Utterback v. Geithner ( 2010 )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
CLAYTON UTTERBACK, )
et al., )
)
Petitioners, )
) Civil Action No. 09-2236 (EGS)
v. )
)
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, )
)
Respondent. )
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are respondent’s motion to dismiss,
petitioners’ two motions for summary judgment, petitioners’
motion for judicial notice in support of their motion for summary
judgment, and petitioners’ motion for leave to file an amended
complaint. Upon consideration of the motions, the responses and
replies thereto, the applicable law, the entire record, and for
the reasons set forth below, the respondent’s motion to dismiss
the action is GRANTED, petitioners’ motions for summary judgment
are DENIED, petitioners’ motions for judicial notice in support
of their motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and petitioners’
motion for leave to file an amended complaint is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioners describe themselves as “Clayton Utterback, Ryan
Kirk, James Utterback who use various UCC ALPHA Trade names, i.e.
CLAYTON T. UTTERBACK and other designations to help identify
financial accounts, interests, and for other purposes.” Pet’rs’
Proposed Sec. Am. Compl. ¶ 2. On November 11, 2009, they filed a
petition titled “Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Compel
Performance for Accounting, Account Stated, Unjust Enrichment and
Specific Performance and Probate the Estate,” in which they named
Timothy Geithner, Queen Elizabeth II, and “Does 1 through 50" as
respondents. In response to a motion for a more definite
statement filed by Mr. Geithner, which the Court granted on
February 22, 2010, petitioners filed an Amended Complaint on May
28, 2010, identifying only Mr. Geithner as a respondent. In
their Amended Complaint, petitioners list numerous purported
causes of action including “extension of credit,” “money loaned,”
breach of contract, breach of trust, negligence, conversion,
unjust enrichment, accounting, constructive trust, an action “for
Appoint [sic] Special Master,” declaratory judgment, declaratory
relief, summary judgment on a Uniform Commercial Code claim, and
an action to “remove blocked account status from petitioners’
accounts.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 76-102.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on June 10, 2010
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a), 10(b), and
12(b)(6). Petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on
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July 6, 2010. Both motions are now ripe for review by this
Court.1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 8(a) requires that “[a] pleading that states a claim
for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleadings of pro se parties, such
as petitioners in the instant action, are “to be liberally
construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless,
“although a court will read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint
liberally,” a pro se complaint, no less than any other complaint,
“must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.”
Chandler v. Roche, 215 F. Supp. 2d 166, 168 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing
Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal
sufficiency of a complaint. Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235(D.C. Cir. 2002). A complaint must present “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and “above
the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
1In response to respondent’s motion to dismiss, petitioners
filed a motion to strike the motion to dismiss. The Court treats
this filing as an opposition to the motion to dismiss.
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544 (2007). In considering a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must
construe the complaint “‘liberally in the plaintiff’s favor,’
‘accept[ing] as true all of the factual allegations’” alleged in
the complaint. Aktieselskabet AF 21 November 2001 v. Fame Jeans
Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original)
(quoting Kassem v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 513 F.3d 251 (D.C. Cir.
2008)). Indeed, a plaintiff is entitled to “the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Kowal v.
MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994). A court need
not, however, “accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such
inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint.
Nor must [a] court accept legal conclusions cast in the form of
factual allegations.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
“[O]nly a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief
survives a motion to dismiss.” Id.Summary judgment should be granted only if the moving party
has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
325 (1986); Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F. 3d 989,
991 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A fact is genuine “‘if the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
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nonmoving party.’” Steele v. Schafer, 535 F. 3d 689, 692 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986)). Facts are material if they “‘might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Id. (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). The party seeking summary judgment
bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine
issues of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. In
determining whether a genuine issue of material facts exists, the
Court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986); Keyes v. District of Columbia,
372 F. 3d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2004). “When a motion for summary
judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party may
not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading;
rather, its response must . . . set out specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
Having reviewed the Amended Complaint filed by petitioners,
the Court concludes that petitioners have wholly failed to
provide the “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
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it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 167 (internal citations omitted).
Instead, despite over a dozen lengthy filings by petitioners, the
basis for petitioners’ action against respondent remains somewhat
of a mystery. As best the Court can ascertain, petitioners seek
billions of dollars in compensation from Mr. Geithner and the
Treasury Department based on allegations that petitioners had a
role in the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
Petitioners allege that:
The Federal Reserve Bank increase of FED profits in
2009 amounted to greater than $52.1 Billion dollars, is
[sic] because of special work product program developed
by Petitioners, intervening to prevent the collapse of
the United States Government, putting a floor under
U.S. economy, . . . re-fund the banking system, protect
the FED, and provide ready [sic] available funds for
the Treasury to operate its 2010 budget.
Without the work provided by Petitioners, what would
the Treasury Department have for funds to date at this
point?
