Beattie v. Barnhart ( 2009 )


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  •                    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    ____________________________
    )
    MICHAEL BEATTIE,             )
    )
    Plaintiff,         )
    )
    v.                 )     Civil Action No. 01-2493 (RWR)
    )
    JO ANNE BARNHART, et al.,    )
    )
    Defendants.        )
    ____________________________ )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Pro se plaintiff Michael Beattie brought this action against
    the Commissioner of Social Security and five unnamed Social
    Security Administration employees alleging, in part, a wrongful
    failure to produce documents related to an inadvertent
    overpayment to Beattie, and wrongful termination of Beattie’s
    social security benefits.   Beattie seeks a temporary restraining
    order (“TRO”) to preserve the documents and provide benefits.
    Because Beattie has failed to demonstrate that he is likely to
    suffer irreparable harm without a TRO and no other factors tip
    the balance in favor of granting a TRO, his motion will be
    denied.
    BACKGROUND
    The plaintiff’s amended complaint seeks, among other things,
    documents related to a claim for underlying social security
    benefits that were terminated over eight years ago.   (See Pl.’s
    - 2 -
    Br. Supporting Mot. for TRO (“Pl.’s Br.”) at 1-2.)1       Beattie
    asserts that he has requested from the defendants documents under
    the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) and the Privacy Act which
    the defendants have failed to search for and provide to him.
    (Id.)       Beattie claims that he will be unable to pursue his
    benefits claim and will suffer stress if the defendants fail to
    preserve his records.       (Id. at 2-3.)   He seeks a TRO that requires
    the defendants to conduct an accounting and listing of the
    documents, and that enjoins the defendants from destroying
    documents sought and from continuing to withhold his social
    security benefits.       (Pl.’s Mot. for TRO.)
    DISCUSSION
    The purpose of preliminary equitable relief usually is “‘to
    preserve the status quo pending the outcome of litigation.’”
    Cobell v. Kempthorne, 
    455 F.3d 301
    , 314 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting
    Dist. 50, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Int’l Union, United Mine
    Workers of Am., 
    412 F.2d 165
    , 168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).        The factors
    that apply in evaluating requests for a temporary restraining
    order are identical to those that apply in evaluating requests for
    preliminary injunctions.       See Al-Fayed v. C.I.A., 
    254 F.3d 300
    ,
    303 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2001).       To obtain preliminary injunctive
    relief, the moving party must show that “he is likely to succeed
    on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the
    1
    Beattie’s filing was not paginated.         Pagination, therefore,
    has been supplied by the Court.
    - 3 -
    absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities
    tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
    interest.”   Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    129 S. Ct. 365
    , 374 (2008).    A court evaluates these factors on a sliding
    scale.   Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 
    571 F.3d 1288
    , 1291
    (D.C. Cir. 2009).    A trial court has the discretion to grant or
    deny a request for a preliminary injunction, Ambach v. Bell, 
    686 F.2d 974
    , 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but such requests are not granted
    lightly.   See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 
    520 U.S. 968
    , 972 (1997).
    Injunctive relief “should not be granted unless the movant, by a
    clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.”    
    Id.
     (emphasis
    in original) (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Fed.
    Practice and Procedure § 2948, at 129-30 (2d ed. 1995)).
    I.   IRREPARABLE HARM
    Ordinarily, a threshold requirement in granting temporary
    injunctive relief is that the moving party make some showing of
    irreparable harm.    See CityFed Fin. Corp. v. Office of Thrift
    Supervision, 
    58 F.3d 738
    , 747 (D.C. Cir. 1995).    Despite the
    flexibility in weighing the four factors in relation to each
    other, courts normally “require the moving party to demonstrate at
    least ‘some injury.’”    
    Id.
     (quoting Population Inst. v. McPherson,
    
    797 F.2d 1062
    , 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); see Sampson v. Murray, 
    415 U.S. 61
    , 88 (1974) (stating that “‘[t]he basis for injunctive
    relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and
    inadequacy of legal remedies’”) (alteration in original)
    - 4 -
    (citation omitted).    If a party fails to make a sufficient showing
    of irreparable injury, a court may deny a motion for injunctive
    relief.   CityFed Fin. Corp., 
    58 F.3d at 747
     (stating that because
    the moving party made no showing of irreparable injury, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request
    for preliminary relief).
    An irreparable harm is an imminent injury that is both great
    and certain to occur, and for which legal remedies are inadequate.
    Wis. Gas Co. v. F.E.R.C., 
    758 F.2d 669
    , 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
    (citing Sampson, 
    415 U.S. at 88
    ).    “Bare allegations of what is
    likely to occur are of no value since the court must decide
    whether the harm will in fact occur.”    
    Id.
     (emphasis in original).
    Thus, to satisfy this prong, the movant must prove either “that
    the harm has occurred in the past and is likely to occur again” or
    that the harm is “certain to occur in the near future.”    
    Id.
    “‘Injunctions . . . will not issue to prevent injuries neither
    extant nor presently threatened, but only merely “feared.”’”
    Comm. in Solidarity With People of El Sal. (CISPES) v. Sessions,
    
