Cornish v. Dudas ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
____________________________
)
CORNELL D.M. JUDGE CORNISH, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 07-1719 (RWR)
)
JON DUDAS, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
____________________________)
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Cornell Cornish moves for reconsideration of the
June 4, 2010 memorandum opinion and order granting summary
judgment to the defendants on the plaintiff’s reinstatement and
Rehabilitation Act claims, dismissing all of the plaintiff’s
remaining claims, and denying him leave to file a second amended
complaint. Cornish reargues his constitutional and reinstatement
claims and contends that the court made clearly erroneous
findings of fact. Because Cornish’s assignments of error have no
basis in the record, and because he presents no new law, new
evidence, or proof of injustice warranting reconsideration, the
motion will be denied.
The facts of this case are reported in Cornish v. Dudas, 715
F. Supp. 2d 56, 58-60 (D.D.C. 2010). Briefly, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) construed Cornish’s letter of
intent to cease practice as a request for removal from the patent
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register. Id. at 59. The Office invited Cornish to correct its
interpretation, waited five months for a response, and, having
received none, removed Cornish’s name. Id. Nine years later,
Cornish requested reinstatement. Id. The Office denied the
request for failure to present sufficient evidence “of his
ability to render patent applicants valuable service” or, in the
alternative, to pass the patent examination. Id. at 59-60.
Cornish challenged the denial as arbitrary and capricious and
asserted various constitutional claims.1 The defendants, in
turn, moved for summary judgment.
The motion as to Cornish’s reinstatement claim was granted
because Cornish had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, id. at 61-64, and Cornish’s constitutional claims under
the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments were dismissed. Id.
at 67-68. Cornish moves for reconsideration of these rulings,
arguing that certain findings of fact and legal conclusions were
error. (Pl.’s Mot. for Reconsideration (“Pl.’s Mot.”) at 8, 12,
21-23.) For example, Cornish denies having failed to exhaust his
1
The motion for reconsideration offers no argument or
authority for disturbing the court’s rulings on Cornish’s claims
under the Rehabilitation Act, the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, or Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805 (E.D.
Va. 2008). Neither does the motion challenge the portions of the
order dismissing Cornish’s employment discrimination claims and
denying him leave to file a second amended complaint. Cornish’s
motion to stay these proceedings and to consolidate this matter
with Cornish v. Dudas, Civ. No. 09-797, will be denied as the
plaintiff presents no legal basis for the relief he seeks.
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administrative remedies on his reinstatement claim, having been
removed from Maryland’s attorney register as a result of a
grievance, and having been denied reinstatement after requesting
it. (Pl.’s Mot. at 12, 21-22.) He also challenges the statement
that his removal from the patent register was voluntary. (Id. at
21.) The defendants oppose the motion and argue merely that
reconsideration should be denied for Cornish’s failure to discuss
four claims, and to characterize accurately the relevant law and
facts applicable to three others. (See, e.g., Defs.’ Opp. at 2,
4, 11.) The plaintiff filed no reply.
To prevail, Cornish bears the burden of identifying “an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.” Goodman v. Blount, No. 10-5410, 2011 WL
2618214, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2011) (citing Firestone v.
Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). However,
“[m]otions for reconsideration are disfavored[.]” Wright v.
F.B.I., 598 F. Supp. 2d 76, 77 (D.D.C. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The granting of such a motion is
. . . an unusual measure, occurring in extraordinary
circumstances.” Kittner v. Gates, Civil Action No. 09-1245 (GK),
2011 WL 1791233, at *1 (D.D.C. May 11, 2011). Accordingly, the
movant must not “relitigate old matters, or raise arguments or
present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry
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of judgment.” Jung v. Assoc. of Am. Med. Colls., 226 F.R.D. 7, 8
(D.D.C. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The “errors” Cornish cites are all findings supported by the
record. (Pl.’s Mot. at 21-23.) See Cornish, 715 F. Supp. 2d at
59, 62. The findings are not newly available evidence; as
evidence, they are merely newly advanced. Even if Cornish’s
allegations to the contrary constituted newly discovered
evidence, none is “so central to the litigation” as to warrant
reconsideration. Taitz v. Obama, 754 F. Supp. 2d 57, 59 (D.D.C.
2010). Further, Cornish’s motion merely repeats arguments raised
and rejected in the June 4, 2010 memorandum opinion and order.
(See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 11.) His continued failure to plead or
cite to a final agency decision on his reinstatement claim
ordinarily bars review here. Cornish, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 61-62.
He has presented no new law or newly discovered evidence showing
that the material facts of the denial of his reinstatement are in
dispute. See id. at 63. Neither does Cornish present any
persuasive argument that denying his reinstatement denies him the
freedom to speak under the First Amendment. It simply
justifiably prevents him from holding himself out as a registered
patent attorney. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 1-2.) See
also Cornish, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 67. He has identified no
intervening change of controlling law, new evidence, manifest
injustice, or clear legal errors warranting reconsideration of
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the ruling. Finally, Cornish, who sued federal officials in
their official capacities, offers no authority for the
proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable to state
action, is an appropriate vehicle for his claims. (See Def.’s
Opp. at 11.) No intervening law or new evidence demonstrates
“facts that, if proven, would demonstrate that he did not have a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Cornish, 756 F. Supp. 2d at
67, 68. In sum, the plaintiff’s arguments either “lack
sufficient support, ha[ve] already been considered and rejected
by the Court, or raise[] arguments that could have and should
have been made previously.” Owen-Williams v. BB & T Inv.
Services, Inc., Civil Action No. 06-948 (CKK), 2011 WL 2783783,
at *4 (D.D.C. July 18, 2011). None provides a legal basis for
granting reconsideration. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion [97] for reconsideration
be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 27th day of September, 2011.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge