Hogan v. Obama ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Jamail J. Hogan, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 09‐2203 (RLW)
)
)
United States Department of Justice, )
)
Defendant. )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this action brought pro se under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552, plaintiff, a federal prisoner, challenges the response of the Department of Justice’s
Executive Office for United States Attorneys (“EOUSA”) to his request for records
pertaining to his criminal prosecution. Defendant, having released responsive records,
moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Upon
consideration of the parties’ submissions and the entire record, the Court will grant in part
and deny in part defendant’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
By letter dated April 19, 2009, plaintiff requested the following records from
EOUSA: “(1) arrest records, (2) investigation and/or investigatory reports, (3) reports or
evidentiary and/or scientific information findings, (4) warrants, and/or detainers, (5) final
and closing investigation reports; and (6) any and /or all information, data, or reports not
otherwise exempt . . . .” In addition, plaintiff wrote as a “Specific Request” “written
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aurthorzation [sic] from the assitance [sic] Attorney General for indictment, criminal
complaint, affidavit, arrest warrent [sic], [and] a copy of my indictment, criminal complaint,
affidavit, and arrest warrant.” Decl. of David Luczynski (“Luczynski Decl.”) [ECF No. 11‐1],
Ex. A. By letter of May 14, 2009, EOUSA informed plaintiff that prior to processing his
request, he would need to provide a notarized example of his signature or a certificate of
identity. It also informed plaintiff that because U.S. Attorney files and records “are
maintained in over one hundred separate offices,” he should “identify the specific [offices]
where you believe records may be located. This would be primarily the district(s) in which
a prosecution . . . occurred.” Id. ¶ 5 & Ex. B at 1. The letter further advised plaintiff that it
constituted the agency’s final action, that he should file a new request after “correct[ing]
the above deficiencies,” and that he could appeal the determination to the Office of
Information Policy (“OIP”). Id. at 2.
On June 4, 2009, EOUSA received a letter from plaintiff dated March 25, 2009, in
which he stated that he was prosecuted in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division,
by “James Muench.” Plaintiff listed the “specific information” sought as: (1) “a copy of the
‘Complaint’ that was filed by prosecutor James Muench requesting an indictment from the
grand jury[;] (2) “a copy of ‘Authorization clearance’ given by the Attorney General
permitting . . . Muench permission to request an indictment against Jamail James Hogan[;]”
(3) “a copy of the indictment[;]” (4) a copy of the grand jury foreman’s letter or Certificate
of Concurrence [] filed [with] the Clerk of Courts[;]” and (5) “a copy of the Grand Jury
Docket Sheet.” Id., Ex. C.
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By letter of August 20, 2009, EOUSA, having treated the latter letter as a new FOIA
request, released “[t]he 8 page indictment . . . in full but for one name of a third party
individual.” Luczynski Decl. ¶ 22. EOUSA withheld the name under FOIA exemption 7(C),
see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), and section (j)(2) of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Luczynski Decl.
¶¶ 17, 20, 22 & Ex. E.1 EOUSA informed plaintiff that “because you were charged by
Indictment, there would not be a complaint filed in your criminal case,” and that “the
district did not locate an arrest warrant or an affidavit.” Ex. E at 1. EOUSA further stated
that “there is no ‘authorization clearance.’ The Grand Jury Foreperson signed the
indictment, however, any other Grand Jury Information is exempt.” Id. at 2. Finally, EOUSA
informed plaintiff that he could appeal the determination to the OIP. Id.
By letter of September 15, 2009, plaintiff lodged his appeal with OIP, claiming that
“[o]ut of everything I requested . . . I only received a copy of my indictment.” Id., Ex. F at 1.
By letter of November 9, 2009, OIP “interpreted” the appeal “as being limited to EOUSA’s
action on six records . . . (1) your indictment; (2) a criminal complaint; (3) the case docket
proceedings; (4) the grand jury docket; (5) an arrest warrant; and (6) an ‘authorization
clearance’ from the Attorney General.” OIP affirmed EOUSA’s action, and noted that
plaintiff had added to his list of requested records “case docket proceedings” that were not
“originally request[ed].” Id., Ex. H at 1. OIP informed plaintiff that he could not expand the
scope of his initial request on appeal and suggested that he submit a new FOIA request for
the case docket proceedings. Id. Plaintiff filed the instant action on November 20, 2009.
1 In the administrative proceedings, EOUSA also invoked FOIA exemption 3 as a basis for
withholding information, see Ex. E at 1, but neither the Luczynski declaration nor any other
declaration mentions this exemption. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant has waived
any reliance upon exemption 3 as a basis for withholding information.
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II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate upon a showing that there is “no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). “[A] material fact is ‘genuine’ . . . if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on an element of the claim. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Factual assertions in the moving party's
affidavits or declarations may be accepted as true unless the opposing party submits his
own affidavits, declarations or documentary evidence to the contrary. Neal v. Kelly, 963
F.2d 453, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1992). “If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or
fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact . . ., the court may . . . grant
summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered
undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The moving
party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The FOIA requires a federal agency to release all records responsive to a properly
submitted request except those protected from disclosure by one or more of nine
enumerated exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), and authorizes the Court only "to enjoin [a
federal] agency from withholding agency records or to order the production of any agency
records improperly withheld from the complainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). In a FOIA
case, the Court may grant summary judgment based solely on information provided in an
agency's affidavits or declarations if they are relatively detailed and when they describe
“the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably specific detail . . .
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and are not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of
agency bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Agency affidavits or declarations are accorded “a presumption of good faith, which cannot
be rebutted by ‘purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other
documents.’ ” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (quoting Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA, 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff does not refute, and therefore has conceded, defendant’s otherwise proper
justification for redacting from one of the released pages the name of a third‐party
individual under FOIA exemption 7(C). See Luczynski Decl. ¶¶ 17‐ 21. As to this single
withholding, the Court finds that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In his opposition to the pending motion, plaintiff argues that defendant and other
non‐parties violated18 U.S.C. § 1623, which is the criminal statute proscribing the making
of false statements before a grand jury or court. Pl.’s Mem. of P. & A Opposing the Def.’s
Summ. J. Mot. (“Pl.’s Mem.”) [ECF No. 13] at 2. Such a claim has nothing to do with an
agency’s withholding of records and, thus, is beyond the scope of this FOIA action. To the
extent that plaintiff is challenging the veracity of the declarants in this action, he has not
created a genuine issue by “point[ing] to evidence sufficient to put the Agency's [presumed]
good faith into doubt.” Ground Saucer Watch, Inc., 692 F.2d at 771.
Plaintiff also challenges the adequacy of defendant’s search for responsive records.
See Pl.’s Mem. at 3. Because an inadequate search for records constitutes an improper
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withholding under the FOIA, see Maydak v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 254 F. Supp.2d 23, 44
(D.D.C. 2003), plaintiff’s challenge of the search is properly before the Court.
An agency is required “to make a good faith effort to conduct a search for the
requested records, using methods which can reasonably be expected to produce the
information requested.” Int’l Trade Overseas, Inc. v. Agency for Intern. Dev., 688 F. Supp. 33,
36 (D.D.C. 1988) (quoting Marrera v. Dep't of Justice, 622 F. Supp. 51, 54 (D.D.C. 1985))
(other citations omitted). In determining the adequacy of a FOIA search, the Court is
guided by principles of reasonableness. Id. (citing Weisberg v. Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d
1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Because the agency is the possessor of the records and is
responsible for conducting the search, the Court may rely on "[a] reasonably detailed
affidavit, setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that
all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched."
Valencia‐Lucena v. United States Coast Guard, 180 F.3d 321, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). "Once the agency has shown that its search was reasonable, the burden shifts to
[the plaintiff] to rebut [the defendant's] evidence by a showing that the search was not
conducted in good faith." Moore v. Aspin, 916 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Miller v.
U.S. Dep't of State, 779 F.2d 1378, 1383 (8th Cir. 1985)). Summary judgment is
inappropriate “if a review of the record raises substantial doubt” about the adequacy of the
search. Valencia‐Lucena , 180 F.3d at 326 (citing Founding Church of Scientology v. Nat’l
Security Agency, 610 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). However, “the [single] fact that a
particular document was not found does not demonstrate the inadequacy of a search.”
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Boyd v. Crim. Div. of U.S. Dept. of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 390 ‐391 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citations
omitted).
According to Luczynski, EOUSA forwarded plaintiff’s request to the Middle District
of Florida because each U.S. Attorney’s Office maintains the files of the cases it prosecutes.
Luczynski Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s criminal case file is “maintained in the Criminal Case File
System . . . entitled United States v. Jamail Hogan.” Id. ¶ 13. Luczynski has supplied the
declaration of Belinda Brown who, as FOIA coordinator for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the
Middle District of Florida, conducted the search for records responsive to plaintiff’s
request. See Brown Decl. [ECF No. 11‐10] ¶¶ 1‐2.
Brown states that she “retrieved [plaintiff’s] criminal docket sheet from LEXIS
Courtlink” and searched the Legal Information Office Network System (LIONS), which
identified the Tampa office as the location of plaintiff’s records. Id. ¶ 4. According to
Brown, “LIONS is the case management/tracking system used by USAOs to record and
maintain up‐to‐date information on cases opened by Assistant U.S. Attorneys . . . and to
produce a variety of reports on that information.” Id. ¶ 4. Brown “physically searched
[plaintiff’s] criminal case file,” for five listed records, and found only the indictment. Id. ¶¶
5‐6. She states that “there was no criminal complaint; no authorization clearance . . . ; no
letter or certificate of concurrence of the grand jury foreperson; and no grand jury docket
sheet.” Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff asserts that he “has submitted proof that an arrest warrant does exist.” Pl.’s
Mem. at 5. This fact alone does not create a triable issue because an agency is required to
produce only those records in its custody and control at the time of the FOIA request.
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McGehee v. CIA, 697 F.2d 1095, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1983). However, Brown does not list the
arrest warrant – listed by OIP as one of six requested records ‐‐ as a record for which she
searched. This omission presents a genuine issue about the adequacy of defendant’s
search. Therefore, the Court will deny defendant’s motion on this issue. See Iturralde v.
Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“ ‘[I]f a review of the record
raises substantial doubt, particularly in view of well defined requests and positive
indications of overlooked materials, summary judgment is inappropriate. ’ ”) (quoting
Valencia‐Lucena, 180 F.3d at 326) (internal quotation marks and other citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on its uncontested withholding of the name of a third‐party individual under
FOIA exemption 7(C). The Court further finds that defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on its search for responsive records. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for
summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part without prejudice. A
separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
________/s/____________
ROBERT L. WILKINS
United States District Judge
Date: August 10, 2011
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