Charlot v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc. ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
)
ESTATE OF PASCAL )
CHARLOT et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civ. Action No. 03-2501 (EGS)
)
BUSHMASTER FIREARMS, INC., )
)
Defendant. )
)
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs brought this case under the District of Columbia
Assault Weapons Manufacturing Strict Liability Act (“SLA” or “the
Act”), D.C. Code §§ 7-2551.01 to 7-2551.03 (2001). The Court
stayed the case pending a final decision on the constitutionality
of the SLA by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See
District of Columbia v. Beretta (“Beretta V”), 940 A.2d 163 (D.C.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1579 (2009).1 In the interim,
Congress passed the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
(“PLCAA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901 et seq., and defendant filed a second
motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(c). Defendant’s new motion argues that the
PLCAA foreclosed or preempted plaintiffs’ SLA action. Plaintiffs
1
The Beretta Cases are fully cited and identified in this
memorandum opinion as Beretta I through Beretta V. See infra
Section I.C.
respond that their suit falls within one of the exceptions of the
PLCAA, and also that the PLCAA is unconstitutional under United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). The United States has
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute.
Pending before the Court is defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. After careful consideration of defendant’s motion,
plaintiffs’ opposition, defendant’s reply, amicus filings the
entire record, and applicable case law, this Court GRANTS
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
When presented with a motion on the pleadings, the Court
“accepts the facts as alleged in the complaint.” Whiteing v.
District of Columbia, 521 F. Supp. 2d 15, 17 (D.D.C. 2007).
Plaintiffs are the personal representatives of the Estate of
Pascal Charlot. Plaintiffs allege that Charlot was shot and
killed with a Bushmaster XM-15 E2S .223 caliber semiautomatic
assault rifle (“rifle”) in Washington, D.C., on October 3, 2002.
Compl. ¶ 2. John Allen Mohammad and Lee Boyd Malvo were charged
with the shooting.2 Id. The defendant, Bushmaster Firearms, Inc.
(“Bushmaster” or “defendant”), is the gun manufacturer that
2
Mohammad and Malvo, known as the D.C. Snipers, terrorized
the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, killing sixteen people
over the course of forty-seven days in October and November 2002.
See Carol Morello, “Va. Court Upholds Muhammad Sentences,” Wash.
Post, April 23, 2005, at B1.
2
produces the rifle. Id. Plaintiffs bring this action under the
SLA.
Plaintiffs allege that Bushmaster manufactured the weapon at
issue, put it into the stream of interstate commerce, and sold it
directly to Bull’s Eye Shooter Supply of Tacoma, Washington
(“Bull’s Eye”). Id. at ¶ 21. Bull’s Eye received the weapon on
July 2, 2002. Plaintiffs further allege that the rifle used to
kill Charlot was manufactured after October 7, 1994, the day the
SLA became applicable to machine guns. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs
state that the weapon was recovered by police, who confirmed that
Charlot was shot and killed with the Bushmaster rifle. Id. ¶ 13.
According to the SLA, a machine gun is defined as a “firearm which
shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot
automatically more than one shot without manual reloading, by a
single function of the trigger.” D.C. Code § 7-2501.01(10).
Plaintiffs allege that the weapon used to kill Charlot falls
within this definition of machine gun, as
it can readily be converted to shoot more than 12 shots
without manual reloading. Bushmaster markets 40 round
magazines as available for sale to the general public for
only $24.95. These magazines are used to convert the
Bushmaster assault rifle to permit the firing of 40 rounds
of ammunition without pausing to reload manually.
Compl. ¶ 27.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiffs originally filed this case in Superior Court of
the District of Columbia (“Superior Court”) on October 1, 2003.
3
Defendant removed the action to this Court on December 5, 2003
pursuant to diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On
January 21, 2004, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings; plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment
on February 20, 2004. On May 5, 2004, after the D.C. Court of
Appeals decided District of Columbia v. Beretta (“Beretta II”),
847 A.2d 1127 (D.C. 2004), this Court, sua sponte, ordered the
parties to file simultaneous pleadings regarding the applicability
of the rationale of Beretta II to the issue raised in this case.
After a motions hearing held on July 29, 2004, defendant, with the
support of amici, urged the Court to grant a stay in this case
until after Beretta II became final. On September 10, 2004, after
a second motions hearing, the Court stayed the case pending final
resolution of Beretta II and ordered the parties to keep this
Court apprised of any developments. On October 10, 2005,
following the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in District of
Columbia v. Beretta (“Beretta III”), 872 A.2d 633 (D.C. 2005),
cert. denied 546 U.S. 928 (2005), this Court ordered the parties
to file a joint proposal for further proceedings.
On November 15, 2005, the Court held a status hearing at
which plaintiffs asked the Court to temporarily lift the stay for
the limited purpose of enabling them to file a motion for leave to
file an amended complaint. The Court granted plaintiffs’ request
and also lifted the stay to allow defendant to brief the
4
applicability of the PLCAA. The Court set a briefing schedule –
including filings from amici, the District of Columbia and The
Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute, Inc., and
the United States – that permitted filings through February 24,
2006. The stay remained in effect as to all other matters. After
a motions hearing on April 18, 2006, the Court took defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings under advisement. While the
motions were under advisement, another iteration of Beretta was
proceeding through the District of Columbia court system. See
District of Columbia v. Beretta (“Beretta IV”), 2006 WL 1892023(D.C. Super. May 22, 2006); see also infra Section I.C. Given the
potential impact of Beretta IV on this case, the Court again
stayed consideration of the pending motions to await the final
resolution of Beretta IV. The appeal in Beretta IV was decided by
the D.C. Court of Appeals on January 10, 2008. Beretta V, 940
A.2d at 163.
On February 7, 2008, after the parties jointly recommended
supplemental briefing to address the applicability of Beretta V,
this Court denied defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings
without prejudice and ordered the parties to file any potentially
dispositive motions thirty days after the decision in Beretta V
became final. The Court set a briefing schedule for the motions,
including an opportunity for the United States, as intervenor, to
5
file its submission. Beretta V became final on March 9, 2009 when
the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See 129 S. Ct. at 1579.
C. The Many Iterations of Beretta
Beretta was originally filed in 2002 in D.C. Superior Court.
See District of Columbia v. Beretta (“Beretta I”), 2002 WL
31811717 (D.C. Super. Dec. 16, 2002). Plaintiffs brought an
action seeking compensatory damages and other equitable relief for
conduct by defendants that plaintiffs alleged gave rise to
liability under common law claims of negligence and public
nuisance, as well as under the SLA. Defendant filed a motion for
judgment on the pleadings seeking dismissal of the suit. The
Superior Court entered judgment for defendant and dismissed the
action, finding the SLA to be an unconstitutional exercise of
extraterritorial regulation by the District. See id. at *48.
On appeal, the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part, holding that the SLA is constitutional and
allowing the individual plaintiffs to advance to discovery. See
Beretta II, 847 A.2d at 1151. An en banc hearing of the D.C.
Court of Appeals vacated the panel’s opinion and superceded the
panel’s decision. See Beretta III, 872 A.2d at 633. Beretta III
held, inter alia, that (1) the SLA confers a right of action on
individuals who are injured, but not on the District; (2) the SLA
does not violate the Commerce Clause; (3) and the SLA does not
violate due process. The D.C. Court of Appeals remanded the case
6
to the Superior Court, but before the case was heard on remand in
Superior Court, Congress enacted the PLCAA.
On remand, the Superior Court granted defendant’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings and held that plaintiffs’ causes of
action under the SLA fall squarely within the PLCAA’s definition
of a “qualified civil liability action” and did not fall within
the PLCAA’s predicate exception. See Beretta IV, 2006 WL 1892023,
at *9. The Superior Court also concluded that the PLCAA was a
constitutional exercise of congressional authority. On appeal,
the D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Superior
Court and held, inter alia, that (1) the District’s and
individuals’ SLA causes of action were a “qualified civil
liability action” barred by the PLCAA, and (2) the PLCAA did not
violate separation of powers by usurping a judicial function and
directing a court to take a specific position in the pending SLA
action. See Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 169-74. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari on March 9, 2009. See 129 S. Ct. at 1579.
D. The D.C. Court of Appeals Holdings in Beretta V
In Beretta V, the plaintiffs conceded that “if their action
is not one alleging ‘violat[ion by the defendants of] a . . .
statute applicable to the sale or marketing of’ a firearm, 15
U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii), then it is a ‘qualified civil liability
action’ that must be dismissed, unless the Constitution dictates
otherwise.” Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 169 (footnote omitted).
