Poindexter v. Wachovia Mortgage Corporation ( 2011 )


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  •                            UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
    )
    SUSIE M. POINDEXTER,           )
    )
    Plaintiff,              )
    )
    v.              )                                Civil Action No. 09-1392 (RLW)
    )
    WACHOVIA MORTGAGE CORPORATION, )
    et al.                         )
    )
    Defendants.             )
    )
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Against
    Defendant Chase Title, Inc., ECF No. 52 [hereinafter Mot.]. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff
    alleges that she was fraudulently induced to refinance her mortgage with a loan that contained
    payment terms she could not meet. See 1st Am. Verified Compl., ECF No. 19. Against Chase
    Title, Inc. (“Chase”), Plaintiff alleges a common-law claim of unconscionability, id. ¶¶ 81–84,
    and a claim for violation of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act, id. ¶¶ 109–16.
    The U.S. Marshals Service served a copy of the amended complaint on Chase’s
    registered agent, National Registered Agents, in August 2010. Process Receipt and Return, ECF
    No. 33 at 2. Chase answered the amended complaint through counsel in December 2010. See
    Ans. of Def., Chase Title, Inc., to 1st Am. Verified Compl., ECF No. 34. In April 2011, Chase’s
    counsel moved to withdraw. See Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Def. Chase Title, Inc.,
    Pursuant to LCvR 83.6(c), ECF No. 39. On May 31, 2011, the Court granted that motion, which
    was not opposed by any party and which was not responded to by Chase itself, as conceded.
    Order, ECF No. 43. At that moment, Chase became unrepresented by counsel.
    A corporation may not proceed pro se in a civil action. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1654
    ; see United
    States v. High Country Broadcasting Co., Inc., 
    3 F.3d 1244
     (9th Cir. 1993). The Court warned
    Chase of that fact several times, through several orders sent to several addresses where Chase
    might have been found, giving Chase ample time and opportunity to secure counsel to represent
    it in this case. See Order, ECF No. 43; Order, ECF No. 46. The final deadline by which Chase
    was to have secured counsel was August 29, 2011. Order at 2, ECF No. 46; Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d).
    To date, since Chase’s original counsel withdrew, no counsel has entered an appearance in this
    case on behalf of Chase and Chase has not responded in any way to any of the Court’s orders.
    By failing to secure counsel, Chase has failed to defend itself in this case. The Clerk of the
    Court therefore properly entered Chase’s default on September 29, 2011. Default, ECF No. 51;
    see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
    Plaintiff now moves for judgment on that default and requests an ex parte hearing on
    damages at the time of trial. See Mot. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), that
    motion will be granted. This default judgment may be amended upon an appropriate showing by
    Plaintiff regarding the amount of damages, whereupon final judgment will be entered.
    Accordingly, it is hereby
    ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment Against Defendant
    Chase Title, Inc., ECF No. 52, is GRANTED; and it is
    FURTHER ORDERED that default judgment is entered against Chase Title, Inc.
    Judge            Digitally signed by Judge Robert L.
    Wilkins
    SO ORDERED this 8th day of November, 2011.                                    DN: cn=Judge Robert L. Wilkins,
    Robert L.        o=U.S. District Court, ou=Chambers
    of Honorable Robert L. Wilkins,
    email=RW@dc.uscourt.gov, c=US
    Wilkins          Date: 2011.11.08 11:09:36 -05'00'
    ROBERT L. WIKLINS
    United States District Judge
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2009-1392

Judges: Judge Robert L. Wilkins

Filed Date: 11/8/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014