    929 F.2d 742
    , 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted).
    Beattie complains that he will suffer stress unless the
    defendants are enjoined from destroying his records.    He cites to
    no authority that such stress is a harm appropriate to remedy by
    injunctive relief.    He also wants the defendants to conduct an
    accounting of documents sought in his purported FOIA and Privacy
    - 5 -
    Act requests and to produce a list of these documents, but he has
    not demonstrated how an accounting or a list of documents will
    prevent him from suffering imminent, irreparable harm.      In
    addition, he seeks to enjoin the defendants from destroying any
    documents within the subject matter of his requests.      Beattie,
    however, has not demonstrated that the defendants previously have
    destroyed any documents related to his pending benefits claim.
    Rather, he states that the relevant documents are “in the
    possession of both the local social security office and the
    regional social security office.”    (Pl.’s Br. at 2.)    Similarly,
    Beattie has not proven that the defendants have threatened to
    destroy documents in the near future.      He merely alleges that
    “[t]here is a distinct possibility that the agency will destroy
    documents that are the subject of [his] request.”      (Pl.’s Br.
    Supporting Mot. to Expedite at 2.)      These feared possibilities
    fall short of the imminent threat of injury required to grant a
    TRO.
    Beattie’s request to enjoin the defendants from continuing to
    withhold his social security benefits is equally deficient.      He
    has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer an imminent injury
    that legal remedies cannot redress if a temporary restraining
    order is not granted.   A TRO, ordinarily issued to preserve the
    status quo, is an inappropriate tool for restoring Beattie’s
    social security benefits which were terminated by agency decision
    over eight years ago.
    - 6 -
    II.   OTHER FACTORS
    A party seeking a TRO also must demonstrate that he is likely
    to succeed on the merits, that the balance of the equities tips in
    his favor and that the public interest favors granting of the TRO.
    See Winter, 
    129 S. Ct. at 374
    .    Assessing the likelihood of
    success on the merits “does not involve a final determination of
    the merits, but rather the exercise of sound judicial discretion
    on the need for interim relief.”    Nat’l Org. for Women, Wash. D.C.
    Chapter v. Soc. Sec. Admin. of the Dep’t of Health and Human
    Servs. et al., 
    736 F.2d 727
    , 733 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnote and
    internal quotation marks omitted).       Here, Beattie’s scant brief
    supporting his motion for a temporary restraining order asserts
    that he has “obviously proven a possibility of success,” but
    provides no support for his assertion.      (Pl.’s Br. at 3.)   Beattie
    largely fails to address the substance of his underlying claims,
    and merely makes conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations that
    the defendants’ failure to provide him with the requested
    documents violated FOIA and the Privacy Act, and the defendants
    have denied him due process by failing to allow him to call
    witnesses, submit evidence, be represented by an attorney, or
    testify.   (Id. at 2-3.)   Furthermore, Beattie’s blanket statement
    that he qualifies for social security benefits is not sufficient
    to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.
    Beattie also alleges that the balance of the equities tilts
    sharply in his favor because he is destitute and the defendant is
    - 7 -
    infinitely wealthy.    He claims that he has no income and little
    resources and the defendant should pay him $600 per month until
    the case is resolved.    (Id. at 3.)     Beattie, however, has failed
    to show that any money is owed to him or that his penury should
    weigh against an agency that he has not demonstrated either has
    destroyed any documents or is even obligated to provide the
    requested documents.    Moreover, Beattie makes no showing that
    there is a strong public interest that favors reinstating by TRO
    social security benefits that were terminated by agency decision,
    or ordering an agency not to destroy documents it has not even
    threatened to destroy.
    CONCLUSION
    Beattie has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable
    injury if his motion for a temporary restraining order is not
    granted.   Nor has he shown that other considerations warrant
    issuing the relief he seeks.    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that Beattie’s motion for a temporary restraining
    order and expedited decision [70] be, and hereby is, DENIED.
    SIGNED this 20th day of October, 2009.
    /s/
    RICHARD W. ROBERTS
    United States District Judge