David v. District of Columbia ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________
)
DARLENE DAVID, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 02-1145 (RWR)(DAR)
)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury awarded plaintiff Darlene David $2,000 in
compensatory damages against the District of Columbia
(“District”), $30,000 in compensatory damages against the
Children’s National Medical Center (“CNMC”), and $1 in
compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages against
Metropolitan Police Officer Andre Davis for injuries arising out
of an assault. The District and Davis have objected to
Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson’s recommendation that Davis
pay David $20,598 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and $2,375 in
costs. Because the magistrate judge’s recommended attorneys’
fees award is reasonable, the defendants have failed to support
their objection to the recommended award of costs, and the costs
are appropriately reimbursable, Magistrate Judge Robinson’s
recommendations will be adopted.
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BACKGROUND
David sued the District, Davis, and CNMC for damages for
injuries sustained by David and her minor daughter arising out of
an assault against David in a treatment room at the CNMC.
David’s complaint included claims of assault and battery,
intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
false arrest and imprisonment against all defendants, and a civil
rights claim against Davis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting
David under color of state law without probable cause in
violation of David’s Fourth Amendment rights. A jury found
against all defendants on David’s claims of negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and false arrest and imprisonment, against
the District and CNMC on the assault and battery claim, and
against Davis on the § 1983 civil rights claim. The jury
awarded David $2,000 in compensatory damages against the
District, $30,000 in compensatory damages against CNMC, and $1 in
compensatory damages and $1 in punitive damages against Davis.
After the trial, David moved for an award of $114,435.75 in
attorneys’ fees and $2,557.63 in costs against all defendants
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Magistrate Judge Robinson recommended 1
ordering Davis to pay David $20,598 in reasonable attorneys’ fees
under § 1988 and $2,375 in costs. In setting the $20,598 fee
1
The magistrate judge issued an order, which has been
treated as a report and recommendation. See David v. D.C., 252
F.R.D. 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2008).
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amount, the magistrate judge found that although David recovered
no more than $2 against Davis, she was nonetheless entitled to an
award of attorneys’ fees under § 1988. In considering the
significant disparity between David’s $2 recovery against Davis
and David’s request of $114,435.75 in attorneys’ fees, the
magistrate judge found it reasonable to reduce David’s requested
fees by eighty percent “to take into account that only one count
of five renders Plaintiff eligible for an award of attorney’s
fees under [§ 1988]” and an additional ten percent “in lieu of a
line-by-line analysis of each entry in Plaintiff’s counsel’s
billing records,” to account for Davis’s challenges to specific
billing records. David v. D.C., 489 F. Supp. 2d 45, 51 (D.D.C.
2007).
The District and Davis have filed objections to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, contending that “although
[David] was a prevailing party at trial, she is not entitled to
attorney’s fees in this case” because she received only nominal
damages against Davis. (Defs.’ Objns. at 3.)2 In addition, the
defendants argue that David failed to separate the costs of her
unsuccessful claims from those of her successful claim. (Id. at
11.)
2
David does not object to the magistrate judge’s
recommended reduced award of $20,598 against Davis.
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DISCUSSION
A magistrate judge’s report and recommendation is reviewed
de novo. Highland Renovation Corp v. Hanover Ins. Group, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 79, 80-81 (D.D.C. 2009); LCvR 72.3(c); see Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72.
I. ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER § 1988
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “[i]n any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of [section 1983,] . . . the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). Congress passed § 1988 “to ensure ‘effective
access to the judicial process’ for persons with civil rights
grievances.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976)). Because David
seeks attorneys’ fees under § 1988, and her civil rights claim
was brought against Davis, David may recover attorneys’ fees from
Davis.3 “[T]o qualify for attorney’s fees under § 1988, a
plaintiff must be a ‘prevailing party.’” Farrar v. Hobby, 506
3
The District and Davis opposed David’s initial request to
have all defendants liable for attorneys’ fees and costs. The
magistrate judge recommended that fees and costs be assessed
against Davis alone. As David has filed no objection to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation, that issue is no longer in
dispute, nor is the issue of whether fees can be recovered for
the related non-constitutional claims on which David prevailed.
(See Pl.’s Reply to Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s Req. for Atty.’s Fees
at 9 (citing Nat’l Org. for Women v. Op’n Rescue, 37 F.3d 646,
653 (D.C. Cir. 1994).)
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U.S. 103, 109 (1992). To be a prevailing party, a plaintiff
“must obtain at least some relief on the merits of his claim.
The plaintiff must obtain an enforceable judgment against the
defendant from whom fees are sought . . . .” Id. at 111
(citations omitted); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.
Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001); see
D.C. v. Straus, 607 F. Supp. 2d 180, 183 (D.D.C. 2009). A
plaintiff who receives only nominal damages is nonetheless a
prevailing party under § 1988 because “[a] judgment for damages
in any amount, whether compensatory or nominal, modifies the
defendant’s behavior for the plaintiff’s benefit by forcing the
defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not pay.”
Farrar, 506 U.S. at 113. Thus, although the jury awarded David
only nominal damages against Davis, she was nonetheless a
prevailing party eligible for attorneys’ fees under § 1988.
