Matthews v. District of Columbia ( 2011 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
______________________________
)
JEFFREY MATTHEWS et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 07-0031 (RWR)
)
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Jeffrey Matthews, Frankie West, and Earline
Hickman sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages and equitable
relief, alleging that the District of Columbia and its Mayor
deprived them of a constitutionally-protected property interest
without due process by terminating their workers’ compensation
benefits without providing them with a post-deprivation hearing
to challenge the termination. The plaintiffs’ claims for
equitable relief were dismissed as moot, and judgment was entered
for the defendants on the claims for damages. See Matthews v.
Dist. of Columbia, 675 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.D.C. 2009). The
plaintiffs now move for reconsideration of that opinion under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Because the plaintiffs
have not shown that the opinion granting the defendants’ motion
to dismiss was clearly erroneous or that denying the motion for
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reconsideration will result in manifest injustice, their motion
will be denied.
DISCUSSION
“‘While the court has considerable discretion in ruling on a
Rule 59(e) motion, the reconsideration and amendment of a
previous order is an unusual measure.’” Berg v. Obama, 656 F.
Supp. 2d 107, 108 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting City of Moundridge v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.R.D. 10, 11-12 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, Civil Action No. 01-731
(RWR), 2007 WL 950082, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2007))). “‘A
motion to alter the judgment need not be granted unless there is
an intervening change of controlling law, new evidence becomes
available, or there is a need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.’” Berg, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 108 (quoting City
of Moundridge, 244 F.R.D. at 12 (quoting Messina v. Krakower, 439
F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
The December 2009 opinion that granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment
held, in relevant part:
The plaintiffs concede that they have now been given
the process they were due and have had their benefits
restored (Pls.’ Cross Mot. at 11), and they fail to
make any argument that there is a reasonable
expectation that the wrong they complain of is likely
to occur again. Instead, they rely on the argument
that their action for actual damages remains live. The
complaint requests “compensatory and pecuniary damages”
for the defendants’ purported deprivations of
plaintiffs’ rights. (Compl. ¶ 38.) . . . . [A]s the
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defendants point out in their motion for summary
judgment, the plaintiffs have presented no evidence
establishing that they suffered actual damages as a
result of the purportedly unconstitutional delay in
providing their post-deprivation due process. The
plaintiffs have made several assertions in their
filings that they did suffer actual injury, but have
come forth with no declarations, affidavits, deposition
testimony, or other admissible evidence of such injury
despite the discovery that has been conducted.
Discovery has closed, the factual record is complete,
and the plaintiffs even agree that the material factual
issues are not disputed. (See Pls.’ Reply at 5.)
Indeed, in moving for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
implicitly concede that there are no disputed facts
that need to be resolved by a trial. . . . With
nothing more in the record beyond mere allegations of
injury in the plaintiffs’ briefs, the plaintiffs have
failed to demonstrate that the purported violation of
their procedural due process rights resulted in actual
damages. Although an alleged “denial of procedural due
process should be actionable for nominal damages,”
Carey, 435 U.S. at 266, the plaintiffs do not even
request nominal damages in their complaint. See Davis
v. Dist. of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal
of the plaintiff’s complaint for damages despite the
possibility that nominal damages could be awarded,
because the complaint requested only statutorily
unavailable compensatory and punitive damages, and
lacked any specific request for nominal damages).
Matthews, 675 F. Supp. 2d at 187-188.
Here, the plaintiffs argue that the opinion was clearly
erroneous because damages may be awarded for violations of
procedural due process absent a finding of actual injury, because
the plaintiffs’ prolonged deprivation of benefits constituted
actual injury, and because damages can be awarded for a violation
of due process. (Pls.’ Mot. for Recons. at 1.)
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In their motion for reconsideration, the plaintiffs do not
address or remedy the flaw that the December 2009 opinion found
fatal in their complaint, namely, the lack of evidence that the
plaintiffs suffered any actual damages as a result of the
purportedly unconstitutional delay in providing their post-
deprivation due process. While the plaintiffs argue that “[t]he
actual injuries caused by [the defendants’] long term and
unexplained deprivation of [the plaintiffs’] disability benefits
are sufficiently obvious to overcome a motion for summary
judgment” (Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. at 9.), the plaintiffs do not
provide any evidence of their injuries nor do they cite any
authority holding that it is improper to dismiss a § 1983 action
where the plaintiff provides absolutely no evidence of actual
damages. “The ‘“. . . basic purpose”’ of § 1983 damages . . .
‘is “to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the
deprivation of constitutional rights.”’ . . . Accordingly, even
where a plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional due
process rights . . . the Supreme Court has . . . ‘held that no
compensatory damages [can] be awarded for violation of [those
rights] absent proof of actual injury.’” Daskalea v. Wash.
Humane Soc’y, 710 F. Supp. 2d 32, 43 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting
Memphis Comm’ty Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986)
and Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254 (1978)) (first alteration
original).
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In addition, the plaintiffs presented the same arguments in
opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment that they present in their motion for reconsideration.
(See Pls.’ Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or for Summ. J. at 12-
17.) “‘[W]here litigants have once battled for the court’s
decision, they should [not be] . . . permitted[] to battle for it
again.’” Hoffman v. Dist. of Columbia, 681 F. Supp. 2d 86, 90
(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Singh v. George Washington Univ., 383 F.
Supp. 2d 99, 101-102 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion for
reconsideration, and stating that “the Court considered the cases
that the [defendant] now cites” and the “attempt to re-litigate
this issue will not be countenanced”)). The plaintiffs have not
met their burden of showing clear error or manifest injustice.
Their motion will be denied.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have not shown clear error or manifest
injustice in the December 2009 opinion entering judgment for the
defendants on the plaintiffs’ claims for damages. Accordingly,
it is hereby
ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion [30] for reconsideration
be, and hereby is, DENIED.
SIGNED this 28th day of March, 2011.
/s/
RICHARD W. ROBERTS
United States District Judge