7
Plaintiffs argued that they met the predicate exception3 because
their complaint alleged that the defendant “knowingly violated”
the SLA, a statute that by its express terms “‘appli[es] to the
sale or marketing of’ a class of firearms.” Id. at 169. The D.C.
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that it had
difficulty seeing how defendants “may be said to have ‘violated’
the SLA.” Id. at 170. The court further reasoned:
In ordinary language, a “violation” is understood to mean “an
infringement or transgression,” and a violation of a law to
mean “[a]n infraction or breach of the law.” Plain meaning,
therefore, would seem to require the law in question to
contain a prohibition against, or standards of, conduct that
are being violated.
Id. (internal citations omitted). The court noted that D.C. Code
§ 7-2531.02(a), which generally mirrors the SLA,
requires proof that the defendant knowingly and willfully
engaged in the illegal sale of a firearm, defined to mean any
of four actions including [f]ailure to establish proof of the
purchaser’s residence in a jurisdiction where the purchase of
the weapon is legal, or [f]ailure to maintain full, complete,
and accurate records of firearm sales as required by local,
state, and federal law.
3
The PLCAA provides for six exceptions to the mandate that
qualified civil liability actions must be dismissed. See 15
U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi). The exception relevant here, which
has been called the “predicate exception,” City of New York v.
Beretta, 524 F.3d 384, 390 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1579 (2009), provides that a suit may proceed when a
plaintiff adequately alleges that a “manufacturer or seller of a
qualified product knowingly violated a State or Federal statute
applicable to the sale or marketing of the product, and the
violation was a proximate cause of the harm for which relief is
sought.” § 7903(5)(A)(iii); see also Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 169-
70.
8
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The problem
the Court of Appeals found, however, is that plaintiffs did not
allege liability under D.C. Code § 7-2531.02, “nor is their SLA
claim that the defendants knowingly violated any proscriptions or
requirements of local or federal law governing the sale or
possession of firearms.” Id. Rather, plaintiffs argued that the
SLA, which by its terms would make these defendants “strictly
liable in tort” for death or injuries resulting from the discharge
of an assault weapon or machine gun they manufactured or sold,
embodies “‘a legal duty owed to the residents of the District’”
and that its requirement to compensate for injuries “‘thus
presupposes a “violation” of a statutory duty.’” Id. (quoting Br.
for Individual Plaintiffs at 4-5).
The court rejected this argument, noting that “it stretches
the meaning of ‘violation’ well beyond what the authors of the
PLCAA reasonably intended.” Id. Accordingly, the court found
that “[t]he SLA imposes no duty on firearms manufacturers or
sellers to operate in any particular manner or according to any
standards of care or reasonableness.” Id. (citation omitted).
The court noted that in the plaintiffs’ view, the statute is
“‘violated’ . . . merely when a person is killed or injured by the
discharge of an assault weapon manufactured or sold by a named
defendant – an injury that may occur years after the manufacture
9
or sale and despite the utmost care taken in the manufacture or
sale.” Id.The court held that “[b]y the terms of the PLCAA, the
plaintiffs’ action under the SLA was properly dismissed.” Id. at
172. The court reasoned that “[s]hoehorning, as it were, into the
predicate exception a strict liability cause of action that, at
bottom, simply shifts the cost of injuries resulting from the
discharge of lawfully manufactured and distributed firearms would,
in our view, ‘frustrate Congress’s clear intention’ reflected in
the PLCAA.” Id. (internal citation omitted).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) will be granted only if “the moving
party demonstrates that no material fact is in dispute and that it
is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Peters v. Nat’l
R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(quoting Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d
Cir. 1988)). The Court must “‘view the facts presented in the
pleadings and the inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Id. (quoting Jablonski,
863 F.3d at 290-91).
III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The SLA
10
The Council of the District of Columbia enacted the SLA in
December 1990, and the law took effect on February 29, 1992. The
SLA provides that
Any manufacturer, importer, or dealer of an assault weapon
or machine gun shall be held strictly liable in tort,
without regard to fault or proof of defect, for all direct
and consequential damages that arise from bodily injury or
death if the bodily injury or death proximately results
from the discharge of the assault weapon or machine gun in
the District of Columbia.
D.C. Code § 7-2551.02.4 The SLA imposes strict liability based on
findings that “assault weapons” and “machine guns” are “abnormally
and unreasonably dangerous,” and “[i]t is foreseeable by
manufacturers and distributors of assault weapons that the
criminal or accidental use of assault weapons will cause injury or
death.” See D.C. Law 8-263 [Act 8-289], § 2(12), (13), DCR 8482
(Dec. 28, 1990).
B. The PLCAA
The PLCAA became law on October 26, 2005, and prohibits the
institution of a “qualified civil liability action” in any state
or federal court. 15 U.S.C. § 7902(b). It further provides that
any such “action that is pending on [the date of enactment of this
Act] shall be immediately dismissed by the court in which the
action was brought or is currently pending.” Id. A “qualified
4
D.C. Code § 7-2551.03 lists exemptions from liability,
including an exemption for a weapon originally distributed to law
enforcement. § 7-2551.03(a). The SLA also provides that “[a]ny
defense that is available in a strict liability action shall be
available as a defense under this unit.” § 7-2551.03(d).
11
civil liability action” is defined as “a civil action . . .
brought by any person against a manufacturer or seller of a
[firearm that has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce] . . . for damages, . . . or other relief
resulting from the criminal or unlawful misuse of [the firearm].”
Id. § 7903(5)(A).
Congress enacted the PLCAA in response to “[l]awsuits . . .
commenced against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, and
importers of firearms that operate as designed and intended, which
seek money damages and other relief for the harm caused by the
misuse of firearms by third parties, including criminals.” Id. §
7901(a)(3). Congress found that manufacturers and sellers of
firearms “are not, and should not, be liable for the harm caused
by those who criminally or unlawfully misuse firearm products or
ammunition products that function as designed and intended.” Id.
§ 7901(a)(5). Congress found egregious “[t]he possibility of
imposing liability on an entire industry for harm that is solely
caused by others.” Id. § 7901(a)(6). Indeed, the PLCAA’s stated
primary purpose is
[t]o prohibit causes of action against manufacturers,
distributors, dealers, and importers of firearms or
ammunition products, and their trade associations, for the
harm solely caused by the criminal or unlawful misuse of
firearm products or ammunition products by others when the
product functioned as designed and intended.
Id. § 7901(b)(1).
12
The PLCAA provides for six exceptions to the definition of a
“qualified civil liability action.” See § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi).
Most relevant to this case, a qualified civil liability action
“shall not include . . . an action in which a manufacturer or
seller of a qualified product knowingly violated a State or
Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the
product, and the violation was a proximate cause of the harm for
which relief is sought.” Id. § 7903(5)(A)(iii). This is known as
the “predicate exception.” See supra n.3.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The SLA and the Predicate Exception
Defendant maintains that Beretta V correctly held that a
claim under the SLA does not fit within the predicate exception of
the PLCAA, because the SLA does not proscribe any conduct nor is
it a statute “applicable to the sale or marketing,” §
7903(5)(A)(iii), of firearms within the meaning of the predicate
exception of the Act. Even if it were possible for Bushmaster to
“violate” the SLA, defendant contends, that violation would not be
a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ harm, as required for the claim
to fit within the predicate exception of the PLCAA.
Beretta V notwithstanding, plaintiffs argue that the PLCAA’s
statutory exception includes, by its plain language, violations of
the SLA. Plaintiffs maintain that the SLA is a statute
“applicable to the sale or marketing,” § 7903(5)(A)(iii), of
13
firearms as defined by the PLCAA and that plaintiffs have
fulfilled the proximate cause requirement of the statutory
exception to the PLCAA by alleging a violation of the SLA.
Plaintiffs argue that this Court is not bound by Beretta V because
the D.C. Court of Appeals is not a federal court.
Plaintiffs are not entirely correct. While it is true that
this Court is not bound by the D.C. Court of Appeals’
interpretation of the PLCAA, this Court is bound by the D.C. Court
of Appeals’ interpretation of the SLA, a District of Columbia
statute. “Resolution of all claims that arise under state law,
whether brought in federal court or not, is controlled by the
substantive law of the state that creates the cause of action.”
U.S. Through Small Bus. Admin. v. Peña, 731 F.2d 8, 11 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 (1938)).
Erie “fully applies to federal courts in the District of Columbia
when they exercise jurisdiction over state-created causes of
action.”5 Id. (citing Anchorage-Hynning & Co. v. Moringiello, 697
F.2d 356, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Construing the SLA, the D.C.
Court of Appeals found that Beretta had not “violated” the SLA
within the meaning of the predicate exception of the PLCAA. See
Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 170-71. The D.C. Court of Appeals holding
that the SLA is not a predicate exception is binding on this
5
. For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, the District
of Columbia is treated as a state. See 28 U.S.C. § 1451.
14
Court. See Steorts v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 647 F.2d 194, 197 n.24
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (“[D]eference due to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals as the highest court of the District require the
federal courts here to abide by the guidelines established by Erie
and its progeny.”).
The Beretta Cases are nearly identical to the case before
this Court. The legal arguments made by the parties here are
identical to some of the arguments the D.C. Court of Appeals
rejected in Beretta V. See supra Section I.B. As determined by
the D.C. Court of Appeals, the SLA is not a predicate exception
statute within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A)(iii), because
Bushmaster cannot be said to have violated the SLA simply by
lawfully selling a gun to Bull’s Eye. That determination
notwithstanding, this Court must still decide whether the PLCAA is
constitutional. Plaintiff is correct that the D.C. Court of
Appeals’ construction of federal law is not controlling precedent
for this Court. See Silvas v. E*Trade Mortg. Corp., 421 F. Supp.
2d 1315, 1321 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (“In any event, none of these
California decisions are binding on this Court since they are
state decisions interpreting federal preemption law.”). This
Court must decide the constitutionality of the PLCAA for itself.
Having determined – based on the D.C. Court of Appeals’ holding in
Beretta V – that the predicate exception does not apply, this
Court now turns to that task.
15
B. The Constitutionality of the PLCAA
Plaintiffs contend that the PLCAA is unconstitutional under
the separation of powers principles announced in Klein because
Congress has directly instructed the courts to dismiss all cases
falling into a certain category. Just as in Beretta V, plaintiffs
challenge the PLCAA on the grounds that Congress has attempted to
direct the outcome of a pending case – thereby usurping the
judiciary’s role to decide cases and violating the separation of
powers doctrine. See Beretta V, 940 A.2d at 172.
In addition to the D.C. Court of Appeals, both the Second and
Ninth Circuits have held that the PLCAA does not contravene the
principles of separation of powers first articulated in United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871). See City of New York v.
Beretta, 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1579 (2009); Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendant argues that the PLCAA is constitutional because it
creates a new federal standard that governs when a manufacturer of
a firearm may be sued for harm resulting from the misuse of the
firearm. Defendant urges the Court to follow the D.C. Court of
Appeals and the Second and Ninth Circuits, which upheld the
constitutionality of the PLCAA.
The United States – which intervened in this case to defend
the constitutionality of the PLCAA – argues that the PLCAA is
constitutional under the Supremacy Clause, as it preempts state or
16
common law causes of action.6 The United States asserts that the
PLCAA is consistent with separation of powers principles announced
in Klein because the PLCAA imposes a new legal standard that is
not restricted to pending cases. Like defendant, the United
States maintains that in enacting the PLCAA, Congress has done
nothing more than create a new governing law, in that federal law
now preempts certain state and common law claims, whereas no
preemption previously existed.
This Court starts from the premise that Acts of Congress are
entitled to a “strong presumption of validity.” Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (2005). Under this presumption, laws with
an economic purpose are upheld “absent proof of arbitrariness or
irrationality on the part of Congress.” Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83 (1978)
(citations omitted). Under Klein, however, Congress cannot direct
the outcome of a pending case without changing the substantive law
underlying the suit.
In Klein, Congress, unhappy with a court’s decision that
proof of loyalty to the Union after the Civil War could be
established by presidential pardon, passed a law directing the
Supreme Court to dismiss any suit in which the claimant had
6
The plaintiffs do not challenge Congress’s authority to
enact the PLCAA, so there is no need to address Congress’s
authority here. For a discussion of Congress’s authority to
enact the PLCAA under the Commerce Clause, see City of New York,
524 F.3d at 393-95.
17
established loyalty on the basis of a pardon. Klein, 80 U.S. at
143-44. The Court held that Congress impermissibly “required [the
court] to ascertain the existence of certain facts and thereupon
to declare that its jurisdiction had ceased, by dismissing the
bill.” Id. at 146. Plaintiffs argue that the PLCAA contains a
similar command: ascertain whether an action is a “qualified
civil liability action” and thereupon dismiss it.
Plaintiffs contend that the PLCAA arose out of Congress’s
dissatisfaction with judicial interpretations of existing laws. A
report by the House Judiciary Committee explains that Congress was
concerned that “various public entities that have brought suit
against the gun industry in recent years have raised novel claims”
and that “approximately half [of these suits] have been allowed to
proceed.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-24 at 13-16. Plaintiffs also point
to the findings in the PLCAA, which warn of “[t]he possible
sustaining” of “liability actions . . . by maverick judicial
officer or petit jury.” 15 U.S.C. § 7901(a)(7). In response,
Congress enacted the PLCAA “to prevent . . . courts . . . from
setting precedents that will further undermine American industries
and the U.S. economy.” H.R. Rep. No. 109-24 at 5.
Defendant responds that (1) the PLCAA reflects a change in
existing law; and (2) that even if it did not change existing law,
the PLCAA does not impose a rule of decision in violation of
Klein. The Court is persuaded by defendant’s argument. Klein’s
18
prohibition does not prevent Congress from changing the law
applicable to pending cases. See Plaut v. Sprindthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (“Whatever the precise scope of
Klein, however, later decisions have made clear that its
prohibition does not take hold where Congress ‘amends applicable
law’” (quoting Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc., 503 U.S. 429,
441 (1992))); Axel Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 6 F.3d
78, 81 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The rule of Klein precludes Congress from
usurping the adjudicative function assigned to the federal courts
under Article III. However, Klein does not preclude Congress from
changing the law applicable to pending cases.”). While Congress
is barred from “retroactively commanding the federal courts to
reopen final judgments,” Plaut, 514 U.S. at 218, “Congress may
require (insofar as separation-of-powers limitations are
concerned) that new statutes be applied in cases not yet final,”
id. at 233 n.7. If a new law imposes a “new legal standard” that
is not restricted to pending cases, there is no separation of
powers violation. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 349 (2000).
Plaintiffs contend that the PLCAA takes the unusual approach
of defining a specific group of lawsuits based on existing law and
directing the judicial branch to dismiss them. In the Court’s
view, however, that is not what Congress did when it enacted the
PLCAA. Congress enacted a law barring qualified civil liability
as defined in the statute, which sets forth a new legal standard
19
to be applied to all actions. In so doing, Congress proceeded in
a way that has been upheld by the Supreme Court. In Robertson,
several environmental organizations filed lawsuits to stop timber
harvesting in old growth forests as violative of certain statutes.
In response, Congress passed a law amending the governing law by
allowing the harvest under certain conditions and, if those
conditions were met, the statutory requirements at issue would be
satisfied. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 438-39. The Supreme Court
found that Klein was not violated because Congress had “compelled
changes in law, not findings or results under old law.” Id. at
438; see also Axel Johnson, Inc., 6 F.3d at 82 (upholding
amendment to Securities and Exchange Act); City of Chicago v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, 423 F.3d 777, 780 (7th Cir. 2005)
(upholding changes to law under Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2005).
The PLCAA creates a new federal standard that governs when
plaintiffs can sue manufacturers or sellers of firearms. As the
Second Circuit explained,
[T]he Act permissibly sets forth a new rule of law that is
applicable both to pending actions and to future actions.
The PLCAA bars qualified civil liability actions, as
defined in the statute. The definition of qualified civil
liability action permissibly sets forth a new legal
standard to be applied to all actions.
City of New York, 524 F.3d at 395 (citing Miller, 530 U.S. at 348-
49). The statute preempts and displaces conflicting state law.
Preemption, rather than amending a specific statute, does not make
20
it any less a change in the law or render it constitutionally
infirm. See Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1131-37.
“Pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution, state law is preempted when it ‘stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’” Cleveland County Ass’n for Gov’t by
People v. Cleveland County Bd. of Comm’rs, 142 F.3d 468, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (quoting Wash. Serv. Contractors Coal. v. District of
Columbia, 54 F.3d 811, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Accordingly,
Congress may abrogate tort claims consistent with separation of
powers principles even when legislation has an impact on pending
cases. Tort law is generally regulated by the states, which have
“considerable flexibility” in defining that body of law. See BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). If a state’s
tort laws burden interstate commerce, however, then its power is
subordinate to federal law. Id. at 571 (“[O]ne State’s power to
impose burdens on the interstate market . . . is not only
subordinate to the federal power of interstate commerce, but is
also constrained by the need to respect the interests of other
States.” (citations omitted)). Congress manifested a clear intent
to preempt state tort actions by designing the PLCAA to conflict
with contrary state or common law laws. See supra Section III.B.;
15 U.S.C. § 7901(b)(4) (“The purpose[] of this chapter [includes
the prevention] of such lawsuits to impose unreasonable burdens on
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interstate and foreign commerce.”). “In determining whether a
state statute is pre-empted by federal law and therefore invalid
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, [the Court’s] sole
task is to ascertain the intent of Congress.” Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987) (citations
omitted). One of Congress’s purposes in enacting the PLCAA was to
“prohibit causes of action” that constitute qualified civil
liability actions. See 15 U.S.C. § 7901 2(b)(1).
The Court rejects plaintiffs’ argument that the PLCAA imposes
an impermissible rule of decision upon the courts. Unlike the
provision at issue in Klein, the PLCAA does not directly interfere
with judicial fact-finding. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 130-34. The
PLCAA identifies particular types of claims that are not
permissible and leaves it to the courts to apply those standards
in the cases before them. See § 7903(5)(A)(iii); City of New
York, 524 F.3d 390. The statute permits the courts to determine
whether the cases before them, such as this one, are covered by
the PLCAA. Id. Defendant has persuasively demonstrated that this
case is squarely covered by the PLCAA.
Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the PLCAA leaves in place
a judicial function before the Court: to determine whether the
suit in question falls into the general category and not one of
the exceptions. See § 7903(5)(A)(i)-(vi); see also City of New
York, 524 F.3d at 395-96; Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1139-40. Though
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plaintiffs rely heavily on Klein to argue that the PLCAA
contravenes separation of powers, every other court to examine the
constitutionality of the PLCAA has found that it does not violate
Klein. See, e.g., Adames v. Sheahan, 2009 WL 711297 (Ill. Mar.
18, 2009).
As discussed above, in Beretta V, the D.C. Court of Appeals
held that
Plaut and Robertson demonstrate why Klein does not apply
to this case. The PLCAA sets forth new standards that
must be met before a case may be brought or a pending one
may proceed against the manufacturer or seller of a
firearm for damages resulting from the use of the firearm
by a third person. When, but only when, a suit is found
by a court not to meet one of the statutory exceptions to
a “qualified civil liability action,” it must be
dismissed.
940 A.2d at 173.
The Second and Ninth Circuits reached the same conclusion.
As the Second Circuit noted
Article III of the Constitution establishes a judicial
department with the province and duty . . . to say what
the law is in particular cases and controversies. Article
III forbids legislatures from prescribing rules of
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in
cases pending before it. However, this prohibition does
not take hold when Congress amends applicable law.
City of New York, 524 F.3d at 395 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “Because the PLCAA does not merely direct the
outcome of cases, but changes the applicable law, it does not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers.” Id. at 396.
The Ninth Circuit, favorably citing both Beretta V and City
of New York, also found that the PLCAA was constitutional and did
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not contravene Klein. The Ninth Circuit noted that “if a statute
compels changes in the law, not findings or results under old law,
it merely amends the underlying law, and is therefore not subject
to a Klein challenge.” Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1139 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). This distinction is key
to this Court’s holding. Rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that
Congress had compelled results under old law, the Ninth Circuit
said, “[h]ere, Congress has amended the applicable law; it has not
compelled results under old law. The PLCAA sets forth a new legal
standard – the definition (with exceptions) of a ‘qualified civil
liability action’ – to be applied to all cases.” Id. at *10. The
Ninth Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the PLCAA
somehow violated Plaut’s holding that Congress cannot “overrule[]
‘the judicial department with regard to a particular case or
controversy.’” Id. (quoting Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227). The Ninth
Circuit noted that “the quoted sentence makes clear, that rule
applies to final decisions by the judiciary, not to pending
cases.” Id. (citing Plaut, 514 U.S. at 227 (“[E]ach court, at
every level, must decide [a case] according to existing laws.
Having achieved finality, however, a judicial decision becomes the
last word of the judicial department with regard to a particular
case or controversy [and cannot be overruled by congressional
act].”)). The PLCAA applies only to pending and future cases and
does not purport to undo final judgments of the judiciary. Id.24
This Court concurs with the rationale of the other courts
that have examined the PLCAA. See Beretta V 940 A.2d at 163; City
of New York,524 F.3d at 384; Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1126. Thus, this
Court concludes that the PLCAA withstands constitutional scrutiny
and that plaintiffs’ SLA claims are preempted by the federal
statute.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the foregoing, defendant’s motion for judgment on
the pleadings is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion to strike, motion
for leave to file, and plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary
judgment are DENIED AS MOOT. An appropriate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
June 25, 2009
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