheld from her salary. (See Compl. at 7 (requesting
that defendant be required to “repay all [u]nlawfully [collected
1
Douglas Shulman is substituted for Linda Stiff under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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debts]); Pl.’s Mot. of Opp’n to Dis. Compl. at 1 (arguing that
“the I.R.S. had no right to remove funds from my salary”).)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Larsen v. U.S.
Navy, 486 F. Supp. 2d 11, 18 (D.D.C. 2007). “Because
subject-matter jurisdiction focuses on the court’s power to hear
the claim, . . . the court must give the plaintiff’s factual
allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to
state a claim.” Jin v. Ministry of State Sec., 475 F. Supp. 2d
54, 60 (D.D.C. 2007). Pro se plaintiffs are not free from the
requirement to plead an adequate jurisdictional basis for their
claims. See Briggs v. State Dep’t Fed. Credit Union, Civil
Action No. 05-1344 (GK), 2006 WL 1444009, at *2 (May 25, 2006).
A district court has subject matter jurisdiction over
“[a]ny civil action against the United States for the recovery of
any internal-revenue tax alleged to have been erroneously or
illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (a)(1).
However, a district court’s jurisdiction is limited to tax claims
for which the plaintiff has first filed a refund claim with the
IRS. 26 U.S.C. § 7422(a) (“No suit or proceeding shall be
maintained in any court for the recovery of any internal revenue
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tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected . . . until a claim for refund or credit has been duly
filed with the [IRS.]”); see also United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S.
596, 601-02 (1990). Bennett-Bey has not alleged in her complaint
that she filed a claim for a refund with the IRS before bringing
this suit. Thus, she has failed to establish that this court has
subject matter jurisdiction over her claim for a refund.
II. EXEMPTION
Bennett-Bey alleges that she is exempt from paying federal
income taxes because she is a beneficiary of the Great Moorish
Estate Express Trust, which makes her “a Moorish American
Citizen” who has “[s]overeign [i]mmunity as a [c]itizen of that
[n]ation.” (Compl. ¶ 1.) She also seeks to enjoin the defendant
from “unlawfully conducting business on the Trust Estate.” (Id.
at 7.) While Bennett-Bey has not pleaded a basis for the court’s
jurisdiction over this claim, it is unnecessary if there is a
recognizable basis for jurisdiction within the complaint. See
Kornegay v. AT&T, Civil Action No. 05-1 (PLF), 2006 WL 825622, at
*2 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2006) (noting it possible to find
jurisdiction even if the complaint fails to cite a statutory
basis “where ‘facts alleged in [the complaint] are sufficient to
establish . . . jurisdiction and the complaint appeared
jurisdictionally correct when filed” (alteration in original)
(quoting Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604,
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608 n.6 (1978))). Bennett-Bey seems to be claiming a religious
exemption from paying taxes under the Free Exercise clause (see
Pl.’s Mot. to Suppl. Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dis. ¶ 1
(stating that the plaintiff’s “rights are being violated
according to the Constitution [o]f [t]he United States[,] in
particular . . . the [F]irst . . . Amendment”)), a claim that
arises under the First Amendment and for which a federal district
court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution[.]”).
However, a complaint must also contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). For a plaintiff to demonstrate
that she is entitled to relief under the Free Exercise Clause,
she must plead, as an initial matter, that the government has
placed “‘a substantial[] burden’ on [her] exercise of religion
‘even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability[.]’” Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)) (first alteration in original).
Because Bennett-Bey does not allege anywhere in her complaint
that paying federal income taxes will impose a substantial burden
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on the free exercise of her religion, she has not stated a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
Under even a liberal construction of her pro se complaint,
Howerton v. Ogletree, 466 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (D.D.C. 2006),
Bennett-Bey is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, the
complaint will be dismissed. An appropriate order accompanies
this memorandum opinion.
SIGNED this 20th day of January, 2010.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge