Amaefule v. Exxonmobil Oil Corporation ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
PETER AMAEFULE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 06-2087 (RWR)
)
EXXONMOBIL OIL CORPORATION, )
)
Defendant. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
On May 15, 2009, the parties filed a joint stipulation to
dismiss this action with prejudice under an agreement reached
between them. An order was issued that same day dismissing this
case with prejudice and vacating the preliminary injunction
issued on December 13, 2006. The parties also seek an order
vacating the oral rulings issued on December 13, 2006 in
connection with the preliminary injunction and on March 6, 2009
on the parties’ summary judgment motions such that the rulings
could not be cited as precedent and would carry no precedential
value.
“[V]acatur must be decreed for those judgments whose review
is . . . prevented through happenstance -- that is to say, where
a controversy presented for review has become moot due to
circumstances unattributable to any of the parties” or due to
“unilateral action of the party who prevailed[.]” U.S. Bancorp
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Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 23, 25 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 276 F.3d 627, 634 (D.C. Cir. 2002). On the other
hand, “mootness by reason of settlement does not justify vacatur”
absent “exceptional circumstances.” Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29
(holding that “[w]here mootness results from settlement . . . the
losing party has voluntarily forfeited his legal remedy by the
ordinary processes of appeal . . . , thereby surrendering his
claim to the equitable remedy of vacatur”); see In re United
States, 927 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (discouraging vacatur
where the parties moot a case through settlement even if “the
prevailing party joins the losing party in moving for vacatur”).
Bancorp instructs that “‘[j]udicial precedents are presumptively
correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are
not merely the property of private litigants and should stand
unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served
by a vacatur.’” 513 U.S. at 27 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo
Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting)). The D.C. Circuit has similarly
cautioned that
[w]hen a clash between genuine adversaries produces a
precedent, . . . the judicial system ought not allow
the social value of that precedent, created at cost to
the public and other litigants, to be a bargaining chip
in the process of settlement. The precedent, a public
act of a public official, is not the parties’ property.
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In re United States, 927 F.2d at 628 (quoting In re Mem’l Hosp.
of Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988)); see
also Okla. Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 3 F.3d 1436, 1437-45 (10th Cir.
1993) (collecting cases and declining vacatur in part because the
reasoning of its earlier opinion might “be helpful to other
courts to the extent that it is persuasive”).
The parties argue that “vacatur is necessary to uphold this
District’s longstanding policy of encouraging the amicable
termination of litigation.” (Joint Mem. at 2 (internal quotation
omitted).) They cite to no precedent, though, establishing any
longstanding practice in this District of encouraging settlement
by vacating court decisions.1 Indeed, a court encourages
settlement by ruling on parties’ dispositive motions so that
parties know where they stand when they engage in settlement
discussions about surviving claims. Similarly, a court
encourages settlement by making available its reasoning for
litigants in similar actions to rely upon when assessing whether
settlement is the preferable resolution to a dispute.
Nevertheless, neither party has demonstrated any exceptional
circumstances justifying deviating from longstanding policy in
1
The sole example cited, 1992 Republican Senate-House Dinner
Committee v. Carolina’s Pride Seafood, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 223
(D.D.C. 1994), does not a longstanding practice make. That court
did choose in its discretion “to reward the parties for
settlement,” id. at 224, by vacating its prior opinion
notwithstanding the D.C. Circuit precedent it cited disfavoring
such action. This court declines to follow that example.
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this circuit against vacatur following settlement. Nor have the
parties argued that the previous rulings in this action were
erroneous. Having expended the time and effort to resolve the
parties’ motions and create precedent which may be of value to
other courts and litigants, this court finds no basis for
vacating the previous rulings in this action. Accordingly, it is
hereby
ORDERED that the parties’ joint request for an order
vacating the oral rulings issued on December 13, 2006 and
March 6, 2009 such that the rulings may not be cited as precedent
and may carry no precedential value be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 30th day of June, 2009.
________/s/_________________
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge