William Penn Apartments, L.P. v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals , 39 F. Supp. 3d 11 ( 2014 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
WILLIAM PENN APARTMENTS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 13-178 (RWR)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT )
OF APPEALS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff William Penn Apartments (“WPA”) brings suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against D.C. Court of Appeals Judges Phyllis D.
Thompson, Corinne A. Beckwith, and Frank Q. Nebeker, and D.C.
Superior Court Judges Brook Hedge and Michael L. Rankin
(“judicial defendants”), as well as John S. Scherlis and William
L. Scherlis (“Scherlis defendants”).1 The defendants move under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) to dismiss
the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for
failure to state a claim, and on Younger2 abstention grounds.
WPA’s claim for § 1983 injunctive relief will be dismissed for
1
Plaintiff’s complaint names as defendants the D.C. Court
of Appeals and the D.C. Superior Court. Because these
institutions are non sui juris, the claims against them will be
dismissed. See Hoai v. Superior Court of Dist. of Columbia, 539
F. Supp. 2d 432, 435 (D.D.C. 2008).
2
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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failure to state a claim. However, the Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine
and Younger abstention do not bar WPA’s claim for declaratory
relief. Thus, the defendants’ motions to dismiss will be granted
in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
From 1994 to 2004, defendant John Scherlis leased three
apartments from WPA. Compl. ¶ 27. In 2005, WPA brought a suit
(the “landlord-tenant case”) in D.C. Superior Court against
Scherlis for non-payment of rent, obtained a default judgment
against him, and evicted him from one of the apartments. Id.
¶¶ 48-54, 67.
In August 2008, the Scherlis defendants filed suit (the
“damages case”) in D.C. Superior Court against WPA and Cafritz
Company, alleging wrongful eviction, negligence, breach of good
faith, and trespass, and seeking $18.5 million in damages. Id.
¶ 69. Also, John Scherlis moved to vacate the 2005 default
judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶ 75. Judge Hedge
consolidated the landlord-tenant and damages cases and vacated
the 2005 default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id.
¶¶ 95, 102. WPA appealed, and the D.C. Court of Appeals sua
sponte remanded the case to the trial court. Id. ¶¶ 110, 123.
The Court of Appeals’ September 9, 2010 order stated that “upon
3
Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.
462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., et al., 263 U.S. 413
(1923).
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the entry of the order that resolves all matters in the
consolidat[ed cases], if any party remains aggrieved, then they
[sic] may file a notice of appeal.” Id. ¶ 123 (emphasis
omitted). On remand, Judge Hedge granted partial summary
judgment to the Scherlis defendants in the damages case. Id.
¶¶ 125-26. WPA filed an application for review of Judge Hedge’s
grant of partial summary judgment in the damages case, which the
D.C. Court of Appeals denied. Id. ¶¶ 131, 135. WPA appealed the
order vacating the default judgment in the landlord-tenant case.
Id. ¶ 146. Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker dismissed the
appeal. Id. ¶ 154. WPA moved for reconsideration, which
Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker denied. Id. ¶ 159. In
October 2012, Judge Rankin denied WPA’s request to refer the
damages litigation to Judge Hedge and ordered the case to
proceed. Id. ¶¶ 160, 188.
WPA asserts that procedural and legal errors infected the
entire litigation process in the landlord-tenant and damages
cases and that the judicial defendants committed multiple due
process violations. See id. ¶¶ 113, 136, 143-44, 169. WPA
claims that Judge Hedge erred by failing to dismiss the damages
case, allowing the Scherlis defendants to move to vacate the
default judgment in the landlord-tenant case, and vacating the
default judgment in the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶¶ 166-71.
WPA further claims that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker
denied WPA due process by declining to hear WPA’s interlocutory
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appeal of Judge Hedge’s order vacating the default judgment in
the landlord-tenant case. Id. ¶¶ 174-76. WPA also alleges that
Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker violated its due process
rights by denying its motion for reconsideration. Id. ¶¶ 181-84.