What would be the results of a cascading system failure
leading to total collapse cost to restart, if possible
at all?
. . .
The Respondent United States Treasury Department is
holding fees, dividends, earnings, and other unknown
interests of Petitioners in the amount of $1.2 Billion
in service fees generated by Petitioners [sic] work
product which is subject for review.
The United States Treasury Department is holding $46.1
Billion Dollars provided as “interest paid” by the
Federal Reserve System for Petitioner’s work product.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66-70.
The remainder of the Amended Complaint contains equally
disjointed, mostly incoherent, allegations. In addition to
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various allegations regarding “special work product” of an
unspecified nature, petitioners also make unexplained references
to money allegedly loaned or transferred by petitioners to
respondent. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 44 (“On or about the date of
September 29, 2008, Petitioners entered into an [sic] security
agreement and contracted for services in form and substances
[sic] sufficient to be accepted for deposit with the Respondents
office the Department of the Treasury . . . and did contract with
Petitioners in relation to 15 U.S.C. Rules for securities and
safe keeping of funds for later transfer and ultimate
distribution of portion of Credit returned. . . .”); Am. Compl.
¶ 77 (“Petitioners state the fact that Respondent accepted Money
loaned by processing instruments from Petitioners and has not
accounted for the interest and dividends due Petitioners for the
money loaned.”). Petitioners, however, fail to identify any
actual security agreements or contracts between petitioners and
respondent.
Petitioners also allege in the Amended Complaint that
injunctive relief is appropriate because “[i]njury to Petitioners
by injection of large or small size implants are objectionable
and repugnant to Petitioners . . . [and] the injunction
preventing the implantation would not substantially interfere
with public policy. That using a large (huge) needle and
inserting a computer bio chip into the arm, hand, or other parts
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of the body penetrating the skin, resulting in a puncture wound
is an injury to the tissue which Petitioners consider another
large breach of trust.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 122-123.
The Court concludes that petitioners allegations fail to
present a claim on which the Court can grant relief or that would
suffice to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (“A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (internal
quotations omitted)). Accordingly, respondent’s motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED, and petitioners’
motions for summary judgment are DENIED. Petitioners request for
judicial notice in support of their summary judgment motion is
also DENIED.
B. Petitioners’ Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint
Petitioners filed a motion for leave to amend their
complaint on August 16, 2010. The proposed second amended
complaint is titled “Aggrieved Party’s First Amended In Rem
Complaint Action for Declaratory and Other Relief.”2
2
Although petitioners already filed an Amended Complaint,
petitioners sought leave to file a “First Amended Complaint.” To
avoid confusion, the Court will refer to this new filing as the
proposed second amended complaint.
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Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a party may amend its pleading once “as a matter of course”
within certain time frames not relevant to the instant action,
and “[i]n all other cases a party may amend its pleading only
with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). It is
appropriate for a Court to grant leave to amend unless there is
“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the
movant, repeated failure to cure deficience by amendments
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by
virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of
amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where an amendment would not survive a
motion to dismiss, a court may deny leave to amend based on
futility. James Madison Ltd. v. Ludwig, 82 F.3d 1085, 1099 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
The proposed second amended complaint is no more coherent
than the first one. It consists of 70 pages of additional,
rambling assertions on various topics that fail to shed any
further light on the basis of petitioners’ claims. See, e.g.,
Second Am. Compl. ¶14-15 (“Aggrieved parties states [sic] a claim
upon which relief can be granted and has expressly demanded the
audit on the accounting owed by respondent to Aggrieved parties.
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Aggrieved parties transactions may related to Bookkeeping Only
Entry data media storage held by respondent or his
Agents. . . .”); Second Am. Compl. ¶ 90 (“Aggrieved parties state
the fact Respondent used money loaned by processing instruments
from Aggrieved parties, but has not accounted for the interest,
dividends, fees, discounted principle credit, other benefits
which are ‘hidden’ and ‘secreted away’ by respondent’s operatives
who work outside the law (dishonor), towards opposite ends of
justice to the detriment of the beneficiaries . . . .”). Nor
does petitioners’ motion for leave to amend provide the Court
with any understanding of what petitioners’ believe to be the
reason an amendment is necessary. Instead, the motion consists
of little more than a garbled recitation of petitioners’
understanding of various legal standards.
The proposed second amended complaint, like the first, fails
to provide a statement of a claim that would entitle the
petitioners to relief, and therefore would not survive a motion
to dismiss. Accordingly, petitioners’ motion for leave to file
the proposed second amended complaint is DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that
respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED; petitioners’ motions
for summary judgment are DENIED; petitioners’ motion for judicial
notice in support of their motion for summary judgment is DENIED;
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and petitioners’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint is
DENIED. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
December 9, 2010
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