Windstead v. District of Columbia ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAMES WINSTEAD, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civ. A. No. 04-887 (JMF)
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case was referred to me for all purposes including trial. Currently pending before
me is Plaintiffs [sic] (George Morgan, Juanita Irving, James Winstead, Louis Beale, Patricia
Newby, Sheila Owens and Mary Waley) Motion for Motion for [sic] Reconsideration of the
January 26, 2009 Order (“Plains. Mot.”) [#81]. For the reasons stated herein, the motion will be
granted.
As noted in previous opinions, plaintiffs are eleven current or former District of
Columbia employees and the estates of two former District of Columbia employees who have
made claims for disability compensation pursuant to the District of Columbia Comprehensive
Merit Personnel System Act (“CMPA”).1 Winstead v. District of Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d 104,
107 (D.D.C. 2008). Defendants are 1) the District of Columbia, 2) Mayor Adrian Fenty,2 3)
1
On May 21, 2007, the estates of two individual plaintiffs were substituted as plaintiffs.
2
Mayor Adrian Fenty was elected in November, 2006, and therefore replaces Mayor
Williams as a named defendant.
James Jacobs, Director of the Office of Risk Management.3 Id. Both Fenty and Jacobs are sued
in their official capacities. Id. On March 12, 2008, this Court 1) granted defendants’ motion to
dismiss as to plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim that the CMPA was facially unconstitutional, 2) granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ § 1985 claim that defendants conspired to deprive
plaintiffs of due process, 3) granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Morgan,
Irving, Winstead, Beale, Newby, Owens and Waley, and 4) denied defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Rogers, Hayden, and Downing. Winstead, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 107-09,
129-30. On January 26, 2009, this Court denied plaintiffs Morgan, Irving, Winstead, Beale,
Newby, Owens and Waley’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s March 12, 2008 Order,4
which in turn granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to these seven plaintiffs.5
These seven plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of the Court’s 2009 Order.
In this Court’s January 26, 2009 Memorandum Opinion, the Court held that the seven
plaintiffs could have either 1) sought review of the agency’s actions under the District of
Columbia Administrative Procedure Act, D.C. Code § 2-510 (2001) (“DCAPA”) or 2) sought a
writ of mandamus from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 21 of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rules. Since they did not, the Court granted defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that they failed to
avail themselves of alternative judicial remedies. The Court then ordered that the remaining
plaintiffs, Rogers, Hayden, and Downing, show cause why their cases should not also be
3
The case against defendant Computer Literacy World/Creative Disability Management
was terminated on October 29, 2005. See Stipulation of Dismissal Without Prejudice at [#20].
4
Winstead v. District of Columbia, 596 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2009).
5
Winstead v. District of Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2008).
2
dismissed for the same reason. Instead of receiving a filing from the remaining plaintiffs,
however, the seven plaintiffs who were dismissed filed another motion for reconsideration.
Having considered the motion and the opposition, I have now concluded that my earlier
conclusion that the availability of alternative forms of judicial relief precluded plaintiffs’
assertion that the delay they encountered violated their right not be to deprived of their property
without due process of law was wrong. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ current motion will be granted
and the Court’s January 26, 2009 opinion, reported at Winstead v. District of Columbia, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2009), will be vacated.
I begin with the acknowledgment that the federal courts have uniformly concluded that an
unreasonable delay in the state’s administrative processing of a claim to benefits may constitute
the deprivation of property without due process of law, cognizable under 42 U.S. C. § 1983.6
Kraebel v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Hous. Pres. and Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 405 (2d Cir.)(“due process
requires that eligibility for a variety of benefits be processed within a reasonable time”) cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 917 (1992) ; Schroeder v. Chicago, 927 F.2d 957, 960 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The
cases on unreasonable delay are best understood as holding that implicit in the conferral of an
entitlement is a further entitlement, to receive the entitlement within a reasonable time.”); Kelly
v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 625 F.2d 486, 489 (3d Cir. 1980) (delay in processing of disability payments
can violate due process); Machado v. Leavitt, 542 F. Supp. 2d 185, 194 (D. Mass 2008)
(Sufficiently egregious delay in process entitlement may constitute a remediable constitutional
violation, even if the relevant statutory framework does not specify a time for agency action).
6
All references to the United States Code and other statutes are to the electronic versions
in Westlaw or Lexis.
3
See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330 (1976) (interest of claimant in prompt resolution of
eligibility permitted him to bypass the full exhaustion route).