Finally, WPA alleges that Judge Rankin denied WPA due process by
failing to transfer the damages case to Judge Hedge to “clarify
her language for appeal” of her summary judgment order and
proceeding with the damages case. Id. ¶¶ 186-88.
WPA brought this suit in federal court seeking a declaration
that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker’s failure to hear the
appeal in the landlord-tenant case deprived WPA of due process
and an injunction to prohibit Judge Rankin and the Scherlis
defendants from proceeding in the damages case until the D.C.
Court of Appeals decides the appeal in the landlord-tenant case.
Id. at 35. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint under
Rules 12(b)(1) and (12)(b)(6), contending that WPA’s suit is
barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the judicial
defendants are immune from claims for injunctive relief.
Scherlis Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 3-7; Judicial Defs.’ Mot. to
Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. at 7-11. The judicial defendants also argue
that Younger abstention precludes federal adjudication. Judicial
Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. at 11-13. WPA opposes the
defendants’ motions arguing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply to state court interlocutory decisions, that the
judicial defendants are not immune because declaratory relief was
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unavailable, and that Younger abstention does not apply because
this case does not implicate important state interests. Pl.’s
Opp’n to Judicial Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n to Jud.
Defs.”) at 5-17.
DISCUSSION
I. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(1)
Jurisdiction is a threshold issue which ordinarily must be
addressed before the merits of the case are reached. See Haase
v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Walsh v. Hagee,
900 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55 (D.D.C. 2012). Rule 12(b)(1) provides
that a federal court must dismiss the case when it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The plaintiff
bears the burden to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Araya
v. Bayly, 875 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Georgiades
v. Martin-Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 833 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
“Faced with motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6), a court should first consider the Rule 12(b)(1) motion
because once a court determines that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, it can proceed no further.” Center for Biological
Diversity v. Jackson, 815 F. Supp. 2d 85, 90 (D.D.C. 2011)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see 5B
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1350 (3d ed. 2004).
Federal district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
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States[,]” 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and over civil actions “to secure
equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for
the protection of civil rights[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4).
Another statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provides a federal cause of
action for the deprivation of constitutional rights.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the Supreme Court
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the highest
state courts. See Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Thus, lower federal courts do not
possess jurisdiction to review such appeals even if the
plaintiffs allege a constitutional injury. See Hunter v. U.S.
Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 698 F. Supp. 2d. 94, 99 (D.D.C. 2010). In
addition, “the [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine ‘prevents lower federal
courts from hearing cases that amount to the functional
equivalent of an appeal from a state court,’ . . . and that the
doctrine extends to review of District of Columbia courts[.]”
Araya, 875 F. Supp. 2d at 3 (quoting Gray v. Poole, 275 F.3d
1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002)) (citing Richardson v. Dist. of
Columbia Court of Appeals, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
However, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Rooker-Feldman
jurisdictional bar is limited to “cases of the kind from which
the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and
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inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.”
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005).
Before Exxon Mobil, the D.C. Circuit stated that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine barred lower federal court review of
interlocutory appeals from state courts. Richardson, 83 F.3d at
1514. In Richardson, the plaintiff challenged an order from the
D.C. Court of Appeals that temporarily suspended him from the
practice of law. Id. He characterized the suspension order as
an “interlocutory” order for which federal lower court review was
available under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. Although the
D.C. Circuit found that the state court proceedings in that case
had resulted in a final decision, it opined that
[e]ven if the suspension were not final for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 1257, the district court would have lacked
jurisdiction. We cannot imagine how one could reconcile
Feldman’s reasoning, based as it is on allowing state
courts to arrive at decisions free from collateral
federal attack, with the idea that the district court
would be free to review Richardson’s suspension so long
as the decision was interlocutory. Indeed, other
circuits have persuasively concluded that the boundaries
of § 1257’s grant of Supreme Court jurisdiction do not
prevent the application of Rooker-Feldman to the final
decisions of lower state courts, or to state courts’
interlocutory decisions.
Id. at 1515. However, Exxon Mobil emphasized that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine can be applied only in “limited circumstances in
which [the Supreme] Court’s appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments, 28 U.S.C. § 1257, precludes a United
States district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction
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in an action it would otherwise be empowered to adjudicate under
a congressional grant of authority[.]” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at
291. In particular, the Supreme Court stated that both Rooker
and Feldman involved “the losing party in state court fil[ing]
suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended,
complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and
seeking review and rejection of that judgment.” Id. As here,
“plaintiffs in both cases, alleging federal-question
jurisdiction, called upon the District Court to overturn an
injurious state-court judgment.” Id. at 291-92. However, Exxon
Mobil stated that “‘the pendency of an action in the state court
is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the
Federal court having jurisdiction.’” Id. at 292 (quoting
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). While Exxon
Mobil recognized that comity and abstention doctrines may allow
the federal court to stay or dismiss an action while related
proceedings are pending in a state court, the Supreme Court held
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases where the
losing party in state court seeks review of the state-court
judgments which were “rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced[.]” Id. at 282-84.
Since Exxon Mobil, courts have interpreted Exxon Mobil to
have abrogated Richardson’s holding in that the post-Exxon Mobil
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to final decisions after the
state proceedings ended and does not apply to appeals of
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interlocutory orders. See In re Hodges, 350 B.R. 796, 799-801
(N.D. Ill. 2006) (“For Rooker-Feldman to apply, the state court
proceedings must have ‘ended,’ . . . producing ‘state-court
losers,’ . . . before the federal action begins. And because the
state proceeding must have ended, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
necessarily poses no jurisdictional bar to a federal action
attacking an interlocutory state court order.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284, 291)). Similarly, the
First Circuit stated that Exxon Mobil held that “[i]f federal
litigation is initiated before state proceedings have ended, then
. . . the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not deprive the [federal]
court of jurisdiction. . . . On the other hand, if federal
litigation is initiated after state proceedings have ended, . . .
the federal courts lack jurisdiction.” Federación de Maestros de
P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 24
(1st Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Federación then defined when
“state proceedings have ended” for the purposes of the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine:
First, when the highest state court in which review is
available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is
left to be resolved[.] . . . Second, if the state
action has reached a point where neither party seeks
further action[.] . . . Third, if the state court
proceedings have finally resolved all the federal
questions in the litigation, but state law or purely
factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be
litigated[.]
Id. at 24-25. Although the D.C. Circuit has not addressed this
issue after Exxon Mobil, the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
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Circuits have relied on the Federación analysis to hold that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to cases where the state
proceedings have ended. See Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266,
1278-79 (11th Cir. 2009); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032
& n.2 (10th Cir. 2006); Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 924
(8th Cir. 2005); Mothershed v. Justices of Supreme Court, 410
F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).
Here, WPA brings this § 1983 action for declaratory and
injunctive relief asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343, Compl. ¶ 10, and arguing that the judicial defendants
denied WPA’s constitutional due process rights. Compl. ¶¶ 161-
88. WPA contends that jurisdiction here is proper under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it seeks review not of a final
judgment by the D.C. Court of Appeals, but rather of an
interlocutory appeal. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Jud. Defs. at 11. The
judicial defendants counter that because the animating spirit of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is aimed at prohibiting lower federal
courts from intruding on state court proceedings, it would be
doctrinally inconsistent to allow review of interlocutory
appeals. See Judicial Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of their Mot. to
Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Jud. Defs.’ Reply”) at 3-4.
Previously, in Richardson, the D.C. Circuit held that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded review of interlocutory orders
from state courts. Richardson, 83 F.3d at 1515. Since Exxon
Mobil, the D.C. Circuit has not considered whether the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from such review.
