Sampaio v. Inter-American Development Bank ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
)
MARCO AURELIO ROQUE SAMPAIO, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 10-0655 (BAH)
)
INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, )
)
Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion
for appointment of counsel. For the reasons discussed below, defendant’s motion will be
granted, and plaintiff’s motion will be denied as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for the Inter-American Development Bank (“IADB”) in June
2005, and at that time he had an Employment Authorization Card. Compl. at 2-3; see id., Ex. 4
(Employment Authorization Card valid from April 25, 2005 through April 24, 2006). 1 He
obtained a G4 visa on March 16, 2006, id. at 3, and on that same date commenced the first of
four employment contracts, each a Research Fellow position, with the IADB. 2 Id., Ex. 8A
1
Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint [Dkt. #5] and several notices to the court [Dkt.
#11, 19-22]. The basic facts are fully set forth in his original Complaint [Dkt. #1] and the
attached exhibits.
2
An International Organization (G) visa is issued to a diplomat and other government
official for travel to the United States to take up an appointment at a designated international
organization. See http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/types/types_2638.html.
1
(Letter of Agreement dated March 2, 2006). This action arose from the third contract with the
IADB’s Office of Evaluation and Oversight (“OVE Agreement”) for the period from November
1, 2006 through January 31, 2007, id., Ex. 8C (Letter of Agreement dated October 27, 2006), and
the fourth contract with the Modernization of State and Civil Society Programs Division 2
(“RE2/SC2 Agreement”) for the period from February 20, 2007 through December 31, 2007, id.,
Ex. 8D (Letter of Agreement dated February 23, 2007). The IADB’s codes, policies and
procedures governed these contracts, Compl. at 4, and among these guidelines were the Norms
for Research Fellows, id. at 5, assigning responsibility to “the incumbent to obtain the necessary
visa or work permits required by the authorities of the country(ies) in which the services will be
performed for the [IADB].” Id., Ex. 11 (Interim Norms for Contractual Research Fellows) at 5-
6. 3 The contract terms provided that the IADB could terminate the contract at any time for any
reason, as long as it provided 14 days’ notice. Id., Ex. 8C at 2 & Ex. 8D at 3. 4
3
Both the OVE and the RE2/SC2 Agreements contained the following language:
During the term of this Agreement, you will be subject to the
[IADB’s] codes, policies, rules and procedures applicable to the
Research Fellowship Program in effect at the time you are
appointed and as they may be amended during your assignment.
Compl., Ex. 8C at 2 & Ex. 8D at 3.
4
Both the OVE and the RE2/SC2 Agreements contained the following language:
The [IADB] shall have the right to terminate this Agreement for
any reason, at any time prior to the expiration of its term, or prior
to completion of the work hereunder by giving you fourteen (14)
calendar days advance written notice. The [IADB] may terminate
this Agreement without advance notice if you are found
blameworthy of misconduct. In the event of termination, the
[IADB] will make equitable payment to you, within thirty (30)
days from the date of termination, for services satisfactorily
performed to the date of termination . . . . Equitable payment upon
termination shall not exceed the total compensation otherwise
payable to you under this Agreement and shall take into account all
2
Plaintiff’s last day of work at the IADB was March 30, 2007. Compl. at 6; see id., Ex. 16
(Letter to plaintiff from Jorge Sapoznikow dated April 3, 2007). On April 3, 2007, the IADB
notified plaintiff in writing of its intention to terminate the RE2/SC2 Agreement effective April
18, 2007. Id. at 7; see id., Ex. 16. In a memorandum to the IADB’s Ethics Committee, the
reasons for the termination were described as follows:
In the wake of the [RE2/SC2 Agreement, plaintiff] proceeded to
request the renewal of his G4 visa from Mr. Adalberto Bellagamba
of [the Benefits and Payments Section of the Human Resources
Department]. That action was not coordinated with the officer in
charge of contracting at RE2/SC2, Ms. Claudia Valderrama, which
is why she asked [plaintiff] for a copy of the visa form. In the
course of that process, both Mr. Bellagamba and Ms. Valderrama
realized that [plaintiff] had presented a form requesting a visa with
a validity date beyond the date of expiration of his current contract
. . . . In addition, it was determined that under his previous
contract, [the OVE Agreement], specifically for his contract from 1
November 2006 to 31 January 2007, [plaintiff] had sought a G4
visa with an expiration date of 20 April 2007.
Compl., Ex. 18 (Memorandum to Maria Borrero, Ethics Officer, Ethics Committee, from Robert
J. Deal, Jr., Chief, Benefits and Payments Section, Human Resources Department, dated April
17, 2007). 5 “[G]iven that [plaintiff] could present himself as a candidate for hiring in other
units,” Mr. Deal submitted the matter to the Ethics Committee for its “consideration, so as to
payments made to you under this Agreement prior to the date of
termination hereof.
Compl., Ex. 8C at 3 & 8D at 3.
5
The five-member Ethics Committee “is responsible for interpreting, implementing and
enforcing the Code of Ethics of the [IADB].” Compl., Ex. 34 (Procedures for the Ethics
Committee of the Inter-American Development Bank) at 1 (Sec. 100, 102.a). It receives
allegations of Code of Ethics violations and is authorized to “obtain the information needed to
determine whether the Code has been violated through hearings or investigations by the [Office
of Institutional Integrity] or other appropriate mechanisms.” Id., Ex. 34 at 2 (Sec. 103.a.3). If a
Code provision has been violated, the Committee may “impose an administrative sanction,
prescribe remedial action, or recommend disciplinary action to the Vice President for Finance
and Administration [VPF].” Id., Ex. 34 at 3 (Sec. 103.a.5).
3
determine whether there was a violation of the [IADB’s] Code of Ethics and, if appropriate, to
include [related documents] in [plaintiff’s] file.” Id., Ex. 18. Through its Secretary, the Ethics
Committee notified plaintiff of its receipt of “an allegation stating that [he had] falsified [his] G4
visa applications on two occasions,” and that it had “requested an investigation on this matter
from the Department of Institutional Integrity (OII).” 6 Compl., Ex. 24 (Letter to plaintiff from
Maria Borrero, Secretary, Ethics Committee, dated July 3, 2007). 7
The OII’s findings of fact included the following:
13. On February 20, 2007, [plaintiff] was hired as a Research
Fellow by RE2/SC2. The expiration date of this contract . . . was
December 31, 2007.
14. On March 16, 2007, almost a month after signing the
RE2/SC2 contract, [plaintiff] completed a second application for a
G-IV visa. In this application [plaintiff] falsely wrote that the
estimated date of completion of his employment was July 31,
2008.
6
The OII conducts investigations on the Ethics Committee’s behalf. See Compl., Ex. 34 at
7 (Sec. 301.6.a). The OII’s final report, which “include[s] findings of fact as well as a copy of
all supporting evidence on which such findings are based (collectively, the ‘Final Investigation
Report’), shall be submitted to the Committee before it conducts any hearings on an [a]llegation,
and before it makes a final decision in respect of an [a]llegation.” Id., Ex. 34 at 7-8 (Sec.
301.6.b).
7
According to the OII’s findings, on October 17, 2006, plaintiff accepted a temporary
position for the period from October 23, 2006 through February 28, 2007, and signed this OVE
Agreement on October 31, 2006. Compl., Ex. 25 ¶¶ 6, 8. When plaintiff submitted his visa
application to the United States Department of State on October 19, 2006, he indicated that the
estimated contract completion date was April 30, 2007, even though agreement had not been
signed, id., Ex. 25 ¶ 7, “because he was convinced that this then-unsigned contract with OVE
would expire on that date, id., Ex. 25 ¶ 9. The Department of State issued an extension of
plaintiff’s G4 visa through April 30, 2007. Id., Ex. 45 at 6. The OVE Agreement actually was in
effect from November 1, 2006 through January 31, 2007. Id., Ex. 25 ¶ 8. The OII found that
plaintiff’s misrepresentation of the completion date of the OVE Agreement violated the Code of
Ethics. Id., Ex. 25 ¶ 23. Plaintiff attributes the error to a “malicious trick” on the part of OVE
staff, prompting him to apply for a visa on the assumption that his contract would have ended on
April 30, 2007, and purposely “cut[ting] the contract shorter so that [he] would be accused of
requesting a visa with a date longer than the contract end date[] of 31 January 2007.” Pl.’s
Opp’n at 11; see id. at 13-15.
