National Parks Conservation Association v. Kempthorne ( 2009 )


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  •                              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    NATIONAL PARKS CONSERVATION
    ASSOCIATION,
    Plaintiff,
    v.                          Civil Action 09-00115 (HHK)
    KEN SALAZAR, Secretary of the United
    States Department of the Interior, et al.,
    Defendants.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    The National Parks Conservation Association (“NPCA”) brings this suit against Ken
    Salazar, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, Glenda Owens, Acting Director of the Office
    of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (“OSM”), and Lisa Jackson, Administrator of
    the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), (collectively, the “Federal defendants”)
    challenging the promulgation of OSM’s Final Rule for “Excess Spoil, Coal Mine Waste, and
    Buffers for Perennial and Intermittent Streams,” 
    73 Fed. Reg. 75,814
     (Dec. 12, 2008) (“SBZ
    Rule”), and the EPA’s written determination concurring in the promulgation of the Rule. NPCA
    alleges that the Federal defendants violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 
    5 U.S.C. § 551
     et
    seq. (“APA”), the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 
    30 U.S.C. § 1276
    , subsection
    7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act, 
    16 U.S.C. § 1536
    (a)(2) (“ESA”), and sections 101 and
    303 of the Clean Water Act, 
    33 U.S.C. §§ 1251
    , 1313. The National Mining Association
    (“NMA”) has been permitted intervene as a defendant.
    Before the Court are the motions of the Federal defendants to remand and vacate the SBZ
    Rule [#10] and to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction [#12] on the grounds that there no
    longer exists a case and controversy. Upon consideration of the motions, the oppositions thereto,
    and the record in this case, the Court concludes that the motions should be denied.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On December 12, 2008, after publishing notice and soliciting public comment on its
    proposed amendment to regulations regarding stream buffer zones, OSM published the SBZ
    Rule, which regulates excess mining spoil, disposal of mine waste, stream buffer zones, and
    stream-channel diversions. NPCA filed this suit in January 2009 alleging that the Federal
    defendants violated several statutes in promulgating and concurring in the promulgation of the
    SBZ Rule. In April 2009, Secretary Salazar “determined that the OSM erred in failing to initiate
    consultation with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service under the ESA to evaluate possible effects
    of the SBZ Rule on threatened and endangered species.” Defs.’ Mot. for Remand & Vacatur at 2.
    Accordingly, the Federal defendants move to remand and vacate the SBZ Rule and to dismiss this
    action. NMA opposes the Federal defendants’ motions and the NPCA supports the motions.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The Federal defendants argue that this Court should employ its equitable authority to
    remand, as well as vacate, the SBZ Rule because Secretary Salazar has confessed serious legal
    deficiencies in the rulemaking and vacatur will not result in disruptive consequences. The
    Federal defendants further argue that there no longer exists a case or controversy between the
    parties, and that judicial efficiency counsels in favor of the Federal defendants’ position that this
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    case should be dismissed, because dismissal would afford plaintiff the same relief that it would
    receive if it won on the merits.
    In opposition, the NMA argues that the Federal defendants should not be permitted to
    bypass the APA’s procedures for repealing an agency rule. The NMA disputes the Federal
    defendants’ assertion that there was any legal deficiency in the rule making leading up to the
    promulgation of the SBZ Rule and the Federal defendants’ contention that vacating the rule
    would not cause disruption. The NMA’s position has merit.
    The cases cited by the Federal defendants provide scant support for their position that
    remand and vacatur is appropriate here because the circumstances addressed in those cases are
    materially different from those extant here. For example in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear
    Regulatory Commission, 
    988 F.2d 146
    , 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and United Mine Workers v.
    Dole, 
    870 F.2d 662
    , 673-74 (D.C. Cir. 1989), a court remanded and vacated an agency action
    only after reaching the merits of the challenge. Here, the Federal defendants seek a remand and
    vacatur of the SBZ Rule without a determination on the merits that the SBZ Rule is legally
    deficient. Other cases cited by the Federal defendants relate to an agency’s motion for voluntary
    remand upon a finding of significant new evidence. See Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 
    989 F.2d 522
    ,
    524 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that where there was significant new evidence, a remand was
    appropriate). Here, the Federal defendants point to no new evidence and ask the Court not only
    to remand the case, but to vacate the SBZ Rule.
    Building Industries Legal Defense Foundation v. Norton, 
    231 F. Supp. 2d 100
     (D.D.C.
    2002) and National Association of Home Builders v. Evans, No. 00-cv-02799, 
    2002 WL 1205743
    (D.D.C. 2002) also addressed materially different circumstances. In National Association of
    3
    Home Builders, the court approved a consent decree that vacated and remanded an agency rule
    over the objections of amici curiae where the Secretary of Commerce confessed legal error in
    light of an adverse Tenth Circuit decision. 
    2002 WL 1205743
    , at *3. There, all parties to the
    case agreed that the rule should be remanded and vacated. 
    Id.
     Here, NMA, a full party to the
    case as an intervenor, see District of Columbia v. Merit Sys. Protection Bd., 
    762 F.2d 129
    , 132
    (D.C. Cir. 1985), opposes the Federal defendants’ motion for vacatur. Further, while not
    reaching the merits itself, the court in National Association of Home Builders reviewed the Tenth
    Circuit decision on the merits, which had caused the Secretary of Commerce to confess error, and
    found the other court’s opinion to be “well-reasoned” and founded in “persuasive rationale.”
    
    2002 WL 1205743
    , at *3. In Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation, the case which NMA
    concedes to be most factually analogous to this case, the court granted a motion for remand and
    vacatur over the objections of intervenor environmental groups where the Secretary of the
    Interior decided that a rule required reconsideration in light of the same Tenth Circuit decision.
    
    231 F. Supp. 2d at 108
    . There, however, all parties agreed that the rule should be remanded
    because legal error existed in the rulemaking process and the only dispute concerned how the
    agency should be instructed upon remand and whether vacatur was also appropriate. 
    Id. at 103
    .
    The Court finds no precedent to support the proposition that it should remand and vacate
    the SBZ Rule under the circumstances presented here. Moreover, the NMA has the better
    argument that granting the Federal defendants’ motion would wrongfully permit the Federal
    defendants to bypass established statutory procedures for repealing an agency rule. The APA
    requires government agencies to follow certain procedures, including providing for public notice
    and comment, before enacting or amending a rule. 
    5 U.S.C. § 553
    (b), (c). An agency must follow
    4
    the same procedure in order to repeal a rule. 
    5 U.S.C. § 551
    (5) (“‘[R]ule making’ means agency
    process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”(emphasis added)); see Motor Vehicle
    Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 42 (1983) (“[A]n agency changing its
    course by repealing a rule is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change.”); Consumer
    Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 
    673 F.2d 425
    , 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d, 
    463 U.S. 1216
     (1983)
    (“[T]he APA expressly contemplates that notice and an opportunity to comment will be provided
    prior to agency decisions to repeal a rule.”). While notice and comment procedure is not required
    where a court vacates a rule after making a finding on the merits, see, e.g., Cement Kiln Recycling
    Coal v. EPA, 
    255 F.3d 855
    , 872 (D.C. Cir. 2001), granting vacatur here would allow the Federal
    defendants to do what they cannot do under the APA, repeal a rule without public notice and
    comment, without judicial consideration of the merits.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reason set forth above and because this case quite clearly presents a continuing
    “case and controversy,” it is this 12 th day of August 2009, hereby
    ORDERED that defendants’ motions for voluntary remand and vacatur [#10] is
    DENIED; and it is further
    ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss [#12] is DENIED.
    Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.
    United States District Judge
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