However, this action has not arisen when state proceedings have
“ended” under the Federación analysis. There is no judgment for
the D.C. Court of Appeals to affirm, the action has not “reached
a point where neither party seeks further action,” and there were
no federal questions in the litigation to resolve. See
Federación, 410 F.3d at 24. Because state proceedings had not
ended, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine presents no bar to WPA’s
having filed suit. Thus, the defendants’ motion to dismiss on
Rooker-Feldman grounds will be denied.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER RULE 12(b)(6)
A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). “‘A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint.’” Maib v. F.D.I.C., 771 F. Supp. 2d
14, 17 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Smith-Thompson v. Dist. of
Columbia, 657 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129 (D.D.C. 2009)).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” . . .
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted)
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) and
citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). A court may dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) a complaint against a judge that alleges injury caused
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by official judicial acts. Hoai v. Superior Court of Dist. of
Columbia, 539 F. Supp. 2d 432, 435 (D.D.C. 2008).
In this case, WPA seeks to enjoin the ongoing damages case
“until or unless Defendant D.C. Court of Appeals hears and
decides the Appeal of the Order to Vacate the Default Judgment ab
initio in the Landlord-Tenant Case.” Compl. at 35. WPA also
seeks a declaration that Judges Thompson, Beckwith, and Nebeker
denied WPA due process. Id. Thus, WPA seeks both injunctive and
declaratory relief in this suit.
Here, the plaintiff fails to state a claim for injunctive
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless
a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief
was unavailable.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A] failure to get one’s desired decisions in
our local courts does not constitute such ‘unavailablity’” of
declaratory relief. Hoai, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (dismissing
suit against judges on D.C. Superior Court and D.C. Court of
Appeals wherein plaintiff challenged those courts’ previous
unfavorable judicial decisions). A party that begins litigation
in D.C. Superior Court may “appeal an adverse decision to the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and if still dissatisfied
seek review in the United States Supreme Court.” JMM Corp. v.
Dist. of Columbia, 378 F.3d 1117, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(footnotes omitted).
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WPA argues that declaratory relief was unavailable because
“no higher court is established by the District of Columbia Court
Reorganization Act of 1970 with the authority to review the D.C.
Court of Appeals’ refusal to hear an appeal of right.” Compl.
¶ 177. The judicial defendants respond that it is “far from
clear that WPA will never have a right to appeal the order
vacating the default judgment in the Landlord-Tenant Case,” and
it is “possible that the Court of Appeals will eventually rule on
the merits of WPA’s appeal[.]” Jud. Defs.’ Reply at 5.
Moreover, they argue, WPA could have obtained declaratory relief
by appealing to the Supreme Court. Id. at 3.
The D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision to decline WPA’s appeal
does not make declaratory relief unavailable because WPA could
have petitioned for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1121.
Furthermore, the D.C. Court of Appeals explicitly left open the
possibility of future declaratory relief in its September 9, 2010
order by stating that WPA may appeal “upon entry of the order
that resolves all matters in the consolidat[ed cases.]” See
Compl. ¶ 123 (emphasis omitted).
Because declaratory relief was not unavailable, and the
challenged actions were official acts by the judges in their
judicial capacity, the judicial defendants are immune from suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, WPA’s claim for injunctive relief
will be dismissed for failure to state a § 1983 claim.
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The defendants also move to dismiss the plaintiff’s § 1983
claim for declaratory relief on Younger abstention grounds. “In
Younger v. Harris and its progeny, the Supreme Court held that,
except in extraordinary circumstances, a federal court should not
enjoin a pending state proceeding . . . that is judicial in
nature and involves important state interests.” JMM Corp., 378
F.3d at 1120 (citations omitted). The doctrine is grounded in
the “‘vital consideration’ of the proper respect for the
fundamental role of States in our federal system.” Ohio Civil
Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 626
(1986) (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). The
Younger doctrine cautions against the exercise of jurisdiction by
lower federal courts over proceedings in D.C. Superior Court and
the D.C. Court of Appeals. JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1122.
“Younger precludes federal adjudication where three criteria are
met: (1) there are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in
nature; (2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and (3) the proceedings afford an adequate opportunity
to raise the federal claims.” Delaney v. Dist. of Columbia, 659
F. Supp. 2d 185, 194 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Bridges v. Kelly, 84
F.3d 470, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Property regulations implicate
important state interests that warrant Younger abstention. See,
e.g., Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of W. Va., 396 F.3d 348, 352
(4th Cir. 2005) (“[P]roperty law concerns, such as land use and
zoning questions, are frequently ‘important’ state interests
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justifying Younger abstention.”); JMM Corp., 378 F.3d at 1128
(holding that a district court decision to decline review of
District of Columbia zoning regulations barring adult bookstore
was proper under Younger); Carroll v. City of Mount Clemens, 139
F.3d 1072, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that the state interest
in enforcing housing codes was sufficiently important to justify
Younger abstention); Rumber v. Dist. of Columbia, 598 F. Supp. 2d
97, 111 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that eminent domain proceedings
are an important state interest for Younger analysis). However,
eviction proceedings, particularly between private parties, do
not generally implicate a state interest that is sufficiently
important for a district court to abstain from hearing a case on
Younger grounds. See Logan v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 722 F.3d
1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2013). There, the Ninth Circuit found that
other courts’ decisions which invoked Younger abstention based on
state-court eviction proceedings
fall prey to the logic that the state has a significant
concern simply because property law, including eviction,
has long been a state concern. The difficulty with this
assumption is that it would require federal courts to
abstain from state litigation in virtually every area of
state law -- from consumer protection to real estate --
even where the dispute is purely private. We agree with
the Third Circuit that the regulation of eviction
proceedings “does not implicate an important state
interest” under Younger.
Id. (citing Ayers v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1195 n.21
(3d Cir. 1990)).
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Here, the parties agree that the ongoing state proceedings
are judicial in nature. See Judicial Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss
Pl.’s Compl. at 13; Pl.’s Opp’n to Jud. Defs. at 15. WPA argues
that the Younger doctrine is inapplicable because the District of
Columbia has no important “state interest” in barring federal
jurisdiction over landlord-tenant issues and the ongoing
litigation does not afford WPA an adequate opportunity to raise
its federal claims. Pl.’s Opp’n to Jud. Defs. at 16. The
judicial defendants counter that the District of Columbia has an
important interest in “administering its landlord-tenant law” and
that WPA “can raise its claims in the ongoing Superior Court
proceeding, or on appeal in the Court of Appeals after a final,
appealable order has been issued by the Superior Court.”
Judicial Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. at 13.
The defendants have not shown that Younger abstention
applies. Although the ongoing judicial proceedings involve the
District of Columbia’s interest in maintaining and administering
landlord-tenant relations, this interest, by itself, does not
justify Younger abstention. The ongoing court proceedings
between the Scherlis defendants and WPA is “garden variety civil
litigation” and implicates no important state interest that would
justify Younger abstention here. See Logan, 722 F.3d at 1168.
Moreover, the defendants do not demonstrate that the District of
Columbia has any special interest in the eviction proceedings
that would justify this court’s abstention. See id. Therefore,
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Younger abstention does not bar consideration of the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim for declaratory relief.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
After Exxon-Mobil, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
preclude lower federal courts from reviewing interlocutory state
court decisions. However, the judicial defendants are immune
from suit for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus,
the plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for injunctive relief will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, the plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim for declaratory relief is not barred by Younger
abstention. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the defendants’ motions [6, 8] be, and hereby
are, GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The plaintiff’s § 1983
claim for injunctive relief is dismissed, but the plaintiff’s
claim for declaratory relief remains.
SIGNED this 14th day of April, 2014.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
Chief Judge