4
15. Instead of following standard procedure by submitting the
visa application to Contract and Budget Assistant Claudia
Valderrama . . . for revision and the subsequent approval by the
Division Chief, [plaintiff] personally delivered it to Benefits and
Visas Officer Bellagamaba . . . .
16. When Valderrama learned that [plaintiff] had bypassed his
Division Chief and had sent his visa application directly to the visa
officer, she requested that [plaintiff] provide her with a copy of the
application. [Plaintiff], however, never complied with the request.
17. Valderrama then requested a copy of [plaintiff]’s visa
application from Bellagamba. Valderrama informed Bellagamba
about the false information contained in [plaintiff’s] application
regarding the termination of his RE2/SC2 contract . . . .
18. Bellagama immediately telephoned [plaintiff]. Using the
speaker function, because Valderrama also was present at the time,
Bellagamba asked [plaintiff] to clarify whether he had another
contract with the [IADB] because . . . according to [IADB]
records, [plaintiff’s] contract was due to expire on December 31,
2007, and [plaintiff’s] visa application indicated his contract was
not due to expire until July 31, 2008. [Plaintiff] falsely informed
Bellagamba that he did, in fact, have another contract . . . .
19. Bellagamba requested that [plaintiff] provide him with a
copy of the contract allegedly expiring in July 2008. [Plaintiff]
agreed to do so the next day. Bellagamba informed OII that
instead of complying, [plaintiff] went to Bellagamba’s office that
same day and asked to change the information in his visa
application. Bellagamba had to deny the request because he had
already submitted the visa application to the Department of State.
19.[ 8] When interviewed, [plaintiff] told OII that he simply made
a mistake when filling out his visa application. He stated that he
was probably just confused about the date because he was planning
to return to Brazil on July 31, 2008.
20. Based on the false information provided by [plaintiff], the
Department of State provided [him] a G-IV visa valid for one year
until March 15, 2008, stating that the consulting contract expired
on July 31, 2008.
8
Two paragraphs had been designated “19” in error. See Compl., Ex. 25 at 4.
5
Compl., Ex. 25 (Final Report of Investigation) ¶¶ 13-20 (references to attachments omitted); see
also id., Ex. 29B (Memorandum to Jorge Sapoznikow from Claudia Valderrama dated March 28,
2007). Based on this information, the OII concluded that there was “sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that [plaintiff] violated the [IADB’s] Code of Ethics on . . . March 16, 2007, when
he knowingly provided false information on his G-IV application[].” Id., Ex. 25 ¶ 22. Plaintiff
“knew that he had signed a contract with (RE2/SC2) only until December 31, 2007, as evidenced
by his efforts to bypass the [IADB’s] visa-application review process,” and he “lied to the
Benefits and Visas Officer when [he] stated that he had another contract . . . that expired on July
31, 2008.” Id., Ex. 25 ¶ 24.
The Ethics Committee held a hearing on September 18, 1997, Compl. at 15-16, during
which plaintiff testified that the visa application submitted for the RE2/SC2 Agreement
contained an incorrect date in error. 9 Id., Ex. 32 (Memorandum to Carlos Hurtado, Vice
President, Finance and Administration, from Alicia Ritchie, Chair, Ethics Committee, dated
October 26, 2007) at 1. The Committee did not find plaintiff’s explanation credible, due in part
to his “familiar[ity] with the [IADB’s] Visa office . . . process and procedures.” Id., Ex. 32 at 1-
2. It stated:
The areas of the Code of Ethics violated by [plaintiff] include: (1)
not providing truthful information; (2) intentional
misrepresentation of information; and, (3) violation of the Core
Value of Integrity.