“Although the ‘technical’ nature of a nominal damages award
or any other judgment does not affect the prevailing party
inquiry, it does bear on the propriety of fees awarded under
§ 1988. . . . ‘[T]he most critical factor’ in determining the
reasonableness of a fee award ‘is the degree of success
obtained.’” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 114 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S.
at 436) (internal citations omitted). Thus, when a plaintiff
recovers only nominal damages because she failed to prove an
essential element of her claim for monetary relief -- that is,
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“actual, compensable injury” -- “the only reasonable fee is
usually no fee at all.” Id. at 115 (citation omitted) (emphasis
added).
Neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has described
what constitutes the unusual case where a plaintiff receiving
only nominal damages on her civil rights claim has nonetheless
achieved sufficient success such that an award of attorney’s fees
under § 1988 is appropriate. However, Justice O’Connor, writing
separately in Farrar, explained that “an award of nominal damages
can represent a victory in the sense of vindicating rights even
though no actual damages are proved.” Farrar, 506 U.S. at 121
(O’Connor, J., concurring). She opined that, as a result, “[t]he
difference between the amount recovered and the damages sought is
not the only consideration[.]” Id. Instead, “the relevant
indicia of success” for determining the reasonableness of an
attorney’s fees award include “the extent of relief, the
significance of the legal issue on which the plaintiff prevailed,
and the public purpose served[.]” Id. at 122. At least seven
circuits have recognized these factors as appropriate
considerations for determining an award of attorney’s fees under
§ 1988. See Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs., Inc., 577 F.3d 169, 175-
76 (3d Cir. 2009); Benton v. Or. Student Assistance Comm’n, 421
F.3d 901, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2005); Mercer v. Duke Univ., 401 F.3d
199, 203-04 (4th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases); Boston’s Children
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First v. City of Boston, 395 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 2005); Murray
v. City of Onawa, Iowa, 323 F.3d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir. 2003);
Brandau v. Kan., 168 F.3d 1179, 1181-82 (10th Cir. 1999);
Cartwright v. Stamper, 7 F.3d 106, 109 (7th Cir. 1993).
Here, although David received only nominal damages against
Davis, the jury’s verdict nonetheless represents a significant
legal vindication that serves an important public purpose. The
jurors found that Davis violated David’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unlawful arrest. They were instructed that they
could impose a punitive damage award against Davis to punish him
as a deterrent to other officers if the jurors found by “clear
and convincing evidence” that Davis acted willfully and
outrageously under the circumstances. (See Final Instructions to
Jury at 40.) David argued that arresting her for trying to see
her minor child after her child had been reported to have been
sexually assaulted warranted a punitive award as a signal that
the officer must modify his behavior and chosen response in
future similar situations. The jury apparently agreed. Because
the jury verdict vindicating an important right serves this
public purpose, an award of attorneys’ fees to David under § 1988
is reasonable in this case.
While there is reason to award fees under § 1988, a “court
should award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in
relation to the results obtained,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440, and
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it has “broad discretion to reduce requested fees when a
plaintiff has achieved limited success on her basic claim.” Goos
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
The magistrate judge’s recommended award of $20,598, to which
David has not objected and which is a substantial reduction of
the $114,435.75 in attorneys’ fees sought by David, is reasonable
in relation to David’s degree of success on her claims against
Davis, and it will be adopted.
II. COSTS
The magistrate judge recommends awarding to David costs in
the amount of $2,375.4 The defendants object to this award,
contending that David should not recover the costs permitted by
the magistrate judge because such costs were “not reasonably
associated with the litigation of [David’s] § 1983 claim.” (See
Defs.’ Objns. at 11.) A review of David’s request reveals that
the costs identified are of the kind usually awarded to a
prevailing party, and the defendants’ brief objection to the
magistrate judge’s recommended award of costs fails to explain
the basis for the defendant’s assertion that the modest costs
allowed by the magistrate judge were irrelevant to David’s
4
David’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs sought
$2,557.63 in costs. The magistrate judge’s recommendation
reasonably excludes the costs attributable to the deposition of
Keith McGlen, service of the complaint on CNMC, and courier
services on June 3, 2003. David, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 52. David
has not objected to the exclusion of these costs, and the
magistrate judge’s exclusion of these costs will be adopted.
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claims. In addition, where, as here, a plaintiff asserts
multiple claims based on the same core set of facts, costs are
likely to relate to all claims and cannot be easily separated on
a per-claim basis. Cf. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435 (recognizing
that in cases where “the plaintiff’s claims for relief involve a
common core of facts[,] . . . [m]uch of counsel’s time will be
devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it
difficult to divide the hours expended [by counsel] on a claim-
by-claim basis”). Accordingly, the magistrate judge’s
recommended award of $2,375 in costs will be adopted.
CONCLUSION
Although David received only nominal damages on her claims
against Davis, she is entitled to an award of reasonable
attorneys’ fees because she achieved a significant legal
vindication that advanced a public purpose. Because Magistrate
Judge Robinson’s recommended award of $20,598 is reasonable in
this case, the defendants’ objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation will be overruled, and the magistrate judge’s
recommendation will be adopted. In addition, because the
defendants have failed to support their objection to Magistrate
Judge Robinson’s recommended award of $2,375 in costs and because
the costs sought by David are appropriately reimbursable, the
magistrate judge’s recommendation regarding David’s request for
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costs will be adopted. An appropriate order accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
SIGNED this 19th day of November, 2009.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge