Levasseur v. Midland Mortgage Company ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JOSETTE R. LEVASSEUR,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 09-0377 (JDB)
MIDLAND MORTGAGE CO. and
SAFEGUARD PROPERTIES, Inc.,
Defendants.
ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration
are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). "A Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary
and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice." Ciralsky v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Here, there has been no
change in law or discovery of new evidence, and hence plaintiff's motion may only be granted if
the Court finds a need to correct clear error or to prevent manifest injustice. But denial of
plaintiff's pre-discovery summary judgment motion certainly was not clearly erroneous and has
worked no such injustice. The case simply entered the discovery phase, as is routine. Indeed, a
grant of that motion might have worked the very injustice that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are designed to prevent.
Plaintiff sought summary judgment -- and seeks reconsideration -- against Safeguard
Properties, Inc. based on deposition testimony provided by Midland Mortgage Co.'s corporate
designee. That deposition was taken on November 11, 2008. See Pl.'s Mot. at 2. Safeguard was
not added as a defendant in this case until January 2009. Safeguard had no involvement at the
Midland deposition and, at the time of plaintiff's summary judgment motion, had not been
provided with an opportunity to conduct any of its own discovery. See Defs.' Opp. at 4. "Pre-
discovery summary judgment motions are usually premature and hence disfavored." Bourbeau
v. Johnathan Woodner Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2009).1 Granting summary judgment
against Safeguard based on a deposition that preceded its involvement in this litigation would be
plainly unjust. For these reasons, and the entire record herein, it is hereby ORDERED that
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
The Court also reminds the parties that it expects them to resolve routine disputes on
their own. As the Court advised at the Initial Scheduling Conference on April 22, 2009, each
party should carefully consider the merits of its position before resisting reasonable requests
from the other side or seeking the assistance of the Court. Intransigence for the sake of
intransigence falls beyond the bounds of zealous advocacy, and the Court does not look kindly
upon frivolous requests or plainly unreasonable arguments. And in any event, all reasonable,
good faith efforts should be exhausted before bringing a discovery dispute to the Court's
attention, and even then the informal resolution process outlined by the Court at the Initial
Scheduling Conference should be followed instead of filing written motions.
1
See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (summary judgment is
normally appropriate after "adequate time for discovery"); Tabb v. District of Columbia, 477 F.
Supp. 2d 185, 188 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that a pre-discovery summary judgment motion
"usually is a disfavored practice").
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SO ORDERED.
/s/ John D. Bates
John D. Bates
United States District Judge
Date: July 29, 2009
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