Based on these violations . . . the Ethics Committee recommends
that [plaintiff] be barred from [IADB] employment for a period of
two years beginning [on October 26, 2007].
9
“A hearing before the [Ethics] Committee . . . shall be held to offer the employee under
view an opportunity to respond to an [a]llegation before the Committee makes a final decision.”
Compl., Ex. 34 at 8 (Sec. 301.7a). The employee may present evidence including witness
testimony and affidavits. Id., Ex. 34 at 8 (Sec. 301.7c).
6
Id., Ex. 32 at 2. The recommendation was accepted by the Vice President for Finance and
Administration (“VPF”), id., Ex. 35 (email to Maria Borrero dated December 20, 2007), and
plaintiff was notified in writing of the Ethics Committee’s decision, id., Ex. 36 (Letter to plaintiff
from Maria Borrero dated February 29, 2008).
Plaintiff appealed to the IADB’s Conciliation Committee, Compl. at 19; see id., Ex. 37-
38 (Complaint Presentation Forms) & Ex. 42 (Letter to plaintiff from Luis M. Bauza, Secretary,
Conciliation Committee, dated July 7, 2008). 10 The Conciliation Committee findings were as
follows:
A. WITH RESPECT TO THE TERMINATION OF YOUR
CONTRACT. The Committee found that your challenge regarding
the termination of the contract had expired 120 calendar days from
the date you were notified of its termination . . . . Therefore, the
Committee will (i) not review the merits of the events leading to
the termination of your contract nor (ii) consider your request for
the suspension of the contested action . . . .
B. WITH RESPECT TO THE 2-YEAR SUSPENSION
DECISION BY THE ADMINISTRATION. This challenge was
timely presented and the Committee reviewed it, but found no
violation of due process (i) in the actions of the Ethics and Conduct
Review Committee or (ii) in the acceptance of its recommendation
by the [VPF].
Based on the afore[]mentioned reasons, the Conciliation
Committee finds no merit in continuing with the claim and
discharges itself of its responsibility in the Case.
10
The Conciliation Committee “hear[s] claims brought by individually and directly affected
employees with respect to any alleged non-observance of the contract of employment, the terms
and conditions of appointment, the [IADB’s] Administrative and Personnel Policies, or, in
general, any claim related to a decision taken by the Administration which directly affects the
individual employee.” Compl., Ex. 44 (PE-326 Staff Rule No. 326 Conciliation Committee) at 1
(Sec. 101). Former IADB employees must “initiate . . . procedures to obtain the administrative
remedies” available through the Conciliation Committee “within one hundred and twenty (120)
calendar days from the date on which they terminated their services with the [IADB].” Id., Ex.
44 at 1 (Sec. 201a).
7
Compl., Ex. 43 (Letter to plaintiff from Luis M. Bauza dated July 16, 2008). Plaintiff availed
himself of an opportunity to seek relief with the IADB’s Administrative Tribunal, id., Ex. 43, a
body charged with “hear[ing] and pass[ing] judgment upon any application by which a staff
member . . . alleges non-observance of his contract of employment or terms and conditions of
appointment,” id., Ex. 46 (Statute of the Administrative Tribunal of the Inter-American
Development Bank) art. 2 § 1. He challenged the termination of the RE2/SC2 Agreement and
the two-year bar on future employment with the IADB. See id. at 22. The Tribunal heard oral
argument on October 29, 2009, id., Ex. 45 (Judgment Case No. 70) at 1, and largely vindicated
plaintiff by overturning the two-year bar on employment and by awarding compensation:
The Tribunal orders:
The annulment of the decision of the VPF of 20 December 2007.
The removal from [plaintiff’s] Personnel File of all documents
related to his G-IV visa renewal applications.
The [IADB] to pay [plaintiff] the sum of US $79,015.68 as
compensation for moral injury to his reputation and to his
prospects of new employment. This amount is determined on the
basis of the two years [plaintiff] was barred form [sic] employment
at the [IADB].
Id., Ex. 45 at 11.
In this action, plaintiff accuses the IADB of “abusing its power, br[eaking] its regulations
in order to deny basic employment rights, . . . conceal[ing] evidence in order to obstruct Justice,
[and] . . . delay[ing] and thwart[ing]” plaintiff’s efforts to use the IADB’s internal grievance
process. Compl. at 1. His claims are directly related to his former employment with the IADB
and arise from the termination of the RE2/SC2 Agreement. Plaintiff demands damages as
compensation for violation of his right to due process, defamation, employment discrimination
based on age, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 27-28.
8
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The IADB moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 13.
Specifically, defendant argues that it is an international organization which is absolutely immune
from suit for any claims arising from an employment relationship. See generally id. at 14-19.
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims, the Court will dismiss
the complaint on this basis and will not address defendant’s alternative arguments for dismissal.
B. Immunity Under the International Organizations Immunities Act
For purposes of the International Organizations Immunities Act (“IOIA”), see 22 U.S.C.
§§ 288-288k, the term “international organization” means “a public international organization in
which the United States participates pursuant to any treaty . . . and which shall have been
designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as being entitled to enjoy the
privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided” in the IOIA. 22 U.S.C. § 288. Established in
1959, the IADB is an international organization the purpose of which is to “contribute to the
acceleration of the process of economic development of the member countries, individually and
collectively.” Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank art. 1§ 1, Apr. 8,
1959, 10 U.S.T. 3029. The President has designated the IADB an international organization, see
Exec. Order No. 10,873, 25 Fed. Reg. 3097 (Apr. 8, 1960); Exec. Order No. 11,019, 27 Fed.
Reg. 4145 (Apr. 27, 1962), and it therefore enjoys the broad privileges and immunities conferred
under the IOIA. See 22 U.S.C. § 283g (“The provisions of . . . article XI, sections 2 to 9, . . . of
9
the agreement shall have full force and effect in the United States.”). 11 It “enjoy[s] the same
immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is enjoyed by foreign governments,
11
In relevant part, Article XI (Status, Immunities and Privileges) of the IADB charter
states:
Section 1. Scope of Article
To enable the [IADB] to fulfill its purpose and the functions with which it
is entrusted, the status, immunities, and privileges set forth in this article shall be
to the [IADB] in the territories of each member.
Section 2. Legal Status
The [IADB] shall possess juridical personality and, in particular, full
capacity:
a) to contract;
b) to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property; and
c) to institute legal proceedings.
Section 3. Judicial Proceedings
Actions may be brought against the [IADB] only in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the territories of a member in which the [IADB] has an office, has
appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service or notice of process, or
has issued or guaranteed securities.
No action shall be brought against the [IADB] by members or persons
acting for or deriving claims from members. However, member countries shall
have recourse to such special procedures to settle controversies between the
[IADB] and its members as may be prescribed in this Agreement, in the by-laws
and regulations of the [IADB] or in contracts entered into with the [IADB].
Property and assets of the [IADB] shall, wheresoever located and by
whomsoever held, be immune from all forms of seizure, attachment or execution
before the delivery of final judgment against the [IADB].
***
Section 10. Implementation
Each member, in accordance with its juridical system, shall take such
action as is necessary to make effective in its own territories the principles set
forth in this article, and shall inform the Bank of the action which it has taken on
the matter.
Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank art. XI1, Apr. 8, 1959, 10
U.S.T. 3029.
10
except to the extent that such [an] organization[] may expressly waive [its] immunity for the
purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The IADB,
then, is absolutely immune from suit with two exceptions: if the IADB expressly waives its
immunity, or if the President of the United States withholds the IADB’s immunity. See 22
U.S.C. §§ 288, 288a(b); see also Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F.2d 619, 613-14 (D.C. Cir.
1983). The President of the United States has not withheld immunity, leaving only one basis for
this Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims – an express waiver by the IADB itself.
The IADB has waived immunity to suits to the extent necessary to further its objectives.
See Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618. For example, the IADB may be sued by a debtor to enforce a
loan agreement, see Lutcher S.A. Celose e Papel v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. Cir.
1967), or for matters arising from “commercial transactions with the outside world” such as
“external relations with its debtors and creditors.” Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618 (emphasis in
original); see also Vila v. Inter-Am. Inv. Corp., 570 F.3d 274, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Allowing
such claims [as unjust enrichment] would mitigate possible hesitancies by independent
consultants to negotiating and entering into formal contracts with the IIC by providing
reassurance that if their agreement or formal contract failed, for whatever reason, they would be
fairly compensated for any benefit they have provided that the IIC has unjustly retained.”), reh’g
en banc denied, 583 F.3d 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 553 F.3d 836, 840-
41 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (finding International Finance Corporation waived immunity from
promissory estoppel and breach of confidentiality claims concerning alleged representations
made during negotiations for sale of its investments to private parties).
Plaintiff attempts to avail himself of this limited waiver of immunity by characterizing
his contractual relationship with the IADB as “participation in work . . . with the ‘outside world’
11
in a commercial setting.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 35 (emphasis in original). He describes his project with
the OVE as the “gathering of data, via computerized research and direct contact with officials in
member countries, to compose the Country Evaluations, which are central to the [IADB’s]
function,” id., and required him to manage a partnership with a consulting firm. Id. Similarly,
plaintiff describes his work with RE2/SC2 as work with the “outside world” to create a database
and conduct research and data analysis pertaining to market conditions in member countries. See
id. at 36. Both contracts, plaintiff argues, “involved work in the commercial-market-place
related to financial activities of the [IADB],” and for both contracts “the visa was issued for
[him] to carryout activities central to the [IADB’s] chartered objective.” Id. A further indication
of contacts with the “outside world,” plaintiff contends, is the requirement of a visa issued by the
State Department, an “outside entity,” which was required in order for plaintiff “to carryout [sic]
activities central to the [IADB’s] chartered objective.” Id.
“One of the most important protections granted to international organizations is immunity
from suits by employees of the organization in actions arising out of the employment
relationship.” Mendaro, 610 F.2d at 615. Such immunity “is rooted in the need to protect
international organizations from unilateral control by a member nation over the activities of the
international organization within its territory.” Id. (citation omitted). For example, the District
of Columbia Circuit “upheld the immunity of the Organization of American States from a suit
brought by employees alleging breach of their employment contracts.” Id. at 616 (citing
Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). It found that “[d]enial of
immunity opens the door to divided decisions of the courts of different member states passing
judgment on the rules, regulations, and decisions of international bodies,” serving to “undercut[]
uniformity in the application of staff rules or regulations” which “would undermine the ability of
12
the organization to function effectively.” Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 35 (footnote omitted).
Lawsuits arising from true commercial transactions “contrast sharply with the harassing
interference noted in Mendaro of allowing a type of employee suit where an organization
operates in many different countries.” Vila, 570 F.3d at 282.
Plaintiff offers no argument or authority to establish that the IADB has waived immunity
with respect to suits filed by employees, or that such suits further the IADB’s purposes. Absent
such a showing, the Court must find that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
claims. See Aguado v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 85 Fed. App’x 776, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (finding that appellant failed to show that a lawsuit furthers the IADB’s objectives so as
to distinguish her claims from other employment disputes); Dujardin v. Int’l Bank for Reconstr.
& Dev., 9 Fed. App’x 19, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (concluding that bank was immune under the IOIA
from defamation suit); Fazzari v. Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 254 F.3d 315, 315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (per
curiam) (finding that plaintiff’s status as a retiree did not distinguish his claim from those that
arise out of an employment relationship); Broadbent, 628 F.2d at 36 (finding that “the
employment disputes between the appellants and OAS were disputes concerning the internal
administrative staff of the Organization,” and absent a waiver of immunity with respect to such
“non-commercial activity,” the appellant’s action had to be dismissed”); see also Atkinson v.
Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1336 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming dismissal of declaratory
judgment action against the IADB on the ground that it is absolutely immune under the IOIA
from garnishment proceedings initiated in order to enforce Maryland court judgments for
alimony and child support).
13
III. CONCLUSION
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, defendant’s motion to dismiss will be
granted. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ Beryl A. Howell
DATE: August 31, 2011 BERYL A HOWELL
United States District Judge
14