Mohammadi v. Scharfen ( 2009 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ALI MOHAMMADI, :
:
Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-1441 (RMU)
:
v. : Document No.: 12
:
JONATHAN SCHARFEN et al., :
:
Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS’ CONSENT MOTION TO TRANSFER AND DENYING WITHOUT
PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS
I. INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the court on the defendants’ consent motion to transfer and
motion to dismiss which the plaintiff opposes. The plaintiff, Ali Mohammadi, brings suit against
the defendants, Michael Aytes, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”); Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); and
Robert Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), 1 seeking to compel USCIS to
adjudicate the plaintiff’s N-400 application for naturalization. The defendants move to transfer
the case to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (“District of Maryland”
or “transferee district”), or in the alternative, to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
plaintiff consents to the defendants’ motion to transfer. Because the plaintiff could have brought
this suit in the District of Maryland, and considerations of convenience and the interest of justice
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Michael Aytes, the Acting Deputy Director of
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Janet Napolitano, the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, are “automatically substituted” as defendants for their
predecessors, Jonathan Scharfen and Michael Chertoff, respectively.
weigh in favor of transferring the action to that district, the court grants the defendants’ motion
to transfer the case to the District of Maryland. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
The plaintiff has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since November
17, 1983. Compl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 1. On July 20, 2006, he applied for naturalization with USCIS.
Compl. ¶ 10 & Ex. 2. He received a receipt notice from USCIS on July 27, 2006, informing him
that he would be “notified of the date and place of [his] interview when [he was] scheduled by
the local USCIS office” and that he could “expect to be notified within 180 days of this notice.”
Id. In accordance with this notice, the plaintiff maintains that he should have been scheduled for
an interview by January 27, 2007. Id. ¶ 10.
On July 28, 2006, USCIS sent a Fingerprinting Notification to the plaintiff instructing
him to appear at the USCIS Application Center in Wheaton, Maryland on August 16, 2006.
Compl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 3. The plaintiff complied with this request. Id. Frustrated with the delay in
the adjudication of his application for naturalization, the plaintiff enlisted the assistance of
Congressman Chris Van Hollen. Compl. ¶ 12. After inquiring into the status of the plaintiff’s
pending naturalization application, Congressman Van Hollen informed the plaintiff on August 7,
2007 that USCIS had notified him that the plaintiff’s application for naturalization was pending
the completion of background checks. Id. & Ex. 4.
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In light of the transfer, the court does not address the defendants’ motion to dismiss. See
Abusadeh v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2111036, at *1 (D.D.C. July 23, 2007) (declining to address the
defendant’s motion to dismiss “[i]n light of the transfer of venue”); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp.,
104 F. Supp. 2d 48, 58 (D.D.C. 2000) (granting the defendant’s motion to transfer venue and
denying all other pending motions as moot).
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B. Procedural History
On August 19, 2008, the plaintiff filed a complaint with this court. See Compl. The
plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to compel the defendants to “immediately and
forthwith take all appropriate actions to adjudicate” his naturalization application. Id. ¶ 1. When
the plaintiff filed his complaint, he had not yet been scheduled for an interview regarding his
naturalization application, id.; however, the defendants indicate in their motion to transfer, filed
on March 13, 2009, that USCIS notified the plaintiff on January 29, 2009 that he would be
interviewed on February 17, 2009, Defs.’ Mot. at 3 & Ex. 2. The plaintiff alleges that the
defendants have “improperly withheld action and adjudication for over two years.” Compl. ¶ 1.
The court now addresses the defendants’ consent motion to transfer.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) and
Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
When federal jurisdiction is not premised solely on diversity and a defendant is an
officer, employee, or agency of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) controls venue,
establishing that venue is proper in
any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial
part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial
part of property that is the subject of the action is situated, or (3) the plaintiff
resides if no real property is involved in the action.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).
If, upon objection of a party, the court concludes that venue is improper, it may transfer
the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406. In an action where venue is proper, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
nonetheless authorizes a court to transfer a civil action to any other district where it could have
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been brought “for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice[.]” 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Section 1404(a) vests “discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions to
transfer according to an ‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and
fairness.’” Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). Under this statute, the moving party bears the burden of
establishing that transfer is proper. Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Agric., 944 F. Supp. 13, 16
(D.D.C. 1996).
Accordingly, the defendant must make two showings to justify transfer. First, the
defendant must establish that the plaintiff originally could have brought the action in the
proposed transferee district. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622. Second, the defendant must
demonstrate that considerations of convenience and the interest of justice weigh in favor of
transfer to that district. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. As to the second showing, the
statute calls on the court to weigh a number of case-specific private and public-interest factors.
Stewart Org., 487 U.S. at 29. The private-interest considerations include: (1) the plaintiff’s
choice of forum, unless the balance of convenience is strongly in favor of the defendants; (2) the
defendant’s choice of forum; (3) whether the claim arose elsewhere; (4) the convenience of the
parties; (5) the convenience of the witnesses; and (6) the ease of access to sources of proof.
Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d
Cir. 1995); Heller Fin., Inc. v. Riverdale Auto Parts, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (N.D. Ill.
1989); 15 FED. PRAC. & PROC. § 3848). The public-interest considerations include: (1) the
transferee’s familiarity with the governing laws; (2) the relative congestion of the calendars of
the potential transferee and transferor courts; and (3) the local interest in deciding local
controversies at home. Id.
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B. The Court Grants the Defendants’ Consent Motion to Transfer
the Action to the District of Maryland
1. The Plaintiff Could Have Brought this Action in the District of Maryland
The defendants argue and the plaintiff does not contest that the plaintiff could have
brought this case in the District of Maryland because venue in that jurisdiction is proper pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Defs.’ Mot. at 6. In an action brought against an employee of the United
States, venue is proper in any district where a “substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(2). The plaintiff’s naturalization application
was transferred on September 15, 2008 from the Vermont Service Center, which conducts
“initial processing of immigration and naturalization applications,” to the District 6 Baltimore
Office and is “currently pending” before that office. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1 (“Donohue Decl.”) ¶ 4-5.
Additionally, on August 16, 2006, the plaintiff, in compliance with a Fingerprint Notification,
reported to an Application Support Center in Wheaton, Maryland, to have his fingerprints
scanned. Compl. ¶ 11 & Ex. 3. The plaintiff also attended an interview at the District 6
Baltimore office regarding his pending application on February 17, 2009. Donohue Decl. ¶ 6.
Accordingly, because the majority of the events or omissions giving rise to the [plaintiff’s] claim
occurred in Maryland, the plaintiff could have brought suit in the District of Maryland and venue
is proper there. See Aftab v. Gonzalez, 2009 WL 368660, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2009) (holding
that the action could have been brought in the Northern District of Texas because the USCIS
Texas Service Center oversaw the plaintiff’s application adjustment and “took actions in
processing [the plaintiff’s] application by gathering evidence and fingerprints” from the
plaintiff); Al-Ahmed v. Chertoff, 564 F. Supp. 2d 16, 18 (D.D.C. 2008) (determining that because
the “plaintiff was scheduled by [the Fairfax, Virginia USCIS office] for a fingerprint
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appointment and interviewed there in connection with his adjustment of status application,” the
plaintiff could have brought suit in the Eastern District of Virginia).
2. The Balance of Private and Public Interests Favors Transfer
a. Private-Interest Factors
The private interest factors that the court considers include “each party’s choice of forum,
where the claim arose, the convenience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses,
particularly if important witnesses may actually be unavailable to give live testimony in one of
the trial districts, and the availability and ease of access to sources of proof.” Robinson v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2008). Because the plaintiff consents to transfer of
the case, Defs.’ Mot. at 2, 3, and the events giving rise to the claim have occurred in Maryland,
see Compl. & Ex. 3, Defs.’ Mot. at 3, the court “presumes that the convenience of the parties
favors transfer,” Johnson v. Lumenos, 471 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D.D.C. 2007) (considering, as a
result of the plaintiff’s consent to transfer, only the private-interest factors of “convenience of the
witnesses and the ease of access to proof”).
The convenience of the witnesses “is considered only to the extent that the witnesses may
actually be unavailable for trial in one of the fora.” Mahoney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 545 F. Supp. 2d
123, 127 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Brannen v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 403 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94
(D.D.C. 2005)). And there is no indication here that transfer of the case to the District of
Maryland would pose any threat to the potential availability of witnesses. See id. (citing FC Inv.
Group LC v. Lichtenstein, 441 F. Supp. 2d 3, 14 (D.D.C. 2006)) (noting that “[w]ithout evidence
to the contrary, courts assume that witnesses will voluntarily appear”). Additionally, the parties
should have no trouble with respect to access to proof because of the proximity of most of the
events giving rise to the plaintiff’s cause of action to the District of Maryland. See Johnson, 471
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F. Supp. 2d at 78 (concluding that “the parties ought to have ready access to proof” because the
courthouse for the transferee district was “in the same city where the alleged events occurred”).
b. Public-Interest Factors
The court must also evaluate public considerations that are pertinent to the case. See
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Bosworth, 180 F. Supp. 2d 124, 129 (D.D.C. 2001). The
public-interest factors include the transferee district’s familiarity with the governing laws, the
relative congestion of the calendars of the transferee and transferor courts, and the local interest
in deciding local controversies at home. Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 16. With respect to
the first factor, because the plaintiff’s claims are based on federal law, the court recognizes “the
principle that the transferee federal court is competent to decide federal issues correctly.” In re
Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal
citations omitted). Thus, the court has no reason to question the District of Maryland’s ability to
adjudicate the plaintiff’s claims. See Johnson, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (noting that “[t]he
transferee district is, no doubt, familiar with federal law and competent to interpret it”).
Similarly, regarding the second factor, the court has “no reason to believe” that the court
calendars in the District of Maryland are “more or less congested” than those in this court.
Sierra Club v. Flowers, 276 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70 n.6 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Johnson, 471 F.
Supp. 2d at 78 (observing that “[t]he court has no reason to suspect that the Eastern District’s
docket could not accommodate this case”).
Finally, with respect to the third factor, the court acknowledges the “local interest in
having localized controversies decided at home.” Sierra Club, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (quoting
Adams v. Bell, 711 F.2d 161, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). In determining whether a controversy is
local in nature, courts have considered a myriad of factors, including where the decision-making
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processes occur, whether a transfer would result in delay in resolving the case and where the
parties are located. See id. (internal citations omitted). In this case, the defendants maintain that
the District of Maryland “has a local interest in resolving this local controversy at home.” Defs.’
Mot. at 9. Indeed, the plaintiff resides in Maryland and has conducted both his fingerprinting
and his application interview at USCIS offices located in Maryland. See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 11 & Ex.
3; Defs.’ Mot. at 3 & Ex. 2. Additionally, the plaintiff’s application for naturalization is
currently pending before the Baltimore USCIS office and officials there are responsible for
adjudicating his application, Donohue Decl. ¶ 3-4, and there is no evidence that a transfer to the
District of Maryland will delay adjudication of the instant claims. Accordingly, the court holds
that the District of Maryland has a strong local interest in having this matter resolved there.
Trout Unlimited, 944 F. Supp. at 19 (transferring venue because “[a] clear majority of the
operative events took place in Colorado,” and consequently Colorado, instead of the District of
Columbia, had “a substantial interest in the resolution of the claims”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants the defendants’ consent motion to transfer this
action to the District of Maryland. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is
separately and contemporaneously issued this 7th day of April, 2009.
RICARDO M. URBINA
United States District Judge
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