Moreover, I have now discovered two well reasoned opinions that, while not binding in
this Circuit, specifically reject my earlier conclusion that the availability of judicial relief with
respect to delay in a state’s administrative process precludes entertaining a § 1983 action
premised on that delay.
In Kraebel, the court of appeals rejected the argument that plaintiff had all the process
that was due because she could have addressed her claim of unreasonable delay in the
administrative processing of her claim in a judicial proceeding. 959 F.2d at 405. It held that the
mere availability of redress in state court did not satisfy her right to be free of unreasonable
delay. As the Supreme Court made clear in Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 541 (1985): “‘[M]inimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are
not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem
adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.’”) (quoting Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980)). In other words, the sufficiency of the administrative process provided
by state law may be challenged in an action in federal court irrespective of any available
alternative state judicial remedies to challenge delay in that administrative process.
Building on Kraebel, the Colorado Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion in
Walter v. City and County of Denver, 983 P.2d 88 (Colo. App. 1998), cert. denied, 1999 Colo.
LEXIS 802 (Colo. Aug. 24, 1999). It too rejected the contention that plaintiff experienced any
deprivation of due process because plaintiff had judicial remedies available to redress the City’s
alleged delays in processing a claim for benefits. The court stated: “The City, however, cannot
4
rely on the mere existence of a system of judicial enforcement to compensate for its allegedly
intentional efforts to delay the payment of benefits to which plaintiff was due.” Id. at 91.
My conclusion to the precise contrary was in error. I now believe that determining
whether the delays plaintiffs have encountered violate due process requires the nuanced, factually
based analysis suggested by the Second Circuit in Kraebel:
Keeping in mind these two unusual aspects of Kraebel's due
process claim, the district court on remand bearing in mind the
deference appropriately accorded by courts to executive agencies
regarding practicalities encountered by those agencies in
administering legislative programs, cf. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at
347-48, 96 S.Ct. at 908-09, should engage in a factual inquiry to
determine whether the burdens and delays imposed by the city
were reasonable. It may consider a variety of additional factors in
making this determination: the procedures actually used by the city
to determine whether a landlord is entitled to the claimed excess
SCRIE payments, the factors the city considers, the level of
difficulty in making the determination, the amount of work
required, the amount of decision-making discretion given to the
employees, the need for and availability of administrative appellate
review, the necessity for the paperwork and supporting
documentation required, the amount of time required to process
similar claims, and any other factors that may bear on whether “due
process” is provided. If, given the steps reasonably necessary to
restore to Kraebel the rents kept from her by this program, the
court finds that the city has taken an unduly long time to process
her applications, the court should not hesitate to award damages,
which may include interest, calculated at a market rate, from the
time that the delay became unreasonable.
Kraebel, 959 F.2d at 406. Accord Metsopulos v. Mascali, No. 86-CV-1826, 1986 WL 15343, at
*12 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 1986) (following Kraebel in defining the nature of the factual inquiry to be
done).
Since such an inquiry is now necessary, I will permit the parties 120 days of discovery in
which to flesh out the facts bearing on the inquiry that must be made. For the edification of their
5
counsel and to advance the interest in efficient and effective discovery, I note two additional
issues that strike me as most significant:
1. Whether entitlement to relief under § 1983 is a function of each plaintiff’s success
or lack of it in the administrative process? In other words, are plaintiffs who have
now prevailed in that process to be treated differently from those who did not? In
addition, are those plaintiffs who claim to still await action (Irving, Rasheed,
Downing, and Newby) entitled to any relief in the form of damages?
2. What proof of actual injury is necessary to preclude an award of nominal damages
to plaintiffs for the delay encountered? See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
In the meanwhile, my decision of January 26, 2009 will be vacated. Additionally, I have
now also concluded that my decision of March 12, 2008, reported at Winstead v. District of
Columbia, 538 F. Supp. 2d at 104 (D.D.C. 2008), was similarly influenced by my incorrect
conclusion as to the significance of the availability of alternative forms of judicial relief and must
be vacated as well. By the same token, the parties have no quarrel with my Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts in the March 12, 2008 opinion and those facts will be deemed
admitted by both sides, unless an objection is filed within ten days of this Opinion. Finally, I will
deem authentic and proof of the facts stated herein the statements in the Orders that are attached
to plaintiffs’ three Notices Regarding Supplemental Authority, i.e. Docket numbers 74. 75, and
76, insofar as they describe events that have occurred and orders issued in the course of the
administrative proceedings affecting the plaintiffs named therein.
An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
6
/S/
JOHN M. FACCIOLA
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated: June 3, 2009
7